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A B S T R A C T 
The thesis I s an attempt to give a d e t a i l e d h i s t o r i c a l 
n a r r a t i v e of a series of nego t i a t i o n s between the U.S. and the 
U.K. during the period 19^1 - 19*+5• I t i s an analysis of the 
p o l i t i c a l controversies which arose between the two countries 
over economic issues. There are three main aims to the st o r y . 
One i s to el u c i d a t e the reasons f o r the economic p o l i c i e s pursued 
by the two cou n t r i e s , the second i s the explanation o f the 
m o d i f i c a t i o n of such p o l i c i e s and the t h i r d i s to account f o r 
the subtle s h i f t s i n bargaining t a c t i c s . 
The account i s di v i d e d i n t o s i x chapters. The f i r s t chapter 
deals w i t h a number o f issues i n an attempt to i n d i c a t e some o f 
the d i f f e r e n c e between the two countries over economic p o l i c i e s , 
The chapter includes b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n s of the i n t r o d u c t i o n , 
by B r i t a i n , o f economic co n t r o l s and her ea r l y attempts to finance 
the war e f f o r t , the A t l a n t i c Conference of 1 9^ -1 and U.S.-U.K. 
ta l k s on a supplement to the 1938 trade agreement. The second 
chapter covers the consideration f o r Lend-Lease t a l k s , and 
chapters three and fou r the n e g o t i a t i o n s to e s t a b l i s h the I.M.F. 
The f i f t h chapter deals w i t h Anglo-American commercial t a l k s and 
B r i t i s h attempts to have The Export White Paper of 19^1 super-
seded. The f i n a l chapter deals w i t h a wide range o f economic 
t a l k s and culminates i n a d e t a i l e d analysis of the t a l k s which 
r e s u l t e d i n the U.S.-U.K. F i n a n c i a l Agreement of 19^6. 
The n a r r a t i v e has been constructed p r i m a r i l y on the basis 
of d i p l o m a t i c correspondence, cabinet and departmental papers 
from the P.R.O. I have also used 'The Foreign Relations o f the 
U.S.1, Hansard, the Congressional Record, both U.S. and U.K. 
government papers, and an extensive range of autobiographies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The f o l l o w i n g i s an attempt to give an account o f what 
happened w i t h regard to the politico-economic r e l a t i o n s 
between the U.S. and the U.K. during the period 
The approach I have adopted was chosen a f t e r c a r e f u l consider-
a t i o n , f o r other accounts have been w r i t t e n about t h i s period 
and subject matter, though i n a d i f f e r e n t manner and w i t h 
somewhat d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s . Thus two questions a r i s e : what 
does t h i s account purport to explain? and what claims to t r u t h 
does i t have? 
Before embarking upon t h i s work I had read a number of 
accounts p u r p o r t i n g to e x p l a i n the p o l i t i c s and the nature o f 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Many o f them l e f t me 
puzzled and w i t h the nagging f e e l i n g t h a t the past events 
r e f e r r e d to had not been explained, but that a p a r t i c u l a r type 
o f s i g n i f i c a n c e had been placed upon them. This i s not the 
place to go i n t o a d e t a i l e d epistemological argument concerning 
the nature o f the explanation o f past events and how the l o g i c 
o f such an explanation undermines many o f the methods c u r r e n t l y 
used. However, my claim that many w r i t e r s are more concerned 
w i t h c o n f e r r i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e r a t h e r than e x p l a i n i n g or g i v i n g 
an account of something does r e q u i r e some j u s t i f i c a t i o n before 
I discuss the s u b s t a n t i a l part of the account.^ ^  
( 1 ) For example, compare 'The P o l i t i c s o f War-Allied Diplomacy 
and The World C r i s i s of l ^ - ^ ' , G abriel Kolko, Weidenfeld 
and Nlcolson, London 1969, w i t h 'Post-war Foreign P o l i c y 
Preparation 1939-L+5'j Notter, H.A. and associates, 
Department o f State Pub .3580, 1950, and'Roosevelt and 
Hopkins - An I n t i m a t e H i s t o r y 1 , Sherwood, R.E., Harper Bros., 
U.S.A., 
i 
I t would be in a p p r o p r i a t e and i t would take too long to 
i l l u s t r a t e f u l l y the general a p p l i c a t i o n s o f ray claim. 
Instead I s h a l l t r y to i n d i c a t e what I mean by reference to 
accounts o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic r e l a t i o n s by neo-Marxists. 
A neo-Marxist 'explanation' i s s i m i l a r to any other 
i d e o l o g i c a l account, and i n many respects to the deployment 
of conceptual schemes, i n t h a t the ideologue b r i n g s to the 
corpus of h i s t o r i c a l "evidence" preconceived notions o f 
s i g n i f i c a n c e which are independent o f any p a r t i c u l a r evidence. 
I n t h i s s p e c i f i c case the assumptions are: the primacy o f 
economic forces i n human a f f a i r s , the xieed f o r c a p i t a l i s m to 
expand, the need to i n v e s t excess c a p i t a l to the detriment of 
lesser developed or n o n - c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , the e x p l o i t a t i v e 
nature of such c a p i t a l and f i n a l l y , the i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f 
p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r y leading to violence. Such r i v a l r y occurs 
between the c a p i t a l i s t powers i f one adheres to Lenin's 
(2 ) 
'Imperialism: The Highest Stage o f Capitalism', or between 
the developed and non-developed countries i n accordance w i t h 
more recent neo-Marxist views. 
The ideologue i s concerned w i t h a n o t i o n o f t r u t h which 
consists o f a s s e r t i n g atemporal c r i t e r i a i n order to i n t e r p r e t 
experience and events as s i g n i f i c a n t or i r r e l e v a n t . Such an 
ev a l u a t i o n i s based not on an h i s t o r i c a l understanding i n terms 
of evidence of the past, but by the values and assumptions 
inherent i n the ideology to which he adheres. Consequently, 
only past "evidence" which i l l u s t r a t e s and "s u b s t a n t i a t e s " the 
(2 ) I n t e r n a t i o n a l Publishers, N.Y., 1939. 
i i 
values and notions of s i g n i f i c a n c e of the ideology i s r e l e v a n t . 
There i s no reference to c r i t e r i o n which i s e x t e r n a l to the 
assumptions of the argument to t e s t i t s t r u t h . E s t a b l i s h i n g 
s i g n i f i c a n c e becomes a c i r c u l a r argument; i t i s no longer i n 
any way dependent upon evidence. I n t h i s context t r u t h i s not 
a t e s t a b l e n o t i o n . One i s required to accept the assumptions 
of the ideologue as ' t r u e 1 , again without reference to any 
independent c r i t e r i o n , before one can accept the " t r u t h " of any 
i d e o l o g i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n . This appears to be a dependence on 
the p r i v a t e language of a closed conceptual system, and, as 
such, i s not conducive to the generation o f knowledge. 
This n o t i o n o f the conferment of s i g n i f i c a n c e i s c e n t r a l 
to i d e o l o g i c a l thought. This stems from the b e l i e f i n the t r u t h 
o f c e r t a i n assumptions th a t are made about the development of 
s o c i e t y and the nature of man. Such assumptions are used i n 
i d e o l o g i c a l claims to profess a knowledge of an e s s e n t i a l i s t 
r e a l i t y . For example, the Marxist claim t h a t the ' r e a l ' causes 
of war are economic and the ' r e a l ' h i s t o r y o f man i s the 
h i s t o r y of class warfare. More s p e c i f i c a l l y G a b riel Kolko's 
claims t h a t economic considerations were the major deciding 
f a c t o r s i n American war-time decision-making, and h i s 
r e i f i c a t i o n o f the American n a t i o n as a r u t h l e s s expansionist 
c a p i t a l i s t w i t h a w i l l of i t s own, which even d i c t a t e d the 
decisions o f p o l i c y makers to f u r t h e r such ends, without 
conscious knowledge of what they were r e a l l y doing. 
i i i 
For example, Kolko makes the f o l l o w i n g claims;-
"... the United States d i d not simply wish to r e p a i r 
the pre-war world economy, but to r e c o n s t r u c t i t 
anew. There was a remarkable unanimity i n Washington 
on t h i s o b j e c t i v e , ..." 
and J-
"... throughout the war H u l l shared the basic 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the f o r m u l a t i o n o f economic peace 
aims, on which everyone i n Washington agreed i n 
p r i n c i p l e , and o f p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s , on which there 
was more dispute and th e r e f o r e many counter-pressures 
to H u l l f s advice." (3) 
Such assertions o f unanimity and the agreement of everyone 
i n p r i n c i p l e are remarkable claims i n themselves ,but even 
more remarkable i s the f a c t t h a t Kolko nowhere demonstrates 
such claims by d e t a i l e d reference to evidence. A clue to 
understanding why t h i s i s so l i e s i n the second q u o t a t i o n where 
Kolko makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between the economic and the 
p o l i t i c a l . P o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s are seen as i n c i d e n t a l 
nuisances which cause minor hiccups i n the execution o f America's 
grand economic s t r a t e g y . ' P o l i t i c s ' has to be relegated to such 
a secondary p o s i t i o n because o f the t h e o r e t i c a l explanation 
Kolko has adopted. The U.S. as a c a p i t a l i s t n a t i o n has c e r t a i n 
needs which are met by government d e c i s i o n makers. They have 
to act i n accordance w i t h the nature o f the s t a t e . Thus 
p o l i t i c s i n terms o f reasons people give f o r t h e i r actions and 
p o l i c i e s , and c o n f l i c t s between such stated points o f view only 
have the semblance o f r e a l i t y . For the i d e o l o g i c a l l y i n i t i a t e d 
i t i s possiDle to see through t h i s to the r e a l nature and the 
r e a l forces at work i n America. Thus Kolko can assert the 
unanimity of aim and the u n i v e r s a l agreement i n p r i n c i p l e o f 
(3 ) See Kolko, Op.Cit. pp.2^5 and 2M*. 
i v 
American d e c i s i o n makers to an expansionist and c a p i t a l i s t 
economic p o l i c y . Such an explanation i s e n t a i l e d by the method 
of explanation he had adopted. His claims are not based on 
evidence but on an assumption concerning the a l l - p e r v a d i n g 
importance end e f f e c t i v e n e s s of economic forces. A l i b e r a l 
might appeal to other f a c t o r s but these, i n a sense, are 
i r r e l e v a n t because they have no place i n the chosen code of 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . They do not have a place i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of events which i s imposed by the Marxist ideology. 
I n b r i e f my main o b j e c t i o n to Kolko i s t h a t he uses 
extreme r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s . Extreme because he imposes upon 
the i n d i v i d u a l actors a sub-conscious r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e i r actions 
derived from h i s b e l i e f s concerning the e s s e n t i a l nature o f the 
American s t a t e , i . e . that i t i s an aggressively expansionist 
c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e . Such assumptions f u r t h e r subsume causal 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the nature of the state and the actions 
of i n d i v i d u a l actors w i t h i n the s t a t e . This i s an a p p l i c a t i o n 
of the Marxist theory t h a t actions are p r i m o r i l y determined 
by economic forces. The problem which arises i n Kolko's 
argument i s , how does one e s t a b l i s h or t e s t the t r u t h o f what 
he says, i . e . t h a t members of the American Government acted, 
w i t h or without f u l l r e a l i s a t i o n , i n accordance w i t h the 
e s s e n t i a l c a p i t a l i s t i c nature of the U.S. State? There i s no 
problem f o r Kolko because the explanation i s causal i n nature-, 
by t h i s I mean given t h a t the nature of the U.S. was as Kolko 
claims i t to have been, then there was no other way i n which 
those responsible f o r p o l i c y decisions could have acted. 
This i s a t h e o r e t i c a l , atemporal explanation, more concerned 
w i t h the nature of r e l a t i o n s h i p s or c e r t a i n categories of events, 
rather than w i t h e x p l a i n i n g any p a r t i c u l a r event. 
v 
The "explanation" deals i n g e n e r a l i t i e s , with the actions of 
the actors being explained through r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s . There 
i s no appeal to s p e c i f i c evidence o f reasoning to discover why 
people acted the way they d i d . 
Kolko i s not r e a l l y concerned w i t h the s p e c i f i c s o f what 
happened. He i s concerned w i t h answering more general questions, 
f o r example, why the Americans t r i e d to undermine B r i t a i n ' s 
monetary and trade position,, But the general or high l e v e l 
questions are themselves answered i n general terras - witness the 
use o f the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n t h a t American o f f i c i a l s acted i n 
accordance w i t h the c a p i t a l i s t nature o f American s o c i e t y , 
whether they were aware o f i t or not. This, i n Kolko's terms, 
allows one to avoid i n v e s t i g a t i n g whatever reasons an 
i n d i v i d u a l might claim he has f o r h i s actions. The r a t i o n a l i s a t -
i o n renders such reasons vacuous; they are not " r e a l reasons". 
"Real reasons" have to be i n accordance w i t h the nature o f the 
state's economic system. Thus there i s nothing independent o f 
Kolko's t h e o r e t i c a l argument to which reference might be made 
to t e s t the t r u t h o f h i s claims. As I suggested above, t h i s i s 
a case o f b r i n g i n g to the corpus of evidence o f the past 
preconceived notions of s i g n i f i c a n c e . This exercise i s not 
concerned w i t h what a c t u a l l y happened because the notions o f 
s i g n i f i c a n c e render much of t h i s i r r e l e v a n t . I t i s concerned 
to confer or r e i n f o r c e the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the nature of c e r t a i n 
past events. 
Kolko's work, and s i m i l a r works which employ conceptual 
schemes or t h e o r i e s , ground t h e i r ideas of i n t e r p r e t i v e 
s i g n i f i c a n c e not upon what happened i n terms of the reasons 
p r o f e r r e d by actors w i t h i n time and space dimensions. They 
base such ideas upon an i n t r o s p e c t i v e , i n t u i t i v e claim to 
v i 
understand the e s s e n t i a l nature o f types o f p o l i t i c a l systems 
or orders o f society. This understanding allows a causal 
explanation to be o f f e r e d of why things and actions occur as 
they do. For the a c t o r s , i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r understanding 
of the s i t u a t i o n , must act i n accordance w i t h c e r t a i n a l l -
pervasive f a c t o r s . A l l - p e r v a s i v e t h a t i s w i t h i n the bounds o f 
what i s deemed to be s i g n i f i c a n t by the t h e o r e t i c a l assumptions 
of the argument. Reasons which do not conform w i t h such 
assumptions are rendered i r r e l e v a n t by r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s . These 
conform to the t h e o r e t i c a l precepts. Consequently, appeals to 
evidence of what happened can also be dismissed as i r r e l e v a n t , 
unless they i l l u s t r a t e the argument put forward. I n short, 
evidence does not c o n s t i t u t e an I n t e g r a l part of the explanation. 
I t may be used to i l l u s t r a t e the explanation put forward, but i t 
i n no sense demonstrates i t . 
The present work does not address i t s e l f to the same ki n d 
of questions that Kolko has concerned himself w i t h , I am 
p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h answering the questions what happened? 
and how p a r t i c u l a r states of a f f a i r s came about i n terms o f 
evidence of reasons people gave f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s . This 
explanation i s not causal i n nature. I t i s not an attempt to 
e s t a b l i s h necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s , to e x p l a i n why 
thin g s happened as they d i d . A reason g i v i n g account cannot 
do t h i s . For example, i f a son k i l l e d h i s f a t h e r and was asked 
why he did t h i s , he might o f f e r the reasons t h a t h i s f a t h e r had 
u n f a i r l y taken money o f f hlra, c r u e l l y beat him, etc. However, 
t h i s could not be regarded as a causal explanation o f why he 
k i l l e d h i s f a t h e r as we can imagine boys undergoing s i m i l a r 
experiences without the outcome being the murder of t h e i r f a t h e r s . 
v i i 
A Freudian psychologist might o f f e r a d i f f e r e n t explanation 
by saying the murder was caused by an extreme Oedipus Complex, 
a concept which purports to e x p l a i n a state of mind. Further-
more, as the son suffered from such an extreme case o f 
Oedipus Complex the only possible course of a c t i o n was the 
murder of the f a t h e r by the son. Thus the reasons the boy gives 
are not " r e a l reasons", h i s subconscious hatred brought about by 
the f a t h e r and son's r i v a l r y f o r the mother's a f f e c t i o n was 
the " r e a l cause". I am not too concerned here w i t h e s t a b l i s h i n g 
the appropriateness of such causal explanations, I simply wish 
to I n d i c a t e t h a t the why question, when used i n t h i s causal 
manner, i s not a question w i t h which I have concerned myself. 
Answers to the question, why d i d x act i n such a manner? i s 
only answered i n terms of adducing evidence o f reasons f o r 
ac t i o n s o f f e r e d by the actors at the time p a r t i c u l a r actions 
and events occurred. Though as we s h a l l see i n the concluding 
part o f the i n t r o d u c t i o n , when I come to discuss the problem 
concerning sources o f evidence, t h i s has to be modified somewhat. 
What I have t r i e d to do i s to construct a n a r r a t i v e account 
i n accordance w i t h evidence o f the past. There i s no claim to 
an understanding of the e s s e n t i a l nature o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between the U.S. and the U.K. I n works l i k e Kolko's there 
appears to be a lacunae i n the type o f explanation put forward. 
How can one j u s t i f y the i m p o s i t i o n o f a c r i t e r i o n of s i g n i f i c a n c e 
on past events without knowing or addressing oneself to the 
problem o f what happened? As I hope I have shown, t h i s depends 
on a claim to an e s s e n t i a l i s t understanding o f the past, w i t h i n 
which a large part of the corpus o f h i s t o r i c a l evidence becomes 
i r r e l e v a n t . Thus authors l i k e Kolko may give the impression 
v i i i 
that they have t o l d us what happened, but t h i s s t r i c t l y 
speaking i s not t h e i r primary concern. My primary concern 
i s to t e l l what happened. I would l i k e to consider b r i e f l y 
the way I have attempted to do t h i s and how i t d i f f e r s from 
the exercise described above, 
I have characterised Kolko's work i n terms o f es s e n t i a l i s m 
anachronisms and r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s w i t h i n a quasi-Marxist theory. 
The present account might be characterised as the a n t i t h e s i s of 
t h i s . The account i s n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l and consists o f adducing 
evidence both of reasoning and o f events and actions to 
construct a coherent story of what happened. My concern i s w i t h 
d e t a i l e d evidence o f reasoning i n order to present an 
explanation i n these terms. Thus statements made i n the account 
are t e s t a b l e by reference to evidence. I n Kolko's work, as I 
have i n d i c a t e d , i t i s impossible to t e s t the thesis that 
American diplomats acted i n accordance w i t h c e r t a i n forces which 
were present i n American society d u r i n g the war. There i s 
nothing independent of the argument to which reference may be 
made. The only courses open to one are e i t h e r to challenge 
or accept the premises of the argument. I n the type of account 
I have produced one can r e f e r to evidence to t e s t , modify and 
c o r r e c t statements. 
An example o f the a b i l i t y to t e s t and c o r r e c t the type o f 
statements I am o f f e r i n g occurs i n chapter f i v e . The example 
concerns the Cairo Conference and the date on which C h u r c h i l l 
and Roosevelt discussed B r i t a i n ' s monetary reserve p o s i t i o n . 
On March 9, 1 9 ^ , C h u r c h i l l , i n a l e t t e r to Roosevelt, r e f e r s 
to December 8, 19^3, as the date on which he and Roosevelt 
discussed the reserve problem. Wheeler Bennett has pointed out 
i x 
that i t was impossible f o r the t a l k s to have taken place on 
that date as iioosevelt l e f t Cairo on December 7. Wheeler 
3ennett does not go on to e x p l a i n what had happened to b r i n g 
t h i s obvious e r r o r about. I f we want to know what happened, 
what avenues are open to us? 
I f we s c r u t i n i s e documentary evidence we discover t h a t 
John Anderson received a l e t t e r from C h u r c h i l l i n December 19*+3» 
dated December 8, which concerned the t a l k s w i t h F.D.R. on 
B r i t a i n ' s reserve p o s i t i o n . The March 1 9M+ l e t t e r to Roosevelt 
was i n f a c t d r a f t e d by Anderson and he simply assumed that as 
C h u r c h i l l 1 s account of the t a l k s was dated December 8, t h a t t h i s 
was also the day on which the t a l k s had taken place. As the l e t t e r 
was w r i t t e n three months a f t e r the event C h u r c h i l l d i d not 
notice the inaccurate date and so i t was sent o f f uncorrected. 
I t i s f a i r l y obvious that n e i t h e r an e s s e n t i a l i s t knowledge o f 
r e a l i t y nor the deployment of causal notions concerning the 
force of economic f a c t o r s could answer such a s p e c i f i c question. 
One might argue, and perhaps r i g h t l y , s o , t h a t t h i s appears 
a t r i v i a l example. However, the example may indeed be t r i v i a l 
i n substance but not i n i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s . I t may be pointed 
out t h a t the evidence presented does not conclusively 
substantiate my account of what happened. There i s a c e r t a i n 
degree of speculation; f o r example, the suggestion t h a t the 
time lapse between the o r i g i n a l t a l k s and the March l e t t e r was 
the reason why C h u r c h i l l d i d not no t i c e that December 8 was an 
inaccurate time reference. Nevertheless, the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of 
p a r t i c u l a r source materials has introduced Anderson as a 
necessary f a c t o r to take i n t o c onsideration when t r y i n g to 
d i s c e r n 'what happened* to b r i n g about the e r r o r . This, and 
evidence of what he d i d , i . e . d r a f t i n g the l e t t e r , I s surely 
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o f c r u c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i f we are to present a p l a u s i b l e 
account of what happened. Furthermore, we may see th a t the 
possible c r i t i c i s m of an h i s t o r i a n addressing himself to the 
question 'what' r a t h e r than 'why' i s not so clear cut. ' By 
g i v i n g an account o f what happened, the question why was 
there a mistake as to the date of the o r i g i n a l t a l k s ? becomes 
redundant. The problem has been resolved by g i v i n g an account 
of what happened. I do not claim t h a t t h i s i s always the 
case by any means, but do want to emphasise the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of some the general points raised by the example. What happened 
can be ascertained by reference to the evidence, though 'what 
happened 1 may always be part of an incomplete p i c t u r e which has 
to be made i n t o a coherent story by r e s o r t i n g to inferences 
from the evidence. This i s not a r e s o r t to a methodological 
s l e i g h t of hand. Inferences must be p l a u s i b l e and not made i n 
avoidance of evidence. I t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to define a 
'plausible inference' and indeed i t i s perhaps one of those 
notions that does not lend i t s e l f to more precise d e f i n i t i o n . 
However, a p l a u s i b l e inference i s something which I believe i s 
r e a d i l y recognisable, f o r example, the one r e f e r r e d to above 
concerning C h u r c h i l l ' s f a i l u r e to not i c e the i n c o r r e c t time 
reference. I f an inference i s not r e a d i l y recognisable as 
p l a u s i b l e , then the i n t e l l e c t u a l r i g o u r of the h i s t o r i c a l 
account must be placed i n question. 
Thus the point o f the example i s to i l l u s t r a t e how the 
t r u t h of what happened can be established - how we can 
formulate statements about past events and substantiate by 
reference to evidence, and how p l a u s i b l e inferences may be 
drawn from evidence to help construct a coherent s t o r y . This 
i s not a f u r t h e r c r i t i c i s m of the work of Kolko, f o r t h i s i s 
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not the sor t o f e x p l a n a t i o n KoLko i s seeking to g i v e . I t i s 
i n no sense a f u r t h e r challenge to h i s work, bu t an i l l u s t r a t i o n 
tha t h i s exp lana t ion and ray account d i f f e r r a d i c a l l y . 
Thus the account o f f e r e d i s not dependent upon anachron i s t i c 
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s out i s r e f e r a b l e to evidence o f reasons f o r 
ac t ions o f f e r e d a t the t ime . Consequently, i t i s p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c 
i n nature and does not r e l y on theory nor on g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s 
apar t f rom those o f a d e s c r i p t i v e na tu re . The accusa t ion tha t 
an account o f t h i s nature i s 1 theory laden 1 and uses ' g ene ra l -
i s a t i o n s 1 o f necess i ty , i s not w e l l founded. The use o f terms 
such as government, Fore ign O f f i c e , ba rga in ing s i t u a t i o n , are 
s imply used i n a d e s c r i p t i v e sense. They r e f e r to a d e t a i l e d 
account o f p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s . 'A ba rga in ing s i t u a t i o n 1 f o r 
example, i s s imply used as a shorthand way o f r e f e r r i n g to a 
whole ser ies o f events and n e g o t i a t i o n s which have been 
descr ibed and accounted f o r p r e v i o u s l y . The words are used 
d e s c r i p t i v e l y as we understand them i n i n t e l l i g e n t everyday 
conversa t ion . There i s no c la im t h a t the terms government or 
i n s t i t u t i o n r e f e r to anyth ing o ther than what a c t u a l l y goes on 
w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r government or i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h i n time and 
space. 
Thus what I have t r i e d to do i s to give a t rue account 
o f the po l i t i co -economic nego t i a t i ons between the U.S. and 
the U.K. i n terms o f evidence which i s a v a i l a b l e to i n d i c a t e 
what reasons views and ideas were a c t u a l l y he ld at the time by 
the ac tors i n v o l v e d . As w i l l be seen, t h i s i nvo lves a very 
d e t a i l e d study o f large amounts o f documentary evidence. This 
r a i s e s some f u r t h e r problems o f a more p r a c t i c a l nature w i t h 
regard to Judgements about c o n f l i c t i n g evidence and primary and 
secondary source m a t e r i a l . However, I s h a l l say more on t h i s 
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i n the l a s t s ec t i on o f the i n t r o d u c t i o n . For the time being 
I would l i k e to t u r n to the s u b s t a n t i a l nature o f the thes i s 
and the problems I have t r i e d to answer. 
A major con ten t ion o f the account i s tha t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
agreements concerned w i t h economic Issues , d u r i n g the war, were 
p r i m a r i l y determined by p o l i t i c a l c r i t e r i a . The i m p o s i t i o n o f 
c o n t r o l s e n t a i l e d the need to choose what type o f c o n t r o l s 
were bes t . Choices were made concerning the nature o f the 
economic system which was to be developed. Such choices were 
made on the basis o f perceived shor t or long term s e l f - i n t e r e s t , 
and as no u n i v e r s a l l y acceptable or n e u t r a l economic system 
e x i s t e d , the cuoice o f p o l i c i e s i n e v i t a b l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d to a 
lesser or greater degree between the p a r t i c i p a n t s . The nature 
o f such choices, as we s h a l l see, wes thus neces sa r i l y p o l i t i c a l . 
The concern was not simply to e s t a b l i s h an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
economic system based on ' p u r e l y economic c r i t e r i a 1 , d i s r e g a r d i n g 
momentarily the problem o f the nature o f such c r i t e r i a . There 
were obvious p o l i t i c a l advantages to be gained, dependent upon 
the nature o f any new i n s t i t u t i o n and the manner i n which i t 
f u n c t i o n e d . Perhaps the c l ea re s t example o f t h i s occurs i n 
chapters three and f o u r i n the sense tha t the monetary t a l k s 
produced two d i f f e r e n t c lear cut sets o f proposals , the 
S t a b i l i s a t i o n Fund and the C lea r ing Union, 
Such a view o f the p o l i t i c a l nature o f the war- t ime 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic planning i s somewhat at var iance w i t h 
ideas put forward by Professor F. H i r s c h . 
For example, see ' P o l i t l c i s a t i o n o f the World Economy and 
Necessary Condi t ions f o r an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic O r d e r 1 , 
H i r s c h and M.W.Doyle, Discuss ion Paper presented at B . I . S . A , 
annual conference, Warwick U n i v e r s i t y , December 197&. 
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Hirsch has given a very i l l u m i n a t i n g ana lys i s and c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n 
o f post-war developments i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
Par t o f h i s thes i s invo lves a comparison between the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
economic s t r u c t u r e , formula ted p r i m a r i l y by the U.K. and the U.S. 
f o r the post-war world and more recent developments, such as the 
r e l a x a t i o n o f the B r e t t o n Woods' c o n t r o l s over exchange ra tes and 
the p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f o i l as a wor ld commodity. w / Such 
comparisons are intended to i n d i c a t e how p o l i t i c a l cons ide ra t ions 
have begun to a f f e c t the world economy more i n recent years . The 
c la im i s based l a r g e l y on the a s s e r t i o n tha t there i s no longer 
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y accepted supe r - s t ruc tu re o f r u l e s and c o n t r o l s 
i n ex i s tence , ou t s ide the p o l i t i c a l system. Now, to pa r t o f t h i s 
t hes i s I have no o b j e c t i o n s whatsoever. But I do have r e se rva t ions 
about the c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n , i n t e n t i o n a l or n o t , o f the post-war 
supers t ruc tu re as being i n some sense a p o l i t i c a l . I t h i n k i t i s 
somewhat misleading to conceive o f the post-war s t r u c t u r e i n these 
terms. I t was constructed i n accordance w i t h e x p l i c i t l y s ta ted 
p o l i t i c a l goa ls , to e s t a b l i s h a Tree market world economy compatible 
w i t h American f r e e e n t e r p r i s e . Furthermore, the ln f requency o f 
chal lenges to t h i s s t r u c t u r e , d u r i n g the f o r t i e s and f i f t i e s , does 
not i n v a l i d a t e the c la im t h a t , b a s i c a l l y , the working system was 
p o l i t i c a l i n na ture . By t h i s I mean tha t the post-war economic 
supers t ruc tu re d i d not embody d i s i n t e r e s t e d ru l e s to f a c i l i t a t e 
the workings o f pure ly economic f o r c e s . The s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f was 
fo rmula t ed w i t h the s p e c i f i c economic i n t e r e s t s o f the U.S. 
p r i m a r i l y i n mind, and 
(5) See also 'The E v o l u t i o n o f the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
System 19^5-77' , B r i a n Tew, Hutchinson, London 1977. 
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to a much lesser ex ten t those o f B r i t a i n . Rules were l a i d 
down to c o n t r o l c e r t a i n types o f " h a r m f u l behaviour" , but 
such r u l e s d i d not e l i m i n a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y to f u r t h e r 
a c o u n t r y ' s perceived economic i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n such r u l e s . 
This i s no t , o f course, to deny t h a t i n recent years 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic r e l a t i o n s have become more c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
and more o v e r t l y p o l i t i c a l . Though t h i s should be seen as a 
q u a n t i t a t i v e r a the r than a q u a l i t a t i v e change. 
The main substance o f the s t o r y then i s the p o l i t i c s o f 
the var ious nego t i a t i ons between the U.S. and the U.K. on 
economic issues . The primary emphasis i s upon B r i t i s h p o l i c y 
making and how i t was a f f e c t e d by i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h the U.S. 
I t I s d i f f i c u l t to charac te r i se the thes i s i n a b r i e f 
I n t r o d u c t i o n as i t i s based on the d e t a i l e d e x p o s i t i o n o f 
complex n e g o t i a t i o n s and the t r a c i n g o f subt le s h i f t s i n p o l i c y . 
The aim has been to e l u c i d a t e the p o l i t i c a l reasons f o r 
B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic p o s i t i o n , the character o f 
the I . M . F . and the s ta tus o f commercial p lanning at the end o f 
19^5. I n doing t h i s an attempt has been made to analyse the 
subs tan t ive c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t s between the U.S. and the U.K. 
over economic Issues. By t h i s I mean tha t I have analysed i n 
d e t a i l the evidence o f how the n e g o t i a t o r s perceived o f t h e i r 
r e spec t ive i n t e r e s t s , how these changed w i t h time and i n 
b a r g a i n i n g , and how they attempted to r e a l i s e t h e i r goa ls . 
This i s intended to add to our understanding o f the character 
o f the o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p o f the U.S. to the U.K. du r ing the 
war and o f the reasons why the post-war economic s t r u c t u r e was 
fo rmula t ed as i t was. 
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The s tory i s not t o l d s t r i c t l y i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l o rde r . 
A f t e r the opening chapters which dea l w i t h at tempts to agree 
to a supplement to the 1938 Anglo-U.S. Trade Agreement and 
e a r l y Lend-Lease mat te rs , chapters three and f o u r g ive an 
account o f the monetary t a l k s up to t h e i r formal, conc lus ion 
a t B r e t t o n Woods i n 19^^. A f t e r t h i s , chapter f i v e r e tu rns to 
the e a r l i e r par t o f the war and t e l l s a very complex s to ry 
r e l a t i n g to commercial p o l i c y , Lend-Lease and B r i t a i n ' s reserve 
p o s i t i o n , a l l w i t h the simultaneous monetary t a l k s i n mind. 
I n the f i n a l chapter B r i t a i n ' s i nc reas ing concern w i t h the 
need f o r f i n a n c i a l assis tance f rom the U.S. i s expla ined i n 
the l i g h t of B r i t a i n ' s r a p i d l y d e t e r i o r a t i n g p o l i t i c a l 
i n f l u e n c e and economic power. An attempt i s made to b r i n g 
together the var ious strands o f c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t between 
the U.S. and the U.K. They are presented i n terms o f how the 
n e g o t i a t o r s perceived these c o n f l i c t s and these percept ions are 
used to e x p l a i n why American ac t ions and p o l i c i e s were as they 
were and how they severely undermined the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
monetary, trade and commercial s tanding o f the U.K. 
To produce such an account I have r e l i e d h e a v i l y on 
d i p l o m a t i c correspondence both B r i t i s h and American, and 
government documents and p u b l i c a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n to these 
sources, I have attempted to f i l l i n gaps i n the record and to 
breathe some l i f e i n t o i t by the extensive use of d i a r i e s and 
b i o g r a p h i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n . Obviously the q u a l i t y o f such 
sources var ies g r e a t l y and pose a number o f p r a c t i c a l problems 
concerning how the h i s t o r i a n uses such i n f o r m a t i o n and the 
types o f judgement he has to pass on them. Furthermore, o f 
course, not a l l o f the persons who appear i n t h i s h i s t o r i c a l 
account have kept t h e i r own record o f events nor have h i s t o r i a n s 
i n t h e i r t u r n constructed coherent o i o g r a p h i c a l accounts o f 
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t h e i r views and a c t i o n s . The f o r t y e igh t a u t o / b i o g r a p h i c a l 
works tha t I have consulted do c o n t r i b u t e g r e a t l y to the 
coherence o f the work, b u t , as I suggested above, pose problems 
o f t h e i r own, which I s h a l l d iscuss s h o r t l y . However, the 
' incompleteness ' o f the i n f o r m a t i o n imp l i ed by what I have said 
above must be conceived o f i n r e l a t i v e terms. By t h i s I mean 
tha t there are i n f a c t c e r t a i n per iods o f the past which are so 
d e f i c i e n t i n i n f o r m a t i o n tha t the exercise o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a 
coherent h i s t o r i c a l account becomes imposs ib le . On the o ther 
hand, to put fo rward ' incompleteness ' as a c r i t i c i s m o f a l l 
h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e s i s not always j u s t i f i a b l e . Thus we are 
not concerned to g ive an all-encompassing d e f i n i t i v e account, 
but w i t h adducing enough or adequate evidence f rom which we 
can cons t ruc t a p l a u s i b l e coherent account. We recognise a 
l i m i t beyond which f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n i s deemed unnecessary 
f o r an understanding o f the s i t u a t i o n and the r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
under s tudy. 
The problems o f evidence, as suggested above, are indeed 
very complex. However, as I have s ta ted b e f o r e , t h i s i s not a 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e s i s , and i t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e to delve 
i n t o t h e o r e t i c a l d iscuss ions concerning the nature and 
s tanding o f evidence w i t h i n an h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e . What 
comments I would l i k e to make are more o f a p r a c t i c a l nature 
and have to do w i t h the s k i l l s o f an h i s t o r i a n . A major 
p r a c t i c a l precept f o r a l l h i s t o r i a n s must be the c o n s t r u c t i o n 
o f a coherent n a r r a t i v e f r o m , c e r t a i n l y i n my case, the immense 
amount o f i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e . I n f o r m a t i o n , and here i s the 
rub , which i s not u n i f o r m i n na tu re . Thus, by analogy w i t h a 
j i g - s a w puzzle , a l though there i s on ly one j i g - s a w p i c t u r e , 
which he f i n a l l y produces, i t i s made up o f pieces f rom more than 
one puzzle . He has to t r e a t i n f o r m a t i o n f rom d i f f e r e n t sources 
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i n d i f f e r e n t ways to make up h i s f i n a l coherent p i c t u r e . I t i s 
f a i r l y obvious tha t the i n f o r m a t i o n a c i v i l servant might wish 
to communicate i n a departmental memorandum w i l l be more 
o b j e c t i v e than a p o l i t i c i a n w r i t i n g h i s memoirs. F i r s t o f a l l 
most memoirs, unless scrupulous ly based on comprehensive 
d i a r i e s kept a t the t ime , con ta in r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s o f the ac t ions 
o f the person concerned and sometimes f a i r l y obvious at tempts 
to t w i s t the I n f o r m a t i o n to j u s t i f y or cons t ruc t an apologia 
f o r past a c t i o n s . A number o f such po in t s a r i s e i n chapter one 
i n the account o f the P l&cent la Bay meeting between hcosevel t 
and C h u r c h i l l . However, d e t a i l e d cons ide r a t i on o f t h i s vjould 
be r a t h e r l eng thy . A more succ inc t example can be drawn from 
the f i n a l chapter . 
The case to be considered b a s i c a l l y concerns Hugh D a l t o n '3 
percept ions o f the n e g o t i a t i n g position o f the B r i t i s h v i s - a - v i s 
the Americans i n Washington i n October }9^5. The example 
i n d i c a t e s two poss ib le problems connected w i t h memoirs. One 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n might simply s ta te tha t the time lapse between 
October 19^5 t n e date D s l t o n wrote h i s memoirs (publ i shed 
19^0) caused some confus ion I n D a l t o n ' s mind such tha t he made 
a mistake. A mistake we w i l l consider i n a moment. This also 
i n d i c a t e s the more general problem concerning the r e l a t i v e 
r e l i a b i l i t y between views and op in ions recorded ex post f a c t o 
and p o l i c y statements and views recorded at the t ime as an 
i n t e g r a l par t o f the developing s i t u a t i o n . The second view i s 
tha t i t could be suggested Da l ton was t r y i n g to cover up h i s 
own misunderstanding o f the n e g o t i a t i o n - s i t u a t i o n i n Washington 
by l a y i n g the blame f o r confus ion on Maynard Keynes. 
x v i i i 
B a s i c a l l y the problem was t h i s . On October 28 , 19^5> 
Dal ton wrote to advise Keynes i n W a s h i n g t o n ^ \ I n t h i s 
l e t t e r he set out p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s ' A ' and ' IS 1 . Part two 
o f a l t e r n a t i v e ' A ' was the request f o r a #2B i n t e r e s t f r e e 
loan to l i b e r a l i s e S t e r l i n g Area d o l l a r purchases. A l t e r n a t i v e 
' 3 ' was the request f o r a pure ly commercial loan o f $2iB a t 
2% i n t e r e s t w i t h no commitments o ther than repayment. Keynes 
r e p l i e d to t h i s , and an accompanying l e t t e r o f exp l ana t ion 
(7) 
which Dal ton had sent , on the same d a y . ' Keynes simply 
s ta ted tha t A l t e r n a t i v e 'B* was out o f the q u e s t i o n , among 
o the r reasons, because the only mechanisms f o r such a loan 
were e i t h e r a 3c agreement under Lend-Lease l e g i s l a t i o n , which 
B r i t a i n had not nego t i a t ed , or a loan v i a the i m p o r t - I m p o r t 
Bank where i n t e r e s t would i n i t i a l l y be 8%, Da l t on i n h i s 
memoirs confuses pa r t two o f A l t e r n a t i v e ' A ' w i t h 
A l t e r n a t i v e f B f . Da l t on claims tha t Keynes' c r i t i c i s m s and 
wor r ies concerning government views i n London, were the r e s u l t 
o f h i s confus ion f o r there was no th ing unreasonable about 
A l t e r n a t i v e ' B * , i . e . par t 2 , o f A l t e r n a t i v e 'A* . I n a c t u a l 
f a c t , even par t 2 , o f A l t e r n a t i v e ' A ' was unreasonable enough, 
but the idea tha t B r i t a i n could evade commitments to American 
economic p o l i c i e s s imply by asking the U.S. government to 
f a c i l i t a t e a commercial loan r e a l l y was absurd. Da l t on has i n 
e f f e c t misrepresented the nature and the grounds o f Keynes* 
(6) Chancellor o f the Exchequer to J .S .M. Washington, Oc t .27 , 
19^5, Bauoon 155, UE502V1 0 9 V 5 3 . 
(7) J . K . K . to D a l t o n , Oct. 27 , 19*+5, ^ 5 1 6 9 / 1 0 9 ^ / 5 3 . 
(8) See 'High Tide aad A f t e r - Memoirs 191*5-60*, D a l t o n , H. 
Freder ick Mul l e r L t d . , London, 1960, pp .76-78 . 
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c r i t i c i s m s by r e f e r r i n g them to the wrong pa r t o f 'Baboon 155 1 -
I n a c t u a l f a c t , as we s h a l l see i n chapter s i x , D a l t c n was to 
r ev i se r a p i d l y h i s assessment o f the s i t u a t i o n i n Washington. 
But the quest ions s t i l l remain. Did Da l ton simply make a 
mistake i n h i s memoirs? Or, was he poss ib ly t r y i n g to cover up 
the o r i g i n a l mistake he made i n mis judging the s i t u a t i o n i n 
Washington? F o r t u n a t e l y f o r us the answers to such quest ions 
are not o f c r u c i a l importance, f o r we know what happened i n 
October 19^5> £s opposed to what D a l t o n subsequently claimed to 
have happened. What i s o f importance i s to convey the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e a h i s t o r i a n must a t t a ch to h i s evidence, how he 
uses i t and presents i t as an accurate account o f what happened 
To do t h i s , as I hope I have I l l u s t r a t e d , he must cons t an t ly 
bear i n mind the v a r i e t y o f natures which h i s sources have. 
F i n a l l y , there are two major themes o f controversy which 
run through the s t o r y . The f i r s t one i s the American attempt 
to persuade the B r i t i s h to d ismant le the I m p e r i a l Preference 
System and to c o l l a b o r a t e w i t h the U.S. i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a 
l i b e r a l i s e d wor ld t r a d i n g system. The second main theme o f 
controversy i s t ha t o f American attempts to undermine the 
p o s i t i o n o f s t e r l i n g and replace i t w i t h the d o l l a r as the 
main medium o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange. Obviously t h i s i s a 
great s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . Such American p o l i c i e s caused v i o l e n t 
r eac t ions I n B r i t a i n and the development o f counter p o l i c i e s 
which could equa l ly be described as major themes o f controversy 
Furthermore, the nature o f t h i s enquiry has led to the develop-
ment o f a number o f sub-themes which could not have been 
envisaged at the beginning o f the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . For example, 
the d i scovery o f the depth o f the feud between the American 
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Treasury and State Department, and the poor l i a i s o n i n general 
w i t h i n the U.S. government. I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s , i n f o r m a t i o n 
which I have brought to l i g h t , neces sa r i l y changes c e r t a i n 
previous h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and o f course the under-
s tanding o f c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l r o l e s du r ing the per iod 19^1-^5-
This i s not to say t h a t the nature o f t h i s work has been 
determined by a ser ies o f s e r e n d i p i t i e s . I have addressed 
myself to s p e c i f i c problems; at the same time the p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f s e r e n d i p i t y perhaps r e i n f o r c e s the c la im tha t t h i s i s not 
s imply an exercise i n i d e o l o g i c a l or ore-determined judgements 
but i s t r u l y i n v e s t i g a t i v e i n na tu re , I s r e f e r a b l e to evidence 
to t e s t s i t s v e r a c i t y and does produce knowledge o f the 
po l i t i co - economic r e l a t i o n s which ex i s ted between the U.S. 
and the U.K. between 19^1 and 19^5• 
(9) For example, the n a r r a t i v e ind ica t e s tha t a l though 
C h u r c h i l l avoided the d e t a i l s o f economic p o l i c i e s he 
was c e r t a i n l y not b l i n d to t h e i r p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s 
and acted, u s u a l l y d e c i s i v e l y , a cco rd ing ly . Compare 
t h i s w i t h the i n t r o d u c t o r y comments i n 'Roosevel t and 
C h u r c h i l l - The i r Secret Wartime Correspondence 1 , 
Ed. Lowenstein, Langley and Jonas, B a r r i e and Jenk ins , 
London 1975* also as regards i n t e r p r e t a t i o n compare 
R.N.Gardner 's and my own i n Chapter 5» Gardner. R.N. 
' S t e r l i n g D o l l a r Diplomacy, Anglo-American C o l l a b o r a t i o n 
I n The Recons t ruc t ion o f M u l t i l a t e r a l T r a d e ' , O x f o r d , 
Clarendon Press, 1956. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE EMEhtiENCE OF PHOBLEMS 
I t i s p l a t i t u d i n o u s to s t a t e tha t the Great War was a 
wor ld d i s a s t e r . I t would be d i f f i c u l t i n t h i s day and age to 
f i n d many people who do not regard a l l wars i n such a v e i n . 
However a new d i sas t rous perspec t ive was in t roduced to the 
wor ld by tha t t e r r i b l e war. This i s not a re fe rence to the 
u n p a r a l l e l e d carnage o f those d r e a d f u l years but to the d e b i l i t -
a t i n g cost o f the war and the i n a p p r o p r i a t e p lanning and 
execut ion o f post-war economic p o l i c i e s . By the 1 9 3 ° ' S t n © 
s i t u a t i o n was complicated w i t h the development o f p o l i t i c a l 
extremism and i t i s d i f f i c u l t to assess whether the move toward 
n a t i o n a l economic autarky was a symptom or a cause o f the 
p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e . One th ing tha t i s c l ea r , i s t h a t both 
America and B r i t a i n came to regard p ro t ec t i on i sm and economic 
na t i ona l i sm as i n i m i c a l to t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s and tha t o f the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. When war even tua l ly broke out i n Europe, 
the governments o f these two coun t r i e s both placed a h igh order 
o f s i g n i f i c a n c e upon economic causes. 
During the Second World War more e f f o r t was d i r e c t e d towards 
p lanning f o r the per iod a f t e r the end o f h o s t i l i t i e s than ever 
b e f o r e . There was a common Anglo-American c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a 
prosperous and w e l l ordered wor ld economic system was i n t h e i r 
own i n t e r e s t s , and a necessary o r e - r e q u i s i t e , i f the d i s a s t e r s 
o f the i n t e r - w a r years were to be avoided. Indeed, there was 
even a general Anglo-American consensus on what the i ia ture o f 
the post-war i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic system should be. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y the s ta tus o f the two c o u n t r i e s ' economies was to 
d iverge i n c r e a s i n g l y as the war progressed. So, a l though the 
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general goal f o r the f u t u r e remained the same, B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s 
to a t t a i n tha t goa l began to dev i a t e f rom American ones. Even 
i n the e a r l y months o f the war, the necess i t i e s o f the s i t u a t i o n 
began to d i c t a t e the adopt ion o f c e r t a i n types o f economic 
p o l i c i e s f o r the B r i t i s h , which were to prove g rave ly problem-
a t i c a l i n the f u t u r e , 
B r i t a i n and the U.S. were by no means g u i l t l e s s i n so f a r 
as the development o f aconomlc n a t i o n a l i s m was concerned. The 
U.S. had in t roduced p r o t e c t i o n i s t t a r i f f measures i n 1922 and i n 
1930* t n e l a t t e r cons i s t i ng o f the h igh -du ty measures proposed 
by Hawley and Smoot. B r i t a i n , who had been t r a d i t i o n a l l y i n 
favour o f l a i s s e z - f a i r e , had g r a d u a l l y r e in t roduced p r o t e c t i o n 
f rom the F i r s t World War onwards, mainly on the basis o f 
I m p e r i a l p re fe rence . This p o l i c y reached i t s c l imax i n 1932 
w i t h the Ottawa Agreements, However, be fo re the war, both 
coun t r i e s attempted to amel iora te the s i t u a t i o n . F i r s t o f a l l 
B r i t a i n a t the World Monetary and Economic Conference i n London 
l n 1933. But t h i s was aborted by Rooseve l t ' s peremptory r e c a l l 
o f H u l l w i t h h i s telegram o f J u l y 3 r d . S t i l l , i n 1 93^> H u l l ' s 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m d i d have some e f f e c t w i t h the i n i t i a t i o n o f the 
Rec ip roca l Trade Agreements Act ( R . T . A . A , ) , which empowered the 
Pres ident to reduce t a r i f f s s e l e c t i v e l y by b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n . 
Despi te the impotence:, o f these two coun t r i e s to b r i n g about any 
s i g n i f i c a n t l i b e r a l i s a t i o n o f the wor ld economy, t h i s should not 
be taken as i n d i c a t i v e o f a lack o f r e a l c o n v i c t i o n . Th i s 
c e r t a i n l y was not the case w i t h the U . K . , where many people he ld 
r e se rva t ions about preferences and which was on ly r e l u c t a n t l y 
pushed, by cont ingencies beyond i t s c o n t r o l , to Implement a 
comprehensive system of economic c o n t r o l s . I r o n i c a l l y , some o f 
t h i s pressure came f rom the U . S . , whose alms by 19^0, were set 
2 
q u i t e r i g i d l y i n terms o f an open post-war wor ld economy. 
I n B r i t a i n , as ea r ly as 1937-38, controversy had a r i s e n 
over the p o l i c i e s t h a t should be adopted i f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s i t u a t i o n d e t e r i o r a t e d to a c r i s i s p o i n t . Despi te est imates o f 
the s t r a i n such a c r i s i s would place upon the B r i t i s h economy, 
the government was r e l u c t a n t to r e s o r t to p o l i c i e s o f economic 
c o n t r o l , which had been advocated by the Bank o f England. The 
Treasury would countenance ne i t he r a regula ted re lease o f s t e r l i n g 
balances, nor a f r e e z i n g o f them. U n f o r t u n a t e l y the course o f 
events was soon to cause a r e a p p r a i s a l o f the s i t u a t i o n . As the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n continued to d e t e r i o r a t e , confidence i n 
s t e r l i n g d e c l i n e d . From A p r i l 1s t to September 30 , 1933, 
£150m o f gold was withdrawn, f rom London. No no t i ceab l e 
a m e l i o r a t i o n was brought about by the Munich Agreement, and i n 
f a c t i n December £350m o f gold had to be t r a n s f e r r e d , a t market 
p r i c e , to the Exchange E q u a l i s a t i o n Fund to s t rengthen the 
pound. I n the face o f such developments the r ea l i sm o f the Bank 
o f England was f i n a l l y acknowledged and the government began to 
take measures to c o n t r o l the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f s t e r l i n g . I n J u l y , 
the Chancellor asked f o r minimum c o n t r o l measures to be d r a f t e d 
and f o r p r o h i b i t i o n s to be imposed on wi thdrawals o f non-res ident 
he ld s t e r l i n g balances. This was the beg inn ing . Soon, the 
government r e s t r i c t e d a l l wi thdrawals o f s t e r l i n g f rom London to 
a l l e v i a t e the dep rec i a to ry pressures on the pound. Secondly, 
the government decided to c o n t r o l S t e r l i n g Area demands f o r 
hard cu r renc ies , p a r t i c u l a r l y d o l l a r s , ^ ^ 
(1 ) For a d e t a i l e d account o f those measures s e e i -
' H i s t o r y o f the Second World War', U.K. C i v i l Ser ies , 
• F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1 , by R.S.Sayers, H.M„S.G. and 
Longman Green and Co. 1956. pp. 228-235, 2^2-2 51. 
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Nevertheless , regardless o f the con t ro l s which had been 
imposed, B r i t a i n ' s economic p o s i t i o n continued to d e c l i n e 
s e r i o u s l y . American p o l i c i e s a t t h i s stage d i d l i t t l e to h e l p . 
The Johnson Act o f A p r i l 13, 193S debarred B r i t a i n f rom n e g o t i a t -
i n g loans or o ther forms o f f i n a n c i a l a id f rom the U.S. as she 
was t e c h n i c a l l y i n d e f a u l t on repayments f o r loans rece ived 
d u r i n g the F i r s t World War. The r epea l o f the U.S. N e u t r a l i t y 
L e g i s l a t i o n on November 1939) a l though i t b e n e f i t e d B r i t a i n ' s 
war e f f o r t , i t was o f l i t t l e he lp economical ly . War ma te r i a l s 
had to be purchased on a d o l l a r cash and car ry ba s i s . F u r t h e r -
more, the U.S. a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was u rg ing B r i t a i n to acce le ra te 
the sales o f her overseas assets as a p r e - r e q u i s i t e f o r any 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f f u t u r e a i d . Such f a c t o r s g r e a t l y weakened the 
s tanding o f s t e r l i n g and by the Spr ing o f 19^0 the r a t e f o r 
s t e r l i n g abroad was 20$ below the o f f i c i a l p r i c e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y 
the Chancel lor o f the Exchequer, John Simon, was i n somewhat o f 
a dilemma. He had, i n the e a r l y months o f 19^0, descr ibed 
s t e r l i n g as, 'good to h o l d 1 . Now, he was faced w i t h the f a c t s 
o f s t e r l i n g ' s de f a c t o d e p r e c i a t i o n and had to take d r a s t i c 
measures to s t a b i l i s e i t s purchasing power. Simon decided on a 
p o l i c y which would make the use o f s t e r l i n g b i l a t e r a l by means 
o f payments agreements. Even tua l ly t h i s would reduce the supply 
(2) 
o f f r e e s t e r l i n g . v J 
(2) See Sayers, Op .C i t . p,2W6, f o r d e t a i l s o f measures see 
3R and 0 (19^0) No.708 May 12, and No.1732 September 27 . 
Under these p rov i s ions s p e c i a l accounts were es tab l i shed 
i n t o which s t e r l i n g was paid and was c o n v e r t i b l e to a degree 
decided on i n the i n d i v i d u a l agreement. 
For hard cu r renc ies , i . e . U.S. d o l l a r s , Swiss f r a n c s , 
Kegis tered Accounts were set up i n t o which a l l cu r ren t 
earnings o f s t e r l i n g were paid and guaranteed c o n v e r t i b l e 
I n t o gold by the B r i t i s h Government. 
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The i n t r o d u c t i o n , by the government, o f such measures soon 
created a comprehensive s t r u c t u r e o f c o n t r o l s over s t e r l i n g . 
The f u n c t i o n and character o f s t e r l i n g was no longer p r i m a r i l y 
determined by f r e e market fo rces but by p o l i t i c a l dec is ions t h a t 
had been taken i n W h i t e h a l l . Furthermore such developments were 
not s o l e l y germane to monetary p o l i c y . B r i t a i n ' s commercial 
p o l i c y was s u f f e r i n g a s i m i l a r r e o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
As the war progressed the government's view o f the economy 
and how i t should f u n c t i o n changed. Soon, the paramount concern 
was the e f f i c i e n t use o f ma te r i a l s to maximise war p roduc t ion , 
B r i t a i n 1 s pauc i ty o f raw ma te r i a l s meant a massive increase i n 
imports o f m a t e r i a l s . Such Impor t s , o f course, d i d not provide 
any re tu rns I n the fo rm of r e - e x p o r t revenue or domestic sa les . 
They were a net burden on the balance o f payments. This soon led 
to f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , to which there were three poss ib le 
s o l u t i o n s . The f i r s t o f these was to Increase expo r t s , but t h i s 
was no longer f e a s i b l e as a t o t a l s o l u t i o n because most o f 
B r i t a i n ' s i n d u s t r i a l capaci ty was busy w i t h war p r o d u c t i o n . 
Secondly, B r i t a i n could have Imported goods on c r e d i t o r w i t h 
borrowed money. However, i n her precar ious p o s i t i o n , coun t r i e s 
were demanding fo rward payments r a the r than o f f e r i n g loans or 
c r e d i t s . America, the only poss ib le major source o f f i n a n c i a l 
h e l p , was not ye t prepared to g ive i t . So the o n l y r e a l l y 
e f f e c t i v e course o f a c t i o n was the t h i r d and t h i s e n t a i l e d r i g i d 
c o n t r o l s o f impor ts w i t h preference being g iven to s o f t currency 
t r a d i n g , I n an e f f o r t to conserve d o l l a r s f o r the purchase o f 
American arms, muni t ions and machinery. D o l l a r s were o f v i t a l 
importance because the U.S. was the on ly poss ib le source o f 
armaments o f the q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y B r i t a i n r e q u i r e d . 
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Faced w i t h the monetary and commercial problems the war 
had created, B r i t a i n began to In t roduce c o n t r o l s i n the commercial 
f i e l d , I n September 1939» under the a u t h o r i t y o f the ' I m p o r t , 
Export and Customs Power Defence A c t ' , 1939*• 
Despite such c o n t r o l s the d o l l a r shortage continued to cause 
(h) 
acute worry . During September 1939 O l i v e r Stanley 
presented a memorandum to the War Cabinet , which proposed the 
i m p o s i t i o n o f r e s t r i c t i o n s , s p e c i f i c a l l y on imports f rom the U.S. 
Such proposals covered l e a f tobacco, apples , pears, canned f r u i t 
and a suggestion t h a t the d o l l a r content o f f i l m r o y a l t i e s 
payable to the U.S. should be reduced by n e g o t i a t i o n . Furthermore, 
s a l t was rubbed i n t o American wounds by a p l an o f S t an l ey ' s to 
save d o l l a r s and a t the same time boost morale i n a s t r a t e g i c a l l y 
threatened area. His plan was to buy £ 8 7 0 , 0 0 0 p . a . worth o f 
Balkan tobacco f rom Turkey and £ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 p . a . worth f rom Greece. 
The money to pay f o r the Turk i sh tobacco was a v a i l a b l e i n the 
form o f i n t e r e s t on a twenty year loan tha t B r i t a i n had 
p r e v i o u s l y negot ia ted w i t h Turkey. I n a c t u a l f a c t B r i t i s h hopes 
to d i v e r t t h e i r tobacco supply sources, p a r t i a l l y a t l e a s t , f r om 
the U.S. to the Balkans, were thwarted by subsequent German and 
I t a l i a n a c t i o n . 
(3) Sept. 3 . 1939, P r o h i b i t e d imports w i t h o u t Board o f Trade 
l i c e n c e , t e x t i l e s , appare l , glassware, cars , po t t e ry and 
non-essen t ia l f oods . 
Oct . 1939. Extended to a l l types o f machinery. 
Nov. 1939. Extended to pears and apples. 
Jan. 19M-0. Extended to tobac co, f o l l o w e d by oacon, ham, 
l a r d , d r i e d f r u i t s . 
March 19^0. Extended to b o t t l e d f r u i t s . 
May 19^0, and p rog re s s ive ly du r ing year , c o n t r o l s and 
p r o h i b i t i o n s on U.S. c o t t o n and tobacco, e t c . 
{h) President Board o f Trade, May 28, 1937 - January 5, 19^0. 
6 
Cordel.1 H u l l (5) was deeply antagonised by thebe moves 
which were contrary to the economic pr inc ip les he held, and 
contrary to the economic in teres ts of primary goods1 producers 
i n the U.S. The apparent attack on these in te res t s , by B r i t i s h 
economic war p o l i c i e s , was not weighed i n the balance by 
Americans against B r i t a i n ' s de facto protec t ion of America's 
A t l a n t i c seaboard from possible attack by Germany, This was 
something that was to become more prominent a f t e r June 22nd 19*K). 
A d i s t i n c t de t e r io ra t ion occurred i n Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s , 
and opinions were voiced i n the U.S. that America should 
u n i l a t e r a l l y denounce the Anglo-American Trade Agreement o f 
1 9 3 8 ^ and o f f i c i a l complaints were presented to the B r i t i s h 
Government. Perhaps rather t a c t l e s s l e ly , no rep l i es were made 
by B r i t a i n to American protests , though i t i s d i f f i c u l t to 
Imagine what oould have been said at that stage considering 
B r i t a i n ' s precarious s t rategic pos i t ion which made economic 
cont ro ls , i n the Government's view, an absolute necessity. 
S i r John Simon ' and R. Cross f o r c e f u l l y expressed the 
opinion that the raaintainance of d i sc r imina t ion against the 
United States, under the conditions prevai l ing at that time, was 
essent ia l . There was i n fac t a rather unfounded hope that 
pressures from American agr icu l ture would persuade the govern-
ment to dispense with i t s cash and carry pol icy and introduce a 
more f l e x i b l e payments or c redi t system/would allow B r i t a i n to 
overcome her fo re ign exchange do l la r problem and enable her to 
buy more f r e e l y i n the U.S. 
(5) The American Secretary of State, 1933-^5-
( 6 ) For de ta i l s see Cmd. 5882, 1938. 
(7 ) Chancellor of the Exchequer, May 28, 1937 - Oct .3, 19^0. 
(8 ) Minister of Economic Warfare, Sept.1939 - May 15, 19^0. 
wni 
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Only Stanley, i n fear of losing the 1938 Trade Agreement, made 
noises to appease the Americans. 
Early i n 19^0, i n the face o f mounting American c r i t i c i s m , 
the B r i t i s h Government did t ry to reassure the Americans that 
the economic controls were temporary war expedients. Attempts 
were made to ameliorate American opinion by point ing to B r i t a i n ' 
increased purchases of arms: unfortunately th i s was not much of 
a p a l l i a t i v e to the tobacco cotton and f r u i t growers. However, 
with the f a l l of France and the threat to B r i t a i n ' s cont ro l i n 
the A t l a n t i c , American c r i t i c i sms subsided somewhat, even i f 
t he i r actions d id not r e f l e c t an abundance of sympathy f o r 
B r i t a i n ' s economic pos i t ion . 
One should not judge American a t t i tudes toward helping 
B r i t a i n wi th her economic d i f f i c u l t i e s too harshly however. 
There was s t i l l much residual i l l - f e e l i n g about America's 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the F i r s t World War and the de fau l t on repay-
ments to her by the European powers. Also, u n t i l mid-1 9^0, 
(Q) 
there was no immediate threat to the interests of the U.S. 7 
(9) I n terms of d iv is ions the French had 130 against 98 German, 
of which 36 were untrained and badly organised. The 
French had more and better armoured, though slower, tanks 
than the Germans. For de ta i l s of the composition of the 
opposing armies see "The History of the Second World War" 
L i d d e l l Hart , Pan.1973: 'The F a l l of France 19^0, Causes 
and Resoons lb i l i t i e s ' , Ed. S.M.Osgood, D.C.Heath and Co. 
Boston/ U.S.A. 19&7. 
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I n addi t ion the war broke out at a most inopportune time 
pol i t icaLLy f o r Roosevelt, as there was an impending pres iden t ia l 
e lec t ion i n November 19^0. At the outbreak of the war 
Roosevelt stateds 
" I hope the United States w i l l keep out of th i s war, 
I believe that i t w i l l . And I give you assurances 
that every e f f o r t of your Government w i l l be directed 
toward that end." (10) 
Sherwood i n his oiography of Hopkins suggests that Roosevelt 
knew even at that time, that the U.S. would have to enter the war 
sooner or l a t e r , though i n 1939 considerations of Congressional 
and public opinion made i t impossible to adopt a more posi t ive 
po l i cy . And indeed, one can quote a number of fac t s to 
substantiate t h i s . What now appears as a f a i r l y minor step taken 
by the adminis t ra t ion , the repeal of the Neut ra l i ty Leg i s l a t ion , 
evoked the fo l l owing comment from the i n f l u e n t i a l Republican 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg. 
" I n the name of "democracy" we have taken the f i r s t 
step, once more, into Europe's "power p o l i t i c s " . . . 
What "suckers" our emotions make of usJ" (11) 
And as la te as August 19^ -1 Beaverbrook reported from the U.S. 
that public opinion was s t i l l very much against p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
the war. This was fu r the r r e f l ec t ed that same month by the 
passage of the Selective Service Act through Congress with the 
narrow margin of one vote. Henry Stimson i n his diary suggests 
that stronger p o l i t i c a l leadership by Roosevelt could have 
increased America's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war e f f o r t against 
Germany, however, t h i s , of course, remains a matter f o r speculatio 
(10) Quoted from 'Lord Lothian 1 ( P h i l i p Kerr, l882-19 l +0), by 
J.R.M. But le r , London Macmillan and Co. L t d . , St .Martins 
Press, 1960, p .269. 
(11) Vandenberg, A.H. J r . , and J .A.Morr i s , !The Private Papers 
of Senator A.H.Vandenberg, Houghton M i f f l i n Co., Boston, 
1952, p . 3 . Oct. 27. 1939. 
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What i s cer ta in , i s that the U.S. did not evince an over-
generous a t t i t ude toward the U.K. i n the supply o f materials . 
I t was only a f t e r a f u l l year of h o s t i l i t i e s that the U.S. 
conceded anything other than normal commercial re la t ions to the 
U.K. fo r the supply of armaments. 
On A p r i l 23 , 19W0, the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Washington, 
Lord Lothian, wrote to V.H.Finney that the Americans were 
beginning to awaken to the problems that might arise i n the 
A t l a n t i c as a r e su l t of a B r i t i s h defeat . On A p r i l 9th the 
Germans had invaded Denmark and Norway. On May 1^th the Dutch 
suffered a s imi la r f a t e and surrendered. H i t l e r was now poised 
to s t r i k e at France and B r i t a i n . On May 15th Church i l l cabled 
Roosevelt that the U.K. would pay cash and carry do l la r s f o r as 
long as she could, but he hoped, that i n the case of a d o l l a r -
less B r i t a i n , U.S. supplies of war materials would continue 
anyway. Church i l l pleaded f o r immediate assistance, i n 
par t i cu la r f o r destroyers to safeguard the sea-lanes. On May 16, 
Roosevelt repl ied sympathetically, but stated qui te c lear ly that 
the transfer of destroyers to the U.K. now under consideration, 
would require Congressional author isa t ion. Nevertheless, the 
f a t e of B r i t a i n , and p a r t i c u l a r l y of her f l e e t , caused increas-
ing concern f o r the Americans during the month of May, 
Cn May 1*+th Church i l l encouraged U.S. Ambassador Kennedy to 
consider the p o s s i b i l i t y that i f the destroyers were t ransferred 
to the U.K. they would s t i l l be available to defend the U.S. 
even i n the event of a B r i t i s h collapse. Both Lothian and 
Church i l l wanted to use th is p o s s i b i l i t y as a bargaining counter 
f o r the Immediate t ransfer of the destroyers. At the same time 
they did not want the f ac t that even the p o s s i b i l i t y of defeat 
was being considered o f f i c i a l l y , f o r obvious morale reasons. 
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Kennedy communicated Church i l l ' s suggestions to Roosevelt, wi th 
whom Lothian took up the matter to the extent of proposing a 
t ransfer of the B r i t i s h Fleet to the U.S., i f she would become 
a co-bel l igerent . Roosevelt answered non-committally, that such 
would be a matter f o r Congress to decide. On May 9, Church i l l 
pointedly stated i n a l e t t e r to the President tha t , although the 
present government would never surrender, there could 
conceivably be a general collapse i n which a puppet government 
might use the f l e e t as i t s only remaining bargaining counter to 
obta in reasonable surrender condit ions, Church i l l was exasperated 
by the d i l a t o r y actions of the U.S. government. I n July B r i t i s h 
and a l l i e d shipping losses were approaching the ^00,000 gross 
tons mark. On the 31st Church i l l i n desperation t o l d Roosevelt 
that the whole war could hinge upon whether the U.S. t ransferred 
(12) 
the destroyers to the U.K. or not. 
I n f a c t , already i n June, some favourable developments f o r 
B r i t a i n had occurred i n the U.S. Admiral Ghorm&y and Generals 
Strong and Emmons began informal s t a f f ta lks with t h e i r 
B r i t i s h counterparts, though Roosevelt turned down H u l l ' s 
proposal that the ta lks should be placed on a formal f o o t i n g . 
On June 12, Lothian wrote to Lady Astor that a staggering change 
had occurred i n the U.S. during the previous f o r t n i g h t and that 
the Americans were now helping the a l l i e s with everything short 
o f w a r . ^ 1 ^ This was an exaggeration, but there had been an 
undoubted s h i f t i n the adminis t ra t ion 's a t t i t udes . This was 
p a r t l y re f lec ted i n the appointments of Knox and Stimson as 
(12) For de ta i l s of above see 'Their Finest Hour ' , 
W.S.Churchil l , Cassell, p.639 and J ,R.M.Butler , Op.Cit. 
(13) See J .R.M.Butler , Op.Cit. 
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Secretaries of Navy and War respect ively . Both favoured an 
in t e rven t ion i s t f o r e ign po l i cy . On August 1 , Lothian took the 
opportunity of a meeting wi th them, to press the case f o r the 
t ransfer of destroyers to the U.K. and met wi th a favourable 
response. Harold Ickes, Secretary of the I n t e r i o r and 
Henry Morgenthau, Treasury Secretary, were also by th i s time i n 
favour o f a destroyers deal . Consequently on August 2 , the 
U.S. Cabinet agreed i n p r inc ip le to the t ransfer of the 
destroyers, but also acknowledged that Congress might prove 
r eca l c i t r an t and would not only require a quid pro quo but one 
that could be c lea r ly seen as such. Thus i t was la ter suggested 
to Lothian that an assurance regarding the f a t e of the B r i t i s h 
Fleet might prove a sa t i s fac tory quid pro quo. This l a t t e r 
point was emphasised by Sumner Welles, H u l l ' s deputy i n the 
Department of State. Although Welles was held i n high regard 
by Eden, x the Foreign O f f i c e had developed cer ta in reservations 
about him, largely because they believed he had been somewhat 
over-influenced by H i t l e r and Mussolini during his February 19^0 
peace mission. ^ ^ j n v i e w 0 f t h i s , the s igni f icance o f a 
quid pro quo was downgraded by the B r i t i s h . I n any case they 
were re luctant to make any commitment concerning the navy, which 
might indicate any p o s s i b i l i t y of defeat . Instead the B r i t i s h 
Government resurrected the idea of bases f o r the U.S. which had 
been previously discussed. 
See Eden, 'The Reckoning' Cassell , 1965 , p . ^ ' i . 
(15) See ' B r i t i s h Foreign Policy During the Second World War', 
Sir Llewel lyn Woodward H.M.S.O. London, 1962, p M . 
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The main question now, as f a r as the U.S. was concerned, 
was the nature of the bargain that was to be concluded. Here 
B r i t a i n found a good f r i e n d i n the form of Dean Acheson, On 
August 11th, Acheson along with B.V.Cohen, T.D.Thatcher -
formerly a New York d i s t r i c t judge and S o l i c i t o r General I n the 
Hoover Adminis t ra t ion - and George Rublee, drew up a document 
of legal considerations, which indicated that Roosevelt had the 
author i ty to t ransfer the destroyers to the U.K. , providing the 
Chief of Naval Operations stated that they were not necessary 
f o r the defence of the U.S. The incumbent Attorney General 
R.H.Jackson received the document favourably and i t appeared that 
only Roosevelt remained to be convinced. Once again Acheson set 
to work and brought favourable opinions to bear c i r cu l tous ly v i a , 
Lothian, Lord Athlone Governor General of Canada and the 
Canadian P.M., McKenzie K i n g / 1 6 ' 
F i n a l l y , Roosevelt agreed and Lothian discussed the terms 
of the agreement wi th Admiral Stark and Knox on August 27 and 
again w i t h H u l l on the 29th . On September 2, the f i n a l agree-
ment was signed. The U.S. received 99 year leases on bases i n 
Newfoundland, the West Indies and B r i t i s h Guiana and B r i t a i n i n 
r e tu rn received f i f t y obsolete destroyers and a small miscellany 
of other war mater ials . Church i l l presented the agreement to 
Parliament on September 5> as two p a r a l l e l transactions. While 
i n the U.S. the agreement was presented as a single whole quid 
pro quo business agreement. Furthermore, there was an 
addi t iona l statement that i n the un l ike ly event of a B r i t i s h 
defeat the f l e e t would be neither scutt led nor surrendered but 
(16) See 'Morning and Noon 1, Dean Acheson, DUO . Houghton M i f f l i n , 
pp 222-22^. 
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sent overseas. The f i n a l comment on the agreement i s l e f t to 
C h u r c h i l l . 
"There was of course no comparison between t i e 
i n t r i n s i c value of these antiquated and i n e f f i c i e n t 
c r a f t and the immense permanent s t ra tegic security 
of fe red the United States by the enjoyment of the 
island bases " (17) 
T.'ie deal was indeed a s i g n i f i c a n t omen. I t was character-
i s t i c o f an ethos which permeated the American Adminis t ra t ion . 
I t i s true that neither side hesitated i n using diplomacy to 
f u r t h e r economic In teres ts , but the U.S. ce r ta in ly did th i s more 
over t ly and more ru th less ly . Much was later to be made by the 
U.S. of the i r determination that the interests of the U.S. and 
not a l t r u i s t i c pr incip les were to determine American po l i cy . 
However, the imp l i ca t ion that they ever did was s l i g h t l y 
r i d i c u l o u s . Unfortunately the ruthless pursuit by the U.S. of 
t h e i r own economic interests at the expense of B r i t a i n 1 s was not 
immediately perceived by the B r i t i s h even a f t e r the destroyers ' 
dea l . I t was to be some months before the B r i t i s h real ised that 
they were to be given no quarter by the Americans regarding 
economic and f i n a n c i a l considerations. 
The Americans, by August 19^0, were concerned by the 
collapse of France and the danger to the B r i t i s h Fleet . Many 
Americans, and cer ta in ly the adminis t ra t ion, would have regarded 
with dis taste and apprehension a Nazi v i c t o r y . There was now a 
more posi t ive wil l ingness to help: but only at the going r a t e , 
and that required businesslike negotiat ions. I n t h i s case, the 
purchase of s t rategic bases with old destroyers at an i n f l a t e d 
p r i ce . A hard bargain, and i n some people's views, i t was hardly 
(17) Chu rch i l l , Op.Cit. p .357. 
playing the diplomatic game. I t was d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, 
to establish a common evaluative denominator f o r an exchange 
(1 8) 
of destroyers f o r s trategic bases. ; I t was thought by some, 
that diplomacy should not cross subject area boundaries, one 
country gaining economically from strategic considerations fo r 
example. Unfortunately fo r B r i t a i n , she was no longer able to 
d i c t a t e the rules of the diplomatic game. I t was now someone 
else 's turn to attempt to organise an in t e rna t iona l system, and 
the s ty le and content of diplomacy that would accompany i t . 
The need to exchange bases f o r destroyers was of course a 
symptom of B r i t a i n ' s f i n a n c i a l problems. Thus i n July 19^0, 
Si r Fredrick P h i l l i p s of the B r i t i s h Treasury journeyed to the 
U.S. wi th the i n t e n t i o n of persuading the Americans to a l l e v i a t e 
B r i t a i n ' s f i n a n c i a l problems i n some way. Unfortunately, so 
soon a f t e r Dunkirk, May 29 - June 3 , the Americans regarded 
B r i t a i n as a sinking ship and were na tura l ly re luctant to put 
money in to her. Roosevelt and his adminis t ra t ion made i t clear 
to P h i l l i p s that i t would not be easy fo r him to obta in f i n a n c i a l 
assistance. Furthermore, they repeated the i r previous pos i t ion 
that B r i t a i n would have to s t r i p herself of a l l d o l l a r s , gold 
and marketable overseas assets, before the American Government 
could make any formal moves to help. Nevertheless, P h i l l i p s 
o p t i m i s t i c a l l y continued to put out feelers f o r a i d , and despite 
the absence of any U.S. commitment to providing B r i t a i n with 
a i d , she continued to forward contract i n the U.S. , on the 
assumption, that America would provide such a id . I n Ju ly , there 
s t i l l appeared to be no immediate l i q u i d i t y problem. I t had been 
(13) See 'Economic Planning f o r the Peace' 
Penrose, E.F., Princeton U.P., New Jersey, 
U.S., 1953, C h . I , 
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estimated that B r i t a i n could maintain her cash and carry 
programme wel l in to 1 9Lf1 • However, i n August, re-assessments 
d r a s t i c a l l y a l tered the p ic ture . The goal of 3 ,000 planes a 
month, set by the government, was costing B r i t a i n dearly and 
since the Spring of 19^0 the Americans, understandably, had been 
i n s i s t i n g on more advance payments. The resul tant s t r a i n on 
B r i t a i n ' s reserves and the threat to s t e r l i ng was i n turn 
endangering Dominion and Empire sources of supply, previously 
obtained because of a wi l l ingness , on the i r par t , to accumulate 
s t e r l i n g balances. Such a wil l ingness was now being undermined. 
The pos i t ion was indeed d i r e . I n August the U.S.Cabinet refused 
to give loans to B r i t a i n on the grounds that 
a) they could not be s u f f i c i e n t because of Congressional 
opposi t ion, arid 
b) a l l i e d war debts might impair the peace settlements. (19) 
There were i n f ac t p o l i t i c a l considerations involved here as w e l l . 
Apart from the impending pres ident ia l e lec t ion and the e f f e c t s 
adverse p u b l i c i t y might have upon i t , occasioned by proposals 
f o r loans to B r i t a i n , the adminis t rat ion was re luctant to act 
prec ip i tous ly as th i s might endanger her bargaining pos i t i on . 
I n Ju ly , Morgenthau had suggested to P h i l l i p s that B r i t a i n 
should s e l l a l l her fo re ign assets, and jus t p r io r to the 
November elections Lothian again reported to trie B r i t i s h Govern-
ment that they would be expected to s e l l a l l the i r South 
American assets and those they held i n the United States. 
I n fac t the Liquidation of B r i t a i n ' s overseas assets was 
wel l under-way, despite the i r depressed market value. Between 
August 19^0 and March 19^1, B r i t a i n sold approximately £70m 
worth of assets. And yet , as time passed, American a t t i tudes 
(19) See Notter, Op.Cit. pp.37-38. 
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appeared to become more and more demanding. During P h i l l i p s ' 
v i s i t to the U.S. i n November, the Americans suggested fu r the r 
sales and that B r i t a i n should commandeer a l l i e d gold and d o l l a r 
reserves. Despite these harsh demands the re -e lec t ion of 
Roosevelt on November 5> was the signal fo r a renewed e f f o r t 
to help B r i t a i n . Meanwhile, at the Board o f Trade i n England, 
Oliver L y t t e l t o n ^ 2 0 ^ was suggesting non-economic concessions to 
the U.S. and/or a loan repayable i n goods over a period of f i v e 
years. But the Treasury was already.deeply concerned about the 
postwar balance o f payments pos i t ion and the adverse e f fec t s 
unrequited exports would have on t h i s . On December 7, Church i l l 
wrote to Roosevelt spe l l ing out B r i t a i n ' s supply d i f f i c u l t i e s 
and the s t rategic implicat ions involved i f they were not met. 
The extremity of the s i t u a t i o n may be Infer red from the f o l l o w i n g 
record of the l e t t e r made by Cordell H u l l . 
" . . . he ( i . e . W.3.C.) gave an in t ima t ion of fu tu re 
union of Northern Ireland and Eire (which would 
have paid o f f a l o t of p o l i t i c a l in te res t to 
Roosevelt) by saying: " I do not doubt that i f the 
Government of Eire would show i t s s o l i d a r i t y with 
the democracies of the English-speaking world at 
th is c r i s i s , a Council of Defence of a l l I reland 
could be set up out of which the un i ty of the island 
would probably i n some form or other emerge a f t e r 
the war"." (21 ) 
Strange words indeed from His Majesty's F i r s t Minister who 
did not wish to preside over the d i s so lu t ion of the B r i t i s h 
Empire, 
(20) President, Oct. 3 , 19^0 - June 29, 1 9*+1 -
(21) "Memoirs of Cordell H u l l " , Vo l . 11 , Header and Stoughton, 
London, 19^8, p .922. 
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According to Sherwood^ the President brooded over 
Churcn i l l ' s Letter f o r some days. On December 17 th , hooseveLt 
acted. At a press conference i n Washington, he suggested that 
extensive aid should be made available to the U.K. by aboLishing 
the do l l a r sign. This was the beginning of what was to become 
Lend-Lease .^ ^  
While Roosevelt had been slowly working out ideas on how 
to help B r i t a i n , the deplet ion of her resources r e l en t l e s s ly 
continued. The shortage of hard currency was now acute. On 
December 12, P h i l l i p s reported that Morgenthau had suggested 
B r i t a i n should take over £200m worth of French gold stored 
safely i n Canada. B r i t a i n was re luctant to do so fo r a number 
of p o l i t i c a l reasons and the Canadian Government was i n f u l l 
accordance with th i s because of the s e n s i t i v i t i e s of the 
Quebec French. The matter of B r i t a i n ' s gold and do l l a r shortages 
was reported to Roosevelt. The President, rather high-handedly, 
decided that , without pr ior consul tat ion with the U.K. , he 
would send the U.S.5, L o u i s v i l l e to South A f r i c a to pick up a l l 
the remaining gold there that had been earmarked fo r the U.K. 
Church i l l was understandably f u r i o u s , but although th i s was 
acknowledged with some sympathy i n the U.S. , i t d id not change 
the course of events that had been set i n motion. B r i t a i n was 
n o t i f i e d on January 26, 19^1, of the safe a r r i v a l i n the U.S. 
of £^2m worth of gold. The 3 r i t i s h f e l t hard-done-by having the 
las t dregs of the i r reserves carted o f f i n an American ship on 
(22) Op.Cit. p.22**. 
(23) Lend-Lease was based on a statute of 1882 which 
empowered the S.S. fo r War to lease or lend army 
property f o r the public good. The Lend-Lease B i l l 
of 19^ -1 was draf ted largely i n the Treasury by 
Edward H. Foley, General Counsel and his assistant , 
Oscar Cox, with background work on B r i t i s h f i n a n c i a l 
problems by a Treasury lawyer, Herman Oliphant. 
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the basis of a u n i l a t e r a l decision by Roosevelt. On the other 
hand, Morgenthau, who as far back as July 5» 19^0, had received 
a B r i t i s h memorandum stat ing the d i f f i c u l t i e s of fu r the r gold 
or do l l a r payments, was becoming suspicious of B r i t a i n ' s 
p l a i n t i v e cries o f poverty when £h2m i n gold could be summoned 
up so qu ick ly . 
I n mid-February the last spectacular American demand before 
Lend-Lease was presented by Morgenthau i n terms of a Pres ident ia l 
ultimatum. Morgenthau demanded the sale of something big a 
week before he was to appear before the Senate Committee on 
Lend-Lease Appropriat ions. This Congressional sweetener turned 
out to be the sale of the #120m Viscose Corporation of America, 
97% owned by Courthaulds, f o r one third of i t s normal value. 
The Americans had been true to the i r word. B r i t a i n had been 
t o l d that she would have to s t r i p herself of marketable assets 
and reserves before o f f i c i a l aid could be obtained from the 
U.S. I t i s too early to judge whether t h i s , and fu tu re po l ic ies 
of a s imilar nature, were due to a fear of public and Congress-
iona l react ion against a milder po l i cy , or whether i t was the 
del iberate and in t en t iona l pol icy of the adminis t ra t ion to br ing 
about changes i n B r i t i s h economic and monetary pol ic ies by such 
means. This i s ce r ta in ly a problem which w i l l have to be 
resolved eventually. S t i l l , i n 19^1 , B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s appear 
to have been under a misapprehension regarding the i r personal 
re la t ions with the i r American counterparts and the e f f e c t o f 
such re la t ions upon the negotiat ions. P h i l l i p s ' o f t repeated 
descr ip t ion of Morgenthau1s help and sympathy bel led the hard 
bargainer. During the Congressional hearings Morgenthau 
committed the adminis t ra t ion to r e s t r i c t i o n s on the use of Lend-
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Lease which went fu r the r than the act I t s e l f , and which were 
(2^) 
more In imica l to B r i t i s h in te res t s . Feelings among B r i t i s h 
ministers began to run nigh, de t a i l s of which w i l l be considered 
l a t e r . However, as eerly as December 26, 19^0, Beaverbrook 
expressed his fee l ings to Church i l l I n no uncertain terms. 
" I t would appear that the United States are demanding 
our South A f r i c a n gold and proposing to carry i t 
away. 
That i s a decision which I would res i s t very strongly 
and seek to destroy with every means i n my power. 
Our f i n a n c i a l re la t ions wi th the Americans have been so 
loosely handled that I t i s necessary, now and f o r t h w i t h 
to take up a f i r m pol icy and to pursue I t i n the face o f 
obstacles and even to the extent o f rupture ." (25) 
U n t i l November, 19^0, the Americans had used the 
pres iden t ia l elect ions as an excuse fo r the inopportuni ty of 
conceding economic help to B r i t a i n . A f t e r November the admin-
i s t r a t i o n moved more r ap id ly , but hardly more palatably, i n 
e f f o r t s to provide B r i t a i n with the materials she required to 
continue her war e f f o r t . There had undoubtedly been a s h i f t i n 
the adminis t ra t ion 's outlook during 19^0. 
(2^+) Morgenthau gave assurances regarding the immediate 
adequacy of U.K. do l l a r and gold holdings. The 
Director of the Budget went even f u r t h e r : 
1. None of the # 7 B was to be used f o r o ld U.K.contracts. 
2. Said U.K. assets s u f f i c i e n t to meet ( 1 ) . 
3 . Any B r i t i s h assets i n U.S. to be used as security 
f o r a r t i c l e s supplied under Lend-Lease. 
However, Morgenthau thought th i s went too f a r and as the 
Director was no longer i n the Treasury but i n the 
President's Executive O f f i c e , he d id not regard himself 
as bound by such statements. I n May 19^2, a f t e r prolonged 
prevar ica t ion, Morgenthau gave the U.K. 3290m c redi t f o r 
pre-Lend-Lease goods. 
(25) 'Beaverbrook' - A.J .P.Taylor , Hamlsh Hamilton, London, 1972, 
pp. ^ 3 9 - ^ 0 . 
20 
On December 29> 19^0, Roosevelt i n his Christmas broadcast 
said i 
"A Nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the 
price of t o t a l surrender . . . . 
Such a dic ta ted peace would be no peace at a l l . I t 
would be only another armis t ice , leading to the most 
gigant ic armament race and the most devastating trade 
wars i n h i s to ry (26) 
These were d i f f e r e n t sentiments indeed from the ones he had 
expressed at the outbreak of the war. S t i l l , t h i s s h i f t did not 
mit igate the harshness of America's bargaining wi th the U.K. 
The next stages i n such bargaining were the negot ia t ion of the 
Master Lend-Lease Agreement of February 23 , 19^2, and abortive 
attempts to supplement the 1938 Anglo-American Trade Agreement. 
During these negotiations a good deal of the problems, which 
were to pers i s ten t ly beset Anglo-U.S. re la t ions f o r the rest o f 
the war, came to l i g h t . 
With the re -e lec t ion of Roosevelt on November 5 th , 19^0, 
the Americans decided that the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n now allowed 
them to take the i n i t i a t i v e i n attempting to modify some of 
B r i t a i n ' s objectionable trade pract ices. During 19^0, B r i t a i n 
had t r i e d to finance her war e f f o r t by an export dr ive and at 
the same time, had tightened controls over imports. Neither of 
these pol ic ies pleased the Americans, and by November 19^0, 
especial ly as B r i t a i n was becoming more and more dependent on 
the U.S. fo r supplies, they decided that i t was an opportune 
moment to consider supplements to the 1938 trade agreement. 
Accordingly, informal proposals were submitted to the B r i t i s h . 
I n substance the Americans wanted B r i t a i n to reduce imper ia l 
preference on goods of in teres t to the U.S. i n re tu rn f o r 
rec iproca l reductions of t a r i f f s on goods s i g n i f i c a n t to U.K. 
purchasers. The reduction of t a r i f f s would be l imi t ed to 50$ 
(26) Sherwood, Op.Cit. p .226. 
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under H.T.A.A. l e g i s l a t i o n . I n addi t ion to t h i s there was a 
proposal fo r a deferred bene f i t , which would accrue to the 
Americans at the end of the war. This was to consist of a pledge 
by B r i t a i n to a pol icy of import de-control at the end of the 
war. These preparatory talks were carried out Ln Washington by 
S t i r l i n g from the B r i t i s h Minis t ry of Economic Warfare and 
Harry Hawkins, U.S. Under-Secretary of S t a t e . B y May 1 9*+1 , 
the negotiations were running in to trouble on the issues of 
import de-control and preferences. On May 9» 1 9 l +1 , the Board of 
Trade sent two amendments to be incorporated Into previous 
B r i t i s h proposals given to Hawkins. I t was hoped that they 
would c l a r i f y the B r i t i s h pos i t ion f o r the Americans. The 
amendments ran as f o l l o w s : -
" (1 ) but , the United Kingdom Government attaching 
v i t a l Importance, as they must f o r reasons of 
nat ional secur i ty , to the welfare of the metal-using 
industr ies a f t e r the war, and regarding the assurance 
o f a substantial market i n overseas parts of the 
Kmpire essential to that welfare , could not a f f o r d to 
surrender the advantages accorded to the i r exports of 
metal goods l n Dominion markets. 
(2) The United Kingdom Government must i n candour 
make i t clear that they may be compelled because of 
scarci ty of Exchange to maintain r e s t r i c t i o n s upon 
imports of tobacco and other American goods a f t e r the 
war. " (28) 
The amendments i n fac t were i n clear opposi t ion to the two 
main concessions the Americans were demanding. S t i r l i n g discussed 
the prop-sals with Hawkins who strongly advised against t he i r 
adoption. He claimed H u l l ' s reactions would be most unfavourable, 
i f they were accepted by S t i r l i n g , and Intimated f u r t h e r , that 
H u l l ! s react ion could jeopardise what progress had already been 
(27) Hawkins was also head of State Department d i v i s i o n of 
Commercial Policy and Agreements. 
(28) A3^35/235 l+/ l+5 Board of Trade to S t i r l i n g , May 9, 19^1. 
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made. Hawkins agreed t h a t B r i t a i n shou ld have some p r o v i s i o n s 
to h e l p her cope w i t h pos t -wa r monetary d i f f i c u l t i e s and 
suggested t h a t i t was the Board o f T r a d e ' s mode o f e x p r e s s i o n 
r a t h e r t h a n the c o n t e n t o f the s a f e g u a r d s t h a t was o b j e c t i o n -
(29) 
a b l e . 7 H a w k i n s ' o p i n i o n h e r e , i n v i ew o f the b e l i e f s H u l l 
was known t o h o l d , appeared somewhat o v e r - o p t i m i s t i c to the 
Board o f Trade who r e f u s e d to be moved i n subs t ance . 
"We do n o t w i s h to i n s i s t upon proposed a d d i t i o n s to 
Ambassador ' s l e t t e r U 3 l + 3 5 / 2 3 5 ^ A 5 ) ? b u t we must 
be f u l l y a s s u r e d , b e f o r e b e i n g commit ted to f o r m a l 
n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h a t these r e s e r v a t i o n s a re accep ted i n 
p r i n c i p l e by U n i t e d S t a t e s Government . " (30) 
Fears i n E n g l a n d , o f H u l l ' s p o s t - w a r i n t e n t i o n s , were 
s u b s t a n t i a t e d o n May 1 8 t h , when H u l l spoke a t the i n a u g u r a t i o n 
o f the N a t i o n a l F o r e i g n Trade Week. The speech was w i d e l y 
d e s c r i b e d by the press as the f i r s t a u t h o r i t a t i v e s t a t emen t o f 
t he U n i t e d S t a t e s peace a ims . They c o n s i s t e d , s u b s t a n t i a l l y o f 
t he f o l l o w i n g f i v e p r i n c i p l e s . 
1 . ext reme n a t i o n a l i s m must n o t be a l l o w e d to express i t s e l f 
i n e x c e s s i v e t r a d e r e s t r i c t i o n s , 
2. n o n - d l s c r i m l n a t i o n must be the r u l e no t the e x c e p t i o n i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l commerc ia l r e l a t i o n s , 
3. new m a t e r i a l s u p p l i e s must be a v a i l a o l e t o a l l n a t i o n s 
w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements r e g u l a t i n g the s u p p l y o f 
commodi t i es must p r o t e c t f u l l y the i n t e r e s t s o f the 
consuim'ing c o u n t r i e s , 
(29) See S t i r l i n g to Board o f T r a a e , May 1 1 , 19^1 , 
A3 l+95/235V l*5. 
(30) Board o f Trade to S t i r l i n g , A3565/235A5. 
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5. i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c e must a i d t he e s s e n t i a l e n t e r p r i s e s 
and development o f the r e c i p i e n t c o u n t r i e s and p e r m i t 
repayment t h r o u g h processes o f t r a d e . ( 3 1 ) 
T h i s speech and the problems emerging i n A n g l o - A m e r i c a n 
economic n e g o t i a t i o n s caused c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n s t e r n a t i o n i n 
(•32) 
B r i t a i n . I n p a r t i c u l a r Leopo ld Amery -* was moved to w r i t e a 
s t r o n g l e t t e r to Eden, e x p r e s s i n g h i s f e a r s o f H u l l ' s economic 
d o c t r i n e s . Amery i n d i c a t e d the dangers o f abandoning i m p e r i a l 
p r e f e r e n c e i n any agreement w i t h the A m e r i c a n s , e s p e c i a l l y as 
t he r e t u r n o f a R e p u b l i c a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would p r o b a b l y r e v i v e 
and i n t e n s i f y the U . S . h i g h t a r i f f p o l i c y . He c o n t i n u e d w i t h 
the a l l e g a t i o n t h a t H u l l was an anachron i sm, who c o u l d d r a g 
B r i t a i n i n t o d i s a s t r o u s economic commitments , w h i c h would o n l y 
l e ad to b i t t e r m u t u a l A n g l o - U . S . r e c r i m i n a t i o n s . ^ - ^ Amery was 
n o t a l one i n h i s f e a r s , b o t h J .M.Keynes and the C h a n c e l l o r o f 
the Exchequer , KIngs ley-Wood were d i s t u r b e d by the Amer i can l i n e 
o f t h i n k i n g . Amery ' s l e t t e r was w i d e l y c i r c u l a t e d i n government 
c i r c l e s and r e c e i v e d a r e p l y f r o m Eden a week l a t e r . 
" . . . I con fe s s I am a l a r m e d , n o t so much by Mr . H u l l ' s 
c o n s e r v a t i v e ideas abou t the M o s t - F a v o u r e d - N a t i o n C l a u s e , 
as by the absence o f any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t he A m e r i c a n 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e c o g n i s e the i n f i n i t e harm done to 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic s e c u r i t y and s t a b i l i t y by what 
Keynes c a l l s the "unba lanced c r e d i t o r p o s i t i o n o f the 
U . S . A . » (3*0 
(31) See H a l i f a x t o Eden, June 9 t h , 19^1. A V J 9 5 / 3 7 9 5 A 5 -
H a l i f a x commented t h a t g e n e r a l v iews o f S t a t e Depar tment 
were i n ev idence i n t h i s speech, 
(32) I n d i a and Burma O f f i c e , May 13, 19^0-^5. 
(33) Amery to Eden May 30, 19^1 , W6669/37A9-
(31*) Eden to Amery, June 6, 19*+1> W6669 /37A9. 
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The two b a s i c p r o b l e m a t l c a l eLements I n the t r a d e t a l k s 
were p r e f e r e n c e s and i m p o r t d e c o n t r o l . There was a l s o a t h i r d 
t e c h n i c a l p rob lem which was to b r i n g about a t empora ry pause i n 
the b i l a t e r a l U . S . - U . K . t a l k s . The problem c o n s i s t e d o f the 
p o s i t i o n o f tne Dominions v i s - a - v i s the I m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e 
sys tem. A t Ot tawa f r o m J u l y 21 t o August 20, 1932, a s e r i e s o f 
b i l a t e r a l p r e f e r e n c e agreements had been s i gned by B r i t a i n and 
the members o f he r Commonwealth and E m p i r e . The A m e r i c a n 
p r o p o s a l s , were i n e f f e c t , demanding a u n i l a t e r a l a b r o g a t i o n o f 
t hese agreements by the U . K . T h i s would r e s u l t i n a s i g n i f i c a n t 
l o s s o f U . K . marke ts f o r the Domin ions w i t h o u t any p r o v i s i o n s 
f o r compensa t ion . I t was i m p o s s i b l e f o r B r i t a i n , i n the economic 
p o s i t i o n she was i n a t t h a t t i m e , to o f f e r compensa t ion , so the 
o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e was the n e g o t i a t i o n o f sepa ra te agreements 
be tween the U . S . and the D o m i n i o n s , On May 23, H a l i f a x i n f o r m e d 
London t h a t H u l l was i n f a v o u r o f such t a l k s , w h i c h would have 
to be accompl i shed b e f o r e any f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s I n the U . S . - U . K . 
t a l k s c o u l d be made. Such a pause was no t unwelcomed by the 
B r i t i s h , and Indeed t h i s was no t to be the l a s t t i m e t h a t the 
Dominions were i n t r o d u c e d i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s by the B r i t i s h on 
the p r e t e x t o f t h e i r i m p o r t a n c e b u t a l s o w i t h the u l t e r i o r 
m o t i v e o f d e l a y i n g p r o g r e s s . 
As f a r as B r i t a i n was c o n c e r n e d , t he proposed new t a l k s 
were to be f o r s epa ra te D o m i n i o n - U . S . t r a d e agreements to 
compensate f o r a r e d u c t i o n i n the m a r g i n o f p r e f e r e n c e o n 
canned and d r i e d f r u i t , p r e v i o u s l y g i v e n to the D o m i n i o n s . 
H o p e f u l l y , such agreements would be f o l l o w e d by a U . S . - U . K . 
o n e , i n which f o r a r e d u c t i o n o f the U . K . tobacco p r e f e r e n c e 
f o r 19^+2, the U .S . would reduce by the maximum 50^, d u t i e s o n 
i t e m s o f i n t e r e s t i n Schedule o f the 1938 Agreement and o n 
25 
c e r t a i n o t h e r a r t i c L e s o f i n t e r e s t to B r i t a i n . F i n a l l y , B r i t a i n 
a l s o wanted the U . S . to acknowledge B r i t a i n ' s f r e e d o m to 
m a i n t a i n i m p o r t c o n t r o l s on schedu led i t e m s to meet her p o s t -
war exchange d i f f i c u l t i e s . J J 4 
D u r i n g the l a t t e r p a r t o f May and the month o f June the 
t r a d e t a l k s s h i f t e d t o a lower g e a r . N e v e r t h e l e s s , by e a r l y 
J u l y i t was oecoming c l e a r t h a t problems were p e r s i s t i n g . Keynes 
t o l d Hawkins p l a i n l y t h a t Amer i ca m i g h t be a s k i n g the i m p o s s i b l e 
o f B r i t a i n i f the U . S . m a i n t a i n e d i t s c r e d i t o r p o s i t i o n , an 
e x p o r t b a l a n c e , r e f u s e d to l end abroad and a t the same t ime 
i n s i s t e d t h a t B r i t a i n d i spense w i t h her d e f e n c e s o f b i l a t e r a l 
a r rangements and economic c o n t r o l s . However, Hawkins r e f u s e d to 
be conv inced o f the n e c e s s i t y o f such ar rangements even f o r a 
t empora ry p o s t - w a r t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . A v i e w t h a t had changed 
f r o m a few months p r e v i o u s l y . F u r t h e r m o r e , Hawkins expressed 
t he o p i n i o n t h a t B r i t a i n ' s m a i n t a i n a n c e o f such c o n t r o l s would 
cause a f u r o r e among Amer ican e x p o r t e r s a f t e r the war , which t he 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n would oe unab l e t o countenance . F i n a l l y , H u l l , 
he s a i d , would r e c o g n i s e no agreement which even appeared to 
i n v o l v e , as a p r i n c i p l e , such r e s t r i c t i o n s . I n f a c t , he was 
even r e l u c t a n t to b roach the p r o b l e m s , r a i s e d by K e y n e s , w i t h 
H u l l f o r f e a r o f h i s u n f a v o u r a b l e r esponse . 
(36) 
There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t by e a r l y J u l y b o t h s ide s were 
b e g i n n i n g to have doub t s about the e f f i c a c y o f c o n t i n u i n g the 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . So much so t h a t on J u l y 5> H a l i f a x sent a t e l e g r a m 
to the C h a n c e l l o r and the P r e s i d e n t o f the Board o f Trade 
(35) See Domin ions o f f i c e to Rhodes i a . A^191 / 2 3 5 A 5 , 
(36) S t i r l i n g t o F .O . J u l y 5, 19**1 , W8681A26A9. 
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summar is ing the p o s i t i o n and r e q u e s t i n g a d e f i n i t e d e c i s i o n , 
H u l l s t i l l u n d o u b t e d l y wanted a r e v i s i o n o f the 1938 Agreement 
and was even p r e p a r e d to d e v i a t e s l i g h t l y f r o m the M . F . N , 
p r i n c i p l e . He was p r epa red to reduce t a r i f f s f o r B r i t i s h c o u n t e r 
c o n c e s s i o n s . As f a r as the B r i t i s h were concerned t h o u g h , a 
m a j o r p rob lem was H u l l ! s i g n o r a n c e o f B r i t a i n ' s economic p rob lems 
Problems wh ich m i g h t f o r c e B r i t a i n to adopt p o l i c i e s t h a t were 
d o c t r i n a l l y a b h o r e n t t o H u l l . I n v iew o f the l o s s o f f i n a n c i a l 
and m a t e r i a l a s se t s and the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f r e - c o n v e r t i n g t o a 
peace - t ime economy n e i t h e r Keynes nor P h i l l i p s c o u l d env i sage 
how B r i t a i n ' s b a l a n c e o f payments problems were to be r i g h t e d 
w i t h o u t r e s o r t to such p o l i c i e s . ~" 
S t i r l i n g was d o u b t f u l i f the Americans c o u l d be persuaded 
t o accep t the i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f such p o l i c i e s , d e s p i t e the good-
w i l l o f c e r t a i n members o f the S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
he s t r o n g l y u rged t h a t a t t e m p t s to f a m i l i a r i s e t he Amer icans 
w i t h B r i t i s h problems shou ld c o n t i n u e , even i f o n l y to s t a r t t h e 
' s o f t e n i n g up process on H u l l ' , T h i s p o l i c y o f a t t r i t i o n was 
condoned by K i n g s l e y - W o o d and S i r A. D u n c a n ^ ^ , though they 
emphasised the f a c t t h a t B r i t a i n would n o t be f o r c e d i n t o u n d e r -
t a k i n g commitments by the Amer icans t h a t she wou ld be unab le t o 
f u l f i l , no m a t t e r how u n p a l a t a b l e t h i s migh t be t o S e c r e t a r y 
H u l l . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y H u l l was n o t the o n l y one t o a p p r a i s e t he 
d i f f i c u l t i e s I n a c c u r a t e l y . There appears to have been a 
r e l u c t a n c e , o r an i n a b i l i t y , on the B r i t i s h s i d e t o see t h a t 
(37) L a t e r i n the yea r Keynes was to change h i s p o s i t i o n 
somewhat, p a r t l y i n f l u e n c e d by J.E.Meade he saw a 
more p a l a t a b l e s o l u t i o n i n terms o f an e f f e c t i v e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
(38) P r e s i d e n t Board o f T r a d e , May 12 - October 3, 19^0. 
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t h e r e was an i m p o r t a n t and s u b s t a n t i a l c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t s 
h e r e . S t i r l i n g a t t e m p t e d to compromise w i t h t he A m e r i c a n s , 
though w i t h l i t t l e success . He t r i e d to g a i n agreement o n the 
b a s i s o f t h r e e new p r o p o s a l s , 
a) t h a t w a r - t i m e r e s t r i c t i o n s wou ld be phased out- i n a c c o r d -
ance w i t h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
b ) c o n t r o l s would be a l l o w e d o n exchange g r o u n d s , 
c) each p a r t y had the r i g h t t o w i t h d r a w f r o m the agreement 
i f i t b e l i e v e d the o t h e r was a b u s i n g i t s r i g h t s under ( b ) . 
The p l a n was n o t a c c e p t a b l e t o the A m e r i c a n s . S t i r l i n g , 
t h o u g h , s t i l l r e c o g n i s e d the i m p o r t a n c e o f t r y i n g to r each a 
modus v i v e n d i w i t h them, p r e f e r a b l y one wh ich would a l l o w 
t r a n s i t i o n a l c o n t r o l s . 
H a l i f a x was somewhat l e s s r e a l i s t i c . He b e l i e v e d H u l l ' s 
i n f l u e n c e c o u l d be c i r c u m n a v i g a t e d and a s a t i s f a c t o r y agreement 
o n t r a n s i t i o n a l problems r eached , l e a v i n g the l o n g terra p rob lems 
f o r d i s c u s s i o n l a t e r when t h i n g s were c l e a r e r . The success o f 
the agreement depended, he b e l i e v e d , s i m p l y o n h a n d l i n g and 
p r e s e n t a t i o n . Eden, K ings l ey -Wood and Duncan were l a r g e l y i n 
agreement and c e r t a i n l y d i d n o t w i s h to p r e j u d i c e the f u t u r e 
g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n by the p r e s e n t t a l k s . However, Eden based 
h i s r a t h e r c a v a l i e r a t t i t u d e toward the p r e s e n t t a l k s o n an 
u n r e a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t he 1938 Agreement . On c l o s e 
s c r u t i n y , the agreement wh ich a l l o w e d the i m p o s i t i o n o f economic 
c o n t r o l s i n w a r t i m e , d i d n o t s p e c i f y a t i m e l i m i t , a f t e r the end 
o f h o s t i l i t i e s , by wh ich they were t o be removed. T h i s was 
c o n s i d e r e d , f o r a b r i e f t i m e , to be a l o o p h o l e w h i c h c o u l d 
l e g i t i m i s e the p o s t - w a r m a i n t a i n a n c e o f economie c o n t r o l s . 
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F o r t u n a t e l y such a v i ew was never pressed o n the Amer i cans . 
The B r i t i s h wou ld s t i l l have f a v o u r e d a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
agreement i f S t a t e Depar tment g o o d w i l l had made i t p o s s i b l e . 
B u t , t h e r e were g r o w i n g doub t s about the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f such 
an agreement o n the b a s i s the t a l k s had been h e l d so f a r . 
Lend-Lease was b e g i n n i n g t o a l t e r the commerc i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
be tween the two c o u n t r i e s and the c o n s i d e r a t i o n t a l k s were 
u n c o v e r i n g economic and commerc i a l q u e s t i o n s w i t h wide 
i m p l i c a t i o n s . I t was now d i f f i c u l t t o s e p a r a t e the t r a d e t a l k s 
f r o m these w i d e r economic problems and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f p o s t -
war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . One p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n would have been t o 
w i d e n the b a s i s o f the t a l k s , b u t the success o f a t r a d e a g r e e -
ment was now seen t o be dependent upon the s a t i s f a c t o r y 
r e s o l u t i o n o f w i d e l y d i f f e r i n g economic p r o b l e m s . The U . S . 
wanted B r i t a i n to commit h e r s e l f to p r i n c i p l e s o f economic and 
monetary l a i s s e z - f a i r e i n the p o s t - w a r p e r i o d . On the o t h e r 
h a n d , B r i t a i n wanted c o n t i n g e n c y p l ans f o r a f l e x i b l e t r a n s i t i o n 
p e r i o d , w i t h A m e r i c a ' s b l e s s i n g s . B l e s s i n g s t he U . S . was 
r e l u c t a n t to g i v e . The U . S . d i d n o t want to be f a c e d w i t h a de 
f a c t o pos t -war s i t u a t i o n o f economic c o n t r o l s , even i f t hey were 
' t r a n s i t i o n a l ' . For the q u e r - t i o n t hen a r i s e s ; t r a n s i t i o n a l to 
what? The answer f o r B r i t a i n would be , to c o n d i t i o n s under 
w h i c h B r i t a i n ' s t r a d e was i n ba lance and the domes t i c economy 
no t s u f f e r i n g f r o m d e f l a t i o n a r y p o l i c i e s . Such c o n d i t i o n s 
wou ld d e l a y the r e m o v a l o f c o n t r o l s i n i m i c a l t o Amer i can i n t e r e s t s . 
(39) See H a l i f a x to F .O. J u l y h> 19^1, W9^65A26A9 a n d 
F.O. to H a l i f a x , J u l y 16, 19^1 , W3738A26A9. 
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By J u l y 25, the -:rade n e g o t i a t i o n s were r e a l l y f l o u n d e r -
i n g o n the p rob lem o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , as a l s o were the 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t a l k s wh ich w i l l be l ooked a t s h o r t l y . On J u l y 25, 
S t i r l i n g w r o t e t o t he Board o f Trade and gave a l e n g t h y 
a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t he S t a t e Depar tments i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i f implemented i n an 
agreement would have p reven ted B r i t a i n p u r c h a s i n g s o f t c u r r e n c y 
goods a t a h i g h e r p r i c e t h a n s i m i l a r U . S . goods, d e s p i t e the 
f a c t she migh t n o t have any d o l l a r s t o purchase such goods . 
There was l i t t l e d o u b t t h a t someth ing would have to be done 
o v e r t h i s s e r i o u s p r o b l e m . The theme r e i t e r a t e d t i m e and a g a i n 
by S t i r l i n g was t h a t no p r o g r e s s would be made u n t i l B r i t i s h 
i n t e n t i o n s were made c l e a r t o t he S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t . ' 
Such c l a r i f i c a t i o n was however r e q u i r e d on b o t h s i d e s . On 
Augus t 20, 19^1, the F o r e i g n O f f i c e w r o t e t o the B r i t i s h 
d e l e g a t i o n n e g o t i a t i n g the Mas te r Lend-Lease Agreement t h a t t hey 
were c o n s i d e r i n g Amer i can p r o p o s a l s and t h a t meanwhile f u r t h e r 
(1+2) 
d i s c u s s i o n would be p r e m a t u r e . S i m i l a r moves were made t o 
a r r e s t the n e g o t i a t i o n s o n a supp lemen ta ry t r a d e agreement . 
A few days p r i o r to t h i s C h u r c h i l l and R o o s e v e l t had met f o r 
t h e i r f i r s t w a r - t i m e c o n f e r e n c e and i t was the r e s u l t s o f t h i s 
m e e t i n g wh ich had a c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f e c t o n the p rob lem o f 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . For a w h i l e , a f t e r the c o n f e r e n c e , t h e r e was a 
pause, w h i l e t he f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s were absorbed and a n a l y s e d , 
(*+0) S t i r l i n g to Board o f T r a d e , J u l y 2? 19^1, W9930A26A9. 
C M ) See f o r e . g . s . J u l y 23, T e l e , to F .O, WIOIO3A26A9, 
H a l i f a x t o F . O . , August 3, W9552/37A9. 
(W2) F .O. t o Wash ing ton Augus t 20, 19^1, W9552/37A9. 
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So, b e f o r e the s t o r y o f the t r a d e n e g o t i a t i o n s i s t a k e n up 
a g a i n i n November, the A t l a n t i c M e e t i n g w i l l be s c r u t i n i s e d 
and some o f the ideas t h a t i t g e n e r a t e d , c o n s i d e r e d . 
The Idea o f a mee t ing between the two l e a d e r s had been 
mooted f o r some t i m e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y when the i d e a came t o a 
head i n December 19^0 b o t h c o u n t r i e s * embassies l a c k e d 
ambassadors, L o t h i a n had d i e d sudden ly i n e a r l y December, and 
Kennedy had been r e c a l l e d f r o m London , to be r e p l a c e d l a t e r i n 
the New Year by J . G . W i n a n t . The ar rangements and some o f the 
i n i t i a l en thus ia sm f o r the mee t ing was thus l e f t to H a r r y 
H o p k i n s . J There was a need f o r such a m e e t i n g , n o t o n l y t o 
e s t a b l i s h a p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between R o o s e v e l t and 
C h u r c h i l l , b u t a l s o to c l a r i f y a number o f problems and p o l i c i e s 
w h i c h b o t h c o u n t r i e s were coming up a g a i n s t . The mee t ing 
a c q u i r e d even g r e a t e r Impor t ance w i t h the deve lopments i n t he 
Summer o f 1 9lt-1 . 
The i n v a s i o n o f Russ ia on June 22, p l aced a whole new 
p e r s p e c t i v e on t he war . A p e r s p e c t i v e which was f u r t h e r 
c o m p l i c a t e d by deve lopments even f u r t h e r E a s t . On J u l y 15, 
A d m i r a l D a r l a n i n f o r m e d A d m i r a l Leahy, Amer ican Ambassador to 
V i c h y F rance , t h a t Japan was to occupy bases i n French I n d o -
China I n the immedia te f u t u r e . Amer ica and B r i t a i n r e a c t e d 
t o t h i s by f r e e z i n g a l l Japanese a s se t s and embargoing s a l e s o f 
o i l and raw m a t e r i a l s to t h a t c o u n t r y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s 
d i d n o t p r e v e n t Japanese l a n d i n g s i n I n d o - C h i n a on the 
f o l l o w i n g day . I n f a c t , Japan , as f a r as C h u r c h i l l was c o n c e r n e d , 
(^3) See ' R o o s e v e l t and Hopkins - An I n t i m a t e H i s t o r y ' , 
R .E .Sherwood, Harper B r o s . 19^8. 
(M+) ' I Was T h e r e ' , W.D.Leahy, G o l l a n z , London 1950, p .58 . 
I n 19If2 Leahy became C h i e f o f S t a f f to the P r e s i d e n t . 
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was the most p r o m i n e n t p rob lem to be d e a l t w i t h a t the 
A t l a n t i c C o n f e r e n c e . H i s o t h e r m a j o r concern was w i t h the 
A t l a n t i c supp ly r o u t e . Here the Americans had a l r e a d y a s s i s t e d 
B r i t a i n by t a k i n g ove r her occupancy o f I c e l a n d and t he reby 
e x t e n d i n g her m i l i t a r y i n f l u e n c e t o the m i d - A t l a n t i c . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the s i t u a t i o n remained e x t r e m e l y g r a v e . W i t h 
r e g a r d to the p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e r n o f t h i s s t o r y , economic p o l i c y , 
t h e r e were a number o f i s s u e s b e i n g n e g o t i a t e d o n i n the 
Summer o f 19^1. Not o n l y was t r a d e under d i s c u s s i o n b u t a l s o 
t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r Lend-Lease and , what e v e n t u a l l y came to 
be known as , the September E x p o r t Whi t e Paper . However, t h e r e 
i s some c o n t r o v e r s y ove r t he I n i t i a t i o n o f the t a l k s o n g e n e r a l 
economic p r i n c i p l e s wh ich l e d to the A t l a n t i c D e c l a r a t i o n , and 
the s t a t u s o r i g i n a l l y c o n f e r r e d upon thera by the two s i d e s . 
(1+5) 
A c c o r d i n g to Sumner W e l l e s , y t h e r e had been n e i t h e r a 
f o r m a l nor an i n d i r e c t i n f o r m a l exchange o f v i ews r e g a r d i n g a 
j o i n t A n g l o - A m e r i c a n d e c l a r a t i o n p r i o r to the P l a c e n t i a - B a y 
m e e t i n g . He goes on to c l a i m t h a t i t was C h u r c h i l l who t o o k 
the i n i t i a t i v e o n the m a t t e r a t d i n n e r w i t h R o o s e v e l t on 
Augus t 9. Sherwood i n h i s b i o g r a p h y o f Hopk ins has t a k e n t h i s 
t o mean t h a t i t was C h u r c h i l l who f i r s t r a i s e d the m a t t e r . 
I n f a c t , t h i s i s somewhat d o u b t f u l , though i t i s c l e a r t h a t 
C h u r c h i l l took the i n i t i a t i v e i n terms o f h a v i n g the f i r s t 
d r a f t o f the d e c l a r a t i o n d rawn u p . I t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t 
C h u r c h i l l f i r s t r a i s e d the p r i n c i p l e s t h a t were e v e n t u a l l y 
embodied i n the A t l a n t i c C h a r t e r . There i s no r e c o r d o f a 
(^5) 'Where Are We Head ing? 1 New Y o r k , Harper B r o s , 19^-6, 
pp. 5 - 6 . 
(^6) See 'The Grand A l l i a n c e ' , W . S . C h u r c h i l l , C a s s e l l , 
London, 'The Second Wor ld War' 6 v o l s . 19^8-5^, 
p . 386. 
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C a b i n e t d i s c u s s i o n o f a j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n p r i o r to C h u r c h i l l ' s 
d e p a r t u r e , nor was the B r i t i s h Government too a n x i o u s t o press 
ahead w i t h economic t a l k s by h a v i n g the d i f f i c u l t n o t i o n o f 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a r i f i e d . C h u r c h i l l , i n f a c t , had t o r e f e r the 
t e x t o f the d e c l a r a t i o n to t he C a b i n e t i n London wh ich r e i n f o r c e s 
t h e v i e w t h a t C h u r c h i l l j o u r n e y e d to P l a c e n t i a Bay unprepa red 
f o r such a d e c l a r a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , C h u r c h i l l had a d i s l i k e 
o f economic i s s u e s and a l s o o f s t a t e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g p o s t - w a r 
a i m s . Only a f ew months e a r l i e r he had ' b l o w n u p ' o v e r a 
leakage t o the p ress c o n c e r n i n g the views o f H a r o l d N i c o l s o n 
(V7) 
o n the pos t -war w o r l d . F i n a l l y , C h u r c h i l l h i m s e l f a l l o c a t e s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o R o o s e v e l t f o r the o r i g i n o f the Idea o f a 
j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n . Sherwood would appear t o have made a 
m i s t a k e r e g a r d i n g t h i s . For example he r e f e r s to C h u r c h i l l and 
H o p k i n s d i s c u s s i n g t he p h r a s e o l o g y o f the A t l a n t i c C h a r t e r 
d u r i n g t he voyage t o Newfoundland when t h e r e was no e x t a n t 
d r a f t i n e x i s t e n c e . 7 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Hopk ins was i n d i s p o s e d 
f o r much o f t he voyage and so d i d n o t keep a w r i t t e n r e c o r d o f 
h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n s , t hus i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to say whether t h i s i s 
a r e f e r e n c e t o a more g e n e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f p o s t - w a r p l a n n i n g 
o r n o t . The u n c e r t a i n t y o f Sherwood ' s ev idence c e r t a i n l y 
undermines h i s c l a i m t h a t C h u r c h i l l was the f i r s t to sugges t 
t he p r i n c i p l e s o f the d e c l a r a t i o n . On b a l a n c i n g the e v i d e n c e 
t he I n f e r e n c e would appear to p o i n t to U o o s e v e l t . 
(•+7) F e b r u a r y , 1 9M . A t t h a t t i m e N i c o l s o n was i n D u f f 
Coope r ' s M i n i s t r y o f I n f o r m a t i o n . See ' D i a r i e s and 
L e t t e r s ' 1939-^5. E d . N . N i c o l s o n , C o l l i n s , London, 1967, 
pp 
(^8) W.3.C. O p . C i t . p .385. 
(*+9) Sherwood, O p . C i t . p .350 . 
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The a l l o c a t i o n o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the o r i g i n o f the 
i d e a o f a j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t 
as an i n d i c a t i o n o f the i m p o r t a n c e p l a c e d o n economic p o l i c i e s 
by t he Amer i can A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . H u l l and the S t a t e Depar tment 
had a l r e a d y made i t c l e a r to the B r i t i s h t h a t c o n t r o l s and 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the U . S . would have to be 
d i s m a n t l e d i f a modus V i v e n d i was to be p o s s i b l e between the 
U . S . and the U . K . H u l l and W e l l e s saw t h i s top l e v e l mee t ing 
as an o p p o r t u n i t y to press t h e i r p o i n t o f v i e w upon the 
B r i t i s h l e a d e r s . A f t e r a l l , the U . S . was i n a v e r y good 
b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . She was s t i l l a non-combatan t ( n e u t r a l 
would no t be an a p p r o p r i a t e te rm a t t h i s s t a g e ) , she had the 
t i m e and the p e r s o n n e l to c o n s i d e r economic i s s u e s and most o f 
a l l B r i t a i n was now v e r y r e l i a n t upon the U . S . f o r her war 
e f f o r t . The l e a d e r s o f the S t a t e Depar tment b e l i e v e d t h a t I f 
t h ey Gould ge t a commitment f r o m B r i t a i n to p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h 
would d e t e r m i n e the n a t u r e o f the p o s t - w a r I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
economic sys tem, t h e n s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s o f the system would be 
easy to f i l l I n , H .N.Gardner comments on t h i s d i s p o s i t i o n o f 
H u l l ' s . 
"He had a most exaggera ted n o t i o n o f the e f f i c a c y o f 
f o r m a l s t a t e m e n t s o f g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e . I n the 
weeks b e f o r e P e a r l H a r b o u r , f o r example , he 
e a r n e s t l y t r i e d to ge t the s i g n a t u r e o f the Japanese 
Government t o a d e c l a r a t i o n . . . i n c l u d i n g a commit-
ment to n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . " (50) 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i n A u g u s t , H u l l was r e c o v e r i n g f r o m i l l 
h e a l t h so I t was the d r y r a t h e r a r r o g a n t We l l e s t h a t 
accompanied K o o s e v e l t to Newfoundland t o press the S t a t e D e p a r t -
m e n t ' s v i e w s . What was even more u n f o r t u n a t e f o r H u l l , was t h a t 
(50) ' S t e r l i n g D o l l a r D i p l o m a c y ' - A n g l o - A m e r i c a n 
C o l l a b o r a t i o n I n The R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Of M u l t i l a t e r a l T r a d e ' 
H . N . G a r d n e r , O x f o r d C l a r e n d o n P re s s , 1956, p . 5 . 
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o n t h i s o c c a s i o n h i s pLans t o p r e s s u r i s e B r i t a i n t o commit 
h e r s e l f t o n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and a p o l i c y o f economic 
d e - c o n t r o l b a c k f i r e d w i t h a vengeance. 
The f i r s t d r a f t o f the d e c l a r a t i o n was d rawn up by 
(51 ) 
C a d o g a n w on the b a s i s o f a b r i e f i n g f r o m C h u r c h i l l . 
However, i t was the second d r a f t d rawn up by W e l l e s and amended 
s l i g h t l y by R o o s e v e l t t h a t was to cause c o n t r o v e r s y . We l l e s 
made a number o f minor a l t e r a t i o n s to the B r i t i s h d r a f t . He 
widened the preamble by i n s e r t i n g ' o t h e r d i c t a t o r s h i p s ' so t h a t 
A m e r i c a ' s immedia te o b j e c t o f c o n c e r n , Japan , was b r o u g h t 
w i t h i n i t s r e f e r e n c e . He o m i t t e d the q u a l i f i c a t i o n w h i c h s t a t e d 
t h a t t he U . S . and the U . K . w e r e ; -
" . . . o n l y concerned t o d e f e n d the r i g h t s o f f r eedom 
o f speech and t h o u g h t w i t h o u t wh ich such c h o i c e 
( o f government ) must be i l l u s o r y . " (52) 
However, the main and most c o n t e n t i o u s change was made i n 
p o i n t f o u r . The B r i t i s h v e r s i o n had s i m p l y p ledged e q u i t a b l e 
d o m e s t i c and i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f e s s e n t i a l p r o d u c t s . 
W e l l e s 1 v e r s i o n a l t e r e d t h i s v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t l y . 
" F o u r t h they w i l l s t r i v e to promote m u t u a l l y advantageous 
economic r e l a t i o n s between them t h r o u g h the e l i m i n a t i o n 
o f any d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n e i t h e r the U n i t e d S t a t e s o f 
Amer ica o r i n the U n i t e d Kingdom a g a i n s t the i m p o r t a t i o n 
o f any p r o d u c t o r i g i n a t i n g i n t he o t h e r c o u n t r y ; and 
they w i l l endeavour t o f u r t h e r the en joymen t by a l l 
peoples o f access o n e q u a l terms to the marke t s and to 
the raw m a t e r i a l s wh ich a re needed f o r t h e i r economic 
p r o s p e r ! t y . " (53) 
(51) S i r A lexande r Cadogan permanent u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y o f 
S t a t e , January 193§ - Feb rua ry 19^+6. 
(52) 'The Semblance o f Peace' by Wheeter Bennet and N i c h o l s , 
M a c m i l l a n , 1972, p .39 . 
(53) I b i d , p . 39 . 
35 
Rooseve l t amended and c u t down the Length o f the W e l l e s ' 
d r a f t b e f o r e i t was f o r m a l l y d i s c u s s e d w i t h C h u r c h i l l l a t e i n 
the morning o f Augus t 11 . Perhaps even. R o o s e v e l t t hough t W e l l e s 
p o i n t f o u r was too b a r b e d , and too o o v i o u s l y d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t 
the U . K . H i s r e - w o r d i n g was c e r t a i n l y more d i p l o m a t i c , though 
t h e substance remained the same. I t was an a t t e m p t to g a i n a 
commitment f r o m B r i t a i n to reduce and e v e n t u a l l y e l i m i n a t e 
I m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e . 
" F o u r t h they w i l l endeavour to f u r t h e r the en joymen t by 
a l l peoples o f access w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and o n 
equa l t « r m s , to the marke ts and t o the raw m a t e r i a l s 
o f the w o r l d wh ich a re needed f o r t h e i r economic 
p r o s p e r i t y . " (5^) 
The o n l y o t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t change R o o s e v e l t made was to 
s t r i k e o u t the r e f e r e n c e to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o r g a n i s -
a t i o n . Wel l e s t hen i n c o r p o r a t e d these amendments i n tne t h i r d 
d r a f t wh ich was t h e n d i s c u s s e d w i t h C h u r c h i l l . 
"The c h i e f d i f f i c u l t i e s were p re sen ted by P o i n t s 
and 7) e s p e c i a l l y the f o r m e r . 
W i t h r e g a r d to t h i s I p o i n t e d o u t t h a t the words 
" w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n " migh t be h e l d to c a l l i n 
q u e s t i o n the Ot tawa agreements , and I was i n no 
p o s i t i o n t o accep t them. T h i s t e x t wou ld c e r t a i n l y 
have to be r e f e r r e d to the Government a t home and , 
i f i t was d e s i r e d to m a i n t a i n the p r e s e n t w o r d i n g , 
t o the Governments i n the D o m i n i o n s . I shou ld have 
l i t t l e hope t h a t i t would be accep t ed . Mr . Sumner 
Wel les i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h i s , was the core o f the 
m a t t e r , and t h a t t h i s pa rag raph embodied the i d e a l 
f o r wh ich the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n had s t r i v e n f o r the 
pa s t n i n e y e a r s . " (55) 
Churchi11 c o n t i n u e d t o press f o r amendments. He s a i d t h a t 
t he o n l y l i k e l i h o o d o f t h e War C a b i n e t r a t i f y i n g such a d r a f t 
would be i f ' w i t h due r e s p e c t f o r t h e i r e x i s t i n g o b l i g a t i o n s ' 
was i n s e r t e d , i f ' w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ' was s t r u c k o u t , and 
• t r a d e ' s u b s t i t u t e d f o r ' m a r k e t s ' . 
(5*0 i b i d , p.1*0. 
(55) W10151A26A9, War C a b i n e t Memo, WP(lt1 )202, 
on A t l a n t i c Mee t ing by W . S . C h u r c h i l l . Dated August 2 0 t h , 
19"+0. 
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W e l l e s argued s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t these amendments f o r he knew how 
much they were c o n t r a r y to A m e r i c a n i n t e r e s t s . R i c h a r d Gardner ^ 
has suggested t h a t R o o s e v e l t ' s l a c k o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g on t h i s l ed 
h i m to b e l i e v e the phrase ' access to raw m a t e r i a l s 1 would 
e f f e c t i v e l y s a f e g u a r d Amer ican i n t e r e s t s . Whatever h i s app rec -
i a t i o n a c t u a l l y was he a l l o w e d h i m s e l f to be persuaded to g i v e 
way to C h u r c h i l l o n t h i s . I n f a c t , H a r r y Hopk ins s t r o n g l y 
recommended t h i s course o f a c t i o n . Hopkins may a l s o have m i s -
judged the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the economic I s s u e s , b u t f o r h im i t 
was more i m p o r t a n t t h a t a j o i n t s t a t emen t s h o u l d be made 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h the announcement o f the mee t ing t h a n t h a t 
d e l a y s shou ld be i n c u r r e d . A c c o r d i n g l y , i t was agreed t h a t 
C h u r c h i l l shou ld d i s p a t c h d r a f t t h r e e o f the proposed d e c l a r a t i o n 
w i t h the suggested amendments to the War C a b i n e t , S t i l l t he 
d e c l a r a t i o n had c e r t a i n l y no t y e t been f i n a l i s e d . I n d e e d , the 
sugges ted amendments had n o t oeen o f f i c i a l l y i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o 
t h e d r a f t , as may be seen f r o m t h i s comment by C h u r c h i l l , 
"The f o u r t h c o n d i t i o n wou ld e v i d e n t l y have t o be amended 
to s a f e g u a r d our o b l i g a t i o n s c o n t r a c t e d I n Ot tawa and 
no t p r e j u d i c e the f u t u r e o f I m p e r i a l P r e f e r e n c e . " (57) 
T h i s l a t t e r p o i n t i s o f some s i g n i f i c a n c e p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h 
r e g a r d to c o n f l i c t i n g accounts o f the r o l e t h a t Max.Beaverbrook 
p l a y e d a t the c o n f e r e n c e . She rwood^ 7 ; has w r i t t e n t h a t 
Beaverb rook a r r i v e d a t P l a c e n t i a Bay o n August 1 1 , and not o n l y 
p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the d i s c u s s i o n s r e l a t i n g to a r t i c l e f o u r , b u t 
c o n s t i t u t e d the main o p p o s i t i o n to the Amer i can a t t a c k o n 
i m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e . A , J . P . T a y l o r r i g h t l y c o n t r a d i c t s t h i s . 
(56) O p . C l t . 
(57) P .M. to A t l e e , Lord P r i v y S e a l , May 1 1 , 19^1 - F e b r u a r y 19, 
19^2. W10151A26A9, a l s o quoted i n 'The Grand A l l i a n c e * , 
W.S.C. p . 3 9 1 . 
(58) O p . c i t . pp .360-361. 
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3eave rb rook i n f a c t d i d n o t a r r i v e a t the c o n f e r e n c e u n t i l 5 a .m. 
o n the 1 2 t h l ^ ^ a y l o r e x p l a i n s t h i s e r r o r i n terms o f Beaverbrook • s 
i n f l a t e d o p i n i o n o f h i m s e l f and tr ie f a c t t h a t Sherwood c o n s u l t e d 
c l o s e l y w i t h h i m i n the w r i t i n g o f h i s book. T a y l o r goes o n 
to add t h a t the d r a f t as amended o n the 11th was approved 
w i t h o u t f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o n the 12th and thus r u l e s o u t the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t Beaverbrook had any I n f l u e n c e on the d e c l a r a t i o n 
a t a l l . As we s h a l l see, t h i s i s . i o t e n t i r e l y a c c u r a t e and i n 
f a c t t h e r e were o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r Beaverbrook to express h i s 
o p i n i o n s b e f o r e the d e c l a r a t i o n was f i n a l i s e d . 
There i s no doubt the o r i g i n a l amendments r e f e r r e d to above 
were C h u r c h i l l ' s , I t was g e n e r a l l y known t h a t C h u r c h i l l was l e s s 
t h a n e n t h u s i a s t i c about t he Ot tawa Agreements under normal 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . However, the s i t u a t i o n I n 19^1 was h a r d l y n o r m a l . 
and a number o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s made him adopt the s tance t h a t he 
d i d . H i s T r e a s u r y Depa r tmen t , i n c l u d i n g Keynes , had been 
a d v i s i n g c a u t i o n w i t h r e g a r d to any d i s m a n t l e m e n t o f p r e f e r e n c e s 
w i t h o u t an accompanying r e f o r m o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e and 
economic p o l i c i e s . Second ly , a d e c l a r a t i o n o n the l i n e s W e l l e s 
advoca ted would have caused d e l a y s because o f the D o m i n i o n s . 
Such d e l a y s would have s e r i o u s l y deva lued the propaganda 
advantages C h u r c h i l l hoped to d e r i v e f r o m the m e e t i n g . And 
t h i r d l y , C h u r c h i l l was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t the Amer icans s h o u l d no t 
p res s a p o l i c y upon him which would have a d i v i s i v e e f f e c t i n 
t he C a b i n e t . K i n g s l e y - W o o d , Lo rd Cranbourne , Beave rb rook and 
Amery would a l l have s t r o n g l y opposed measures t h a t m igh t have 
undermined the i m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e sys tem. 
(59) M o r t o n , A . V . , ' A t l a n t i c M e e t i n g ' , Methuen and Co. London 
19^3, p . 1 2 1 . M o r t o n was an e y e - w i t n e s s j o u r n a l i s t a t the 
c o n f e r e n c e . 
(60) ' B e a v e r b r o o k ' , A . J . P . T a y l o r , Hamish H a m i l t o n , London 1972, 
p P ^80-^81 . 
(61) Cranbourne , l a t e r 5th Marquess o f S a l i s b u r y , 3 . 3 . 
Dominions O f f i c e October 30 - February 19, 19I+2 and a g a i n 
September 2k, 191*3-^5, Q 
On r e c e i v i n g C h u r c h i l l ' s te legram, Atttee c a l l e d a cabinet 
meeting i n the e a r l y hours o f August 12, to discuss the 
proposed d r a f t . The d r a f t , w i t h C h u r c h i l l ' s amendments was 
accepted by the cabinet though they proposed tha t a new clause 
should be added. 
" F i f t h , they des i re to b r i n g about the f u l l e s t 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n between a l l na t ions i n the economic 
f i e l d w i t h the ob j ec t o f secur ing , f o r a l l , 
improved labour standards, economic advancement 
and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y . " (62) 
I t i s q u i t e c lear f rom the f a c t that t h i s was incorpora ted 
i n the f i n a l d e c l a r a t i o n tha t the impression Tay lor gives i n 
'3eaverbrook 1 t ha t the d r a f t was f i n a l i s e d on the e leven th , i s 
erroneous. Indeed the Cabinet wanted to go f u r t h e r i n securing 
B r i t i s h I m p e r i a l economic i n t e r e s t s and t h i s was put to 
Roosevelt by C h u r c h i l l on the t w e l f t h , but the o b j e c t i o n s were 
so s t rong tha t tne p o i n t was pushed no f u r t h e r . p u r t h e r m o r e , 
t h i s a l lows the p o s s i b i l i t y tha t Seaverbrook might have t r i e d 
to i n f l u e n c e the content o f the d e c l a r a t i o n e i t h e r by u rg ing 
C h u r c h i l l to press f o r f u r t h e r safeguards before the f i n a l 
meeting on the t w e l f t h or by u rg ing such safeguards on the 
Americans h i m s e l f . I n f a c t C h u r c h i l l was i n c l i n e d to b e l i e v e 
tha t the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n was adequately safeguarded by the 
amendments put forward on the e l even th , and i n the end tha t was 
the form tha t p o i n t f o u r took. 
The other po in t o f d i f f i c u l t y which C h u r c h i l l mentioned i n 
h i s memorandum was a re ference to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y 
o r g a n i s a t i o n whicn Koosevelt had objec ted t o . At t h i s time 
(62) 'A Decade of American Fore ign P o l i c y , Basic Documents 
l9^1- l +9' ) U.S.Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e 1950, p . 2 . 
(63) See paper indexed W101 5 1 A 2 6 A 9 . 
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Roosevelt was r e l u c t a n t to commit h imse l f to an I n t e r n a t i o n -
a l i s t p o l i c y which was equated by many i n the U.S. w i t h 
' i n t e r v e n t l o n i s m 1 , a p o l i c y which was s t i l l very much i n the 
m i n o r i t y . Furthermore, Welles r e c o r d s : -
"He said ( i . e . F . D . h . ) t ha t he h imse l f would not be 
i n favour o f the c r e a t i o n o f a new Assembly o f the 
League o f Nat ions , a t Least u n t i l a f t e r a per iod o f 
time had passed and d u r i n g which an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p o l i c e f o r c e composed of the Uni ted States and Great 
B r i t a i n had had an o p p o r t u n i t y to f u n c t i o n . 1 1 (6*+) 
This idea o f an Anglo-U.3 . p o l i c e f o r c e had been mooted 
p rev ious ly i n J u l y by Roosevelt but had been received very 
cau t ious ly i n B r i t a i n . ^ 5 ) ^ w a s ^Q b e 3 0 r n e m o n t h s be fo re the 
preference o f the State Department f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n was accepted f u l l y by Roosevelt and became standard 
U.S. p o l i c y . The B r i t i s h view, on the other hand, was 
i n f l u e n c e d by an awareness o f the s t r a t e g i c v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f her 
amorphous f a r - f l u n g empire and hopes were being d i r e c t e d toward 
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n as a means to safeguard B r i t a i n 1 s 
( f i f i ) 
i m p e r i a l i n t e r e s t s . On t h i s issue C h u r c h i l l was again 
l a r g e l y success fu l at P lacen t ia Bay. Roosevelt would not r e t u r n 
to the previous wording but he accepted the phrase 
" . . . pending the establ ishment o f a wider and more 
permanent system o f general s e c u r i t y , . . . " (67) 
(6*0 3. Welles , O p . C i t . p .12 . 
(65) Kaynes and H a l i f a x to F.O, J u l y 8 , 19V1 , W83^0/37A9. 
(66) For d e t a i l s on t h i s see 'The Memoirs o f Lord Gladvyn' 
G, Jebb, Weidenfeld and Nico l son , London 1972, pp .113. 
(67) 'U.S. Documents' l ^ l - ^ , O p . C i t . p . 2 . 
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The A t l a n t i c Meeting was undoubtedly a d i p l o m a t i c v i c t o r y 
f o r the B r i t i s h , judged on any c r i t e r i o n , but p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
the l i g h t o f Anglo-U.S. r e l a t i o n s . C h u r c h i l l ' s o r i g i n a l 
concern w i t h o b t a i n i n g an agreement on j o i n t Anglo-U.S. a c t i o n 
toward Japan proved a b o r t i v e . This was a grave disappointment 
but i n o ther areas the 3 r i t i s h had much to be pleased about. 
The American proposal f o r a j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n had been seized 
by the horns by the B r i t i s h and r e s u l t e d i n a most s a t i s f a c t o r y 
outcome. The f i r s t h i g h - l e v e l assaul t by the Americans on 
B r i t a i n 1 s economic system was e f f e c t i v e l y s ide-s tepped. The 
Americans f a i l e d to modify B r i t a i n ' s i m p e r i a l economic system. 
The U.S. accepted the view tha t economic p r i n c i p l e s might have 
to be mod i f i ed i n the l i g h t o f e x i s t i n g circumstances. I n 
a d d i t i o n they accepted a n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n to ma in ta in h igh 
employment and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y and committed themselves to some 
form o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a f u t u r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . F i n a l l y , t h e i r acceptance o f e q u a l i t y o f t reatment 
f o r ' v i c t o r and vanquished 1 was to prove impor tan t l a t e r when 
the Sovie t Union replaced Germany as the t h rea t to Europe i n 
B r i t i s h eyes. I n r e t u r n f o r a l l t h i s the Americans had rece ived 
r a the r vague and cont ingent commitments f rom the U.K. to a 
p o l i c y o f open-door t r a d i n g and n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . Not a very 
s a t i s f a c t o r y conc lus ion f o r the Americans. 
I n f a c t the debate which f o l l o w e d i n the U.S. soon waxed 
acr imonious. H u l l i n p a r t i c u l a r ob jec ted to the d e c l a r a t i o n , 
(68) I n f a c t there i s s t i l l some controversy over whether 
Roosevelt pledged help to the U.K. i n the event o f 
Japanese aggression or not . C e r t a i n l y f rom o f f i c i a l 
documents t h i s would not appear to be the case, see 
F.R. o f U.S. Pub. by State Dept. V o l . I , 1 9 M . However, 
such an impress ion was g iven to Vandenberg by a speech 
o f C h u r c h i l l ' s on January 27 , 19^2, i n Par l iament , See 
Vandenberg O p . C i t . p .27 . K e v i s i o n i s t h i s t o r i a n s have also 
attempted to main ta in t h i s argument. 
and as we s h a l l see t r i e d to modify i t i n American, i n t e r e s t s . 
The B r i t i s h had perhaps been too success fu l f o r i:heir own good. 
The State Department w i th whom trade and other economic t a l k s 
were being c a r r i e d on were c e r t a i n l y d isappoin ted w i t h the 
r e s u l t s and were less incLined to compromise on t h e i r own 
i n t e r e s t s . The nego t i a t i ons on economic matters w i t h the U.S. 
became more and more p r o b l e m a t i c a l , and the d iscuss ions f o r 
Lend-Lease were to lead to very d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s . However, 
be fore tu rn ing to these t a l k s we must f i r s t r e t u r n to the t a l k s 
f o r a supplementary trade agreement and see how they progressed. 
We may r e c a l l tha t the trade t a l k s had been d e l i b e r a t e l y 
slowed down i n August. S t i l l w i t h the success fu l conclus ion 
o f the A t l a n t i c Conference the B r i t i s h were o p t i m i s t i c tha t there 
might be a less d o c t r i n a l approach to economic c o n t r o l s and 
preferences . This optimism was added to by the success fu l 
progress o f the American t a l k s w i t h Dominion r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 
On November 6, H a l i f a x wrote t h a t : -
11 . . . they ( i . e . the Dominion r ep re sen t a t i ve s ) were 
c e r t a i n tha t the State Department now f u l l y r e a l i s e d 
tha t the p r o v i s i o n f o r a " t r a n s i t i o n a l " per iod i s 
i n e v i t a b l e , and tha t c o n t r o l s and r e s t r i c t i o n s cannot 
be dropped immediately the war ends. But they said 
tha t the Americans do i n s i s t on some general d e c l a r a t i o n 
to e l i m i n a t e these " d i s c r i m i n a t o r y " methods o f 
r e g u l a t i n g t r ade , plus some p r o v i s i o n f o r implementing 
tha t i n t e n t i o n a f t e r the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . " (69) 
The optimism w i t h which t h i s was received was, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , 
to be soon q u a l i f i e d . On the f o l l o w i n g day H a l i f a x ' s commercial 
counse l lor informed the Board o f Trade o f a l i s t drawn up by the 
Sta te Department which contained the poss ible concessions 
(69) H a l i f a x to F.O. received November 6, 19^1, 
W13202/11576A9. 
B r i t a i n could make to the United Sta tes . The document proposed 
t h a t du r ing the l i f e of the agreement there should be no 
increases i n preferences which would e f f e c t the U.S. There was 
also a t e n t a t i v e but s p e c i f i c l i s t o f concessions on 
a g r i c u l t u r a l goods which inc luded tobacco, r i c e , ham, bacon, 
a p r i c o t s , prunes, e t c . ^ 0 ^ I n a d d i t i o n the Board o f Trade 
was t o l d tha t the American Trade Agreements Committee were s t i l l 
cons ider ing 'a smal l number o f i n d u s t r i a l p roduc t s ' f o r which 
preference reduc t ions might be requested. Such reques ts , i f 
made, would be communicated i n due course, though the State 
Department commented tha t they viewed such developments as 
u n l i k e l y . This was small compensation f o r the B r i t i s h who were 
taken aback by the proposals . 
I n the trade nego t i a t i ons S t i r l i n g had c o n s i s t e n t l y argued 
f o r a r e d u c t i o n i n tobacco preferences o n l y . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t 
t h a t the main Empire tobacco producer was Rhodesia which was 
s t i l l a colony and easier to contend w i t h i n those days than the 
f o u r Dominions who suppl ied hard and s o f t f r u i t , bacon and 
meat, e t c . , which had now been added to the l i s t as subjec ts 
f o r possible r e d u c t i o n s . Furthermore, w i t h the broadening o f 
the t a l k s to encompass the Dominions the s i t u a t i o n had become 
more complicated f o r B r i t a i n . The Dominions, however, could 
see advantages, bo th economic and p o l i t i c a l i n ga in ing access 
to the U.S. markets and i n f a c t were now more f avourab ly disposed 
towards a trade agreement w i t h the U.S. than the U.K. 
(70) For f u l l d e t a i l s see Washington to 
B. o f T. received November 7, 19^1> 
W1323/1 1 5 7 6 A 9 . 
^3 
During November and ea r ly December they even began to complain 
o f B r i t a i n ' s d i l a t o r y approach to the t a l k s . ^ 1 ) The wider 
r a m i f i c a t i o n s which were emerging worr ied B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s . 
They d i d not want t h e i r ba rga in ing p o s i t i o n weakened by i n t e r n a l 
disagreements w i t h i n the Empire. They wanted these problems 
solved f i r s t so tha t a un i t ed Empire stance could be taken, 
v i s - a - v i s the United S ta tes . So, despi te one or two minor 
concessions ceded by the U.'S, communicated to London on 
November 10, they began to back -ped£L f u r i o u s l y on the t a l k s . ^ 
A d r a f t telegram was drawn up f o r d i spa tch to the Dominions and 
I n d i a p o i n t i n g out prospect ive economic problems f o r the U.K. 
and which also i nd i ca t ed tha t the t a l k s on the c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r 
Lend-Lease might be a b e t t e r venue, f o r trade d i scuss ions . This 
view was f u r t h e r supported by the need f o r inter-Commonwealth 
c o n s u l t a t i o n tha t the more general nature o f the t a l k s would 
necess i t a t e . Paragraph f o u r o f the telegram s ta ted r a the r 
p o i n t e d l y ; -
" . . . we assume that no th ing w i l l be done which would 
commit any o f the Empire Governments concerned u n t i l 
each o f them has had ample o p p o r t u n i t y o f s tudying the 
complete p i c t u r e . " (73) 
(71 ) For a b r i e f summary o f the p o s i t i o n o f the Dominions 
v i s - a - v i s the U.S. and trade see summary o f U . S . t a r i f f 
requests - an a p p r e c i a t i o n by S i r R.W.Dal ton, U.K. 
senior t rade commissioner i n A u s t r a l i a 1 92H—4-8 i n Board 
o f Trade to Washington December 22, 19^1 , W1 5569/11 57&A9. 
(72) See H a l i f a x to F.O. November 10, 1 9^ 1 » W13928/I 1 5 7 6 A 9 . 
(73) D r a f t telegram to Dominion Governments: a s i m i l a r l e t t e r 
was sent to I n d i a . W13923/11 5 7 6 A 9 . 
On November 27 , the Fore ign O f f i c e wired Washington asking tha t 
a request be made to the State Department to exerc ise pat ience 
w h i l e B r i t a i n fo rmula ted her p o l i c y ideas c l e a r l y . I t also 
contained the view o f the Board o f Trade which could n o t : -
" . . . see how they could use f u l l y the general clauses 
of the trade agreement w i t h the Uni ted States 
Government, since i t would be d i f f i c u l t to dea l w i t h 
those r e l a t i n g to exchange c o n t r o l and impor t 
r e s t r i c t i o n s apar t f rom the wider problems invo lved i n 
the ques t ion o f " cons ide ra t i on" f o r Lend-Lease and 
general post-war economic r e l a t i o n s . " (7^) 
A few days l a t e r the U.S. was p r e c i p i t a t e d i n t o the war by 
the a t t ack on Pear l Hafrbor. At f i r s t , as we s h a l l see i n d e t a i l 
s h o r t l y , the B r i t i s h be l ieved tha t t h i s would s t rengthen t h e i r 
ba rga in ing p o s i t i o n . The Americans i n f a c t r e fused to modi fy 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n substance. On December 25 , H a l i f a x wrote t h a t s -
"The State Department have shown the g rea tes t 
re luc tance to y i e l d any ground even on immoderate 
requests . This seems to be due (A) to f e a r t ha t 
f a i l u r e to o b t a i n s u b s t a n t i a l m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f 
Ottawa preferences would d i sappo in t expec ta t ions 
aroused by the A t l a n t i c Charter and (B) to extreme 
pressure f rom the Department o f A g r i c u l t u r e , , . " (75) 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y the ambigui ty o f the A t l a n t i c Charter which 
i n August had seemed so favourab le to the U.K. had allowed a 
d i f f e r e n t emphasis o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n the U.S. An i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n which H u l l had made sure favoured American economic 
i n t e r e s t s and which ra i sed hopes regarding the m o d i f i c a t i o n o f 
B r i t a i n ' s p r e f e r e n t i a l system. 
By May 19^2 doubts were again being expressed about the 
e f f i c a c y o f con t inu ing the n e g o t i a t i o n s . The B r i t i s h nego t i a to r s 
were becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y uneasy w i t h recent developments. 
(7h) F.Q. to Washington, November 27, 19^1, W13923/1 1 5 7 6 A 9 . 
(75) Washington to F.O. , December 25, 19^1, W15562/11576A9. 
(76) For e .g . see W.B.Ronald to J . J . W i l l s , May 19, 191+2, 
W5812/253A9. 
I n f a c t the scope and d i r e c t i o n o f the d iscuss ions were 
g r adua l l y oeing superoedeo1 by the development o f events . 
With the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f Lend-Lease the immediate importance 
o f trade on the basis o f the 1938 Agreement d e c l i n e d and i n 
a d d i t i o n the e n t r y o f the U.S. i n t o the war s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
a l t e r e d matters both i n terms o f U.S. p o l i c y and n e g o t i a t i o n 
p r i o r i t i e s . The p o s i t i o n o f the U.S. i n 19 -^2 was such tha t her 
capaci ty to nego t i a t e was very l i m i t e d u n t i l she became more 
organised on a war f o o t i n g . The l a s t s i g n i f i c a n t re fe rence to 
the trade n e g o t i a t i o n i n 19^2 was i n a Fore ign O f f i c e telegram 
to Washington o f June. By now i t was the considered o p i n i o n 
o f the Fore ign O f f i c e tha t the d i f f e r e n t economic issues were 
so i n t e r - r e l a t e d tha t the trade agreement should not be 
(77) 
completed i n i s o l a t i o n . ' ' For example, the outcome o f the 
t rade t a l k s would be a f f e c t e d by whatever agreement was 
reached on A r t i c l e V I I o f the cons ide r a t i on t a l k s . Thus u n t i l 
progress could be made on a more general l e v e l , the m i n i s t r y 
was r e l u c t a n t to a l l ow even a p u b l i c hearing o f the t rade i ssues . 
Furthermore, the State Department wanted to avoid p o l i t i c a l l y 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l nego t i a t i ons because o f the congress ional e l e c t i o n s 
i n November 19^2. I t was also u n l i k e l y tha t a t rade agreement 
could be passed through Congress before the Spr ing o f 19^3 when 
Congress was due to renew the Trade Agreements A c t . However, 
as evidence o f B r i t a i n ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to cooperate, S t i r l i n g ' s 
team were advised to continue i n f o r m a l t a l k s . I t was hoped t h a t 
such t a l k s might i l l u s t r a t e to the Americans the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f 
a wider se t t lement unless they adopted a more sympathetic 
(77) F . u . to Washington, June 11, 19^1, W8006/253 A 9 . 
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a t t i t u d e toward the U . K . ' s probable post-war economic 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . B r i t a i n d i d want the nego t i a t i ons to cont inue 
on t h i s l e v e l e s p e c i a l l y as they knew d e t a i l e d t a l k s would be 
necessary to dea l w i t h the thorny problem o f t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n , 
and tha t such reduc t ions could on ly occur i n t i ie context o f a 
general se t t l ement . S t i l l , there was no i n t e n t i o n to conclude 
an agreement now. By J u l y 19^2 concern over the progress o f 
the U.S.-Dominions t a l k s on t a r i f f s and preferences had 
increased. The B r i t i s h d i d not want the Dominions to get out 
o f step w i t h them on t h i s issue and once again began to apply 
pressures to slow the progress down. The importance o f the 
t a l k s began g radua l ly to dwind le . From November 19^2 to 
Spring 19^3 there was a v i r t u a l h a l t i n U .S . -U .K. n e g o t i a t i o n s 
on matters a r i s i n g f rom A r t i c l e V I I and the Clea r ing Union 
proposals . Furthermore, when they were renewed the U.S. 
favoured a m u l t i - l a t e r a l approach. By January 19W3 the Board 
o f Trade also hoped to postpone b i l a t e r a l U.S . -U.K. trade 
nego t i a t ions i n d e f i n i t e l y i n favour o f a m u l t i - l a t e r a l a p p r o a c h , ^ 
though they d i d expect some s t rong U.S. o p p o s i t i o n to t h i s . 
I n f a c t the t a l k s continued i n a d e s u l t r y f a s h i o n . I n J u l y 19^3 
Waley and S t i r l i n g were s t i l l i n f o r m a l l y n e g o t i a t i n g , ^ 9 ) though 
a War Cabinet Paper *: 8 0 ^ o f J u l y 22 , 19^3, made I t q u i t e p l a i n 
tha t the B r i t i s h now regarded t rade problems on a much wider 
basis and wanted some form o f m u l t i - l a t e r a l l y e f f e c t i v e agreement, 
p r e f e r a b l y worked out b i - l a t e r a l l y f i r s t by the U.S. and the U.K. 
(78) Washington to F.C. January 13, 19^3, U 2 1 5 A 7 / 7 0 . 
(79) Washington to F .U. J u l y 30, 19lK3> U3399/68/53. 
(80) WP (i+3) 329, U3116/251/70. 
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I n short the supplementary traoe agreement t a l k s f a i l e d . 
The i r f a i l u r e was p a r t l y because o f t h e i r narrow base. As time 
passed B r i t a i n became more and more deeply invo lved economical ly 
w i t h the U.S. both on a p r a c t i c a l l e v e l and on tne h y p o t h e t i c a l 
l e v e l i n terms o f planning f o r the oost-w2r p e r i o d . As the 
s i t u a t i o n became more complex so more cons idera t ions became 
i n v o l v e d which were unimaginable wher* the t a l k s began. The t a l k s 
thus do not appear to have a graat s i g n i f i c a n c e . However, they 
d i d , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the more s u b s t a n t i a l Lend-Lease 
cons ide ra t i on t a l k s , i n s t i g a t e the i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o problems 
which separated the U.S. f rom the U.K. on commercial monetary, 
t rade and economic p o l i c i e s . These were d i f f e r e n c e s which were 
to have very s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l consequences i n the coming 
years . 
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CHAPTiiH I I 
LEND-LEASE - THE CONSIDERATION 
On March 11, 19^1 > a f t e r two months o f cont roversy i n 
Congress, the Lend-Lease B i l l was signed and came i n t o e f f e c t . 
Sec t ion 3 ( ° ) o f the act p r o v i d e d ; -
"The terms and cond i t ions which any such f o r e i g n 
Government r ece ives , any a id au thor ized under 
Sub-sect ion (a) s h a l l be those which the Pres ident 
deems s a t i s f a c t o r y and the b e n e f i t to the Uni ted 
States may be pa3rment or repayment i n k i n d or 
proper ty or any other d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t b e n e f i t 
which the President deems s a t i s f a c t o r y . " (1 ) 
The problem f a c i n g the Americans and the B r i t i s h now was 
the form of cons ide r a t i on 3 r i t a i n was to p r o v i d e . I n the e a r l y 
Spr ing o f 19^1 many o f f i c i a l s i n Washington wanted p o l i t i c a l 
and s t r a t e g i c concessions f rom the B r i t i s h i n r e t u r n f o r Lend-
(2) 
Lease^ . On May 22 , Keynes and P h i l l i p s repor ted a number 
o f American ideas on cons ide r a t i on which inc luded the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f bases by B r i t a i n f o r the U . S . , a f i v e - y e a r supply 
o f t i n and rubber f o r U.S. s t o c k p i l e s a f t e r the war, the 
replacement o f ships by a long term c o n s t r u c t i o n programme and 
f i n a l l y the g i f t o f c e r t a i n B r i t i s h P a c i f i c I s l ands to the U.S. 
The l a t t e r suggest ion was r a the r t e n t a t i v e though, f o r the 
Americans d i d not wish to appear as u n d e r - w r i t e r s o f the B r i t i s h 
Empire i n the Far Eas t / -* ) A t t h i 3 stage the Fore ign O f f i c e 
were o p t i m i s t i c about an e a r l y entrance i n t o the war by the 
U . S . , which they b e l i e v e d , would enhance t h e i r ba rga in ing p o s i t i o n . 
(1) Taken f rom Fore ign O f f i c e copy W6017/37A9. 
(2) See Penrose, Op .C i t . C h . I . 
(3) H a l i f a x to F.O. received May 22 , 19I+I, W6216/37A9. 
^9 
So, i n view of t h i s , they were r e l u c t a n t to rush i n t o 
( I f ) 
nego t i a t i ons w i t h the Americans. U n f o r t u n a t e l y i n f o r m a t i o n 
received f rom i^eynes on May 22 , dampened such hopes. Keynes 
informed the Treasury tha t Koosevel t was press ing f o r an 
announcement on cons ide ra t i on be fo re June 13, when he intended 
to r e p o r t to Congress. Harry Hopkins had assured Keynes tha t 
Hawkins, who was working on the cons ide ra t i on problem, was 
producing a l i b e r a l d r a f t . Sy t h i s he presumably meant one tha t 
would be favourab le to B r i t a i n , w / Hopkins, u n o f f i c i a l l y , said 
t h a t he thought the p o s i t i o n f o r B r i t a i n would be tha t she 
would have to r e t u r n s u r v i v i n g war m a t e r i a l s , but suppl ies o f 
rubber and t i n , i s l ands and bases would on ly be exacted f o r 
non-war m a t e r i a l s . Keynes t a c t f u l l y i nd i ca t ed the poss ib le 
dangers to the B r i t i s h balance o f payments i f economic cons ider -
a t i ons o f any substance were demanded i n the post-war p e r i o d . 
I n f a c t , a t t h i s stage, Keynes seems to have regarded these 
American pressures simply i n terms o f o v e r - e b u l l i e n t salesman-
s h i p . He ne i t he r thought t ha t claims f o r t i n or rubber would be 
pressed, nor d i d he consider the time f a c t o r to be o f p a r t i c u l a r 
urgency. He t o l d the Foreign O f f i c e tha t Roosevelt was under no 
l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s to make an announcement and recommended tha t 
i f the American terms were harsh , then the Treasury should s t a l l 
by i n s i s t i n g tha t the terms must be submitted to the Dominions 
f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . ^ ^ Keynes wrote as l a t e as May 29> t ha t 
H u l l and Koosevelt s t i l l appeared unsure over whether to inc lude 
(*0 See F.O. minutes W6216/37A9-
(5) Messrs. Acheson, Fe i s , Hawkins and Hickerson i n 
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h C . H u l l were i n charge o f drawing up 
the f i r s t d r a f t . 
(6) Keynes to F.O, received May 22 , 19M , W6216/37A9. 
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references to post-war economic r e l a t i o n s or not i n the consider 
a t i o n agreement. The B r i t i s h Government however, by t h i s t ime , 
had l i t t l e doubt . They expected, and c e r t a i n l y hoped, tha t no 
s u b s t a n t i a l economic concessions would be demanded, but were 
resigned to the acceptance, i n some form or o t h e r , o f a 
d e c l a r a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s s i m i l a r to tnose expressed by H u l l on 
Hay 18. This aroused concern among min i s t e r s i n the B r i t i s h 
Government, no tab ly i l l u s t r a t e d by Amery's l e t t e r to Eden on the 
30th.<?> 
On June 12, the President made the f o l l o w i n g statement to 
Congress i n h i s f i r s t q u a r t e r l y r e p o r t on Lend-Lease. 
"Work has s t a r t ed on the agreement to f i x the terms 
and c o n d i t i o n s , under Sec t ion 3(b) upon which the 
f o r e i g n governments rece ive a i d . " (8) 
I n f a c t t h i s work had been i n i t i a t e d , a t an o f f i c i a l l e v e l , 
by an interchange o f views between H a l i f a x and Sumner Welles 
on June 12. During June the B r i t i s h became aware o f increased 
pressure f rom Hoosevelt f o r an e a r l y agreement on the cons ider -
a t i o n agreement. With t h i s , wor r i e s deepened i n the U.K. 
regard ing the subjec t matter o f the t a l k s . I n cables o f the 
5th and 9th o f the month, the Board o f Trade and the Treasury 
c l e a r l y expressed t h e i r concern. 
(7) For d e t a i l s o f t h i s and H u l l ' s speech see Chapter I 
(8) rteport a t tached to l e t t e r , Kingsley-Wood to Kden, 
August 8, 1 9 M . 
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"We do not know what our post-war exchange and import 
Licencing p o l i c y w i l l be, and we must a v o i d , i n the 
d iscuss ions on trade p o l i c y , making any statements 
which can be quoted as pledges or which can t i e our 
hands. We f e e l tha t i t would be a mistake to enter 
i n t o any discuss ions w i t h the Americans about the 
technique o f Payments Agreements and t h e i r poss ib le 
adap ta t ion to post-war c o n d i t i o n s ; we should t h i n k 
I t unwise to i n d i c a t e now tha t i t w i l l oe our aim 
not to d i s c r i m i n a t e as regards imports between 
count r i es except as a r e s u l t o f our being h e a v i l y 
indebted to p a r t i c u l a r c o u n t r i e s . " (9) 
By l a t e June the s i t u a t i o n regarding cons ide r a t i on needed 
d e f i n i t e c l a r i f i c a t i o n and on J u l y 8, H a l i f a x and Keynes were 
presented w i t h an o p p o r t u n i t y to do so. On the 8 t h , they were 
to have an audience wi th the Pres iden t . Kings ley-Wood d i r e c t e d 
them tc r e s t r i c t themselves to l i s t e n i n g to the P res iden t ' s 
v iews, though i f the need arose they were to emphasise the 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f B r i t a i n accept ing cons ide r a t i on o b l i g a t i o n s i n 
the form o f d o l l a r s or d o l l a r earning goods. 
The s u b s t a n t i a l par t o f the U.S. proposals which were 
considered at the meeting were as f o l l o w s . 
"1 . (3 ) I i i respect o f balance o f a id accorded under 
the Lend-Lease Act not thus compensated, no cash 
account s h a l l be set up and no d e l i v e r y o f goods or 
assets s h a l l be asked f o r which would i n t e r f e r e w i t h 
the normal economic r e l a t i o n s between the United 
o ta tes and the B r i t i s h Commonwealth a f t e r the war or 
w i t h capaci ty o f the B r i t i s h Commonwealth to purchase 
American goods and se rv ices . 
(^0 But the B r i t i s h Government deeply a p p r e c i a t i v e 
o f the magnanimity o f these terms, agree f o r t h e i r 
pa r t to f u r n i s h i n r e t u r n f u r t h e r cons idera t ions and 
co-opera t ion set f o r t h i n subsequent clauses below. 
2. Pres ident s h a l l be e n t i t l e d to ask f o r d e l i v e r i e s 
i n k ind or p roper ty or f o r d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t 
(9) Board o f Trade to P h i l l i p s , June 5, also s i m i l a r one to 
S t i r l i n g , June 9, 19^1, W6315/37A9- See also K i n g s l e y -
Wood to Eden, June 23 , 19^1 > W 7 7 8 2 A 2 6 A 9 . 
(10) Chancellor o f Exchequer to Washington, June 29, 19^1j 
W7905/37A9. 
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b e n e f i t s under a l l or any o f the f o l l o w i n g heads 
as may be agreed i n d e t a i l h e r e a f t e r , sub jec t to 
1.3 above. 
a) Defence o f the United Sta tes , 
b) Maintainance o f the f u t u r e peace of the w o r l d . 
c) Post-war r e l i e f and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
d) Post-war trade and economic p o l i c y . 
3 . B r i t a i n to r e t u r n any s u r v i v i n g Lead-Lease goods 
at the end o f the war on demand, " (11) 
During the i n t e r v i e w the Pres ident expressed a s t rong d e s i r e 
f o r a general agreement. He went on to su rp r i se H a l i f a x and 
Keynes by saying tha t he d i d not see any urgency f o r d e t a i l e d 
p r o v i s i o n s . This was p a r t l y oecause he was not c lear h i m s e l f 
what form such p rov i s ions should take and p a r t l y because what 
ideas he d i d have might prove to be unpala table to the p u b l i c . 
He quoted an i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c e f o r c e and i s l a n d economic 
unions i n the West Ind ie s as examples. Roosevelt added tha t he 
d i d not envisage tha t f u t u r e demands would be made f o r r e c i p r o c a l 
Lend-Lease nor was he i n favour o f malting nice d i s t i n c t i o n s 
between war and non-war m a t e r i a l s . The most impor tan t view he 
expressed, f rom the B r i t i s h p o i n t o f v iew, was general agreement 
w i t h the proposal o f 1 .3 . This was most encouraging f o r 
H a l i f a x and Keynes. The President suggested tha t Keynes should 
undertake f u r t h e r t a l k s w i th Acheson and draw up a. new d r a f t . 
Keynes r e a d i l y agreed to t h i s f o r he now hoped tha t a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n might be poss ible i n view o f 1.3- tie was 
somewhe.t d i s t u r b e d though, by the vagueness o f the headings 
2 . A - D . , and requested guidance f rom London before meeting w i t h 
Acheson f o r t a l k s . 
(11) H a l i f a x to F . u . J u l y 3 , 19^1, 
W 3 3 W 3 7 A 9 . 
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The m i n i s t e r s I n London expressed general s a t i s f a c t i o n 
w i t h the developments but were more apprehensive than Keynes. 
They s t rong ly advised him not to enter i n t o d e t a i l e d 
d iscuss ions w i t h Acheson on the A-D headings. I n e f f e c t Keynes 
was to r e s t r i c t h imse l f to a d e c l a r a t i o n o f common purpose 
s i m i l a r to 1.3 f o l l o w e d by something on the l i n e s o f : -
" . . . the B r i t i s h Government w i l l be happy to discuss 
w i t h the Uni ted States Government i n due course 
f u r t h e r measures o f co -opera t ion over a wider sphere." 
The r e t u r n o f Lend-Lease goods was acceptable provided there 
was no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the U.K. to r e t u r n Lend-Lease ma te r i a l s 
which had been passed on to the Dominions, Fur ther than t h i s 
Keynes was not to go, her-
" . . . should not put forward o ther proposals even i n 
a t e n t a t i v e f o r m . " ' (12) 
The Chancel lor also telegrammed d i r e c t to Keynes and 
cautioned him agains t d e t a i l e d e l u c i d a t i o n o f the headings 
discussed w i t h the Pres ident . He suggested tha t i n view o f h i s 
imminent r e t u r n to London he should wa i t u n t i l then, when the 
issues could be sor ted out face to f a c e . Kingsley-Wood 
cont inued: -
"The proposals regard ing defence o f the Uni ted States 
and post-war trade and economic p o l i c y have most f a r -
reaching i m p l i c a t i o n s and i n v o l v e commitments i n t o 
which we should not wish to enter l i g h t l y or wi thou t 
the f u l l e s t understanding o f the exact i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
l i k e l y to be placed on them, whether by the present or 
by some f u t u r e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , We warmly agree w i t h 
the President tha t at tempts to d e f i n e such matters a t 
t h i s stage might lead to great d i f f i c u l t i e s and we hope 
you w i l l be able i n your d i scuss ion w i t h Acheson to 
conf ine him to the general quest ions which the Pres ident 
seems to have i n mind . . . e s p e c i a l l y now tha t the 
President has h i m s e l f g iven such a c lear lead tha t he 
does not a t present wish f o r d e f i n i t i o n s . " (13) 
(12) P.M. and Chancellor o f Exchequer to 
Washington, J u l y 1^, 19^1, W8377/37A9. 
(13) Chancellor o f Exchequer to Keynes, J u l y 1^, 19*+1, 
W8377/37A9. 
5^ 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r B r i t a i n , the S t a t e Department had 
r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t views r e g a r d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r Lend-Lease. 
D u r i n g the e a r l y months o f 19^1 the S t a t e Department had worked 
o u t c l e a r e r and more d e f i n i t e ideas r e g a r d i n g economic p o l i c y 
t h a n e i t h e r the P r e s i d e n t o r h i s immediate entourage. 
Furthermore, t h e r e was some f r i c t i o n over Lend-Lease between t he 
P r e s i d e n t ' s E x e c u t i v e O f f i c e , the S t a t e Department and the 
Treasury. The a u t h o r i t y f o r o r g a n i s i n g the supply o f m a t e r i a l s 
to B r i t a i n , and China, had p r e v i o u s l y been under t he a u s p i c i e s 
o f the Treasury. With the Lend-Lease l e g i s l a t i o n the a u t h o r i t y 
was removed from t h e Trea s u r y , much to t h e i r annoyance, and 
vested i n a new agency, 'The D i v i s i o n o f Defence A i d Reports o f 
the O f f i c e o f Emergency Management'.^ 1^ T h i s opened up a new 
area o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y which was denied t o the S t a t e Department, 
much to t h e i r i r r i t a t i o n . The o n l y way the S t a t e Department 
c o u l d i n t e r f e r e was on a p e r s o n a l l e v e l w i t h the P r e s i d e n t 
t h r o u g h t h e i n f l u e n c e o f H u l l o r Welles. The S t a t e Department 
was piqued over the P r e s i d e n t ' s h a n d l i n g o f Lend-Lease and 
i n t e n d e d t o make t h e i r i n f l u e n c e f e l t on t h i s new p o l i c y area 
v i a the c o n s i d e r a t i o n t a l k s . The S t a t e Department had a c l e a r 
view o f the concessions they wished t o e x t r a c t f r o m the B r i t i s h 
and were not prepared t o l e t the o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t was 
presented by the c o n s i d e r a t i o n t a l k s t o s l i p t h r o u g h t h e i r 
f i n g e r s . 
(1*0 Seven months l a t e r re-named O f f i c e o f Lend-Lease 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , O.L.L.A. O f f i c i a l l y the new agency 
was headed by General Burns but de f a c t o a u t h o r i t y 
l a y i n the hands o f h i s f r i e n d H a r r y Hopkins. 
With the c r e a t i o n o f O.L.L.A. Edward S t e t t i n i u s 
became c h i e f a d m i n i s t r a t o r . 
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Keynes c a r r i e d o u t the i n s t r u c t i o n s sent from London and 
presented the m o d i f i e d p r o p o s a l s t o Acheson. Acheson's 
immediate r e a c t i o n was to p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e new d r a f t excused 
B r i t a i n o f any l i a b i l i t i e s i n the form o f goods, a s s e t s o r any 
o t h e r type o f o b l i g a t i o n . Keynes agreed, b u t i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
b o t h the P r e s i d e n t and the Prime M i n i s t e r appeared t o f a v o u r 
such verbose v a c u i t y . Acheson s t i l l m a i n t a i n e d the view t h a t 
t he U.S.government would not accept such a one-sided agreement. 
He s a i d t h a t the S t a t e Department I n p a r t i c u l a r would oppose i t 
i n no u n c e r t a i n f a s h i o n . I t was apparent t he S t a t e 
Department, a t any r a t e , was not prepared t o excuse B r i t a i n f r o m 
p h y s i c a l repayment o f Lend-Lease w i t h o u t some form o f c o n s i d e r -
a t i o n from o t h e r areas. Acheson and h i s c o l l e a g u e s i n the 
S t a t e Department s e t about d r a f t i n g an a l t e r n a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
agreement. Acheson had s t r o n g l y advocated t he Lend-Lease 
l e g i s l a t i o n and i n many ways was s t r o n g l y A n g l o p h i l e . On the 
o t h e r hand t h i s d i d n ot pre-empt him from a v i d l y p u r s u i n g 
American economic i n t e r e s t s as he pe r c e i v e d them, d e s p i t e the 
obvious harm t h i s d i d to B r i t a i n on o c c a s i o n . By the end o f 
J u l y the new d r a f t was completed and approved by the P r e s i d e n t , 
On J u l y ZQy Acheson handed i t t o Keynes. From t h i s d r a f t a 
w o r r y i n g ambivalence began to emerge from American p o l i c y . 
On the s u r f a c e the problem appeared t o be an American d e s i r e t o 
o b t a i n c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f B r i t a i n ' s i n t e n t i o n s r e g a r d i n g post-war 
p o l i c y . However, the a l t e r n a t e t o t h i s was a l s o an i s s u e , 
though the Americans were not w i l l i n g to acknowledge t h i s . 
(15) Keynes to F.O., J u l y 3 , 19^1> 
W8377/37A9. 
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The d r a f t Acheson passed t o Keynes was by no means 
w h o l l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e . There was to be no repayment o f Lend-
Lease i n cash or goods. Keynes favo u r e d c l e a r i n g up the m a t t e r 
as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e . He d i d not want l e s s p r o p i t i o u s 
c ircumstances to a r i s e which would make an agreement more 
d i f f i c u l t b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s he f e l t o b l i g e d to o b j e c t to the 
wording o f A r t i c l e V I I . O b j e c t i o n s which a c c o r d i n g t o Acheson, 
he made w i t h some vehemence. 
"... he b u r s t i n t o a speech such as o n l y he c o u l d 
make. The B r i t i s h c o u l d n o t 'make such a 
commitment I n good f a i t h ' ; ' I t would r e q u i r e an 
i m p e r i a l c onference'; ' i t saddled upon the f u t u r e 
an i r o n - c l a d f o r m u l a f r o m the N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y 1 ; 
' i t contemplated the .., hopeless task o f r e t u r n i n g 
to a g o l d s t a n d a r d ' ; and so on." (16) 
Acheson c o l d l y r e p l i e d t h a t the i n t e n t o f A r t i c l e V I I was 
t h a t a t the end o f the war a f t e r B r i t a i n had r e c e i v e d v a s t 
q u a n t i t i e s o f a i d f r o m the U.3. she was simply to be p r o h i b i t e d 
( 1 ' 
from t a k i n g whatever t r a d e measures she l i k e d a g a i n s t the U.S. 
Acheson had i n f a c t gone f u r t h e r t h a n t h i s . He v i r t u a l l y 
a d m i t t e d t h a t t e c h n i c a l language had been used which would 
p r o h i b i t the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the i m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n c e system and 
p o s s i b l y i m p o r t and e x p o r t exchange c o n t r o l s . T h i s was 
something the P r e s i d e n t had I n d i c a t e d to Keynes and H a l i f a x as 
unnecessary at t h i s stage. Here the problem f a c i n g the B r i t i s h 
n e g o t i a t o r s becomes c l e a r e r . On the one hand they were b e i n g 
asked by the Americans to c l a r i f y t h e i r post-war plans and 
commit themselves t o g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s . The Americans were not 
prepared to accept v e r b a l assurances o f t h i s from the B r i t i s h . 
( l o ) 'Present At The C r e a t i o n 1 , Dean Acheson, Hamish H a m i l t o n , 
London 19^7, p.30. 
(17) I b i d . p.30. 
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They I n s i s t e d t h a t assurances should be embodied i n a w r i t t e n 
agreement. On the o t h e r nana the B r i t i s h were b e i n g asked to 
accept v e r b a l assurances from the Americans r e g a r d i n g the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f such an agreement. Fu r t h e r m o r e , such 
assurances c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n them c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . 
From t a l k s w i t h the P r e s i d e n t a n o n - t e c h n i c a l agreement o f 
g e n e r a l i n t e n t appeared to be what the U.S. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
wanted. I n f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h members o f the S t a t e D e p a r t -
ment a more s p e c i f i c g o a l seemed to be envisaged, one t h a t 
embodied the l o n g - h e l d views o f the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , C o r d e l l 
H u l l . Keynes was w o r r i e d by the p r o p o s a l s and Acheson's r e a c t i o n 
to the r e c e p t i o n they g o t . S t i l l he cooled down somewhat and 
promised Acheson t h a t he would t r y to e x p l a i n the American 
p o s i t i o n t o the B r i t i s h Government on h i s r e t u r n t o London on the 
f o l l o w i n g day. B e f o r e the meeting ended he d i d warn Acheson t h a t 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the d r a f t i n London might take some t i m e . 
H a l i f a x was a l s o w o r r i e d by the r e c e n t developments. 
On August he t o l d the F o r e i g n O f f i c e t h a t i n h i s o p i n i o n the 
Americans were now determined to get some assurances r e g a r d i n g 
U.K. post-war economic p o l i c i e s . As A r t i c l e V I I stood though, 
he thought i t was too s p e c i f i c . Couched i n such s p e c i f i c terms 
i t c o u l d prove h i g h l y embarrassing under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . 
On balance H a l i f a x d i d not c o n s i d e r the acceptance o f A r t i c l e V I I 
a d v i s a b l e . He suggested t h a t approaches to o t h e r U.S. D e p a r t -
( i 3) 
ments might prove f r u i t f u l r e g a r d i n g A r t i c l e V I I . I n f a c t 
H a l i f a x may not have had a f u l l grasp o f the s i t u a t i o n . As we 
s h a l l see s h o r t l y , he was soon to change h i s p o s i t i o n on 
A r t i c l e V I I . 
(18) H a l i f a x to F.O. August 5, 19^1 . 
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The problem o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n had a l s o a r i s e n i n the 
t r a d e agreement t a l k s and the Americans were b e g i n n i n g to take 
a h a r d e r l i n e . Keynes was w o r r i e d by the s i t u a t i o n and by the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the p o s i t i o n might d e t e r i o r a t e f u r t h e r . To 
p r e v e n t t h i s he wanted the B r i t i s h Government t o be as f o r t h -
coming as p o s s i b l e . I n America, Hawkins d i s c u s s e d t h e problem i n 
t h e Cabinet and urged the need f o r a B r i t i s h assurance on non-
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . I t was obvious a d e c i s i o n was r e q u i r e d f r o m the 
B r i t i s h Government b u t the C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer s t i l l 
had grave d o u b t s . 
On August 8, Kingsley-Wood wrote to B i d e n ^ 1 ^ t h a t he d i d 
n o t t h i n k the Government could accept the second p a r t o f 
A r t i c l e V I I . The d r a f t Acheson had g i v e n to Keynes was as 
f o Hows: -
"The terms and c o n d i t i o n s upon which the U n i t e d 
Kingdom r e c e i v e s defence a i d from the U n i t e d S t a t e s 
o f America and the b e n e f i t s to be r e c e i v e d by the 
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America i n r e t u r n t h e r e f o r , as 
f i n a l l y d e t e r m i n e d , s h a l l be such as not t o burden 
commerce between the two c o u n t r i e s b u t to promote 
m u t u a l l y advantageous economic r e l a t i o n s between 
them and the b e t t e r m e n t o f w o r l d wide economic 
r e l a t i o n s , they s h a l l p r o v i d e a g a i n s t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
i n e i t h e r the U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America o r the U n i t e d 
Kingdom a g a i n s t the i m p o r t a t i o n o f any produce 
o r i g i n a t i n g i n the o t h e r c o u n t r y ; and they s h a l l 
p r o v i d e f o r the f o r m u l a t i o n o f measures f o r the 
achievement o f these ends." (20) 
Kingsley-Wood proposed a r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f the second p a r t 
o f the A r t i c l e . 
they s h a l l p r o v i d e f o r j o i n t and agreed a c t i o n 
by the U.S. and the U.K., each working w i t h i n the 
l i m i t s o f t h e i r g o v e r n i n g economic c o n d i t i o n s , d i r e c t e d 
t o the p r o g r e s s i v e a t t a i n m e n t o f a balanced i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l economy which would render unnecessary p o l i c i e s 
o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and o t h e r impediments t o the freedom 
o f t r a d e . " (21 ) 
(19) & 
(20) A t t a c h e d to l e t t e r Kingsley-mJood to £dan, 
August 8, 19^+1, W 9 7 W 3 7 A 9 . 
(21) I b i d . 
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Kingsley-Wood, r e f l e c t i n g B r i t i s h p o l i c y g e n e r a l l y , wanted 
to safeguard a g a i n s t two p o s s i b l e e v e n t u a l i t i e s . F i r s t o f a l l 
the i m p o s i t i o n on B r i t a i n o f a u n i l a t e r a l o b l i g a t i o n t o reduce 
o r a b o l i s h p r e f e r e n t i a l arrangements, i m p o r t and e x p o r t exchange 
c o n t r o l s . I f such commitments were unavoidable t h e n they should 
be t i e d to r e c i p r o c a l U.S. concessions, though o f a d i f f e r e n t 
k i n d . I n the U.S. i t was not p r e f e r e n t i a l arrangements which 
were the main o b s t a c l e t o B r i t i s h e x p o r t e r s , b ut t a r i f f s . 
The i n s e r t i o n o f 'agreed and j o i n t a c t i o n ' by Kingsley-Wood 
was supposed to emphasise the r e c i p r o c a l n a t u r e o f any 
o b l i g a t i o n s B r i t a i n might u n d e r t a k e . Secondly, B r i t a i n was 
a c u t e l y aware o f her d e c l i n i n g t r a d e , f i n a n c i a l and economic 
s t a n d i n g , which would make her more prone to the v a g a r i e s o f 
e x t e r n a l economic and t r a d e c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s would p e r t a i n 
much more t o the U.K. than the U.S. who was r a p i d l y emerging as 
an economic g i a n t . Consequently any post-war commitments f o r 
B r i t a i n had t o be made more c o n t i n g e n t upon the p r e v a i l i n g 
economic c o n d i t i o n s a t t h a t t i m e . The B r i t i s h were t r u l y 
w o r r i e d over t h i s problem o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n w i t h r e g a r d b o t h t o 
the Lend-Lease C o n s i d e r a t i o n and t r a d e t a l k s . The A t l a n t i c 
M eeting c o m p l i c a t e d the p o s i t i o n even f u r t h e r . For a s h o r t t i m e 
the P r e s i d e n t o f the Board o f Trade b e l i e v e d the i s s u e had been 
r e s o l v e d i n B r i t a i n ' s f a v o u r , ~* b u t soon t he a m b i g u i t y o f the 
agreement and H u l l ' s r e a c t i o n s t o I t d i s p e l l e d such o p t i m i s m . 
(22) The Americans d i d have some p r e f e r e n t i a l arrangements, 
namely w i t h , V i r g i n I s l a n d s , P o r to R i c o , P h l l l l o p i n e s 
and Cuba. They were not s i g n i f i c a n t i n terms o f 
wo r l d t r a d e b u t they were a c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f the S t a t e 
Department's c l a i m t o adhere t o a p o l i c y o f non-
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n as a p o i n t o f p r i n c i p l e . 
(23) 3ee Ronald to P l a y f a i r , August 2 1 , 19^1» 
W10085/37A9. 
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S t i l l , f o r a w h i l e , d u r i n g the pause i n the t a l k s a t t h i s t i m e , 
the B r i t i s h began to r e - d r a f t the second h a l f o f A r t i c l e V I I 
i n the hope t h a t the A t l a n t i c D e c l a r a t i o n could be used to 
j u s t i f y t h e i r views. Before r e t u r n i n g to the proDlem o f 
A r t i c l e V I I , n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a wheat agreement w i l l be b r i e f l y 
c o n s i d e r e d . The d i s t a s t e t h a t B r i t a i n f e l t r e g a r d i n g the 
d o c t r i n a i r e views o f the U.S. on d i s c r i m i n a t i o n has a l r e a d y been 
seen. Now, i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s on wheat we s h a l l see how t h a t 
d i s t a s t e was compounded by the h y p o c r i s y the Americans d i s p l a y e d 
i n t h e i r a t t e m p t s to secure markets and h i g h p r i c e s f o r t h e i r 
own c e r e a l s . Such h y p o c r i s y was to have an e f f e c t upon the 
B r i t i s h i n o t h e r realms o f n e g o t i a t i o n . T h e i r a t t i t u d e towards 
the Americans hardened and t h e i r s c e p t i c i s m o f American 
p r i n c i p l e s deepened. 
On J u l y 10, t a l k s began w i t h the Americans t o e s t a b l i s h 
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement on the p r o d u c t i o n and s a l e o f wheat. 
As the t a l k s developed the B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n and 'Whitehall were 
soon aghast a t the terms the Americans were a t t e m p t i n g to impose. 
E v e n t u a l l y , the b l a t a n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s a p p l i e d by 
the U.S. i n these t a l k s w i t h those o f the c o n s i d e r a t i o n and 
t r a d e d i s c u s s i o n s embarrassed even the Americans. 
The p r o d u c t i o n and s a l e o f wheat, s i m i l a r t o o t h e r mass 
produced commercial f o o d - s t u f f s , i s e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o 
c o n t r o l because o f the whims o f weather and o f man. I n 1933 & n 
a b o r t i v e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Wheat Agreement had been drawn up which 
r e s u l t e d I n the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a Wheat A d v i s o r y Committee, 
w i t h i t s sole o f f i c e i n London. T h i s was the o n l y c o n c r e t e 
outcome o f the conference and was i n e f f e c t i v e as a c o n t r o l l i n g 
body. I n September 1939) however, the A d v i s o r y Committee was 
used by the B r i t i s h Government I n at t e m p t s to arr a n g e new quotas 
6 i 
from the four big producers, Canada, U.S.A., A u s t r a l i a and 
Argentina. The attempt again f a i l e d , t h i s time because of 
opp o s i t i o n from the newly e l e c t e d Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r , 
McKanzle King who had campaigned on an a n t l - r e s t r i c t i o n i s t 
t i c k e t . 
I n September 19*+0, London r a i s e d the i s s u e y e t again. 
T h i s time, although i n i t i a l l y u n s u c c e s s f u l , i t d i d lead to 
f u r t h e r developments. The reason for B r i t a i n ' s r e c u r r i n g 
concern for a wheat agreement i s not hard to d i s c o v e r . She 
was the l a r g e s t world importer of c e r e a l s . At f i r s t the U.S. 
did not act on the new B r i t i s h proposals because of the 
imminent p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n but the proposal had not been 
r e c e i v e d with u n i v e r s a l coolness* The American Department of 
A g r i c u l t u r e , headed by Claude H. Wickard^ hoped to 
r e s t r u c t u r e the i n t e r n a t i o n a l wheat market so that American 
quotas and production could be increased and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p r i c e of the commodity r a i s e d . I n March 19V1 the U.S. began 
to make p o s i t i v e moves on the wheat i s s u e and on J u l y 10, 
informal t a l k s began i n Washington. 
By the f i r s t week i n August a d r a f t agreement had been 
prepared on which i t was proposed that formal t a l k s should be 
based. The Americans i n f a c t had been f a r b e t t e r informed and 
b r i e f e d than t h e i r B r i t i s h counterparts and t h i s was very much 
i n evidence i n the nature of the progress that had been made. 
The d r a f t was s i m i l a r i n o u t l i n e to the 1939 one but with 
s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n d e t a i l . F i r s t , a minimum p r i c e was to 
be applied on a l l wheat production; not 75% as p r e v i o u s l y . 
(2*0 U.S.Under-Secretary February-August 19*K) and 
Se c r e t a r y of A g r i c u l t u r e 19^0-19**5-
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Second, the minimum p r i c e was to be r a i s e d from 35 / -6 per 
quarter to 3 8 / - 6 . T h i r d , the o b l i g a t i o n to c o n t r o l trade quotas 
on wheat was to be switched from the exporting to the importing 
c o u n t r i e s , a switch which c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d a change i n 
American views regarding European and B r i t i s h bargaining power. 
The r e a c t i o n i n Whit e h a l l , to put i t m i l d l y , was very 
sharp. Keynes dubbed i t a piece of chicanery. Hudson^*^ 
wanted to know where the quid pro quo was. He suggested that 
such American arrogance was a good excuse f o r removing acreage 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . He went on to claim that the proposals would make 
I t impossible f o r the U.K. to r e v e r t to p r i v a t e purchasing of 
wheat a f t e r the war and indeed i f the agreement stood f o r f i v e 
y e a r s , as proposed, the p r i v a t e g r a i n trade nould be extinguished 
fo r good. N.B. Ronald, Foreign O f f i c e Counsellor, i n v i t r i o l i c 
mood on September 9> minuted the following views: 
" I n what they have said about the Wheat Agreement 
the Americans have constantly hinted that we could 
force the Continental Powers, to whom they want to 
s e l l wheat, to agree i n r e t u r n f or being saved from 
s t a r v a t i o n to bind themselves for an i n d e f i n i t e 
period h e r e a f t e r to conform ( t o ? ) t h e i r n a t i o n a l 
economic p o l i c y to s u i t American i n t e r e s t s . T h i s i s 
too much l i k e s e l l i n g one's b i r t h r i g h t f o r a mess of 
potage. Do not l e t us allow o u r s e l v e s to be 
manoeuvred i n t o the p o s i t i o n of s e l l i n g our b i r t h r i g h t 
for a mess of potage and give away too f a r to meet the 
Americans on A r t i c l e V I I of the Dr a f t Consideration 
Agreement." • (26) 
The f u l l conference t a l k s which began a t the end of October 
were of a d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r . Now the B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n was 
f u l l y b r i e f e d and had been d i r e c t e d to oppose the proposals. 
(25) M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e and F i s h e r i e s , May 19^0-19^5. 
(26) Minutes by N.B.Ronald, September 29, 19^1, 
Wl 0969 /37A9 . 
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This caused d i f f i c u l t i e s for the Americans, but Wickard s t i l l 
hoped to maintain the f i r s t d r a f t . The B r i t i s h p e r s i s t e d with 
t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s to the minimum p r i c e arrangements though, and 
s a i d that they vould have to cons u l t t h e i r new a l l y , the S o v i e t 
Union. With t h i s the t a l k s reached a stage of deadlock. 
At t h i s time the American Embassy i n London was drawn i n t o 
the controversy. As we have seen above the wheat t a l k s were 
not the only economic i s s u e being d i s c u s s e d by the two c o u n t r i e s . 
I n the ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n 1 and trade t a l k s the U.S. was attempting 
to gain B r i t i s h commitments to f r e e r and non-discriminatory 
economic p o l i c i e s . Yet here, i n the wheat t a l k s , the U.S. i n 
d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n of these p o l i c i e s , was t r y i n g to c o n t r o l 
the market i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . T h i s would deprive B r i t a i n 
of a buyer's market with r e s p e c t to her most v i t a l import* Such 
a p o l i c y would a l s o have d i r e consequences for B r i t a i n ' s post-
war balance of payments. The Americans on the one hand were 
i n v i t i n g the B r i t i s h to put her economic i n t e r e s t s i n the balance 
by adopting c e r t a i n economic p r i n c i p l e s , while on the other hand 
they were v i o l a t i n g these same p r i n c i p l e s to remove an area of 
American economic I n t e r e s t s from the balance of u n c e r t a i n t y . 
The American Embassy i n London was quite aware of these 
f a c t s and noted with some alarm the s u s p i c i o n s and s c e p t i c i s m 
they occasioned i n London. The American p o l i c y on wheat was not 
enhancing her bargaining p o s i t i o n i n other areas of economic 
concern. I n e f f e c t , l a r g e l y because of t h i s and the 
vigorous B r i t i s h o pposition to the proposals i n Washington, the 
Americans gave way. The p r i c e p r o v i s i o n s were replaced by 
measures to e s t a b l i s h annual agreements on maximum and mini mum 
(27) See Penrose, Gp.Cit. pp.66-67. 
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p r i c e s . Consumer r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , quotas r e l a t e d to the t o t a l 
volume of wheat trade and c o n t r o l of stocks were a l l provided 
f o r i n a n>oderate fashion. Most important of a l l though was 
the f a c t that the d r a f t was to remain as such u n t i l a t r u l y 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference could be convened. 
The pro v i s i o n s which were to be operable immediately 
co n s i s t e d of rat h e r vague production c o n t r o l s and a 100 m i l l i o n 
bushel r e l i e f pool administered by an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Wheat C o u n c i l , 
temporarily located i n Washington. The Board of Trade i n 
A p r i l 19^2 recommended that the memorandum of agreement drawn 
up at the t a l k s should be accepted. There were some disapproving 
noises from the Exchequer but the whole problem had now r e a l l y 
become a dead l e t t e r . The Americans had r e a l i s e d the 
lnopportunity of pressing f o r agreement on the o r i g i n a l l i n e s 
of the d r a f t agreement. The memorandum of agreement simply post-
poned the wheat problem. The pro v i s i o n s which were to be 
immediately operable, were, to any eyes, a very pale r e f l e c t i o n 
of American hopes i n the Autumn of 19*M. So f a r as B r i t a i n was 
concerned the outcome was s a t i s f a c t o r y but t h e i r views of 
(?ft 'i 
American economic p r i n c i p l e s had been b i t t e r l y soured. 
During the l a t e Summer of 19^1 B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r s were busy 
r e - d r a f t i n g A r t i c l e V I I . Opinions were beginning to harden 
and with the apparent diplomatic v i c t o r y at the A t l a n t i c Meeting 
(28) N.3. I n August 19^2 and January 19*+35 B r i t a i n , with the help of Canada, managed to postpone f u r t h e r 
d e c i s i o n s on wheat p r i c e s a t Wheat C o u n c i l meetings 
though not without U.S. a l l e g a t i o n s of uncooperative-
ness. I n August 19^3> the U.S., h e r s e l f , r e q u e s t e d 
f u r t h e r postponements u n t i l January 1 9 ^ . 
For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s see 'History of the Second 
World War, U.K. C i v i l S e r i e s , Food. Vol.1. 'The 
Growth of P o l i c y ' , E d i t e d . W.K.Hancock, H.M.S.O. and 
Longman Green and Co.Ltd., London 1951 > PP 350-355-
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concerning economic p o l i c i e s , i t was ge n e r a l l y f e l t that l e s s 
a t t e n t i o n should be paid to American p r e d i l e c t i o n s f or 
d e c l a r a t i o n s of economic p r i n c i p l e s . However, d e s p i t e the 
b l a t a n t American hypocrisy over the wheat t a l k s , the B r i t i s h 
should have known H u l l would not give i n so e a s i l y . H u l l was 
determined to t w i s t a favourable i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the A t l a n t i c 
D e c l a r a t i o n from the B r i t i s h . On August 27, 1 9 ^ 1 , Winant t o l d 
Eden of a telegram from H u l l concerning the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
the phrase, "with due res p e c t for t h e i r e x i s t i n g o b l i g a t i o n s " . 
"Mr. H u l l wished to d e s c r i b e t h i s phrase as a 
f o r t h r i g h t d e c l a r a t i o n by the B r i t i s h and American 
Governments to do everything i n t h e i r power, now 
and i n the post-war period, by means of the re d u c t i o n 
of trade b a r r i e r s and the reduct i o n and e l i m i n a t i o n 
of preferences and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s , ..." (29) 
T h i s was put to C h u r c h i l l who r e p l i e d to H u l l that i t 
would be pr e f e r a b l e simply to use the words 'the a b o l i t i o n of 
vexatious d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s ' . T h i s was too vague f o r H u l l who 
refused to be moved, and so there the matter r e s t e d for some 
weeks. 
By September, the B r i t i s h r e - d r a f t of A r t i c l e V I I had 
been completed. I t was l a r g e l y composed by Greenwood, who 
communicated i t to Kingsley-Wood i n a l e t t e r of August 22. 
Some amendments were made, the most important of which are 
(29) Quoted i n 'History of the Second World War, 
V o l . 1 1 , B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y I n The Second 
World W a r S i r . L l e w e l l y n Woodward, 
London, 1971, p.207. 
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i n d i c a t e d below. 
"The terms and conditions upon which the Government 
of the United Kingdom r e c e i v e s defence a i d from the 
Government of the United S t a t e s of America and the 
b e n e f i t s to be received by the United S t a t e s of America 
i n r e t u r n there f o r , as f i n a l l y determined, s h a l l be 
such as not to burden commerce between the two c o u n t r i e s , 
but to promote mutually advantageous economic r e l a t i o n s 
between them; they s h a l l provide for J o i n t and agreed 
a c t i o n by the United S t a t e s and United Kingdom, each 
working w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h e i r governing economic 
conditions*, d i r e c t e d to securing as part of a general 
plan the progressive attainment of balanced i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
economies, the avoidance of harmful** d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s and 
g e n e r a l l y the economic o b j e c t i v e s set f o r t h i n the J o i n t 
D e c l a r a t i o n made by the P r e s i d e n t of the United S t a t e s of 
America and the Prime M i n i s t e r of the United Kingdom on 
August 12, 19*+1. 
And furthermore i t i s agreed that at an e a r l y convenient 
date conversations should be begun between the two 
Governments with a view to d i s c u s s i n g the best means of 
a t t a i n i n g the above o b j e c t s and g e n e r a l l y the b e t t e r 
ordering of economic i n t e r c o u r s e between nations i n 
future conditions of s e t t l e d peace." (30) 
By September 26, the above d r a f t had been passed by C h u r c h i l l 
and accepted by H a l i f a x as a b a s i s for new t a l k s . T h i s d e t a i l e d 
and protracted c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the d r a f t was beginning to 
arouse impatience i n the U.S. Wlnant had asked the S t a t e Depart-
ment i n e a r l y September to agree to a pause i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s 
while the B r i t i s h Government d e a l t with pressing war problems. 
(30) H.W.Smith to N.Butler, September 26 , 19^1, W11797/37A9» 
* suggested by Amery i n l e t t e r to Greenwood, August 27* 
19M, W10W80/37A9: ** t h i s p reviously read ' s p e c i a l * , 
but caused some concern - see Cranbourne to Kings ley-Wood, 
September 7 , 19**1, WlOW80 /37A9, 'Harmful 1 was e v e n t u a l l y 
s u b s t i t u t e d on C h u r c h i l l ' s recommendation - see margin 
notes i n Smith to B u t l e r , quoted above: For d e t a i l e d F.O. 
a n a l y s i s of the t e x t , see N.B.Ronald to T.Daish, O f f i c e s 
of the War Cabinet, September 8, 19^1, W104SO /37A9. 
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This i n f a c t enabled the B r i t i s h to reconsider the problems 
involved. Nevertheless, by October Winant was complaining about 
the hold-up, and the f a c t that nothing had been communicated to 
the Americans on the subject of A r t i c l e V I I s i n c e Acheson had 
handed h i s d r a f t to Keynes on J u l y 28. By October 6 i t looked 
as I f the B r i t i s h were ready. No o b j e c t i o n s to the r e - d r a f t had 
been r a i s e d by the Dominions but disagreements w i t h i n the 
Cabinet caused f u r t h e r d e l a y s ^ 1 ^ so that the B r i t i s h v e r s i o n 
was not handed to Acheson u n t i l October 17> 1 9^1. Acheson took 
immediate exception to a number of points i n the d r a f t . Some 
(72) 
y e a r s l a t e r Acheson was to comment on t h i s . J 
"... t h e i r proposed settlement would commit the two 
cou n t r i e s each working w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h e i r 
governing economic conditions (an escape clause l a r g e 
enough f o r a Sherman tank) ... to securing as part of 
a general plan (that i s , B r i t i s h o b l i g a t i o n s f or Lend-
Lease to be conditioned upon, say, L a t i n America's 
accepting the same) the progressive attainment of a 
balanced economy, (here were two Hurapty Dumpty words 
which could mean whatever one wished them to mean) 
the avoidance o f harmful d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s , (harmful 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s , I said to H a l i f a x , are always the other 
f e l l o w ' s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s , never one's own) ... " 
And a t the meeting i t s e l f he i n d i c a t e d c l e a r l y the 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y nature of the proposals. Members of the S t a t e 
Department considered the r e - d r a f t s h o r t l y a f t e r the meeting 
with H a l i f a x . Herbert F e i s ^ 3 ) suggested that there might be 
a r e a l problem for B r i t a i n with regard to the Dominions and 
i m p e r i a l preference. However, Acheson with h i s c l a r i t y of 
perception s a i d that the Dominions would f a l l into l i n e with 
(31) See Acheson Op.Cit. p.31. 
(32) Acheson, Op.Clt. p.31. 
(33) S t a t e Department a d v i s e r on i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic 
a f f a i r s , 1937-^3-
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American p o l i c y I f pressed because of t h e i r growing r e l i a n c e 
on the U.S. f o r m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . Both H u l l and Roosevelt 
l a t e r concurred with t h i s view and agreed that the B r i t i s h 
proposals were q u i t e inadequate. Acheson and F e l s now s e t about 
r e - d r a f t i n g A r t i c l e V I I i n c o n s u l t a t i o n with G.L.L.A., the 
Economic Defence Board under Vice President Wallace and with 
Roosevelt h i m s e l f . On November 19, H u l l submitted a memorandum 
to Roosevelt which included a new d r a f t of A r t i c l e V I I . The 
President expressed h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the new d r a f t , and 
t h i s i n f a c t was the f i n a l form of the a r t i c l e with the 
exception of a few grammatical a l t e r a t i o n s . I t was not, however, 
to be the end of the controversy over i t s a c c e p t a b i l i t y . 
T h i s f i n a l d r a f t of A r t i c l e V I I was submitted to H a l i f a x 
on December 2, by Acheson and F e l s . 
" I n the f i n a l determination of the b e n e f i t s to be 
provided to the United S t a t e s of America by the 
Government of the United Kingdom i n r e t u r n for a i d 
furnished under the Act of Congress of March 1 1 , 1 9 ^ 1 , 
the terms and conditions thereof s h a l l be such as not 
to burden commerce between the two c o u n t r i e s , but to 
promote mutually advantageous economic r e l a t i o n s 
between them and the betterment of world-wide economic 
r e l a t i o n s . To that end, they s h a l l include p r o v i s i o n 
for agreed a c t i o n by the United S t a t e s of America and 
the United Kingdom, open to p a r t i c i p a t i o n by a l l other 
countries of l i k e mind,.directed to the expansion, by 
appropriate i n t e r n a t i o n a l and domestic measures of 
production, employment, and the exchange and consumption 
of goods, which are the m a t e r i a l foundations of the 
l i b e r t y and the welfare of a l l peoples; to the 
e l i m i n a t i o n of a l l forms of d i s c r i m i n a t o r y treatment i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l commerce, and to the reduction of t a r i f f s 
and other trade b a r r i e r s ; and, i n o b j e c t i v e s set f o r t h 
i n the J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n made on August ^U•J 19^1» by the President of the United S t a t e s of America and the Prime 
Mini s t e r of the United Kingdom. 
At an e a r l y convenient date, conversations s h a l l be 
begun between the two Governments with a view to 
determining i n the l i g h t of governing economic c o n d i t i o n s , 
the best means of a t t a i n i n g the above s t a t e d o b j e c t i v e s by 
t h e i r own agreed a c t i o n and of seeking the agreed a c t i o n 
of other l i k e minded Governments." (3*0 
(31*) From 'A Decade of American Foreign P o l i c y , B a s i c 
Documents 1, U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 
1950, p.5. 
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H a l i f a x was told that the wording of A r t i c l e V I I had 
been kept general to avoid embarassment by a s p e c i f i c r e f erence 
to i m p e r i a l preference. I t s eventual a b o l i t i o n though, was 
intended by the a r t i c l e and the U.S. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would have 
to say so i f questioned on t h i s . There was l i t t l e to console 
the B r i t i s h i n t h i s . Acheson h i m s e l f made a number of f u r t h e r 
points to H a l i f a x as he handed him the d r a f t . He said that the 
changes were intended to give more emphasis to the element of 
m u l t i - n a t i o n a l a c t i o n r a t h e r than simply J o i n t Anglo-American 
a c t i o n , and hence the a l t e r a t i o n from ' j o i n t and agreed 1 to 
'agreed a c t i o n ' . T h i s , I n c i d e n t a l l y , de-emphasised the 
r e c i p r o c a l and b i l a t e r a l nature of the l i n k between B r i t i s h 
r eductions of i m p e r i a l preference and U.S. t a r i f f r e ductions. 
B r i t a i n was s t i l l committed to a b o l i s h d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n t r o l s 
but American commitments were of a more general nature and no 
longer t i e d too c l o s e l y to B r i t i s h reductions. Acheson omitted 
any mention of t h i s subtle s h i f t and indeed denied any I n t e n t i o n 
of Imposing u n i l a t e r a l o b l i g a t i o n s on the B r i t i s h though the 
commitment to a b o l i s h r a t h e r than simply reduce was a c q u i r i n g 
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of such a commitment. Secondly the 
American Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n regarded t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n as the 
beginning of a movement aimed a t broader goals, one of the main 
ones being increased production. Thus sentence two of A r t i c l e 
V I I had been a l t e r e d . Acheson s a i d the S t a t e Department had 
kept to the s p i r i t of a general formulation but had avoided 
unduly cautious phraseology which could have offended some 
f a c t i o n s l n America. F i n a l l y , and i n f a c t one of the two 
changes which were to cause concern for the B r i t i s h , was the 
t r a n s f e r of the phrase ' i n the l i g h t of economic c o n d i t i o n s ' , 
from paragraph one to paragraph two. 
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Hal i fax reported:-
"Acheson l a i d great stress on the f ac t that paragraph 1 
of a r t i c l e 7 states object ives at which the two 
governments declare the i r i n t e n t i o n to aim; and. that 
paragraph 2 re fe rs to "the doing", i . e . ac t ion to be 
taken, a f t e r discussions, to achieve purposes stated i n 
paragraph 1." (35) 
Whether H a l i f a x realised the f u l l Impl i ca t ion of th i s or 
not i s unclear. He cer ta in ly does not spe l l i t out i n his 
account of the meeting with Acheson as he had spelt out the 
change which committed B r i t a i n to abolish d i sc r imina t ion i n 
re tu rn f o r t a r i f f reductions. The point of s h i f t i n g the phrase 
to paragraph two was to make i t q u a l i f y the means o f obtaining 
the objectives rather than the object ives themselves as was 
c lear ly seen by the B r i t i s h North American Department 
Acheson refused to concede anything on the commitment to 
abolish d i sc r imina t ion eventually but did add that the 
Adminis t ra t ion now realised that i t would have to be done over 
a period of time. Hal i fax was encouraged by th i s and i n view 
of what he believed to be American good f a i t h , urged that a 
s t a r t should be made on the post-war economic problems. I n f a c t 
H a l i f a x was rap id ly coming to the conclusion that the agreement 
should be accepted as i t stood. This was a considerable change 
(* 7 ) 
from the view he had expressed i n August. 
(35) Ha l i f ax to F.O. December 5, 19^1, W1W596/37A9. 
(36) N.American Dept. Minutes and Comments, N. Bu t le r , 
P. Dean, December 7, and 11th, W1W652/37A9. The 
Minutes received wide c i r c u l a t i o n , S i r s , H.Wilson and 
R.Hopkins, Keynes, Waley, Leith-Ross, Daish. C r o f t , 
Kingsley-Wood, Cherwell, Lelsching and Overton. 
(37) See Ha l i f ax to F.O. August 5, 19*+1, W9552/37A9. 
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Now, Hal i fax began to support American views. He wrote:-
"The United States adminis t ra t ion urge that some 
r i sks fo r the sake of the fu tu re must be taken. . . 
They are w i l l i n g to take the i r r i sk s wi th Congress 
and they beg of us to take p o l i t i c a l r i sks on our 
side to win the large gains which are at stake." (38) 
One could ask what r i sks were the U.S. taking when no f igures 
or guidelines were given f o r the technical ly very d i f f i c u l t task 
of reducing t a r i f f s ? The main r i s k f o r the U.S. was i n terms 
of Congress. But t h i s would take the form of c r i t i c i sms i f an 
adequate consideration agreement was not concluded. So 
H a l i f a x ' s argument, and the American one, was rather feeble . 
The p o l i t i c a l r i sks f o r the U.S. and the U.K. hardly complemented 
each o then they competed. The better the consideration was 
from B r i t a i n , the more acquiescent Congress would be and vice 
versa. Ha l i f ax did admit that the commitment to the eventual 
a b o l i t i o n of d i sc r imina t ion was a thorny p o l i t i c a l issue but i f 
i t became a question of the break-down of the talks versus 
acceptance of A r t i c l e VI I as i t stood, he preferred the l a t t e r 
course. 
I n f a c t , Acheson had pushed the Issue to a c r i t i c a l po in t . 
He had warned H a l i f a x that i f agreement was not reached soon, 
or i f a loop-hole f o r Imperial preference was again suggested, 
the suspicions and impatience th i s would arouse i n the U.S. 
could prove disastrous. He cautioned that even those amicably 
disposed toward B r i t a i n might f e e l l i k e throwing i n the towel. 
I f there was f u r t h e r delay there was also the danger that 
departments such as the War and Navy, might i n s i s t on becoming 
involved which again would not be favourable f o r B r i t a i n . 
(38) Ha l i f ax to F.O. December ^ 
W1W596/37A9. 
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F i n a l l y , Acheson said there was a need f o r an agreement which 
could be presented as a quid pro quo to Congress before the 
t h i r d Lend-Lease appropriat ion measures come up i n Congress i n 
January. Such pressures appeared, to many i n B r i t a i n , as 
unwarranted ra i l road ing t ac t i c s . There was l i t t l e i n c l i n a t i o n 
to give way under such condit ions. 
On December 7> the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
temporarily al tered the bargaining re la t ionsh ip . This eventual i ty 
had been awaited wi th some degree of optimism by the Foreign 
O f f i c e . The new war s i t ua t i on even made the Americans adopt a 
more f l e x i b l e a t t i t u d e to the time l i m i t they had been t ry ing 
to impose upon the B r i t i s h f o r the agreement. On December 13, 
the Foreign O f f i c e wired the Washington Embassy and stated 
c lear ly that i n the changed pos i t ion i t would be preferable not 
to push ahead in to a hurr ied decision regarding the extant 
American d r a f t . They added that they were considering more 
general ta lks with the Dominions and the U.S. 
requi r ing no f i n a l decision on Imperial Preference 
or any other large issue." (39) 
I n f a c t , London favoured ta lks on economic pol icy p r io r to 
the signing of the Consideration Agreement and was obviously 
less sanguine than Ha l i f ax about accepting the American proposals. 
The telegram quoted below exhibi t s some of the I r r i t a t i o n f e l t 
i n London toward H a l i f a x . The cable i s c i ted i n length as an 
accurate summary o f London's fears and apprehensions of being 
prematurely pushed in to an agreement. London's policy of 
delaying progress because of America's misfortune may not have 
been very ga l lan te , but i s i n i t s e l f an i nd i ca t ion of London's 
growing desperation with American actions and p o l i c i e s . 
(39) F.O. to Washington, December 13, 19^1, W1W652/37A9. 
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"Apart from Imperial Preference, the i . e . i n t roduc t ion 
of the word "discr iminat ion" without any q u a l i f y i n g 
adject ive shows the importance the Adminis t ra t ion 
attach to i t . Our comment f o r your in format ion , i s 
that the word "discr iminat ion" admits of various 
in te rpre ta t ions and i t becomes essential that we 
should review very ca re fu l ly to what extent we can at 
th i s stage wholeheartedly subscribe to i t . I s i t 
cer ta in the Administrat ion would wish e n t i r e l y to 
el iminate a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of d i sc r imina t ion against 
states which may s t i l l i n the fu ture exh ib i t aggressive 
tendencies? Have they i n mind to eliminate the 
discr iminatory export subsidies now i n force i n the 
United States which d i s t ingu i sh between d i f f e r e n t 
destinations? But what we have c h i e f l y i n mind are our 
own post-war d i f f i c u l t i e s which w i l l be very r ea l i they 
are ce r ta in ly not understood i n America at present. We 
need to review c a r e f u l l y how f a r we can a f f o r d to divest 
ourselves o f t h i s power to use protect ive measures 
unless and u n t i l bet ter arrangements can be found. (^0) 
The Foreign O f f i c e had deep doubts about the proposals and 
was less w i l l i n g than Ha l i f ax to accept verbal assurances 
regarding i n t e n t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I n the U.S. H u l l 
continued to urge that a rapid settlement should be sought. 
He to ld Winant to press the matter with the B r i t i s h . On, or 
about, December 11, Winant handed a State Department appreciat ion 
of the extant proposals to Anthony Eden, i n the hope that t h i s 
might d ispe l B r i t i s h f e a r s . ^ 1 ^ B r i e f l y the l e t t e r stated that 
the proposals had been dra f ted wi th B r i t a i n 1 s post-war problems 
s p e c i f i c a l l y i n mind. They were i n no way p r e j u d i c i a l to the 
so lu t ion of such problems. Act ion resu l t ing from the agreement 
by 
was to be/mutual consent and decisions were to be executed 
subject to the prevai l ing economic condit ions. The agreement 
was to be the basis f o r wider ac t ion , and f i n a l l y , the U.S. had 
no i n t en t i on o f imposing u n i l a t e r a l condit ions, but had, 
he r se l f , accepted i d e n t i c a l ones. Although, as we sha l l see, 
(WO) I b i d 
(^1) Te l . State Department to Winant, F.O. 
indexed W1513/37 A 9 -
7W 
the idea behind such a communication appealed to B r i t i s h leaders, 
the actual content of th i s d id l i t t l e to c l a r i f y the issues or 
a l l e v i a t e concern. The f i n a l comment f o r example, was simply 
untrue. The B r i t i s h were to undertake the a b o l i t i o n of 
preferences while the Americans were only to reduce t a r i f f s . 
The Foreign O f f i c e decided to allow the pos i t ion to stand on the 
December 13 telegram. 
The B r i t i s h might have been reluctant to see fu r the r 
progress at th i s stage but the Americans ce r t a in ly were not. 
Pressure fo r agreement was maintained and on December 16, the 
Americans resorted to a most unusual ploy. Leo Pasvolsky, one 
of the main economic advisers i n the State Department, handed a 
secret and con f iden t i a l document to Redvers Opie which set out 
the State Department's appraisal of the s i t u a t i o n . I n f a c t , 
the memorandum had been drawn up by Pasvolsky himself . H a l i f a x 
forwarded the document to London with the comment that i t had 
been handed to Opie i n s t r i c t e s t confidence, though obviously 
i n the knowledge that i t would be sent to London. I t was an 
In t e rna l memorandum of the State Department but a number o f fac to rs 
suggested that i t was more s i g n i f i c a n t than i t s face value 
might have suggested. I t r e f l e c t e d the views of H u l l and was 
the r e su l t of much debate w i t h i n h is department. Secondly, 
despite i t s length the State Department hoped to submit i t to 
Roosevelt f o r consideration. Ha l i f ax obviously thought that i t 
should be taken very ser iously. 
The communication of t h i s document to the B r i t i s h was 
intended to indicate in fo rmal ly the concern f e l t i n the State 
Department. They wanted to show the importance they attached to 
75 
the substance of A r t i c l e V I I and by doing so persuade the 
B r i t i s h to adhere to I t . 
our unsuccessful attempts to obtain from the 
B r i t i s h Government a sa t i s fac tory c l a r i f i c a t i o n of 
the reservat ion contained i n Point IV of the 
A t l a n t i c Declaration; and many other ind ica t ions 
have revealed the existence i n some i n f l u e n t i a l 
B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l quarters of views wi th respect to 
post-war economic pol ic ies which should be highly 
d i s tu rb ing to us. These views r e f l e c t on the part 
of those who hold them, a d e f i n i t e antagonism to the 
acceptance by Great B r i t a i n now of any commitment 
to move a f t e r the war toward adherence to the type o f 
commercial po l i c i es which our Government has 
heretofore regarded, and regards today, as indispensable 
to economic progress." (**2) 
Pasvolsky continued by a l loca t ing the blame f o r the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s to a small group of i n f l u e n t i a l men who held strong 
views on protec t ion of one kind or another. He categorised 
them as (a) p ro tec t ion is t s f o r pro tec t ion ' s sake, (b) those 
who believed i t would be necessary to maintain protect ion during 
the t r a n s i t i o n to a peace-time economy, (c) those who believed 
i n the imperial preference system and (d) those who agreed i n 
general with the broad pos i t ion o f the U.S. but who baulked at 
g iv ing up imper ia l preference i n the manner suggested. 
Although Pasvolsky admitted that th i s was not o f f i c i a l pol icy 
at th i s time, he d id believe i t was causing the problems which 
were delaying the agreement. Pasvolsky, however, hardly f i l l e d 
i n the reasons f o r these B r i t i s h a t t i tudes which made them 
appear more d o c t r i n a l than they actual ly were, but more of t h i s 
shor t ly . Pasvolsky did consider an Anglo-American economic 
entente essent ia l . A f a i l u r e to achieve t h i s would resu l t i n 
(h2) Ha l i f ax to Eden. December 16, 19M, Document enclosed, 
' S t r i c t l y Conf iden t i a l , Pasvolsky to H u l l ' , December 12, 
19M, Copy. W367/81A9. 
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an economic war with B r i t a i n . Other countries would emulate 
U.K. po l ic ies and a general collapse of i n t e rna t iona l economic 
cooperation might then f o l l o w . 
" . . . i f po l ic ies of economic peace f a i l of adoption 
i n one they w i l l necessarily be doomed i n the other 
and, therefore , everywhere i n the wor ld . " (W3) 
Pasvolsky expressed the view that a pol icy o f b i l a t e r a l i s m 
on i t s own, would not prove successful f o r B r i t a i n , largely 
because the U.S. would be the main source of cap i t a l goods 
supply f o r B r i t a i n and her Empire a f t e r the war. Thus some form 
of m u l t i l a t e r a l trade could be ins is ted upon. He acknowledged 
the need fo r spec i f i c po l ic ies to cope wi th B r i t a i n ' s 
t r a n s i t i o n a l problems, but ins i s ted on the present need f o r 
adherence to the declarat ion embodied i n A r t i c l e V I I . Once t h i s 
had been accepted ta lks could then begin, under various headings, 
f o r de ta i led economic planning. This was a l l very wel l f o r 
Pasvolsky and the Americans but the B r i t i s h were not sure 
whether detai led economic talks could solve the i r problems i f 
ce r t a in po l ic ies were i n i t i a l l y excluded by declarations such 
as that embodied i n A r t i c l e V I I . 
Eden was cer ta in ly unimpressed, and i n his brusque reply to 
Ha l i f ax raised an idea that was to become s i g n i f i c a n t l a t e r . 
"My own point o f view i s that from a p o l i t i c a l point 
of view Imperial Preference i s an Imperial domestic 
matter and as such should not be l i g h t l y described 
as d iscr iminatory , though from the economic view i t 
i s undoubtedly discr iminatory i n e f f e c t . " (MO 
(1*3) I b i d . 
(MO Eden to Ha l i f ax January 6, 19^2, W36?/8 lA9, D r a f t . 
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More important than th i s though was Keynes' Lengthy 
appreciat ion of the Pasvolsky Memorandum. Paragraph one reads: 
"The buLk of t h i s paper, which i s a very able one, 
w i t h i n i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , i s a dogmatic statement of 
the v i r tues of l a i s sez - fa i re i n i n t e rna t i ona l trade 
on the l ines f a m i l i a r f o r t y years ago, much of which 
i s t rue , but without any attempt to state t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
or to tackle p r a c t i c a l l y the d i f f i c u l t i e s which both 
the theory and the h i s to ry o f the las t twenty years 
has pressed on most modern minds. Mr. Pasvolsky looks 
l i k e Rip Van Winkle and evidently i s , i n f a c t , he J11 (^5) 
From which one may gather that Keynes regarded the 
' l i m i t a t i o n s ' to be more a matter of Pasvolsky's I n t e l l e c t than 
of the assumptions o f the paper. Keynes' c r i t i c i sms were i n 
f a c t quite scathing. Pasvolsky noted the problems fac ing B r i t a i n 
but d id not evince a clear understanding of them. Thus the 
assumption that l a i s sez - fa i r e would maximise trade simply avoided 
the problem. Such a claim depended upon other conditions and 
the condit ions, p a r t i c u l a r l y d o l l a r sca rc i t i e s , which would 
p r e v a i l at the end o f the war would prevent such an automatic 
expansion of trade. The main B r i t i s h concern was wi th these 
conditions which d i s to r ted the f r ee market economy and undermined 
the assumptions of l a i s s e z - f a i r e . Pasvolsky, wi th the point o f 
view he held was thus unable to see b i l a t e r a l agreements as a 
means by which trade would be continued, under conditions o f 
exchange shortages and monetary i n s t a b i l i t y . Keynes went on to 
c r i t i c i s e Pasvolsky f o r not acknowledging the harm that t a r i f f s 
d id and f o r regarding preferences with greater h o s t i l i t y than 
they warranted. Keynes did not think that the paper was a good 
example of economic th ink ing . He quoted Professors Viner, 
Clark and Hansen as people who a l l advised the U.S. and who 
(*+5) Notes on the Pasvolsky Memorandum, J.M.Keynes, 
January 5, 19^2, W789/81A9. 
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would not express such naive views. There was perhaps a danger 
of over-estimating the State Department's ro le I n decis ion 
making f o r he was dubious about the claim that the paper would 
receive wide c i r c u l a t i o n . Perhaps Keynes had missed the point 
here. The document was not intended to be a un ive r s i ty paper 
embodying the la tes t ideas on economic analysis , i t was a 
p o l i t i c a l document. The paper was Intended to disclose American 
displeasure with B r i t i s h recalci t rance and indicate the 
determination of the Americans to gain a commitment, on the 
l ines of A r t i c l e V I I , from the B r i t i s h . The misunderstandings 
of economic theory were only o f secondary importance. 
Keynes was pleased by Pasvolsky's suggestion that ta lks 
on economic po l ic ies should be undertaken i n the near f u t u r e . 
He hoped that such talks would clear up some of the misunderstand-
ings . For example, Pasvolsky had characterised him I n the paper 
as an unqual i f ied proponent of b i l a t e r a l i s m . Keynes objected 
strongly to t h i s , especially as he had never talked to 
Pasvolsky on such matters. Pasvolsky's views were based on 
second-hand reports from Harry Hawkins during the trade t a l k s . 
But Keynes commented that Hawkins d id not even pretend to 
f o l l o w the ta lks with understanding, implying that he was 
Incapable of assessing what economic views Keynes might or might 
not have. I n f a c t by t h i s time Keynes believed he had h i t on 
an idea which would allow a viable a l t e rna t ive to b i l a t e r a l i s m . 
This idea was to be expressed I n the d r a f t of the In te rna t iona l 
Clearing Union ( I . C . U . ) , Furthermore, despite h is scathing 
c r i t i c i sms o f Pasvolsky, Keynes now also favoured acceptance of 
A r t i c l e V I I as i t stood. He placed his f a i t h i n the I . C . U . and 
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judged that A r t i c l e V I I would be inev i t ab ly vague without 
de ta i led talks,so i t might as we l l be signed rather than cause 
fu r the r unnecessary t rouble, 
Keynes1 preference f o r signing the agreement was not shared 
by many of his colleagues. Indeed Keynes1 appreciat ion o f the 
Pasvolsky memorandum gave added f u e l to the case f o r not 
s igning. 
"The chief moral I draw from th i s paper i s the 
i n a d v i s a b i l i t y (which I wish Lord Ha l i f ax could be 
made to appreciate) of our being asked to sign up 
ambiguous undertakings on the dotted l ine i n advance 
of face to face discussion about the p r inc ip les of 
fu tu re p o l i c y . " (1+6) 
The general view of the Foreign O f f i c e was that Pasvolsky's 
Memorandum, contrary to Keynes1 view, was of considerable 
s ign i f icance . However, they d id agree with Keynes that f u r t h e r 
ta lks were necessary and that much of the trouble was due to the 
lack of American understanding. They did acknowledge the 
p o l i t i c a l s igni f icance of the Pasvolsky Memorandum but would not 
accept that there were substant ia l areas of c o n f l i c t i n g in t e re s t s . 
" f ) the ta lks once s tar ted , we sha l l have an 
unanswerable case 'against "signing up ambiguous 
undertakings on the dotted l i n e " and w i l l be f u l l y 
j u s t i f i e d i n refusing to enter in to d e f i n i t i v e 
agreements i n respect of pa r t i cu la r p ro jec t s , e.g. 
the d r a f t Wheat Agreement, without reference to the 
larger economic and p o l i t i c a l Issues they invo lve . " (^7) 
However, the consideration of these views i s an t i c ipa t ing 
the course o f events somewhat. The a t t i t ude i n the Washington 
Embassy was less hos t i l e to the American pos i t i on . On 
December 20, H a l i f a x sent two telegrams to the F,0 . making i t 
qui te clear that he was re luctant to convey to the Americans, 
(1*6) N.B.Ronald to R. Hopkins, January 23, 19^2, W7H9/81A9. 
(k7) Ronald to R. Hopkins, January 23, 19**2, W7W9/81A9. 
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B r i t i s h Government views which had been conveyed to him, 
notably i n the telegram of the 13th of that month. He re i t e ra t ed 
arguments he had used on December Ky i n favour of accepting the 
agreement wi th increased vehemence. 
"Above a l l we simply cannot a f f o r d to allow suspicion 
to arise i n the mind of the President or of h i s 
advisers that we are organising the entry o f the 
United States in to the war as a pretext f o r evading 
commitments which we might otherwise have been not 
unwi l l i ng to undertake, as appears to be suggested 
by reference i n paragraph 1 o f your telegram under 
reply to the changed p o s i t i o n . " (M-8) 
The point here i s that Judgements were being made from 
two d i f f e r e n t standpoints. H a l i f a x , na tura l ly as he was on the 
scene of the negotiations was more concerned wi th the immediate 
problem of maintaining cooperation with the Americans. He was 
on the receiving end of c r i t i c i sms and recriminations from men 
who, on a number of occasions, he had expressed f a i t h i n and 
noted the i r apparent sympathy f o r B r i t a i n ' s economic p l i g h t . 
Here again the i n c l i n a t i o n was to bend and acquiesce. I n London 
the picture was seen i n a wider perspective. The dealings, so 
f a r , wi th the Americans did not appear i n a favourable l i g h t 
no matter what the intent ions or the personal d isposi t ions o f 
the American negotiators might be. Great concern was f e l t about 
the appreciated f a c t that the proposed agreement was subject to 
an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which i n the i r view could be so used by the 
U.S. as to be detr imental to B r i t a i n ' s post-war recovery. There 
was a prevalent view o f t e n expressed by Keynes, that B r i t a i n 
should not accept conditions which her fu tu re economic weakness 
would not allow her to carry out . I t was judged that th i s could 
be a greater danger than that of prolonging the negotiations f o r 
(W8) Ha l i f ax to F.O. Tel.5953 and 595^, W152W9/37A9. 
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modif ica t ion and c l a r i f i c a t i o n . The Foreign O f f i c e thus wrote 
to Hal i fax on the 2U-th, point ing out the apprehensions they 
f e l t . However, they knew that he was eager to prec ip i ta te 
events, so i n an e f f o r t to f o r e s t a l l the s i t u a t i o n , suggested 
that he consult personally wi th Church i l l . The Prime Minister 
was at that time i n the U.S. to discuss cooperation wi th 
B r i t a i n ' s new wartime a l l y . 7 / I t was widely known that there 
was l i t t l e love los t between Church i l l and H a l i f a x . The Foreign 
O f f i c e also suggested the p o s s i b i l i t y of exchanging i n t e r p r e t a t i v e 
notes to safeguard B r i t a i n ' s pos i t ion i n the eventuali ty o f 
f u t u r e disagreements.^ 0 ^ 
On the 29th Ha l i f ax r ep l i ed . He reported that the Prime 
Minister had been too busy to formulate a judgement on the issue. 
But Ha l i f ax was determined not to l e t the negotiations f a i l by 
d e f a u l t . Ha l i f ax had a meeting wi th Cordell H u l l on the same day 
and according to H u l l 'seemed impressed* by the Secretary o f 
State 's arguments. Ha l i f ax appeared to be convinced that i t was 
necessary to conclude the agreement speedily i n time f o r the 
Congressional appropriations f o r Lend-Lease i n J a n u a r y . w 
(52) 
I n f ac t on that day Ha l i f ax signed the provis iona l agreement. w 
(W9) Church i l l ' s v i s i t was o r i g i n a l l y to be December 22-28 
but i t was extended in to January f o r the 'Arcadia 
Conferences 1 , 
(50) F.O. to H a l i f a x December 2**-, 19**1, Wl 5273/37/^9- The 
idea of the exchange of notes or ig inated i n the 
communication o f State Department views on the agreement 
communicated v i a Winant to Eden. See Wl 513/37A9 above. 
(51) See 'Memoirs of Cordell H u l l , V o l . I I ' , London, Hodder and 
Stoughton, 19^8, p.1152. 
(52) See H a l i f a x to F.O. Tels. 6105 and 6106, December 29, 19M, 
W15637 and W15638/37/^9. 
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The precipitousness of t h i s ac t ion aroused no l i t t l e 
concern i n the U.K. On January 7, 19^2, Richard Law ^ 3 ) 
wrote to Lord Cranbourne. 
"Hal i fax telegram of 29th December about the Consideration 
Agreement seems to me to show that he has not understood 
what we here had i n mind when I n our telegram to him of 
2^th December we spoke of an agreed i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
embodying the explanations given by the State Department 
(see W1513/37/V? above) as to what they understood to be 
the purport and s igni f icance o f A r t i c l e V I I . " (5*0 
Law added at the end of h i s l e t t e r that Eden was i n 
agreement wi th him. Law attached a possible d r a f t of an 
exchange of notes f o r Cranbourne's perusal. The d r a f t accepted 
i n p r inc ip l e the eventual e l imina t ion of d i sc r imina t ion . 
But i t also emphasised the need f o r j o i n t agreement, the 
e l imina t ion of d i sc r imina t ion i n prolonged stages, rejected 
u n i l a t e r a l obl iga t ions and stressed that ac t ion must be dependent 
upon prevai l ing economic condit ions. I n short there was no 
longer simply a q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the means by which d i sc r imina t ion 
was to be eliminated but also of the end goal i t s e l f . ^ 5 ) 
Among B r i t i s h ministers the f ee l i ng that f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c -
a t i on was necessary grew. Cranbourne i n a l e t t e r to Greenwood 
on January 13 f s t a t ed i -
" . . . I personally think i t i s essential to obta in from 
the Americans an agreed i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the paragraph 
( A r t i c l e V I I ) which would be acceptable to us and could 
be used i n pub l i c . " (56) 
Meanwhile C h u r c h i l l , s t i l l i n the U.S. having extended his 
stay f o r the 'Arcadia Conference', said to H a l l at a dinner on 
January 12, t h a t » -
(53) Parliamentary Under Secretary f o r Foreign A f f a i r s 
19^1-1 -^3, Minister of State 19^3-L»'5-
(5*0 Law. personal to Cranbourne, January 7i 19^2, 
W1 5&77/37A9. 
(55) I b i d . 
(56) Cranbourne to Greenwood, January 13, 19^2, W585/122A9. 
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" . . . he d e f i n i t e l y refused to agree to g iv ing up 
imperial t a r i f f preferences and would not accept 
the inc lus ion o f such a clause i n the Lend-Lease 
Agreements." (57) 
Churchi l l was undoubtedly extremely busy wi th pressing 
s t ra tegic problems while i n the U.S. and may indeed have been 
too busy to consider A r t i c l e V I I i n any depth as Ha l i f ax had 
mentioned. However, Church i l l had to ld Ha l i f ax i n no uncertain 
terms that because of America's recent entry in to the war the 
B r i t i s h Government considered i t opportune to delay agreement 
as long as poss ib le .^8) j t w a s bQ C O ming doub t fu l though 
whether the B r i t i s h could continue to res i s t American pressure. 
Acheson and Feis continued to press strongly f o r the forraal-
l s a t i o n of the agreement. I t was true that American advocacy 
of the agreement had f luc tua ted somewhat from December 7j but 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t to agree wi th the o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h h i s to ry that 
there had been anything l i k e a general re laxa t ion of pressure 
or any major change i n American objec t ives . y 7 / Acheson's 
determination to push the agreement through f i n a l l y took him to 
the President. Roosevelt agreed to suggestions put forward by 
him. These were that Acheson should make i t e x p l i c i t l y clear 
that the President favoured agreement on the present terms, but 
i f t h i s was not possible then the second part of A.r t lc le V I I 
should be struck out , leaving each country f ree to adopt 
whatever pol icy i t w i s h e d . A c h e s o n , i n confidence, 
communicated such views to H a l i f a x , along with a w r i t t e n comment 
(57) H u l l , Op.Cit. p.1153, Vol .11 . 
(58) Ha l i fax to P.O. January 29, W1 508/122A9. 
(59) "The History of The Second World War, C i v i l Series 1939-^5, Financial Po l icy" , R.S.Sayers, HMSO and 
Longman Green, London 1956, pAn. 
(60) See Acheson, Op.Cit. p.33. 
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comment from Roosevelt. 
" . . . I s trongly hope that the B r i t i s h w i l l accept the 
f i r s t course ( i . e . immediate acceptance), because the 
second leaves them i n a more d i f f i c u l t f u tu re economic 
p o s i t i o n . " (61) 
The Americans were now r e a l l y f l e x i n g the i r muscles. 
The implied threat was, agree to A r t i c l e V I I now, or else when 
such subjects come up f o r discussion i n the fu tu re the 
p robab i l i t y w i l l be that the U.K. w i l l be faced wi th an even 
harder bargain. Furthermore, B r i t a i n by her r e fusa l to agree 
to A r t i c l e V I I was endangering the prospects f o r fu tu re Anglo-
American col labora t ion . This l a t t e r poin t , as the Americans 
knew f u l l w e l l , was regarded as very important by the B r i t i s h 
Government. There was also a t h i n l y vei led threat that now the 
State Department had f u l l p res iden t ia l backing some members 
might be less r e t i cen t i n demanding concessions from the B r i t i s h . 
Ha l i f ax when informing London of these developments, though he 
did not see them i n the threatening l i g h t presented here, 
r e i t e ra ted his convict ion that B r i t a i n should sign the agreement. 
Indeed the s i t u a t i o n f o r B r i t a i n was rap id ly de t e r i o r a t i ng . 
The possible advantage B r i t a i n might have gained by the entry of 
the U.S. in to the war was being rap id ly eroded. I n f a c t , wi th 
Japanese successes i n the Far East i t was becoming a d i s t i n c t 
disadvantage i n the short run. The d i v i s i v e e f f e c t Japanese 
successes had upon the Commonwealth was weakening B r i t a i n ' s stand 
on Imperial Preference. By January 19^2, the southern Dominions 
were pressurising B r i t a i n to accept the agreement. With the 
U.S. as the i r only possible protector , they were unwi l l i ng to 
(61) H a l i f a x to F.O, January 29, 19^2, 
wi 508/122A9. 
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(62) countenance arguments with her over economic p o l i c i e s . 
Furthermore, the Aus t ra l ian a t t i t u d e since Ottawa i n 1932 had 
changed somewhat. At Ottawa much of the impetus, f o r 
preferences had come from the Austral ians i n the form of 
Mr, Bruce and from the Canadian representative Mr. Bennet. 
However, by 19^1» Mr. Bruce, now the Aus t ra l i an High 
Commissioner i n London, was tempted by the prospect o f 
Aust ra l ian access to the American wool market and had modified 
h i s views somewhat. He and his economic adviser, McDougall, 
had, i n f a c t , v i s i t e d Wlnant i n London to discuss such matters. 
"Though they d id not i n any way compromise the B r i t i s h 
pos i t ion , i t was clear that they were extremely 
anxious to assist i n reaching a so lu t ion sa t i s fac tory 
As f o r Canada, the Prime Minister McKenzle King had 
o r i g i n a l l y opposed the p r e f e r e n t i a l system and would on no 
account countenance a breach wi th the United States, on the 
grounds i n question, because of Canada's close economic and 
commercial l inks wi th that country. The emergence o f these 
divergent a t t i tudes I n the Dominions was of great concern to 
Church i l l who set such store by the uni ty of the Empire, So 
t h i s was yet another pressure on the B r i t i s h Government to reach 
agreement. 
On February 2, the Cabinet discussed the problems involved 
i n A r t i c l e V I I . Eden and Cranbourne decided r e luc t an t ly i n 
favour of signing the agreement f o r fear of the pos i t ion and 
conditions becoming even worse. Others i n the Cabinet in s i s t ed 
on the unacceptabi l i ty of the term and held out hopes f o r 
improvement. Winant, who short ly a f t e r the meeting stayed f o r 
(62) See Aus t ra l i an High Commissioner to D.O. January 31,19^2, 
to a l l s i d e 3 . n cory (63) 
W1508/122A9. 
(63) Penrose, OpCit. p.21. 
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a weekend at Chequers, noted that approximately three-
quarters of the Cabinet objected to any mention of preferences 
i n the agreement. Some, l ike Amery, objected on p r i n c i p l e , 
but the majority simply objected to the venue. They were quite 
prepared to have preferences discussed i n the context of a 
general economic agreement. Their object ion was to the nature 
of the quid pro quo being demanded. C h u r c h i l l , i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
did not wish i t to appear that B r i t a i n was bargaining away 
imperia l preference for materials which she required to wage 
war against the common enemy. The resu l t of t h i s d i v i s i o n of 
opinion was prevar icat ion . I t was generally agreed that i t was 
inappropriate to s ign such an agreement u n t i l there had been 
further t a l k s . The Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary were 
delegated the respons ib i l i ty for replying to H a l i f a x . I n the 
reply they were to press for the p o s s i b i l i t y of an exchange of 
Interpretat ive notes. 
On February V, Winant wrote to Eden and enclosed a l e t t e r 
from the State Department which contained the information and 
opinions that Acheson and Fe i s had conf ident ia l ly communicated 
to Hal i fax on January 29* On the following day Roosevelt 
appealed personally to C h u r c h i l l for prompt act ion . 
Roosevelt said that he did not think i t was i n e i ther govern-
ments in teres t s to delay further . Nevertheless, the Cabinet 
on the 6th decided to press on. The arguments against signing 
were substant ia l ly the same, though now presented i n the 
following manner. 
(61+) Cabinet Meeting February 2, 19^2, Wi 870/122A9. 
N.B. I n Acheson's account i n Op.Ci t . pp29-33» he re f er s 
to this Cabinet Meeting Inaccurately as taking place on 
February 6. 
(65) F.D.Roosevelt to W . S . C h u r c h i l l , received February 5, 19*+2 
wi 508/122A9. 
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"The point of view to which most importance was 
attached by the War Cabinet was that we should not 
put ourselves i n the posit ion of appearing to give 
undertakings i n regard to our system of Imperial 
Preference, i n exchange for benefits received under 
the Lend-Lease Act. I f we were to a l t e r our system 
of Imperial Preference, th i s should be done as part 
c f negotiations for economic concessions from other 
countries ." (66) 
Consequently, draf t in terpre ta t ive notes were wired to 
Hal i fax i n Washington. The d r a f t statements were the same i n 
substance as those drawn up by Richard Law which were referred 
to above, but with a very s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n ; 
"para. The representatives of the United Kingdom 
Government have stated that they do not understand 
the word 'd i scr iminat ion 1 as applying to spec ia l 
arrangements between members of the same Commonwealth 
or Federation," (67) 
This was an attempt to get the U.S . to accept imperial 
preference as a purely domestic politico-economic i s sue . 
A point of view which we have come across before, but one 
which had never been seriously put to the Americans. This was 
very obviously a l a s t desperate attempt to avoid the implicat ions 
of America's economic doctrine. H a l i f a x ' s report of American 
react ions was very unfavourable; Welles used the word 'grave 1 
to describe the new posit ion brought about by th is B r i t i s h 
innovation. Acheson took much the same l i n e . He said 
that i f the B r i t i s h suggestions were accepted i t would mean 
that d iscuss ion of imperial preference would depend solely on 
the benign grace of B r i t a i n . As Welles had said at P lacent ia 
(66) War Cabinet February 6, 19^2, W1871/122A9. 
(67) F , 0 . to Washington February 6, 19*+2, 
W1 508/122A9. 
(68) Hal i fax to F . O . February 8,19^2, 
W1979/122A9-
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Bay, the breakdown of Imperial preference had been the goal 
of the State Department for nine years; they were not prepared 
to l e t the issue go l ike this^ I n short the Americans turned 
the proposals down f l a t . Acheson told Hal i fax that he saw no 
point i n continuing the ta lks fur ther . Hal i fax agreed. 
The impasse was reported to Roosevelt and Welles who were 
unwil l ing to l e t the s i tuat ion r e s t there. Roosevelt drafted 
a personal telegram to C h u r c h i l l which was amended by Acheson 
and Hopkins. Welles and Roosevelt approved the changes and i t 
was sent o f f . ^ 0 ^ I n i t Roosevelt:-
"said that nothing could be further from h i s mind than 
an attempt to use Lend-Lease as a trading weapon over 
the pr inc ip le of imperial preference." (71) 
This helped to soften the fee l ing that the abol i t ion of 
imperial preference was the price of war mater ia l s . At a 
cabinet meeting on the 12th, C h u r c h i l l read out the l e t t e r and 
i t was f e l t that the President had shown a f u l l appreciat ion 
of the problems ra i sed by B r i t a i n , i n par t i cu lar h i s acceptance 
of the fac t that there wasi-
" . . .no commitment i n advance (of negotiations) to 
abolish Empire Preference . . . " (72) 
I t seems somewhat strange that the Cabinet should have 
viewed th i s l e t t e r i n the l ight of a considerable concession 
from Roosevelt. Acheson cer ta in ly put l i t t l e weight on i t . 
" I f th i s ( i . e . F . D . R . ' s l e t t e r ) did not i l lumine the 
subject , as Professor Whitehead said of a lecture by 
Lord R u s s e l l on higher mathematics, i t did not deepen 
the surrounding darkness." (73) 
(69) Acheson, Op .Ci t . p.33. 
(70) Acheson, Op .Ci t . p.33-
(71) Sherwood, Op .Ci t . p.507. 
(72) WM(^2)20 Conclusions, February 12,19^2, W1871/122A9. 
(73) Acheson, O p . C i t . p.33. 
89 
What should be kept i n mind though was B r i t a i n ' s posit ion 
which was now r e a l l y desperate. For example, N.B.Ronald was to 
paint th is gloomy picture only a few days l a t e r . 
" I t seemed to me that our posit ion was considerably 
weaker now than i t had been four or f i v e months ago. 
The ser ies of calamities which were now overtaking 
us i n the f i e l d were attr ibuted r i g h t l y or wrongly, 
by the Americans, the Dominions and India to the 
ineptitude with which we were conducting the war. 
There could be no doubt that a s t r a i n had been put on 
the bonds which bound A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand and 
India to the United Kingdom. The recovery of Malaya 
from the Japanese might wel l have to be l e f t to the 
Americans, They would cer ta in ly demand a price for a l l 
t h i s . A l l those areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y Malaya, formed an 
integra l part of any s t e r l i n g block. South A f r i c a with 
her gold was also i n danger of wobbling out of the 
s ter l ing bloc* The p o s s i b i l i t y of a closed Empire 
economy was now even more of a mirage than i t had been 
before. The Americans could hardly be expected to treat 
seriously any suggestion by us that , unless they f e l l 
i n with our ideas for the co-ordination of post-war po l i cy , 
we should be forced back on a closed Empire trading 
system. Such a trading system henceforward i s probably 
I n the Light of t h i s , and the dependence B r i t a i n now had, 
and would continue to have on the U.S . for the Immediate 
future , even a gesture such as the l e t t er from Roosevelt, was 
grasped fur desperately. The Cabinet expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n 
with the posit ion as stated by Roosevelt, though the f i n a l 
dec is ion was deferred for some hours because of m i n i s t e r i a l 
consideration of the agreement. Later on February 12, 
C h u r c h i l l wrote to Roosevelt and told him that subject to 
Dominion approval, they would now sign the agreement, without 
an exchange of interpretat ive notes. However, i f he was 
questioned on the agreement he would explain i t from h i s stand-
point. This standpoint was that there were no commitments i n 
(7*0 Minutes of conversation N.B.Ronald and 
S i r Hubert Henderson, February 26,19^2, 
W2^58/27A9. 
an i l l u s i o n • * • n 
a D i y 
(7*0 
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advance of negotiations and that post-war de-control was to 
be i n stages depending on the prevai l ing economic conditions, 
C h u r c h i l l did add that he would not refer to Roosevelt 's 
personal correspondence with him to substantiate such a stand-
point. On February 23, 19^2, the Master Lend-Lease Agreement 
was duly signed. 
I n many ways the agreement was a stand-off . The B r i t i s h 
had not succeeded i n qual i fy ing i t to the degree they had 
wanted, though they were committed to ta lks which would involve 
dealing with the problems of d iscr iminat ion and controls at a 
time which many considered to be premature. The American 
posi t ion had cer ta in ly been improved since their s l ight set -
back at the A t l a n t i c Conference, but i t was s t i l l far from being 
s a t i s f a c t o r y . S t i l l the agreement had been f i n a l i s e d and could 
be interpreted i n a manner which seriously undermined B r i t a i n ' s 
imperial economic s tructure . For a l l the B r i t i s h reluctance to 
accept verbal assurances t h i s , i n the f i n a l ana lys i s i s what 
they had to do. The B r i t i s h had re luctant ly acquiesced to the 
force of circumstances and American bargaining pressures. 
As Ronald so poignantly indicated, B r i t a i n ' s economic posi t ion 
could not be divorced from mi l i tary defeats and the d e b i l i t a t i o n 
of Empire unity. These problems and the exhausting dra in on 
B r i t a i n ' s economic resources themselves, was to complicate her 
ta lks with the Americans on economic and post-war planning 
during the res t of the h o s t i l i t i e s . However, toward the end of 
19^ -1 there was a new ray of hope for B r i t a i n . Maynard Keynes 
had for some months been i n favour of signing A r t i c l e V I I . 
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He did not believe that further modifications of i t could be 
made because the r e a l task was now i n terms of detai led economic 
planning. Keynes believed that i t would be possible for B r i t a i n 
to accept a policy of economic de-control which the Americans 
favoured so strongly, i f an adequate in ternat iona l monetexy 
system could be establ ished. Such a system he envisaged i n 
terras of an Internat ional Clearing Union, to the planning for 
which we must now turn. 
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CHAPTER I I I 
The Internat ional Clearing Union and 
The S t a b i l i s a t i o n Fund: Two Di f f erent 
Answers to Two Di f ferent Questions. 
The opening months of 19^2 were dismal indeed for B r i t a i n . 
Losses of men and defeats I n the Far East snowballed along, 
culminating in the f a l l of Singapore on February 15. B r i t a i n ' s 
much vaunted naval expertise was unable to prevent the loss of 
the prest igious 'Prince of Wales' or the movement of German 
warships through the Channel i n broad dayl ight . I n North A f r i c a 
the Germans were proving to be considerably more troublesome 
than their I t a l i a n a l l i e s , and here too, the B r i t i s h began to 
experience a ser i e s of reverses which were not arrested u n t i l 
J u l y 19^2. Confidence at home and abroad was badly shaken, so 
much so that C h u r c h i l l broadened the p o l i t i c a l base of h i s 
government during February. Atlee became deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister at the Dominions O f f i c e , Crlpps Leader of the 
House and Hugh Dalton President of the Board of T r a d e . ^ 
These further decl ines i n B r i t a i n ' s fortunes affected to a 
marked degree, the negotiations i n Washington. B r i t a i n ' s 
pos i t ion was now precarious on a l l f ronts . 
B r i t a i n had been shown to be incapable of protecting her 
i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East i n the face of Japanese aggression. 
Not only had B r i t a i n lost Malaya, with her t i n and rubber which 
provided over Z^QOm a year i n foreign currencies for the s t e r l i n g 
b loc , but also a great loss of prest ige . The growing dependence 
(1) For other m i n i s t e r i a l changes see, ' B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l 
F a c t s 1 , Butler and Freeman, Macmillan, London 1968, 
PP 22-31. 
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of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand on the U.S. for the ir defence 
had a d i srupt ive e f fec t on what p o l i t i c a l cohesion there was 
i n the Empire. These challenges to both the p o l i t i c a l and 
economic bases of the B r i t i s h Empire affected B r i t a i n ' s 
standing I n the Empire i t s e l f , furthermore, there were fears 
that South A f r i c a , with her gold, might leave the S ter l ing Bloc 
which would adversely a f fec t B r i t a i n ' s negotiating strength 
with the U.S . One of the main strengths of the B r i t i s h 
bargaining pos i t ion i n the A r t i c l e V I I controversy had been the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of B r i t a i n maintaining a viable preference system 
based on the Empire and s t e r l i n g . ' By 19^2 th i s a l t ernat ive 
to cooperation with the Americans appeared unviable. However, 
fortunately for B r i t a i n , although the Americans pressed for , and 
were success fu l i n bringing the consideration agreement into 
being, conditions i n the U.S. were such that further ta lks at 
th i s time did not mater ia l i se . The U.S . was having considerable 
d i f f i c u l t i e s h e r s e l f , organising her war e f f o r t , creating a 
more e f f i c i e n t administrative s t ruc ture , apportioning 
re spons ib i l i t y for decis ion making areas to the various depart-
ments, coordinating po l ic ies and, of course, f ight ing the 
Japanese. I n f a c t , as s h a l l be seen, 19^2 was largely devoid 
of post-war planning per se, though preparations towards that 
purpose did get underway. Very l i t t l e was done to resolve the 
problems l inger ing , and indeed perpetuated by the Mutual Aid 
Agreement. Some tentative steps were taken to r a t i o n a l i s e supply 
provisions between the U.S. and the U . K . , and noises were made 
(2) For U.S . fears on this see 
'Pasvolsky Memorandum' i n Hal i fax to Eden, 
December 16, 19^1, W367/81A9 
9^ 
over the Lend-Lease White Paper, but largely inconsequential 
at th i s stage; though they w i l l be considered b r i e f l y l a t e r . 
The main developments, from our point of view i n 1°A2, were 
ideas regarding internat ional monetary problems, Keynes by the 
f a l l of 19^1 had begun to apply himself to th is problem. He 
saw i t s solut ion as a necessary complement for B r i t i s h economic 
success i f she was to abandon preferences, b i l a t e r a l i s m , quotas, 
e t c . , as the Americans seemed determined that she should do. 
Keynes was b a s i c a l l y i n favour of a m u l t i - l a t e r a l so lut ion 
to the problems of internat ional trade, and commerce; but was 
deeply appreciat ive of the obstacles to such an approach and 
the re laxat ion of economic controls which i t entai led . 
I n accordance with the prevalent b e l i e f of the B r i t i s h Government 
and administration, he Judged that B r i t a i n ' s economic decl ine 
and the war-time organisation of her economy would render the 
adoption of an economic policy of de-control i n the in ternat iona l 
sphere unviable without a t r a n s i t i o n period and in ternat iona l 
previsions to cope with the problems which would a r i s e . The 
American f a i l u r e to appreciate or make concessions to B r i t a i n ' s 
weakening economic posit ion, at times, intimidated Keynes. I t 
was not a matter of him being a proponent of b i l a t e r a l i s m , 
preferences, exchange controls , e t c , for their own sake, but 
of such po l i c i e s being the only possible way of sustaining the 
B r i t i s h economy under certa in conditions. He was not being 
doctr ina ire and cer ta in ly objected strongly, on more than one 
occasion, to being categorised as an unqualif ied protagonist 
of b i l a t e r a l c l ear ings , and was further i r r i t a t e d by the apparent 
lack of American enthusiasm to discuss the problems i n order to 
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c l a r i f y the i ssues and avoid such mis interpretat ions . ^ 
Keynes was i n favour of the re laxat ion of economic r e s t r i c t i o n s 
and this was re- inforced on the commercial side by J.E.Meade 
who was working on the control of in ternat iona l commodities 
19^1-^2, and whose work was to become a basis of I . T . O . and 
G . A . T . T . I t was then, not a r a d i c a l d i f ference between economic 
v i s ions that divided the U.S. and the U . K . , but the problem of 
how to bring what was very much a common v i s i o n , into being. 
The Board of Trade held s imi lar views. For example, a 
memorandum of February 12, 19*+2, began:-
"Idea l ly , the Board of Trade regard a m u l t i - l a t e r a l 
system as the desirable bas is for this country's trade 
and for internat ional trade general ly ." (5) 
But l ike Keynes i n the Treasury, there was concern over 
the methods to be employed. I n the Board of Trade's view the 
Americans were placing an unwarranted optimism on the e f f i c a c y 
of the M.F.N. (Most Favoured Nation) p r i n c i p l e . Although the 
adoption of th is by the Americans had a l l ev ia ted trade 
conditions i n the 30's to a small extent, there was always the 
danger that i t could simply mean -
' . . e q u a l i t y of treatment before a closed door*. . ' (6) 
Furthermore, the A r t i c l e V I I agreement, although there was an 
Interdependence between U.S . and U.K. reductions of trade 
b a r r i e r s , the B r i t i s h were pledged to the abo l i t i on of preferences 
as opposed to American reductions i n t a r i f f s . Now reductions 
(3) See J .M.K. Memo 5-1 A 2 , F .O. Indexed W?^9/31 A 9 . 
(h) Member of the Economic Sect ion of the War Cabinet 
Secre tar ia t 19^0-^5, Director 19^-^7-
(5) Board of Trade Memo 'Post-War Commercial P o l i c y 1 , 
Shackle, F .O, Indexed W2317/27A9, February 12, 19^2. 
(6) I b i d . 
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of t a r i f f s was a very complicated issue and a time consuming 
The a l ternat ive to this was a very protracted s er i e s of 
b i l a t e r a l negotiations which could take up v i t a l time at the 
end of the war when B r i t a i n would most need a more l i b e r a l 
American import pol icy . However, this eventuality was not of 
great sal ience at this time, i t began to be considered but not 
u n t i l the commercial ta lks were started did i t become of 
c r i t i c a l importance. On the other hand the t r a n s i t i o n period, 
of which the above would be a key d e t a i l , was of general and 
prominent concern. 
"Before the war. while preserving the general basis 
of M.F.N, treatment, we had to make c e r t a i n departures 
from i t , such as c lear ing and payments agreements, e t c . , 
and there i s reason to expect that the d i f f i c u l t i e s which 
led to our adopting these spec ia l expedients w i l l ex i s t 
i n s t i l l greater degree a f ter the war. Except i n so far 
as spec ia l steps could be taken to a l l e v i a t e these 
d i f f i c u l t i e s and to stimulate trade and employment 
generally under some of the various suggested forms of 
Anglo-American co-operation, we should need to be at 
l iberty to a v a i l ourselves temporarily at l ea s t , of some 
of these ' b i l a t e r a l ' devices." (8) 
By early 19^2 Keynes favoured a concentration on the 
substant ia l economic problems which would a r i s e i n the post-war 
period. He believed that Anglo-American problem solving i n the 
p r a c t i c a l f i e l d would be conducive to a more concrete Anglo-
American accord than declarat ions of economic pr inc ip l e . Thus 
by February 19^2, though s t i l l perturbed by the vagueness of 
the wording of the Mutual Aid Agreement, he had been urging 
(7) Ibid 
(8) I b i d . p.5. S imi lar views in Draft Treasury note on 
'External Monetary and Economic Po l i cy , February 17, 
191+2, W2*+58/27A9. 
one. 
"G H eneva experience has shown m u l t i - l a t e r a l " a l l 
M round" t a r i f f reduction schemes to be v i r t u a l l 
CT5 impract ica l . 
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B r i t i s h acceptance of i t for some months. Not only did 
he bel ieve that acceptance of h i s Clearing Union ( C . U . ) would 
solve some of the problems that had plagued the consideration 
of A r t i c l e V I I , but he also knew that the success of tne C . U . 
would be dependent upon U.S. col laboration. With this 
cooperation he hoped to concretise to some extent the economic 
posi t ion of the two countries i n a manner which would hopefully 
a l l e v i a t e the post-war d i f f i c u l t i e s envisaged for B r i t a i n . 
Obviously Keynes did not wish to break with the Americans over 
A r t i c l e VII with such aspirat ions I n mind. 
From the fecundity of h i s mind, Keynes rapidly formulated 
the problems which could r e s t r i c t post-war in ternat iona l 
l i q u i d i t y and he began to produce a structure of i n t e r - r e l a t e d 
answers which he termed an Internat iona l Clear ing Union. 
However, before we turn to analyse the development of the C . U , 
and la ter the American S t a b i l i s a t i o n Fund ( S . F . ) we must f i r s t 
look at the important conditions under which they were 
developed. During 19^2 there was a d i s t i n c t absence of act ive 
U . S . - U . K . cooperation on economic planning. The declared 
intent ion to embark upon conversations to implement the 
A r t i c l e VII provisions " . . . at an early date", was i n fac t 
delayed u n t i l the Autumn of 19^2, and then the preliminary ta lks 
were very tentat ive . 
I n the Spring of 19^2 Winant suggested that Washington 
should send a small group of experts to London to engage i n 
informal ta lks on ways of Implementing A r t i c l e V I I . But Spring 
passed on for Summer and s t i l l no U.S. representatives mater ia l i sed , 
(9) See £ . F . P e n r o s e , Op.Ci t . p.30. 
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By August the Foreign Off ice decided that they were not going 
to do so. I n J u l y , Acheson had conf ident ia l ly informed the 
B r i t i s h Embassy O f f i c i a l s that the delay was due to the 
d i f f i c u l t y of s e l ec t lng: -
" . . . two or three people out of the many departments 
who would expect to be represented." (10) 
These ' conf ident ia l remarks 1 of Acneson were i n fac t simply 
the t ip of a very complicated Iceberg. The Americans were 
natura l ly primari ly concerned with the dangerous s tra teg ic 
posi t ion i n the P a c i f i c and organising war-time production. 
On the third of January F i e l d Marshall S i r John D i l l , senior 
B r i t i s h o f f i c e r of the U . S . - U . K . Combined Chiefs of S t a f f , 
wrote of the American mi l i tary organisat ioni -
"There are no regular meetings of their Chiefs of S t a f f , 
and i f they do meet there i s no secre tar ia t to record 
their proceedings. They have no jo in t planners and 
executive planning s ta f f . . . Then there i s the great 
d i f f i c u l t y of getting the s t u f f over to the President . 
He jus t sees the Chiefs of S t a f f at odd times, and again 
no record. There i s no such thing as a Cabinet meeting, 
and yet the Secretar ies for War, Navy, e t c . , are 
supposed to funct ion. At present this country has not -
repeat not - the s l ightes t conception of what the war 
means, and the ir armed forces are more unready for war 
than i t i s possible to imagine 
The whole organisation belongs to the days of George 
Washington . . . " (11) 
S i m i l a r l y , the State Department was very badly organised 
for dealing with foreign a f f a i r s on a vast ly expanded s c a l e . 
(10) P l a y f a l r to Shackle, May, 19^3, U2505A7/70. 
(11) D i l l to Brooke, January 3rd 19^-2, from Lord Alanbrooke 
Personal F i l e s - quoted 'The Turn of the Tide 1939-^3 
- A Study Based on the D i a r i e s and Autobiographical 
Notes of F i e l d Marshal The Viscount Alanbrooke 1 by 
Arthur Bryant, C o l l i n s , London 1957, pp.292-93. 
For some d e t a i l s of domestic re-organisat ion for war 
production see early chapters of 'Speaking F r a n k l y 1 , 
by Byrnes, J . F . , Heineman London 194-7 - Byrnes was 
Director of Economic S t a b i l i s a t i o n 194-2-4-3 and Director 
of Of f i ce of War Mobil isat ion 19^3-5 i n which posit ions 
he was likened to a Vice President i n charge of domestic 
a f f a i r s . For some d e t a i l s of war taxation p o l i c i e s and 
f i s c a l measures see J.M.Blum, 'From the Morgenthau D i a r i e s 
- Years of War 194-1-4-5' Houghton M i f f l i n Co. Boston 1967. 
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The State Department ciphers, for example, were so unrel iable 
that the President often used mi l i tary ciphers i n diplomatic 
exchanges. A s i tuat ion which exacerbated the State Department's 
ignorance of internat ional developments due to Roosevelt 's 
monopolisation of the ' p o l i t i c a l aspects'of the war and part ly 
accounts for references to Winant's lack of knowledge i n c e r t a i n 
areas of Anglo-U.S. negotiations and the widely held knowledge 
of th is i n the U . K / 1 2 ^ Roosevelt did in fac t take charge of 
U . S . foreign policy to an extreme extent largely to the exclus ion 
of the State Department. 
"Prior to Pear l Harbor I had been a member of the 
War Counci l , composed of the President the Secretar ies 
of State , War, and the Navy, the Chief of S t a f f , and 
the Chief of Naval Operations, and I took part i n i t s 
meeting. After Pear l Harbor I did not s i t i n on meetings 
concerned with mi l i tary matters I learned from 
other sources than the President what had occurred at the 
Casablanca, Ca iro , and Teheran conferences." (13) 
Some r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n and reorganisation of the administr-
a t ive system had taken place during 1939-^2, but the problems 
of executive co-ordination, p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard to the 
State Department were never s a t i s f a c t o r i l y resolved during the 
(1 h) 
war. R.E.Sherwood v comments on the f a i l u r e of S t e t t i n i u s 
to e f f e c t i v e l y reform the department as Secretary of S ta te . 
This was, i n f a c t , one of the major tasks delegated to him by 
Roosevelt. Sherwood suggests that Ste t t i n i u s *s f a i l u r e 
was due to profess ional i n e r t i a i n the department and reluctance 
to become involved i n ' Internat ional New Dealing' and 'One 
World Ideas' a f t er long experience of i so lat ionism. The lack of 
(12) See a l e t t e r of December 11, 19^2 UI838/50/7O. 
(13) H u l l , Op.Ci t . pp.1109-1110. 
(1W) Op.Ci t . p.757. 
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communication between the President and the State Department 
over 'mi l i tary matters' caused added confusion i n the depart-
ment as , of course, mi l i tary matters often had wide implications 
for post war planning - the primary role of the State Department 
i n these years - which indeed was noted by H u l l , himself . The 
organisat ional Inadequacies of the State Department were further 
compounded by lack of c lear d i r e c t i v e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y concerning 
l i a i s o n and cooperation with the Treasury on post-war problems. 
Eventually the co-ordinating and Inter-departmental organs 
established during 1939- l +2, and which were further developed 
during the war did bring about smoother executive functioning, 
but inter-departmental c o n f l i c t s did continue to a r i s e through-
out the war, often confusing both American p o l i c i e s and 
procedures; and the B r i t i s h who were on the rece iv ing end. 
(15) N.B. January 8, 19^ +0, based on recommendatory memo by 
Leo Pasvolsky 'Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign 
R e l a t i o n s ' , Chaired by S.Welles , with three sub-committees 
on P o l i t i c a l , Arras and Economic Problems - chaired by 
G.Rublee (Welles i n e f fec t because of Rublee's i l l h e a l t h ) , 
Judge Moore and Pasvolsky respec t ive ly . 
May 27,19^0, Economic sub-committee re-organised 
under Pasvolsky and re-named Inter-Departmental Group to 
Consider Post-War Internat ional Economic Problems and P o l i c i e s 
with representatives o r i g i n a l l y from State , Treasury, 
Agriculture and Commerce Departments, but broadened further 
as time passed, 
December 22, 19^1, Hul l proposed Advisory Committee 
on Post-War Foreign Policy consist ing of members of the State 
Department, academics, j o u r n a l i s t s , businessmen, e t c . , to be 
chaired by Secretary of State; approved by F . D . R . on 
December 28,19^1. I t contained two economic sub-committees 
to deal with short term reconstruct ion problems and long term 
economic problems. They were chaired by A.A.Berle and Dean 
Acheson respect ive ly - f i r s t met February 20,19^2. A P o l i t i c a l 
Advisory Committee chaired by Welles, February 21 ,19^2-Jan. 23, 
19^3 1 January 30 taken over by H u l l , continued to meet t i l l 
June 19, 19^3- Other sub-committees on Internat iona l Organis-
at ion , Legal and T e r r i t o r i a l Problems. 
A p r i l 9, 19^3 - the two economic sub-committees super-
seded by the Post-War Foreign Economic Pol icy Committee or 
Taylor Committee, chaired by Myron C. Taylor - th i s marked an 
expansion of post-war planning i n i t i a t e d by H u l l . 
September 22, 19^3, Committee on Co-ordination of 
Economic Po l i cy . Again i n s t i t u t e d by Hul l and presided over by 
M.C.Taylor. 
For a f u l l e r account of committees and their composition 
See Notter, Op .Cl t . 
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As we s h a l l see the Treasury was undergoing s imi lar 
re-organisat ion, though not on the same scaLe, or to the same 
extent. 
A considerable amount of re-organisat ion was being carr ied 
out i n the State Department during the l a t t e r part of 19^1 and 
the early months of 19^2. T h i s , of necess i ty , caused some 
delays . I t had become obvious during the 19^1 Anglo-American 
ta lks that the Americans were unsure of themselves I n e l a b o r a t l y 
i n d e t a i l , and putting into p r a c t i c a l formulations the economic 
pr inc ip le s which predominated i n the State Department. This 
part ly stemmed from the over zealous f a i t h , i n the e f f i c a c y of 
Joint statements of pr inc ip le of Mr. Hull,noted before. Even 
i n retrospect he could write of the completion of the Mutual Aid 
Agreementi-
"The foundation was now la id for a l l our la ter post-war 
planning i n the economic f i e l d . " (16) 
As we have already seen i n February 19^2, the leaders on 
both sides were not even sure about the in terpretat ion of the 
agreement and Hul l himself had t r i ed to extract from the B r i t i s h 
an interpretat ion more concretely i n favour of American interes t 
There was indeed much room, for further c l a r i f i c a t i o n and scope 
for the Americans to develop p r a c t i c a l proposals i n A r t i c l e V I I 
t a l k s . However, there was considerable confusion and c o n f l i c t 
wi th in the U.S. as to how ta lks with the U.K. should proceed, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y between the Treasury and the State Department. 
On February 20, 19^2, the newly formed Advisory Committee 
on Post-War Foreign Policy held i t s f i r s t meeting and by 
March 21 Acheson was able to submit a report of h i s economic 
(16) H u l l , Op.Ci t . p.1153. 
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s u b - c o m m i t t e e t o a f u l l mee t i : ag o f t h e A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e . I t 
was c l e a r t h a t t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f r e l e v a n t A n g l o - U . S . e c o n o m i c 
p r o b l e m s i n r e l a t i o n t o f u t u r e A r t i c l e V I I t a l k s was s t i l l i n 
i t s I n f a n c y . M o r e c o m m e r c i a l h a n d l i n g o f L e n d - L e a s e s u p p l i e s 
a n d l o n g r a n g e e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s w e r e b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d and a l s o , 
" . . . A t t e n t i o n was b e i n g g i v e n t o t h e p r o b l e m o f 
b a l a n c e s o f p a y m e n t . " (17) 
H o w e v e r , e v e n a t t h i s e a r l y s t a g e t h e r e was l i t t l e c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
o f p o l i c i e s w i t h t h e T r e a s u r y . H . D . W h i t e , i n c h a r g e o f T r e a s u r y 
l i a i s o n w i t h o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s o n e x t e r n a l p o l i c y was n o t a 
member o f t h e A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e i n i t s i n i t i a l s t a g e . A n d y e t 
i t was t o be t h e T r e a s u r y w h i c h t o o k t h e l e a d i n t h e f i e l d o f 
e c o n o m i c p o s t - w a r p l a n n i n g i n 19^2, 
The T r e a s u r y was headed b y H e n r y M o r g e n t h a u , a n o l d f r i e n d 
o f R o o s e v e l t ' s and a s t r o n g a d v o c a t e o f New D e a l p o l i c i e s . T h i s 
f r i e n d s h i p , i n m a r k e d c o n t r a s t t o R o o s e v e l t ' s f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i t h H u l l , was p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e c o m p a r a t i v e l y l a r g e 
r o l e t h e T r e a s u r y p l a y e d i n t h e f o r e i g n a f f a i r s o f t h e U . S . d u r i ; 
t h e w a r . A t t h e same t i m e H u l l ' s p r e s t i g e b o t h I n C o n g r e s s and 
among t h e p u b l i c s h o u l d n o t b e f o r g o t t e n . I n d e e d Rosenman 
comments t h a t o f t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o n l y H u l l , as f a r as 
R o o s e v e l t was c o n c e r n e d , was p o l i t i c a l l y d a n g e r o u s i f he 
t h r e a t e n e d t o r e s i g n . S t i l l w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s 
w i t h t h e B r i t i s h o n p r o b l e m s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o n e t a r y s t a b i l i s -
a t i o n , i t i s d o u b t f u l i f t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t h a d t h e r e l e v a n t 
e x p e r t i s e , w i t h t h e p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n o f M e r l e C o c h r a n who i n 
e a r l y 19^-2 was o n l o a n t o t h e T r e a s u r y f r o m t h e S t a t e D e p a r t -
m e n t . ( I n d e e d a t t i m e s K e y n e s q u e s t i o n e d t h e T r e a s u r y 
( 1 7 ) N o t t e r , O p . C I t . p .88 . 
(18) See Rosenman S . I . ' W o r k i n g w i t h R o o s e v e l t ' , R u p e r t H a r t -
D a v i s , L o n d o n , 1952. 
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D e p a r t m e n t s c o m p e t e n c e t o c o n d u c t n e g o t i a t i o n s o f s u c h a. 
t e c h n i c a l n a t u r e ) . On December 8, 1 9 ^ 1 , M o r g e n t h a u c a l l e d a 
m e e t i n g o f h i s s e n i o r s t a f f and t o a v o i d any f r i c t i o n a p p o i n t e d 
H . D . W h i t e t o be i n c h a r g e o f t h e T r e a s u r y ' s f o r e i g n a f f a i r s 
l i a i s o n w i t h t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t a n d t o be i n c h a r g e o f d r a w i n g 
up a S t a b i l i s a t i o n F u n d . T h i s was c o n f i r m e d o n December 15 b y 
T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t O r d e r V } . T h i s was a l l v e r y a p p r o p r i a t e a n d 
p e r h a p s i n e v i t a b l e , and y e t i t was t o cause some d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
U n t i l 19^2, U . S . - U . K . n e g o t i a t i o n s o n e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s h a d b e e n 
m a i n l y r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t and t h e A g r i c u l t u r e 
D e p a r t m e n t . C o n t a c t s w i t h M o r g e n t h a u h a d b e e n p r i m a r i l y 
c o n c e r n e d w i t h p a y m e n t s f o r p r e - L e n d - L e a s e g o o d s and t h e i r s u p p l y . 
Once t h e L e n d - L e a s e B i l l h a d b e e n p a s s e d , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y p a s s e d 
t o G e n e r a l Barn3 a n d H o p k i n s , a n d l a t e r t o O . L . L . A . u n d e r 
S t e t t i n i u s . The r a p p o r t a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d b e t w e e n t h e S t a t e 
D e p a r t m e n t a n d B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n t h e U . S . was l a c k i n g 
w i t h t h e T r e a s u r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y W h i t e who was n o t a n e a s y man t o 
(19 ) 
g e t o n w i t h a t t h e b e s t o f t i m e s . J A n d y e t i t was a t t h i s 
t i m e o f r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n i n t h e S t a t e , T r e a s u r y a n d o t h e r d e p a r t -
m e n t s and when t h e r e was a p a u c i t y o f e f f e c t i v e c o o r d i n a t i o n o f 
p o l i c i e s t h a t t h e p r o b l e m s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o n e t a r y r e - o r g a n i s -
a t i o n became p r o m i n e n t and had t o b e d e a l t w i t h b y t h e T r e a s u r y . 
W h i t e was t h e m a s t e r - m i n d b e h i n d t h e S . F . b u t n a t u r a l l y he h a d 
t o w o r k w i t h a b r o a d s e c t i o n o f G o v e r n m e n t a d v i s e r s a n d o f f i c e r s , 
l a r g e l y i n two c o m m i t t e e s , a C a b i n e t l e v e l c o m m i t t e e a n d a 
s u b - c o m m i t t e e k n o w n as t h e ' A m e r i c a n T e c h n i c a l C o m m i t t e e 1 
c o n s i s t i n g o f e x p e r t s f r o m t h e T r e a s u r y , S t a t e a n d Commerce 
D e p a r t m e n t s , t h e B o a r d o f G o v e r n o r s o f t h e F e d e r a l R e s e r v e S y s t e m , 
(19) See R e e s , O p . C i t . 
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S e c u r i t i e s a n d E x c h a n g e C o m m i s s i o n and t h e F o r e i g n E c o n o m i c 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a i l o f whom met u n d e r W h i t e ' s c h a i r m a n s h i p , 
t h o u g h ; . t was h e and h i s two T r e a s u r y a d v i s e r s , E d w a r d M . 
B e r n s t e i n a n d A n s e l F . L u x f o r d , who w e r e L a r g e l y r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e f i n a n c i a l p l a n s . 
D u r i n g t h e e a r l y mon ths o f 19^2 W h i t e d r e w up t h r e e 
t e n t a t i v e d r a f t s o f a 3 . F . and i n May M o r g e n t h a u f o r e w o r d e d a 
c o p y o f a d r a f t t o R o o s e v e l t w i t h t h e r e m a r k s ! -
" I am c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e l a u n c h i n g o f such a p l a n a t 
t h i s t i m e h a s t r e m e n d o u s s t r a t e g i c as w e l l as 
e c o n o m i c b e a r i n g . I t seems t o me t h a t t h e t i m e i s 
r i p e t o d r a m a t i z e o u r i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c o b j e c t i v e s 
i n t e r m s o f a c t i o n w h i c h p e o p l e e v e r y w h e r e w i l l 
r e c o g n i s e as p r a c t i c a l , p o w e r f u l and i n s p i r i n g . " (20) 
M o r g e n t h a u ' s memorandum was r e c e i v e d f a v o u r a b l y b y t h e 
P r e s i d e n t who s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e s t u d i e s now i n p r o g r e s s s h o u l d 
c o n t i n u e a n d t h a t M o r g e n t h a u s h o u l d r e f e r b a c k t o h i m a f t e r 
d i s c u s s i o n s h a d t a k e n p l a c e b e t w e e n t h e i n t e r e s t e d d e p a r t m e n t s . 
M o r g e n t h a u c a l l e d a c a b i n e t l e v e l c o m m i t t e e m e e t i n g o n May 25th 
w h i c h w e n t s m o o t h l y . On J e s s e J o n e s ' s u g g e s t i b n , W h i t e was made 
c h a i r m a n o f t h e s u b - c o m m i t t e e , o r A m e r i c a n T e c h n i c a l C o m m i t t e e 
as i t became k n o w n , and gave i t t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f i s s u i n g 
t h e n e x t r e p o r t o n t h e i s s u e s i n v o l v e d . The S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e H e r b e r t F e i s a p p e a r e d f a v o u r a b l y d i s p o s e d t o t h e 
d e v e l o p m e n t s and no h i t c h e s emerged d u r i n g t h e m e e t i n g . 
H o w e v e r , t h e r e w e r e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e S t a t e a n d 
T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t s . F i r s t o f a l l t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t 
r e s e n t e d T r e a s u r y e n c r o a c h m e n t s o n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , e s p e c i a l l y 
(20) Memo b y M o r g e n t h a u t o F . D . R o o s e v e l t , May 15, 19^2, 
t a k e n f r o m t h e M o r g e n t h a u D i a r i e s and q u o t e d i n 
B l u m , O p . C i t . : M o r g e n t h a u D i a r i e s 528 i 321-322. 
(21) F . D . R . t o M o r g e n t h a u i n D i a r i e s 597:7. Q u o t e d i n B l u m 
O p . C i t . 
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so when a l a r g e p o r t i o n o f f o r e i g n a f f a i r s h a d a l r e a d y b e e n 
t a k e n o v e r by t h e P r e s i d e n t . The T r e a s u r y u n d e r M o r g e n t h a u as 
we s h a l l s e e , had a m b i t i o n s t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s e New D e a l 
p o l i c i e s o f ' e c o n o m i c g u i d a n c e 1 . Now as f a r a s t h e T r e a s u r y 
was c o n c e r n e d i n 19*+2 h e r r o l e i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s was f a i r l y 
n a r r o w l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d , t h o u g h o f g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e . The S t a t e 
D e p a r t m e n t o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n s p i t e o f P r e s i d e n t i a l 
e n c r o a c h m e n t s , s t i l l h a d a l a r g e a r e a o f p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s t o 
c o n c e r n h e r s e l f w i t h . T h i s a g a i n caused some d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
The S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t w a n t e d t o p l a c e p l a n s f o r a n I . C . U . o r S . F . 
i n a c o n t e x t o f w i d e r p o s t - w a r e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g . T h i s n o t 
o n l y c o i n c i d e d w i t h t h e b r o a d e r f o r e i g n a f f a i r s i n t e r e s t s o f t h e 
S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t b u t w o u l d a l s o p e r p e t u a t e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t ' s 
o v e r a l l c o n t r o l i n t h i s f i e l d , t h u s i m p o s i n g some r e s t r a i n t s o n 
t h e a c t i o n s a n d p o l i c i e s o f t h e T r e a s u r y r e g a r d i n g t h e S . F . 
S u s p i c i o n s s o o n d e v e l o p e d b e t w e e n t h e S t a t e a n d T r e a s u r y 
and d i f f e r e n c e s o v e r p r o c e d u r e i r r i t a t e d T r e a s u r y o f f i c i a l s who 
b e g a n t o s u s p e c t t h a t H u l l was a t t e m p t i n g t o s a b o t a g e t h e 
m o n e t a r y p r o p o s a l s b e i n g d e v e l o p e d . The S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t 
f a v o u r e d t a l k s o f a n i n f o r m a l n a t u r e w i t h a s m a l l number o f 
c o u n t r i e s . T h e y d i d n o t f a v o u r a f u l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e 
w h i c h M o r g e n t h a u a n d W h i t e w e r e p r e s s i n g f o r . The m a i n 
d o m e s t i c o b j e c t i o n s t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t had f o r t h i s was t h a t 
T r e a s u r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e w o u l d 
c o n f e r u p o n them r e c o g n i t i o n a n d p r e s t i g e i n t h e f i e l d o f 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o n e t a r y m a t t e r s w h i c h w o u l d g i v e them v i r t u a l 
a u t o n o m y i n t h i s f i e l d . A n e v e n t u a l i t y t h i s , t h a t w o u l d n o t 
o n l y d e t r a c t f r o m S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t p r e s t i g e b u t c o u l d be h a r m f u l 
t o t h e D e p a r t m e n t ' s p o s t - w a r e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s . The m a i n p r o b l e m 
h e r e was t h a t i t was k n o w n t h a t M o r g e n t h a u h a d g r e a t a m b i t i o n s 
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f o r t h e d o l l a r i n t h e p o s t - w a r w o r l d and t h e c o n c o m i t a n t o f 
t h i s was a weakened p o s i t i o n f o r s t e r l i n g , n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a s a 
p o s i t i v e a i m o f T r e a s u r y p o l i c y b u t s i m p l y b y n o t a d o p t i n g 
p o l i c i e s t o h e l p a weakened s t e r l i n g . The S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t o n 
t h e o t h e r h a n d w a n t e d a r e a s o n a b l y h e a l t h y p o u n d t o e n a b l e t h e 
U . K . t o i m p l e m e n t a more l i b e r a l e c o n o m i c p o l i c y . The S t a t e 
D e p a r t m e n t a l s o , w i t h t h e r e c e n t d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e B r i t i s h 
o v e r A r t i c l e V I I i n m i n d , t h e l a r g e B r i t i s h s t a k e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
m o n e t a r y r e f o r m and B r i t i s h e x p e r t i s e , w e r e a p t t o be more 
d e f e r e n t i a l t o t h e B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n . They t h o u g h t i t m e r i t e d 
c l o s e U . S . - U . K . t a l k s as a p r e l i m i n a r y . A c h e s o n e x p l a i n e d t o 
M o r g e n t h a u o n J u l y 2, 1 9 ^ 2 , t h a t t h e B r i t i s h i n h i s o p i n i o n w e r e j -
" . . . v e r y n e r v o u s t h a t we w i l l p r o d u c e a l a r g e m e e t i n g , 
h a v e some p l a n w h i c h we w i l l p u t b e f o r e t h a t m e e t i n g , 
a n d t h a t t h e y w i l l n o t h a v e a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o go o v e r 
t h e w h o l e t h i n g w i t h us f r e e l y , p r i v a t e l y , and f r a n k l y 
b e f o r e t h e t h i n g s t a r t s . ' 1 (22) 
T h e r e was a l s o a f e e l i n g , n o t j u s t i n t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t 
e i t h e r , t h a t s u c h t a l k s I n i s o l a t i o n were p r e m a t u r e . A l v i n 
H a n s e n and B e n j a m i n Cohen o f t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t and 
E . A . G o l d e n w e i s e r o f t h e F e d e r a l R e s e r v e S y s t e m ; a l l members o f 
t h e A m e r i c a n T e c h n i c a l C o m m i t t e e , w a r n e d W h i t e t h a t h i s S . F . 
was a s s u m i n g t h e s o l u t i o n o f a l l o t h e r p o s t - w a r e c o n o m i c 
(2^) 
p r o b l e m s . J N e v e r t h e l e s s , as we s h a l l s e e , t h e S t a t e D e p a r t -
m e n t was r e l u c t a n t t o e n t e r i n t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f a w i d e r a n g e 
o f e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s a t t h i s t i m e and i t w o u l d a p p e a r 
M o r g e n t h a u was u n w i l l i n g t o w a i t f o r t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t t o 
s u r m o u n t t h i s r e l u c t a n c e . D u r i n g t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h A c h e s o n 
(22) C o n v e r s a t i o n J u l y 2, 19*+2, 
M o r g e n t h a u D i a r i e s 5^5 * 9 0 - 1 1 ^ i n B l u m , O p . C l t . 
(23) See f o o t n o t e p ,75 G a r d n e r , O p . C l t . 
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o n J u l y 2, M o r g e n t h a u , e x a s p e r a t e d w i t h t h e s l o w n e s s o f 
d e c i s i o n s t o l d A c h e s o n t h a t h e w o u l d a l l o w H u l l t o d e c i d e t h e 
n a t u r e o f t h e p r o c e d u r a l i n i t i a t i v e o n t h e m o n e t a r y t a l k s , a n d 
w o u l d a b i d e b y that d e c i s i o n : b u t h e demanded t h a t H u l l s h o u l d 
come t o a c l e a r d e c i s i o n , fly J u l y 21, H u l l ' s p r o p o s a l s o n 
p r o c e d u r e had b e e n r e c e i v e d a n d f u l l y a c c e p t e d . The U . S . was 
t o i n f o r m f r i e n d l y g o v e r n m e n t s o f t h e U . S ' s . moves o n t h e 
m o n e t a r y f i e ld , and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e T r e a s u r y a n d t h e 
S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t w e r e t o i n v i t e spokesmen f r o m t h e U . K . , S . U . , 
C h i n a , C a n a d a , A u s t r a l i a , B r a z i l and M e x i c o f o r i n t r o d u c t o r y 
d i s c u s s i o n s . I f t h e i r r e s p o n s e was f a v o u r a b l e , t h e n t h e 
T r e a s u r y was t o d r a w up a n agenda and o t h e r n e c e s s a r y d o c u m e n t s 
(2U-) 
f o r a f o r m a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e . 
I n f a c t t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t I t s e l f was b e g i n n i n g t o l o o k 
more f a v o u r a b l y o n t h e r e n e w a l o f t a l k s . On J u l y 23, H u l l 
( 2 5 ) 
made a m a j o r b r o a d c a s t o n p o s t - w a r e c o n o m i c p o l i c y . y I n h i s 
s p e e c h H u l l r e i t e r a t e d t h e s p i r i t o f t h e A t l a n t i c D e c l a r a t i o n , 
and made a s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o i -
1 1 . . . t h e need f o r m a k i n g n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c i e s o n c e 
more f r e e l y e x c h a n g e a b l e f o r each o t h e r a t s t a b l e 
r a t e s (26) 
The U . K . Embassy i n W a s h i n g t o n t h o u g h t t h e s p e e c h more r e m a r k a b l e 
f o r i t s o m i s s i o n s . H u l l h a d o m i t t e d w i d e l y e x p e c t e d c r i t i c i s m s , 
o f w h a t he c o n s i d e r e d Utopian post-war p l a n s b e i n g e n t e r t a i n e d 
i n t h e B o a r d o f E c o n o m i c W a r f a r e u n d e r V i c e - P r e s i d e n t W a l l a c e 
and h i s p r o t e g e , M i l o P e r k i n s ; t h i s a l s o a p p l i e d , t h o u g h t o a 
(2W) See B l u m O p . C I t . pp .233-23^. 
(25) See F . O . I n d e x e d A6957/5202A5, W l n a n t t o E d e n , 
J u l y 25, 19^2. 
(26) I b i d . 
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much Lower d e g r e e t o H e n r y M o r g e n t h a u . T h i s f e u d , o u t s t a n d i n g 
b e t w e e n t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t and t h e 'New D e a l e r s 1 i n t h e 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , now m o v i n g i n t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g f i e l d , 
h a d r e c e n t l y b e e n e x a c e r b a t e d i n d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h S i r F r e d e r i c k 
L e i t h - R o s s o v e r p o s t - w a r r e l i e f s chemes , w h i c h made H u l l ' s l a c k 
(27) 
o f c r i t i c a l comment a p p e a r e v e n more m e m o r a b l e . I t was 
i n d i c a t i v e , h o w e v e r , t h a t H u l l h a d e s t a b l i s h e d , t o h i s o w n 
s a t i s f a c t i o n , t h e p r o c e d u r e f o r f u r t h e r t a l k s w i t h t h e B r i t i s h 
o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o n e t a r y m a t t e r s . I n t h e m o n t h s o f J u i y a n d 
A u g u s t t e n t a t i v e s t e p s w e r e t a k e n t o r e - s t a r t t a L k s . I t was 
c l e a r t o t h e B r i t i s h by mid-Summer t h a t t h e A m e r i c a n s h a d no 
i n t e n t i o n o f r e n e w i n g t a l k s i n L o n d o n b u t c o p i e s o f t h e C . U . a n d 
t h e S . F . w e r e e x c h a n g e d f o r s t u d y . Rees c o m m e n t s i -
" F r o m t h i s t i m e o n t h e two c o u n t r i e s w o r k e d t o g e t h e r 
o n p o s t w a r f i n a n c i a l p l a n n i n g . " ( 2 8 ) 
T h i s h a d c e r t a i n l y n o t b e e n t h e ca se up u n t i l t h e l a t a 
Summer o f 19^2 a n d i n f a c t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s comment i s 
somewhat m i s l e a d i n g w i t h r e g a r d t o s u b s e q u e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s . 
V / h a t , t h e n i n summary , w e r e t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e d e l a y s o v e r 
A r t i c l e V I I t a l k s ? I n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l r i v a l r y was one f a c t o r . 
The S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t w a n t e d t o k e e p p o s t - w a r p l a n n i n g u n d e r i t s 
o w n w i n g , b u t t h e s w i t c h o f e m p h a s i s t o m o n e t a r y m a t t e r s i n 
19^2 n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e d t h e T r e a s u r y . I n a n a t t e m p t t o 
m i n i m i s e t h e T r e a s u r y ' s i n f l u e n c e t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t t r i e d t o 
b r o a d e n t h e t a l k s o n p o s t - w a r e c o n o m i c s so t h a t s p e c i a l i s t a r e a s 
( 2 7 ) F . O . I n d e x e d A6957/5202A5. S i r R . I . C a m p b e l l t o F . O . 
W e e k l y P o l i t i c a l R e p o r t ! A u g u s t H h 19^2. 
( 2 8 ) R e e s . O p . C i t . p p . 1 ^ 0 - 1 M . 
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s u c h as money w o u l d h a v e t o f i t i n t o a g e n e r a l f r a m e w o r k 
d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t . ^ 2 ^ ) T h i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
e n t a i l e d much r e o r g a n i s a t i o n and t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f i n t e r -
d e p a r t m e n t a l c o m m i t t e e s t o c o n s i d e r t h e p r o b l e m s w h i c h a d d e d t o 
t h e d e l a y s . I n a d d i t i o n H u l l e n t e r t a i n e d a n u n j u s t i f i a b l y 
o p t i m i s t i c a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e A r t i c l e V I I 
A g r e e m e n t , b u t he was r e l u c t a n t t o e n t e r I n t o t h e more d o w n t o 
e a r t h e x e r c i s e o f i m p l e m e n t i n g i t i n d e t a i l , k n o w i n g f u l l w e l l 
t h e r e was a l w a y s a d a n g e r o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s b e i n g m o d i f i e d i n 
s u c h t a l k s . T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y u n d e s i r a b l e w i t h t h e m i d -
t e r m e l e c t i o n s r a p i d l y a p p r o a c h i n g . ^ 0 ^ F i n a l l y , H u l l was n o t 
e n t h u s i a s t i c a b o u t b i l a t e r a l t a l k s w i t h t h e B r i t i s h b e c a u s e , 
among o t h e r r e a s o n s , i t m i g h t a l i e n a t e o t h e r U . N . members f r o m 
t h e m u l t i - l a t e r a l a p p r o a c h he f a v o u r e d . T h i s l a s t p o i n t t h o u g h 
was n o t so s t r o n g l y s u b s c r i b e d t o b y some o f H u l l ' s m a i n a i d e s 
i n t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t . ^ 1 ^ 
T h i s d e l a y a n d i t s causes a r e o f c o n s i d e r a b l e i m p o r t a n c e . 
The d e l a y was a symptom o f t h e l a c k o f U . S . - U . K . c o m m u n i c a t i o n 
a t t h i s t i m e a n d e x a c e r b a t e d a c o n d i t i o n K e y n e s h a d n o t e d i n 
h i s c r i t i q u e o f t h e ' P a s v o l s k y M e m o r a n d u m 1 . -* The two s i d e s 
w e r e f o r m u l a t i n g p r o b l e m s and d e v e l o p i n g s o l u t i o n s i n v i r t u a l 
I s o l a t i o n f r o m e a c h o t h e r . As we s h a l l see w h a t I n f o r m a l e f f o r t s 
w e r e made t o k e e p t h e two s i d e s f a m i l i a r w i t h r e s p e c t i v e p l a n n i n g 
d e v e l o p m e n t s was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o a v o i d t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f two 
s e p a r a t e p l a n s and t h e i r p u b l i c a t i o n . T h i s was a n e v e n t u a l i t y 
(29) See Memo o f c o n v e r s a t i o n J . M . K e y n e s and P e n r o s e , 
Memo t o G . J e b b d a t e d A u g u s t 21, 19*+2, U5&W5Q/70. 
(30) Memo 0. S a r g e n t , A u g u s t 25,19^2, U56O/5202A5. 
(31) H u l l ' s l a s t two o b j e c t i o n s t o r e u e w i n g t a l k s c o n f i r m e d b y 
A c h e s o n , c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h O p i e and P h i l l i p s , A u g u s t ^ ^ 9 
19^2, C a m p b e l l , M i n i s t e r i n W a s h i n g t o n 19M-W5, t o 
F . O . U565/50/70. 
(32) K e y n e s , J a n u a r y 5,1 9*+2 ,W789/8lA9. 
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w h i c h c r e a t e d a number o f s i g n i f i c a n t p r o b l e m s . S t i l l t h i s i s 
a n t i c i p a t i n g e v e n t s . I n o r d e r t o c o n t i n u e t h e s t o r y a d e t a i l e d 
l o o k mus t be t a k e n a t t h e g e n e s i s o f t h e C . U , and t h e S . F . , t h e 
m o t i v a t i o n s b e h i n d them and t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h e y i n t e n d e d t o 
b r i n g a b o u t . I t s h o u l d be k e p t i n m i n d t h o u g h t h a t t h e p r o b l e m s 
o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n d e s c r i b e d a b o v e a n d t h e d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n 
b e t w e e n t h e S t a t e and T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t s o n l y e x a c e r b a t e d t h e 
d i f f i c u l t y o f r e s o l v i n g t h e s u b s t a n t i a l p r o b l e m s we a r e now 
g o i n g t o c o n s i d e r . L a c k o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n d i d n o t c r e a t e t h e m . 
K e y n e s 1 i d e a s o n m o n e t a r y r e f o r m g r a d u a l l y t o o k shape d u r i n g 
l a t e 19U1 and e a r l y 19^2. H a r r o d comments t h a t o r i g i n a l l y t h e 
C . U . was r e g a r d e d v e r y s c e p t i c a l l y i n g o v e r n m e n t c i r c l e s , b u t as 
i t was d i s c u s s e d , amended and r e - d r a f t e d i t g r a d u a l l y became 
a c c e p t e d , ^ 3 3 ) j n t h i s s e n s e B r i t i s h e x e c u t i v e s p r o v e d more 
r e c e p t i v e t o r e - e d u c a t i o n t h a n t h e A m e r i c a n s . By t h e S p r i n g o f 
19^2 t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r a n I . C . U . h a d t a k e n shape b u t h a d b e e n 
d i s c l o s e d t o n o - o n e o u t s i d e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t c i r c l e s . J 
M r . W l n a n t ' s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t a s m a l l t e am o f e x p e r t s s h o u l d come 
t o B r i t a i n f r o m t h e U . S . t o d i s c u s s m o n e t a r y p r o b l e m s was 
r e c e i v e d w e l l I n t h e U . K . t h o u g h as we h a v e s e e n , t h e p r o p o s a l 
p r o v e d a b o r t i v e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n a n t i c i p a t i o n a n o u t l i n e o f 
t h e C . U . p r o p o s a l s was s u b m i t t e d t o t h e D o m i n i o n s o n May 22nd. 
By A u g u s t t h e B r i t i s h h a d d r a w n up I . C . U . as a n o f f i c i a l g o v e r n -
ment d o c u m e n t , a n d , a s i t was a p p a r e n t t h a t A m e r i c a n I n a c t i o n i n 
L o n d o n w o u l d r e q u i r e new i n i t i a t i v e s t o be c a r r i e d o u t i n 
W a s h i n g t o n , i n e a r l y A u g u s t a c o p y o f t h e C . U , was h a n d e d t o t h e 
A m e r i c a n s b y P h i l l i p s . 
(33) H a r r o d , O p . C i t . p .523. 
(31*) P l a y f a i r t o S h a c k l e , May 31, 19^3, U2505A7/70. 
(35) See I b i d , 
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B r i t a i n ' s p r i m a r y p r o b l e m i n t h e p o s t - w a r p e r i o d i n t e r m s 
o f e c o n o m i c r e c o n s t r u c t i o n was j u d g e d t o be t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f 
a b a l a n c e o f p a y m e n t s e q u i l i b r i u m . T h i s h a d t o be done w i t h o u t 
d e p r e s s i n g t h e d o m e s t i c e c o n o m y , a p r o b l e m f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d 
b y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s t e r l i n g b l o c w h i c h o f t e n n e c e s s i t a t e d 
a n " e x p e n s i v e m o n e y ' p o l i c y i n o r d e r t o a t t r a c t a n d / o r r e t a i n 
s t e r l i n g d e p o s i t e d i n L o n d o n b y members o f t h e b l o c . K e y n e s 
d i d n o t w i s h t o s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m b y t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n o f d e f e n s i v e 
e c o n o m i c c o n t r o l s , i f p o s s i b l e . He saw t h e a l t e r n a t i v e I n t e r m s 
o f a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n . B u t k n o w i n g t h a t E r l t a i n ' s 
e c o n o m i c and p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e was i n e x t r i c a b l y i n t e r - w o v e n , a n d 
t h a t B r i t a i n w o u l d emerge f r o m t h e war e c o n o m i c a l l y e x h a u s t e d , 
h e w a n t e d t o e n s u r e t h a t a n a t i o n ' s c r u d e e c o n o m i c power w o u l d 
n o t r e f l e c t , i n a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d f o r m , i t s c o n c o m i t a n t 
p o l i t i c a l p o w e r . J u d g i n g t h a t B r i t a i n w o u l d emerge f r o m t h e war 
e c o n o m i c a l l y w e a k , h e s e t o u t t o p o l i t i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h a 
d e - p o l i t i c i s e d I n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n t h a t w o u l d i n s t i t u t i o n -
a l l y h e l p t o p r o m o t e B r i t a i n ' s e c o n o m i c w e l f a r e . 
I n t h e p r e f a c e t o t h e I . C . U . t h e m a i n o b j e c t i v e s w e r e 
c l e a r l y s t a t e d t o b e t h e r e j e c t i o n o f b i l a t e r a l c l e a r i n g s , 
u n i l a t e r a l c o m p e t i t i v e d e v a l u a t i o n s and t h e a v o i d a n c e o f n a t i o n a l 
t r a d e d i s - e q u i l i b r i a . The p r o p o s e d s o l u t i o n i n g e n e r a l t e r m s 
was t o i n s t i t u t e o r d e r l y b a n k i n g , as o p p o s e d t o p o l i t i c a l , c o n t r o l 
o v e r m o n e t a r y p r i c e s . The c r e a t i o n o f a f l e x i b l e q u a n t u m o f 
a r t i f i c i a l I n t e r n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c y c o m b i n e d w i t h t h e p e n a l i s a t i o n 
o f i t s a b u s e , w h e t h e r i n t h e f o r m o f a c c u m u l a t i n g d e b t s o r c r e d i t s . 
The a p p l i c a t i o n o f u n - u s e d c r e d i t b a l a n c e s t o f i n a n c e r e c o n s t r u c t -
i o n and d e v e l o p m e n t . A l l t h e s e m e a s u r e s w e r e a i m e d a t r e - c r e a t i n g 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o a f l d e n c e i n t r a d e and t o p r o v i d e a n a d e q u a t e 
b r e a t h i n g s p a c e so t h a t o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e e c o n o m i c r e m e d i e s c o u l d 
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be a d o p t e d i n a n o r d e r l y way t o e s t a b l i s h i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
e q u i l i b r i u m . 
" T h e i d e a u n d e r l y i n g s u c h a U n i o n i s s i m p l e , n a m e l y , 
t o g e n e r a l i s e t h e e s s e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e o f b a n k i n g a s 
i t i s e x h i b i t e d w i t h i n any c l o s e d s y s t e m . T h i s 
p r i n c i p l e i s t h e n e c e s s a r y e q u a l i t y o f c r e d i t s and 
d e b i t s . I f no c r e d i t s c a n be r emoved o u t s i d e t h e 
c l e a r i n g s y s t e m , b u t o n l y t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h i n i t , t h e 
U n i o n c a n n e v e r be i n any d i f f i c u l t y as r e g a r d s t h e 
h o n o u r i n g o f c h e q u e s d r a w n u p o n i t . I t c a n make w h a t 
a d v a n c e s i t w i s h e s t o any o f i t s members w i t h t h e 
a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h e p r o c e e d s c a n o n l y b e t r a n s f e r r e d t o 
t h e c l e a r i n g a c c o u n t o f a n o t h e r member. I t s s o l e t a s k 
i s t o see t o i t t h a t i t s members keep t h e r u l e s and 
t h a t t h e a d v a n c e s made t o e a c h o f them a r e p r u d e n t and 
a d v i s a b l e f o r t h e U n i o n as a w h o l e . " (36) 
The p r o v i s i o n s o f t r i e p l a n d i d c o n t a i n a number o f p o i n t s 
w h i c h w e r e t o c a u s e c o n t r o v e r s y w i t h t h e A m e r i c a n s ; p r o v i s i o n s 
w h i c h w e r e r a t h e r o b v i o u s l y f a v o u r a b l e t o B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . 
The v o t i n g s y s t e m was t o be p r o p o r t i o n a l t o e a c h c o u n t r y ' s 
q u o t a w h i c h was d e f i n e d as t h e maximum d e b i t b a l a n c e a l l o w e d t o 
a c o u n t r y , a n d t h a t sum was e s t i m a t e d o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e v o l u m e 
o f a c o u n t r y ' s e x p o r t s and i m p o r t s o v e r a s e l e c t e d p e r i o d . T h i s 
was o b v i o u s l y a f a v o u r a o l e p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e U . K . S e c o n d l y , 
t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t c o n s i s t e n t c r e d i t b a l a n c e s , 
p l a c i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o n c r e d i t o r c o u n t r i e s t o h e l p e s t a b l i s h 
e c o n o m i c e q u i l i b r i u m , a l t h o u g h e c o n o m i c a l l y s o u n d , i t s o n u s 
w o u l d f a l l p r i m a r i l y o n t h e U . S . I t was i n t e n d e d t o p r e v e n t 
t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f c r e d i t c a u s i n g d i s - e q u i l i b r i a , and e x e r c i s i n g 
a c o n t r a c t i c n i s t p r e s s u r e o n t h e w o r l d e c o n o m y . C r e d i t o r 
c o u n t r i e s w o u l d h a v e t o h e l p f i n a n c e o t h e r c o u n t r i e s 1 d e f i c i t s 
a n d f a c i l i t i a t e t h e i r e x p o r t s a l e s . 
"How i n d e e d c a n any c o u n t r y hope t o s t a r t up t r a d e 
w i t h E u r o p e d u r i n g t h e r e l i e f and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
p e r i o d o n any o t h e r t e r m s . " (37) 
(36) F . O . I n d e x e d U58V50/70. P r o p o s a l s f o r a n I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
C l e a r i n g U n i o n , d a t e d A u g u s t 22, 19^2. 
(37) I b i d , p . 5 . S e c t i o n I I I , p a r a 12. 
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H o w e v e r , t h e s e p r o p o s e d s a n c t i o n s w e r e t o De a u t o m a t i c and 
e m b o d i e d i n t h e r u l e s o f t h e C . U . T h e r e w e r e t o be no ' p o l i t i c a l ' 
m a n i p u l a t i o n s o f m o n e t a r y p r i c e s , w i t h h o l d i n g o f c r e d i t 
f a c i l i t i e s , e t c . The o n l y s a n c t i o n a g a i n s t s t a t e s p e r se was 
t h e r e m o v a l o f t h e C . U . f a c i l i t i e s f r o m t h e m . I n s e c t i o n 8, 
p a r a g r a p h 38, K e y n e s s t r e s s e d w h a t he t e r m e d t h e I m p e r s o n a l 
b a n k i n g n a t u r e o f t h e C . U . 
"No p a r t i c u l a r member S t a t e s h a v e t o engage t h e i r o w n 
r e s o u r c e s as s u c h t o t h e s u p p o r t o f o t h e r p a r t i c u l a r 
S t a t e s o r o f any o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o j e c t s o r 
p o l i c i e s a d o p t e d . They h a v e o n l y t o a g r e e i n g e n e r a l 
t h a t , i f t h e y f i n d t h e m s e l v e s w i t h s u r p l u s r e s o u r c e s 
w h i c h f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g t h e y do n o t t h e m s e l v e s w i s h 
t o e m p l o y , t h e s e r e s o u r c e s may go i n t o t h e g e n e r a l 
p o o l and be p u t t o w o r k o n a p p r o v e d p u r p o s e s . T h i s 
c o s t s t h e s u r p l u s c o u n t r y n o t h i n g b e c a u s e i t i s n o t 
a s k e d t o p a r t p e r m a n e n t l y , o r e v e n f o r any s p e c i f i c 
p e r i o d , w i t h s u c h r e s o u r c e s , w h i c h I t r e m a i n s f r e e t o 
e x p e n d and e m p l o y f o r i t s o w n p u r p o s e s w h e n e v e r i t 
c h o o s e s ; i n w h i c h case t h e b u r d e n o f f i n a n c e i s 
p a s s e d o n t o t h e n e x t r e c i p i e n t , a g a i n o n l y f o r so l o n g 
as t h e r e c i p i e n t h a s no u s e f o r t h e money . As p o i n t e d 
o u t a b o v e , t h i s m e r e l y a m o u n t s t o e x t e n d i n g t o t h e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s p h e r e t h e m e t h o d s o f any d o m e s t i c b a n k i n g 
s y s t e m , w h i c h a r e i n t h e same sense " i m p e r s o n a l " i n as 
much as t h e r e i s no c a l l o n t h e p a r t i c u l a r d e p o s i t o r 
e i t h e r t o s u p p o r t as s u c h t h e p u r p o s e s f o r w h i c h h i s 
b a n k e r makes a d v a n c e s o r t o f o r e g o p e r m a n e n t l y t h e u se 
A n e c e s s a r y i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s was t h e a d o p t i o n o f a b o o k 
e n t r y b a n k i n g s y s t e m t o r e g i s t e r c r e d i t and d e o i t o f t h e member 
s t a t e s w h i c h w o u l d a c c o r d i n g l y r e n d e r t h e u se o f g o l d as a 
r e s e r v e r e d u n d a n t and i n e f f e c t d e - m o n e t i s e i t . T h i s w o u l d 
r e m o v e a v e r y i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l and m o n e t a r y l e v e r f r o m t h e 
U . S . as she h e l d t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y o f t h e w o r l d ' s m o n e t a r y g o l d . 
A l s o i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e i n n o v a t i o n r e g a r d i n g p e r s i s t e n t c r e d i t o r 
(19) 
b a l a n c e s r e f e r r e d t o a b o v e J 7 t h e r e w e r e a l s o a r r a n g e m e n t s 
r e g a r d i n g t h e h o l d i n g o f r e s e r v e s w h i c h w o u l d h e l p t o p r o t e c t 
o f h i s d e p o s i t . " (38) 
(38) I b i d , p . 1 1 . 
(39) See a l s o S e c t i o n V I I , p a r a 35 I b i d . 
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B r i t a i n ' s e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n . 
" I t s h o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , be l a i d down t h a t C e n t r a l Bank 
b a l a n c e s may n o t b e h e l d i n a n o t h e r c o u n t r y e x c e p t 
w i t h t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e C e n t r a l Bank o f t h a t c o u n t r y ; 
a n d , i n o r d e r t h a t s t e r l i n g and d o l l a r s m i g h t n o t 
a p p e a r t o c o m p e t e w i t h b a n c o r f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f C e n t r a l 
Bank r e s e r v e b a l a n c e s , t h e F o u n d e r S t a t e s m i g h t a g r e e 
t o g e t h e r t h a t t h e y w o u l d n o t a c c e p t r e s e r v e b a l a n c e s o f 
o t h e r C e n t r a l B a n k s i n e x c e s s o f n o r m a l w o r k i n g b a l a n c e s 
e x c e p t i n t h e ca se o f b a n k s d e f i n i t e l y b e l o n g i n g t o a 
S t e r l i n g A r e a o r D o l l a r G r o u p . " (1*0) 
N o t o n l y was Keynes i n c o r p o r a t i n g p r o v i s i o n s w h i c h 
e n v i s a g e d t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f a S t e r l i n g B l o c w i t h i n t h e w o r k -
i n g s o f t h e C . U . b u t S e c t i o n I X , p a r a g r a p h s k-2 a n d 3^ w e r e 
a c t u a l l y d e s i g n e d t o h e l p t h e S t e r l i n g B l o c t o r e c o v e r as a 
v i a b l e c o n c e r n f r o m i t s war t i m e d i f f i c u l t i e s . The p r o v i s i o n s 
w e r e d e s i g n e d t o e n a b l e , as p a i n l e s s l y as p o s s i b l e , t h e 
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y a n d l i q u i d a t i o n o f s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s a c c u m u l a t e d 
d u r i n g t h e w a r . F i n a l l y , K e y n e s e n v i s a g e d t h e n e e d f o r a 
t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d w i t h r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , p e r h a p s p a r t l y f i n a n c e d 
b y t h e u n - u t i l l s e d c r e d i t b a l a n c e s o f t h e C . U . , t h o u g h t h e m a i n 
b u r d e n w o u l d f a l l o n t h e U . S . i n t h e f o r m o f e x t e n d e d L e n d -
L e a s e o r o t h e r f o r m s o f a i d . I f , due t o t h e s e m e a s u r e s , 
i n f l a t i o n a r y t e n d e n c i e s become t o o p r o m i n e n t , c o u n t e r - m e a s u r e s 
c o u l d be t a k e n I n t h e f o r m o f r e d u c i n g t h e a m o u n t o f c r e d i t s 
made a v a i l a b l e b y t h e C . U . K e y n e s c o n c l u d e d : -
" I t m i g h t h e l p t o c r e a t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s a n d t h e 
a t m o s p h e r e i n w h i c h much e l s e w o u l d b e made e a s i e r . " ) 
By A u g u s t 19^2 t h e B r i t i s h d e c i d e d t h a t W i n a n t ' s S p r i n g p l a n f o r 
U . S . e x p e r t s t o come t o t h e U . K . was n o t g o i n g t o p r o v e f r u i t f u l . 
(WO) S e c t i o n I V p a r a . 23, I b i d . 
I b i d . 
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P e n r o s e and W i n a n t had b o t h b e e n s u r p r i s e d by t h e t a r d i n e s s 
o f t h e A m e r i c a n r e s p o n s e and i n d e e d t h e 3 r i t i s h w e r e g r a d u a l l y 
r e a l i s i n g t h a t W i n a n t and t h e Embassy i n W a s h i n g t o n w e r e n o t 
e f f e c t i v e enough f o r t h e d e l i c a t e n e g o t i a t i o n s t h e y w e r e a b o u t 
t o embark u p o n , and t h a t t h e y w o u l d have t o go t o W a s h i n g t o n . 
I n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e r e n e w a l o f t a l k s w i t h t h e U . S . , P h i l l i p s 
was a u t h o r i s e d t o hand a copy o f t h e C . U . t o t h e A m e r i c a n s i n 
W a s h i n g t o n and t h e D o m i n i o n s w e r e i n v i t e d t o send e x p e r t s t o 
L o n d o n f o r i n f o r m a l and n o n - c o m m i t t a l d i s c u s s i o n s o n m o n e t a r y 
(hi) 
and o t h e r p o s t - w a r e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s , ~ > / 
D u r i n g S e p t e m b e r P h i l l i p s b e g a n d i s c u s s i o n s o n m o n e t a r y 
q u e s t i o n s w i t h t h e S t a t e and T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t s . B u t i t s o o n 
became a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e U . S . w a n t e d t o w i d e n t h e s cope i f t h e y 
w e r e t o c o n t i n u e . A p a r t f r o m t h i s p o i n t , h o w e v e r , t h e A m e r i c a n s 
a p p e a r e d t o h a v e c o n s i d e r a b l e d o u b t s a b o u t t h e C . U . and o n 
O c t o b e r 6, A . A . B e r l e h a n d e d a l i s t o f q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e 
(MO 
p r o p o s a l s t o P h i l l i p s . 
(^2) By December 19*+2 The B r i t i s h w e r e f u l l y a w a r e t h a t W i n a n t 
was n o t k e p t f u l l y i n f o r m e d b y W a s h i n g t o n . See F .0 .1833/ 
50/70 W a s h i n g t o n t o F . O . December 11,19^-2: See a l s o 
Geo rge K e n a n " M e m o i r s 1925-50' L i t t l e B r o w n , B o s t o n , T o r o n t o 
1967, pp 170-173. I n a d d i t i o n t h e B r i t i s h d i d n o t h a v e a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y h i g h o p i n i o n o f W i n a n t u s u a l l y d e s c r i b e d n o n -
c o m m i t a l l y - h o n o u r a b l e - i n a r t i c u l a t e b u t a r e a l f o r c e , e t c . 
B u t A l e x a n d e r Cadogan d e s c r i b e s h i m as a n ' a s s ' , ' i n a u d i b l e 1 , 
' a g r e a t b o r e ' and ' s p i n e l e s s 1 - See D i a r i e s o f S i r A l e x a n d e r 
Cadogan 1938-*+5", E d . D . D i l k s , C a s s e l , L o n d o n 1971; 
Cadogan was F . O . P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e J a n u a r y 
1938 t o F e b r u a r y I9W6). 
(1+3) See P l a y f a l r t o S h a c k l e May 31 > 19^3, U250^A7/70, and 
d r a f t o f C . U . as d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , F . O . U581+/50/70 A u g u s t 
22, 19I+2. 
(MO s e e F . O . U1008 /50 /70 , D a t e d O c t o b e r 19,19^2. B r i t i s h 
Embassy t o N . B . R o n a l d , F . O . Q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e C . U . 
f r o m t h e U . S . A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
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The q u e s t i o n s e x h i b i t e d a s u r p r i s i n g l a c k o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
o f t h e mechan i sms o f t h e C . U , , b u t t h e y d i d i n d i c a t e t h e c e n t r a l 
c o n c e r n o f t h e A m e r i c a n s r e g a r d i n g t h e n a t u r e o f t h e b a s i c 
i d e a s w h i c h w o u l d h a v e t o be e m p l o y e d - one way o r a n o t h e r i n 
any i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n d e a l i n g w i t h m o n e t a r y m a t t e r s . 
T h u s , t h e q u e s t i o n s w e r e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s t h e c o n t r o l o f 
e x c h a n g e r a t e s , l a c k o f g o v e r n m e n t c o n t r o l , p r o b l e m s o f i n f l a t i o n , 
t h e o v e r - d r a f t s y s t e m , A m e r i c a n l i a b i l i t y , c r e d i t o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e c o n t i n u a n c e o f t h e S t e r l i n g B l o c as a 
m o n e t a r y e n t i t y a n d t h e e m p h a s i s o n f o u n d i n g members and t h e 
d i v i s i v e e f f e c t t h i s c o u l d h a v e o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n . 
S t i l l , t o f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e A m e r i c a n p o s i t i o n we mus t now 
t u r n t o s t u d y t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f A m e r i c a n i d e a s o n t h i s s u b j e c t , 
(1+5) 
u n d e r t h e o v e r a l l management o f H . D . W h i t e . ^ 
As we h a v e s e e n i n l a t e 19*+1 W h i t e was d e l e g a t e d t h e t a s k 
o f d r a w i n g up a s t a b i l i s a t i o n f u n d by M o r g e n t h a u . The S e c r e t a r y 
a d m i t t e d h i s l a c k o f e x p e r t i s e i n s u c h m a t t e r s a c c o r d i n g t o 
B l u m , and l o o k e d t o W h i t e f o r t h e t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e . 
He d i d o f c o u r s e have w e l l f o r m u l a t e d v i e w s c o n c e r n i n g t h e 
u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e s o f s u c h a n o r g a n i s a t i o n and o f t h e r e l a t i o n 
s h i p s b e t w e e n s t a t e s w h i c h s h o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d i n s u c h a n 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . M o r g e n t h a u v i e w e d B r i t a i n w i t h some a d m i r a t i o n a n d 
e s t a b l i s h e d f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 
t h o u g h n o t t o a n e x t e n t w h i c h w o u l d c o m p r o m i s e A m e r i c a n I n t e r e s t s , 
( ^ 5 ) N . B . The B r i t i s h r e p l y t o t h e A m e r i c a n q u e s t i o n s a r e 
c o n t a i n e d i n t h e same s e r i e s o f f o l d e r s b u t a r e o f l i t t l e 
I n t e r e s t , b e i n g t e c h n i c a l r e p l i e s and a d d i n g l i t t l e t o 
o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f B r i t i s h a i m s as e x p r e s s e d i n t h e C . U , 
(L+6) O p . C i t . p .229. 
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He was s u s p i c i o u s o f t h e Bank o f E n g l a n d and W a l l S t r e e t and 
(I4.7) 
a t t r i b u t e d t h e e c o n o m i c f a i l u r e s o f t h e 3 0 ! s l a r g e l y t o t h e m . ' 
B e n e v o l e n t g o v e r n m e n t g u i d a n c e o n t h e home f r o n t had b e e n t h e 
c o r n e r s t o n e o f t h e 'New D e a l 1 and such b e n e v o l e n c e was now t o b e 
t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a . H i s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s 
B r i t a i n I n m o n e t a r y m a t t e r s , as we s h a l l s e e , was d e t e r m i n e d b y 
h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e d o l l a r , i n t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e U . S . 
T r e a s u r y , s h o u l d p r e d o m i n a t e i n t h e p o s t - w a r m o n e t a r y f i e l d . 
He and W h i t e c o l l u d e d i n a t t e m p t s t o b r i n g t h e s e two r e s u l t s 
a b o u t . T h i s p o l i c y I m p l i e d a n u n s y m p a t h e t i c a t t i t u d e 
t o w a r d s t e r l i n g and a c c o u n t s f o r W h i t e and M o r g e n t h a u ' s a t t e m p t s 
t o r e s t r i c t t h e s i z e o f B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s and t o t e r m i n a t e L e n d -
L e a s e o n t h e c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s . T h i s a l s o c a u s e d some 
d i v e r g e n c e o f o p i n i o n w i t h t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t who w a n t e d l a r g e r 
B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s t o s u p p o r t B r i t a i n ' s p o s t - w a r l i b e r a l i s a t i o n o f 
t r a d e . H o w e v e r , t h e s e above comments a r e o n l y s k e t c h y g e n e r a l -
i s a t i o n s o f a t t i t u d e s and n o w h e r e f u l l y a c c o u n t f o r t h e t w i s t s 
and t u r n s o f p o l i c y w h i c h we mus t now d e l v e i n t o . 7 
D u r i n g 19^-2, I n t h e e a r l y m o n t h s , W h i t e p r o d u c e d t h r e e 
d r a f t s f o r a S . F . a n d b y May 8th 19I+2 h a d c o m p l e t e d a f i r s t 
d e t a i l e d and e l a b o r a t e d d r a f t . The p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e S . F . 
d i f f e r e d f r o m t h o s e o f t h e I . C . U . a n d more s i g n i f i c a n t l y t h e y 
r e f l e c t e d a d e e p d i v i s i o n o f b a s i c i d e a s and a i m s b e t w e e n 
B r i t a i n and t h e U . S . H o w e v e r , t h e a u t h o r o f o n e o f t h e m o s t 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e a c c o u n t s o f t h e m o n e t a r y t a l k s d u r i n g t h e war 
a p p e a r s t o d i f f e r w i t h t h e p r e s e n t w r i t e r o v e r t h i s , t h o u g h as 
T h i s s u s p i c i o n l a t e r e x t e n d e d t o H . H . B r a n d , a b a n k e r by 
p r o f e s s i o n , who was t h e B r i t i s h T r e a s u r y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n 
W a s h i n g t o n d u r i n g t h e c r u c i a l y e a r s 19^-^6. 
(W8) See M o r g e n t h a u ' s l e t t e r t o H . S . T r u m a n q u o t e d i n 'New Y o r k 1 
H e r a l d T r i b u n e ' , M a r c h 31, 19W6. 
(^9) F o r a b o v e see B l u m O p . C i t . p.122-121*. 
(50) B l u m , p .230. 
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s h a l l be i l l u s t r a t e d , t h e r e I s c e r t a i n c o n f u s i o n i n h i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Of the genes i s and e a r l y d r a f t s o f the two 
p l a n s , he s a y s : -
"These two p l a n s were s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r b o t h i n t h e i r 
o r i g i n and i n t h e i r f u n d a m e n t a l purpose The 
p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n s o f the two p l ans r e i n f o r c e d the 
i m p r e s s i o n t h a t a l a r g e g u l f s epa ra ted B r i t i s h and 
Amer i can o p i n i o n o n e x t e r n a l f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y . " (51 ) 
A p p a r e n t l y i m p l y i n g t h a t t h e r e was no s u b s t a n t i a l g u l f a t a l l . 
And as r e g a r d s the a c t i v e o r p a s s i v e n a t u r e o f the f u n d o r 
c l e a r i n g u n i o n , he appears to s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o n t r a d i c t h i m s e l f . 
"They ( I . 3 . R . and I . M . F . ) were to become genuine 
i n s t i t u t i o n s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l government , s e r v i n g 
the needs o f t h e i r members w i t h o u t r e g a r d to n a t i o n a l 
p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . " BUT they would 
have to s u r r e n d e r the r i g h t t o v a r y t h e i r exchange 
r a t e s ; a b o l i s h a l l f o r m s o f exchange c o n t r o l ; and 
submit t o Fund s u p e r v i s i o n o v e r d o m e s t i c economic 
p o l i c i e s . " ( 5 2 ) 
T h i s i s n o t an a t t e m p t t o c a r i c a t u r e G a r d n e r ' s o v e r a l l 
judgement by q u o t i n g o u t o f c o n t e x t . He does accep t t h a t the 
U . S . and U . K . were f a r f r o m agreement o n such i s s u e s as 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l L i q u i d i t y and c r e d i t o r - d e b t o r c o n t r o l b u t a t t he 
same t ime does m a i n t a i n an a m b i v a l e n t a t t i t u d e towards the two 
s i d e s 1 o v e r a l l p o s i t i o n . Now these s tances as £ . F . P e n r o s e 
r i g h t l y sugges t s^ -^ ) w e r e l a r g e l y adopted i n the knowledge t h a t 
h a r d b a r g a i n i n g would o f n e c e s s i t y take p l a c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
( 5 1 ) Gardner , O p . C i t . p . 1 0 0 . 
( 5 2 ) O p . C i t . Gardner , p , 7 ^ . H a v i n g i n mind the e a r l y S .F . 
p r o p o s a l s w h i c h would have g i v e n the U . S . an e f f e c t i v e 
v e t o o n the g o v e r n i n g boa rd - one c o u l d ask i f such 
d e c i s i o n s a r e c o n s i d e r e d p o l i t i c a l when under n a t i o n a l 
c o n t r o l , how i s i t t h a t they q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e d once 
they became s u b j e c t to i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o - i t r o l , e s p e c i a l l y 
as the proposed S .F . g o v e r n i n g body i n 1 9*+2 was so 
o b v i o u s l y o f a p o l i t i c a l n a t u r e ? The answer i s , o f 
c o u r s e , t he S .F . was to be p o l i t i c a l b o t h i n i t s 
i n s t i t u t i o n and e f f e c t i n a way f a v o u r a b l e t o Amer i can 
i n t e r e s t s . 
( 5 3 ) O p . C i t . p . ^ 5 . 
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t h i s , and the knowledge t h a t some compromise would be necessa ry 
does n o t d e t r a c t f r o m the f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t economic and 
p o l i t i c a l judgements and g o a l s w h i c h were embodied i n these two 
p l a n s . I t i s easy t o r a t i o n a l i s e i n r e t r o s p e c t i n a manner 
such as ( 1 ) the U . S . had a monetary plan-, ( 2 ) t he U . K . had a 
monetary p l a n ; ( 3 ) a f t e r n e g o t i a t i o n a j o i n t A n g l o - U . S . 
monetary p l a n was p roduced . ( K ) C o n c l u s i o n : - t he success i n 
p r o d u c i n g a j o i n t p l a n must mean t h a t (1 ) and ( 2 ) were f u n d a m e n t -
a l l y s i m i l a r . 
T h i s migh t be p l a u s i b l e i f one c o u l d c o m p a r t m e n t a l i s e such 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n a c t u a l f a c t these n e g o t i a t i o n s c o n t i n u e d , o f f 
and o n , u n t i l the B r e t t o n Woods C o n f e r e n c e ; and the 
a c t i v e / p a s s i v e n a t u r e o f the Fund was n o t f i n a l i s e d u n t i l 19^6. 
D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d much happened to a l t e r B r i t a i n ' s v i e w s , her 
b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n , her e v a l u a t i o n o f the I . M . F ' s . r o l e , and 
i t s i m p o r t a n c e i n the emerging c o n t e x t o f p o s t - w a r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
p l a n n i n g . 
W h i t e s t a t e d i n the e a r l y d r a f t s o f t he S .F . i t s g e n e r a l 
purpose which was t o p r e v e n t the d i s r u p t i o n o f f o r e i g n exchange, 
t he r e c u r r e n c e o f monetary and c r e d i t c o l l a p s e , to assure 
r e s t o r a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e and to s u p p l y c a p i t a l f o r 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , r e l i e f and r e c o v e r y , J The l a t t e r t h r e e aims 
come under the j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t he I . B . H . , w i t h a s se t s o r i g i n a l l y 
o f #10B f o r c o n t r a - c y c l i c a l spend ing and commodity p r i c e 
s t a b i l i s a t i o n . A t 19*+2 p r i c e s q u i t e a c o n s i d e r a b l e sun . However , 
t he T e c h n i c a l Committee c o n c e n t r a t e d on the S .F . d u r i n g 19^-2 
and the I . B . R . p r o p o s a l s were t e m p o r a r i l y pu t to one s i d e . 
(5*0 Whi te Papers P . U . L . ( P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y ) 
F i l e 2W. 
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The c o n d i t i o n s f o r membership o f the f u n d f o r b a d e exchange 
c o n t r o l s , b i l a t e r a l c u r r e n c y ar rangements and r e q u i r e d l i b e r a l 
t a r i f f , t r a d e and commerc ia l p o l i c i e s . The f u n d was t o enable 
one c o u n t r y to ouy a n o t h e r ' s c u r r e n c y up to the l i m i t o f i t s 
own c o n t r i D u t i o n to the f u n d , t o meet a ba lance o f payments 
d e f i c i t . Purchases above o n e ' s own c o n t r i b u t i o n had t o be 
r a t i f i e d by a f o u r - f i f t h s m a j o r i t y v o t e o f the g o v e r n i n g b o a r d , 
w n i c h was a l s o r e q u i r e d f o r a change i n exchange r a t e s . The 
v o t i n g r i g h t s o f the board o f c o n t r o l was p r o p o r t i o n a l t o o n e ' s 
q u o t a , 100 v o t e s each , one a d d i t i o n a l v o t e f o r each #1m o f g o l d 
and f o r each #2m i n c u r r e n c y . The s i z e o f the quo tas was : -
" . . . i n accordance w i t h an e l a b o r a t e f o r m u l a i n which 
a r b i t r a r y w e i g h t s were a s s i gne d to g o l d s t o c k s , g o l d 
p r o d u c t i o n , n a t i o n a l income, f o r e i g n t r a d e , p o p u l a t i o n , 
f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t s and e x t e r n a l d e o t s . T h i s f o r m u l a . . 
. . . covered p o l i t i c a l m o t i v e s . . . " ( 5 5 ) 
I t was more t h a n j u s t a c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t t h i s f o r m u l a p r o v i d e d 
the U . 3 . w i t h an e f f e c t i v e ve to as i t a c q u i r e d more t h a n 1 / 5 t h 
o f the v o t i n g r i g h t s on the c o n t r o l boa rd . The n a t u r e o f the 
f u n d was to be based on the c o n t r i b u t i o n by members o f g o l d 
and c u r r e n c y . T h i s was a ma jo r d i f f e r e n c e f r o m the C .U ' s 
o v e r - d r a f t p r i n c i p l e w h i c h , i t was e s t i m a t e d i n e a r l y 19^2, 
would c r e a t e f o u r t imes as much c r e d i t as the S .F . The f u n d 
was a l s o to be l e s s f l e x i b l e t h a n the C .U. and a symptom o f 
t n i s was the r o l e i t a l l o t t e d to g o l d . 
"The U n i t e d S t a t e s . . . had a c q u i r e d most o f the 
w o r l d ' s monetary g o l d , and as Morgenthau and Whi te 
saw i t , i t se rved the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t to keep 
g o l d as p a r t o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary s y s t e m . " ( 5 6 ) 
( 5 5 ) Penrose , O p . C i t . p A 5 . 
( 5 6 ) B l u m , O p . C i t . p . 2 3 1 . 
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W h i t e ' s p r o p o s a l s Tor b l o c k e d oa lances however was one 
area where ne adopted a more- r a d i c a l approach t h a n Keynes . 
Keynes had s i m p l y p r o v i d e d the c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f the 
S t e r l i n g Area w i t h i n the f ramework o f the I . C D . , w i t h r a t h e r 
vague p r o v i s i o n s to p r e v e n t i t o r t he d o l l a r area f r o m compe t ing 
w i t h the C . U . o u t s i d e o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e areas as a v e h i c l e o f 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c l e a r i n g , h i .F .Penrose c l e a r l y summarises W h i t e ' s 
r a t h e r t e c h n i c a l p r o v i s i o n s as f o l l o w s ; -
(57 ) 
" H i s scheme would :iave enab led a government to s e l l 
to the I . M . F . b l o c k e d oa lances accumula ted d u r i n g the 
war ( 5 8 ) ) o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t b o t h tne c r e d i t o r and the 
d e b t o r c o u n t r y a f t e r a t h r e e y e a r s i n t e r v a l would b e g i n 
to r e - p u r c h a s e H-0 per cent o f them a t the r a t e o f 2 per 
cent a n n u a l l y . The oa lance h e l d by the Fund would n o t be 
s o l d w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n f r o m the d e b t o r c o u n t r y , so 
r e s t r i c t i o n s o n c o n v e r t i b i l i t y would be p l a c e d o n the 
amounts r e - p u r c h a s e d by the c r e d i t o r c o u n t r y . The danger 
t h a t the Fund would be encumbered w i t h too much b l o c k e d 
c u r r e n c y was to be met (1 ) by p e r m i t t i n g the Fund to buy 
the Government bonds o f the d e b t o r c o u n t r y , and use them 
as s e c u r i t y f o r loans i n any c o u n t r y excep t trie d e b t o r 
c o u n t r y and ( 2 ) by g i v i n g to the Fund a u t h o r i t y to l i m i t 
the p r o p o r t i o n o f the b l o c k e d ba lances w h i c h i t would be 
o b l i g e d to purchase i n a s t a t e d p e r i o d o f t i m e . " 
The Amer icans were ve ry s u s p i c i o u s o f b l o c k e d ba lances and 
the economic una p o l i t i c a l l e v e r a g e they c o u l d bes tow. Thus 
they were p r epa red to be v e r y f o r t h c o r a l x i g about t h e i r l i q u i d a t i o n 
by c o n v e r t i b i l i t y . 
I n October 19^2 , H . i ) . W h i t e and Morgenthau came to London. 
T h e i r p r i m a r y purpose was to s o r t o u t the problems o f an 
o c c u p a t i o n c u r r e n c y wh ich would be used i n N o r t h A f r i c a a f t e r the 
impending a l l i e d i n v a s i o n . However , i n J u l y , w h i t e had sent 
( 5 7 ) Penrose , O p . C i t . p.H-6. 
(53 ) I n f a c t a c l e a r d i f f e r e n t i a l was n o t made be tween war 
ba lances and o t h e r s u n t i l F e u r u a r y 2 ^ , 19^3> by the 
U . S . o n U . K . p r o m p t i n g s , see F . O . U 8 6 1 A 7 / 7 0 , 
Telegrams 908 and 909 , b o t h d a t e d February 24-th, 
q u e s t i o n aiia answer 13. 
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a d r a f t o f h i s p r o p o s a l s on monetary r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n to 
K e y n e s ^ ^ a n d Keynes had r e c i p r o c a t e d w i t h h i s C , U . i n A u g u s t . 
John Wlnant o n the p e r i p h e r y o f the economic t a l k s , d e c i d e d 
t h a t an u n o f f i c i a l meet ing between Keynes and W h i t e m i g h t 
f a c i l i t a t e the development o f A n g l o - A m e r i c a n monetary p l a n n i n g . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , a mee t ing was a r r a n g e d , a t t e n d e d by the two g r e a t 
men and Penrose , Lauren W.Casaday and P h i l l i p s , who had 
r e c e n t l y r e t u r n e d f r o m the U . S . to d i s c u s s monetary m a t t e r s w i t h 
the Dominions i n London. P e n r o s e ' s account o f the m e e t i n g ( 6 0 ) ^ 
a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y a Whi te -Keynes t e t e - a - t e t e , r e c o r d s c o n s i d e r -
a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t , which appeared more p r o m i n e n t t h a n p o i n t s o f 
agreement . One o f the main areas o f c o n t r o v e r s y was the s i z e 
o f the f u n d s f o r any i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n , the p o s s i b l e 
323B U . S . l i a b i l i t y under the C . U . was not r e a l l y a p p r e c i a t e d 
by the A m e r i c a n s . F u r t h e r m o r e , t he c r e a t i o n o f an a r t i f i c i a l 
c u r r e n c y and the m i n i m i s a t i o n o f the use o f g o l d and the 
p r e v a l e n c e o f Impass ive b a n k i n g p r i n c i p l e s w o u l d , Whi te c l a i m e d , 
be u n a c c e p t a b l e to Congress . On the o t h e r hand the S .F . 
s t r i c t u r e s on the changing o f exchange r a t e s w o r r i e d the B r i t i s h 
who were f e a r f u l o f pos t -war economic c o n d i t i o n s b e i n g so 
u n s t a b l e t h a t exchange a d j u s t m e n t s i n t h i s p e r i o d would be 
u n a v o i d a b l e . V o t i n g a r r angemen t s , quotas and W h i t e ' s a v e r s i o n 
to u s i n g the Fund f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n were a l s o p o i n t s o f 
d e p a r t u r e be tween the two . 
D u r i n g October the B r i t i s h t a l k e d I n some d e t a i l w i t h t he 
Domin ions c o n c e r n i n g the I . C . U . B o t h P h i l l i p s and Keynes were 
( 5 9 ) Rees, O p . C i t . p . 1 ^ 0 . 
( 6 0 ) O p . C i t . pp I+7- 1+9. 
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i n London a t t h i s t i m e and c o n s i d e r a b l e m o d i f i c a t i o n s were 
e f f e c t e d to the I . C . U . A number o f p o i n t s were a l t e r e d and 
d r a f t i o g p o i n t s c l e a r e d up . Bu t the most s i g n i f i c a n t change, 
and a change t h a t r e f l e c t e d the conce rn f e l t by the B r i t i s h 
r e g a r d i n g t a l k s w i t h Whi te o n h i s S.F,, was the r e -emphas i sed 
p r o v i s i o n to e s t a b l i s h i n no u n c e r t a i n terms c r e d i t o r r e s p o n s -
i b i l i t y i n the I . C . U , . I n t he Augus t copy o f the I . C . U . handed 
to the A m e r i c a n s ^ ^ the p r i n c i p l e o f c r e d i t o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
had oeen l a i d down i n S e c t i o n 2 , pa ra T h i s p r o v i d e d f o r a 
r i s i n g i n t e r e s t charge o n c r e d i t o r o r d e b t o r b a l a n c e s . I n t he 
(62 ) 
r e v i s e d v e r s i o n s e c t i o n I I I was e n t i t l e d 'What L i a b i l i t i e s 
Ought t he P l a n to P lace on C r e d i t o r C o u n t r i e s ? " . The emphasis 
was now on e x p l a i n i n g the consequences ' o f a c h r o n i c c r e d i t o r 
p o s i t i o n . There was no p r o p o s a l t h a t a c r e d i t o r shou ld be 
o b l i g e d to reduce I m p o r t t a r i f f s , e x p o r t c a p i t a l and so f o r t h , 
b u t i t was I n d i c a t e d t h a t i f such p o l i c i e s were n o t a d o p t e d , 
t h i s would e v e n t u a l l y d i s r u p t the I . C . U . I n f a c t , the whole 
r a t i o n a l e o f the I . C . U . was t h a t a l o n g e r b r e a t h i n g space would 
be made a v a i l a b l e w h i c h would a l l o w o r d e r l y a d j u s t m e n t s w i t h o u t 
r e s o r t i n g to d e f l a t i o n a r y p o l i c i e s . 
The B r i t i s h conce rn w i t h c r e d i t o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y d i d have 
an e f f e c t on W h i t e , I n h i s December 16 r e - d r a f t he i n t r o d u c e d 
a ' s c a r c e c u r r e n c y c l a u s e * . T h i s was o b v i o u s l y i n d e f e r e n c e t o 
B r i t i s h v i e w s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y the U . S . d i d no t c l a r i f y the 
( 6 1 ) F.O. U 5 8 V 5 0 / 7 0 
( 6 2 ) November 9 , 19^2, U1336 /50 /70 . 
( 6 3 ) Other minor changes i n c l u d e d the G o v e r n i n g B o a r d ' s 
r i g h t t o reduce or i n c r e a s e a l l quo tas i n f i x e d 
p r o p o r t i o n o n the b a s i s o f c o n t r a - c y c l i c a l p l a n n i n g 
I I ( i i ) , o p t i o n to i n v e s t s u r p l u s bancor i f i t was 
n o t b e i n g used by the c r e d i t o r c o u n t r y I I I ( a ) . 
p r o p o s a l u n t i l Feb rua ry 19W3. H a r r o d , and some o t h e r p r o -
A m e r i c a n o f f i c i a l s i n B r i t a i n r e c e i v e d the new Amer i can 
p r o p o s a l w i t h g r e a t e l a t i o n . H a r r o d d e s c r i b e s i t i n e u p h o r i c 
terms i n h i s b i o g r a p h y o f j \ eynes , though as we s h a l l see, t h e r e 
were o t h e r s who a p p r a i s e d i t more s o b e r l y . 
The t e n t a t i v e moves on e i t h e r s i d e i n the Summer o f 1 9*f2 
now seemed t o be b e a r i n g f r u i t . I n November P h i l l i p s had g i v e n 
the Amer icans B r i t i s h r e p l i e s to t h e i r e n q u i r i e s o n the C . U . 
w h i c h had been made i n e a r l y O c t o b e r . He a l s o gave them the 
r e v i s e d d r a f t o f the C .U. wh ich was b r i e f l y d i s c u s s e d t 
The p r o s p e c t s f o r p rogress were e n c o u r a g i n g . F u r t h e r t a l k s 
were env isaged by the B r i t i s h I n which W h i t e ' s S .F . c o u l d be 
i n t e g r a t e d w i t h the C .U . to produce a j o i n t A n g l o - A m e r i c a n 
p l a n ^ ^ . But i n f a c t the Americans proved e l u s i v e y e t a g a i n 
and l e f t the B r i t i s h i n the d a r k as to f u t u r e deve lopments u n t i l 
l a t e - F e b r u a r y 19*+3. 
The B r i t i s h were d i s a p p o i n t e d by the l a c k o f p r o g r e s s . 
I n mid-December even C h u r c h i l l f e l t the need to e n q u i r e what 
p r o g r e s s had been made o f K ings ley-Wood, K l n g s l e y - W o o d r e p l i e d 
t h a t the B r i t i s h were prepared f o r t a l k s and had handed c o p i e s 
o f t h e I . C . U . to t h e Amer icans b u t : -
" t h e y have n o t been ready to engage i n a c t i v e 
c o n v e r s a t i o n s . " (66 ) 
(6*+) See U1008/50 /70 quoted i n f u l l above. 
( 6 5 ) P l a y f a i r to S h a c k l e , May 31 1 19*+3, U 2 5 0 5 A 7 / 7 0 . 
( 6 6 ) December 1 7 , 19^2, C h u r c h i l l to K i n g s Ley-Wood and 
h i s r e p l y WJ+7A7/70. 
On January 8, P h i l l i p s i n f o r m e d the T r e a s u r y t h a t one 
r e a s o n f o r t he d e l a y was t h a t H u l l and Morgenthau were 
a p p a r e n t l y r e l u c t a n t t o put up a U . S . p l a n t o be c r i t i c a l l y 
sho t down. They wanted a p l a n t o emerge i n d i s c u s s i o n w i t h 
e x p e r t s f r o m t h e U . S . , U . K . , U . S . 3 . H . , C h i n a , Canada, L a t i n 
Amer ica and perhaps one o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t he a l l i e d 
powers . The Amer icans d i d no t have any o b j e c t i o n , t h o u g h , t o 
B r i t a i n c i r c u l a t i n g the C . U . to Russ i a nor f o r t h a t m a t t e r 
C h i n a . ' The Amer i can a l l u s i o n to the emergence o f a p l a n 
t h r o u g h d i s c u s s i o n appeared somewhat s t r a i n e d t o the B r i t i s h 
who had r e c e i v e d no r e j o i n d e r , f r o m the U . S . , t o t h e i r r e v i s e d 
C . U . which had been p re sen ted to them i n November. The absence 
o f Amer i can comments o n monetary m a t t e r s , and t h e i r s h i f t i n 
p r o c e d u r a l p o l i c y caused much conce rn i n the U . K . On F e b r u a r y 
18 , 19^3> N .B .Rona ld w r o t e to C a m b e l l , m i n i s t e r i n W a s h i n g t o n , 
c o n c e r n i n g the s t a t u s o f A n g l o - A m e r i c a n t a l k s . The change 
i n p r o c e d u r a l p o l i c y was q u i t e w o r r y i n g . D u r i n g t he Summer o f 
19^-2 the S t a t e Depar tment had emerged f r o m a b o u t o f r e - o r g a n i s -
a t i o n and i n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l c o n f l i c t over s u b j e c t a r ea s . I t 
had t h e n begun to make n o i s e s f a v o u r a b l e to a r e n e w a l o f A n g l o -
U . S , t a l k s . The S t a t e Depar tment had suggested t h a t t a l k s 
s h o u l d be renewed a deux between the U . S . and the U.K., o n p o s t -
war p rob lems . They hoped t h a t by January a t t he l a t e s t an 
agenda o f l i k e l y t o p i c s f o r d i s c u s s i o n c o u l d De drawn up . 
On November 17, 19^2, We l l e s had spoken p u b l i c l y on t he 
d e s i r a b i l i t y o f i n t e r - U . i N . t a l k s p r i o r to the a r m i s t i c e , a l s o 
t he t a l k s Opie and P h i l l i p s had conducted w i t h the S t a t e and 
T r e a s u r y depa r tmen t s had i n i t i a l l y augured w e l l . S i n c e November 
( 6 7 ) See P h i l l i p s t o T r e a s u r y January 8,191+3 and P l a y f a i r to 
S h a c k l e , May 31 , 19^3, U A 9 A 7 / 7 0 and U 2 5 0 5 A 7 / 7 0 . 
( 6 8 ) i^T^vc^r^ 1 1 ' P e r s o n a i and secret'Feb-18. 
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t h o u g h , t h e r e had been a pause I n deve lopmen t s . The U . S . 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n now f a v o u r e d a m u l t i l a t e r a l , o r a t l e a s t a 
q u a d r i l a t e r a l approach w i t h t he U . K . , China and R u s s i a . The 
B r i t i s h were r e l u c t a n t to accep t t h i s . I n t h e i r o p i n i o n 
B r i t a i n and the U . S . would have the b i g g e s t s t a k e s i n the p o s t -
war i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic arena and i t s h o u l d be l e f t to them 
to d e c i d e on i t s b a s i c c h a r a c t e r . Second ly , t hey knew t h a t i n 
q u a d r i l a t e r a l t a l k s the U . S . would have the a u t o m a t i c s u p p o r t 
o f China a t he r d i s p o s a l . The s w i t c h i n Amer i can p o l i c y was 
l a r g e l y caused by a p a r t i a l r e v e r s a l o f S t a t e Depar tment p o l i c y . 
The S t a t e Depar tment d i d no t c o m p l e t e l y abandon the i d e a o f 
b i l a t e r a l t a l k s w i t h the B r i t i s h because they s t i l l had an eye 
o n the w i d e r c o n t e x t w i t h i n which t he monetary o r g a n i s a t i o n 
would have to b l e n d . They a l s o r e q u i r e d B r i t i s h accep tance o f 
t he g e n e r a l p o s t - w a r economic s t r u c t u r e which t hey were 
d e t e r m i n e d t o c r e a t e . But such acceptance would be l e s s f o r t h -
coming i f some d e f e r e n c e to B r i t i s h views o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
monetary p l a n n i n g was n o t g i v e n . The T r e a s u r y Depar tment w i t h 
t h e i r na r rower c o n c e r n to s i m p l y e s t a b l i s h an I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
monetary o r g a n i s a t i o n went even f u r t h e r t h a n the S t a t e D e p a r t -
ment by u r g i n g an I n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e . There were o t h e r 
reasons however f o r the S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t ' s d e p a r t u r e f r o m c l o s e 
b i l a t e r a l c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h B r i t a i n . The s u c c e s s f u l A n g l o -
A m e r i c a n campaign i n N o r t h A f r i c a had occas ioned an acu te 
p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m . The Amer icans had adopted A d m i r a l F r a n c o i s 
D a r l a n as the l eade r o f the F r e n c h , d e s p i t e h i s p r e v i o u s 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n I n t he V i c ^ y Government and h i s w e l l - k n o w n 
f a s c i s t t e n d e n c i e s . The B r i t i s h suppor t ed Gene ra l C h a r l e s de 
G a u l l e and the d i f f e r e n c e s be tween the B r i t i s h and Amer icans t h a t 
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t h i s caused, c r e a t e d a minor p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . H u l l who had 
been s y m p a t h e t i c toward VicKy France was i n f l a m e d oy the B r i t i s h 
a t t i t u d e and the whole ep isode l e f t a sour t a s t e i n h i s mouth 
f o r many months . I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s d i r e c t d i s r u p t i o n o f 
r e l a t i o n s between B r i t a i n and the S t a t e Depar tment t h e r e was 
a l s o the e f f e c t o f the m i d - t e r m e l e c t i o n s wh ich though more 
c i r c u m s p e c t d i d i n h i b i t d e c i s i v e n e s s i n t he S t a t e Depar tment 
somewhat. xhe re was a l s o a n o t i c e a b l e s h i f t to c o n s e r v a t i s m 
i n b o t h p a r t i e s ' c a n d i d a t e s . On Feb rua ry 1 7 , 1 9 ^ 3 , P h i l l i p s w r o t e : 
" P a r a , 2 . I never f e e l sure how f a r the g e n e r a l 
se tback i n r e c e n t months t o H o o s e v e l t ' s p o s i t i o n , 
and to the p r o s p e c t s o f p o s t - w a r c o o p e r a t i o n i s 
r e a l l y a p p r e c i a t e d i n L o n d o n . " ( 7 0 ) 
On January 16 , m o m e n t a r i l y t he p o s i t i o n b r i g h t e n e d . The 
F o r e i g n O f f i c e was i n f o r m e d t h a t H u l l h i m s e l f was t a k i n g a 
renewed i n t e r e s t i n A r t i c l e V I I t a l k s and i n t e n d e d to exchange 
(71 ) 
view3 w i t h the B r i t i s h s o o n . w L a t e r the same day however , 
any o p t i m i s m which had been aroused was dampened down w i t h the 
news t h a t B e r l e ' s p r o j e c t e d v i s i t t o London, o f which t he B r i t i s h 
(69 ) November 19^2 M i d - t e r m e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . 
G u b e r n a t o r i a l B e f o r e A f t e r 
(32 c o n t e s t e d ) D.17 R.15 D.2U- H.23 P1 
House o f 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s D,2?6 ft. 165 1.6 D.223 R.209 o t h e r s U-
Senate 
E l e c t i o n s D.65 R.29 1.1 D.57 £ , 3 8 P.1 1.1 
P.1 
D = democra t R - r e p u b l i c a n I = independen t 
P = p r o g r e s s i v e 
(70 ) P h i l l i p s to tfady, Feb rua ry 17 , 19^3, U 9 1 5 A 7 / 7 0 . 
( 7 1 ) Re fe rence to t h i s i n Ronald t o Campbe l l , Feb rua ry 13 , 
191*3, U 6 7 1 A 7 / 7 0 . 
^ 3 
had h i g h e x p e c t a t i o n s , had been pos tponed i n d e f i n i t e l y . 
Hopes f o r A n g l o - A m e r i c a n d e t a i l e d c o n s u l t a t i o n p r i o r to a w i d e r 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f monetary i s sues were f i n a l l y 
dashed by B e r l e o n Februa ry 1 s t . On t h a t day B e r l e c i r c u l a t e d 
a r e v i s e d v e r s i o n o f W h i t e ' s p l a n to B r i t i s h , Chinese and 
(72) 
R u s s i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n Wash ing ton . L i t t l e d e f e r e n c e had 
been g i v e n to B r i t i s h views i n the new d r a f t . 
P h i l l i p s ' immedia te r e a c t i o n was t h a t the p l a n was too 
d e t a i l e d to be c o n s i d e r e d i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m o t h e r economic 
i s s u e s . He sugges ted t h a t the B r i t i s h shou ld s t a l l on becoming 
i n v o l v e d i n t a l k s by p r o t e s t i n g such a p o i n t o f v i e w . He was 
f r i g h t e n e d t h a t t he U . S . were t r y i n g to e x t r a c t a p ledge f r o m 
B r i t a i n r e g a r d i n g r i g i d exchange s t a b i l i t y b e f o r e r e v e a l i n g 
(7^) 
t h e i r hand o n complementary economic i s s u e s . J T h i s r e f l e c t e d 
a b a s i c p rob lem which tended t o s e p a r a t e the two c o u n t r i e s . 
The i s sue was the ba l ance t o be e s t a b l i s h e d be tween ' s t a b i l i t y ' 
and ' e x p a n s i o n i s m ' and the measures which would be c o n d u c i v e t o 
such p o l i c i e s . The Amer ican Depar tment o f the F o r e i g n O f f i c e 
minu ted more f a v o u r a b l e v iews on the U . S . S t a D l L i s a t l o n Fund 
p r o p o s a l s . They r e f e r r e d p a r t i c u l a r l y to the measures f o r 
(7H0 
d e a l i n g w i t h b l o c k e d Dalances a f t e r the war . Gladwyn Jebb 
a l s o shared t h i s more f a v o u r a b l e v i e w , b u t he was unsure whe the r 
W h i t e had r e a l i s e d the f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f h i s p r o p o s a l s o n 
( 7 2 ) P h i l l i p s t o T r e a s u r y , F e b r u a r y h, 19^3, U 5 7 0 A 7 / 7 O . 
(73) I b i d . 
(7H-) F.O. N . A m e r i c a n D e p t . M i n u t e s by C o u l s o n , 
U 6 2 7 A 7 / 7 0 . 
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accumula ted b a l a n c e s . J ebb f u r t h e r q u a l i f i e d h i s v i ews by-
p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t the manner o f d e t e r m i n i n g quo ta s must be 
c o n s i d e r e d as the c r u c i a l p rob lem f o r B r i t a i n . Jebb b e l i e v e d 
t h a t the p r o p o s a l s shou ld be d i s c u s s e d i n a U . N . f o r u m , however , 
u n l i k e some o f h i s c o l l e a g u e s , he appears t o have grasped a n i c e 
p o i n t c o n c e r n i n g Amer ican p r o c e d u r a l p o l i c y . He knew the 
Amer icans would n o t f a v o u r a t r u l y m u l t i l a t e r a l approach I n 
terms o f a U . N . f o r u m . What the U . S . d i d f a v o u r was a s e r i e s 
o f b i l a t e r a l t a l k s c e n t r e d o n the U .S . wh ich would have the 
appearance o f m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m b u t would l eave Amer ica f i r m l y i n 
t he d r i v i n g s e a t , Jebb suggested t h a t t he Amer icans would be 
t h e l e a s t l i k e l y to accept a U . N . f o r u m , and added t h a t ; -
" I t has been made c l e a r t h a t t h i s ( S . F . ) i s n o t an 
o f f i c i a l v i e w , b u t mere ly the v i e w o f o f f i c i a l s . " ( 7 5 ) 
The r e s t r i c t e d c i r c u l a t i o n o f the d r a f t S .F . w i t h o u t p r i o r 
n o t i c e o r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the B r i t i s h was d i s c o n c e r t i n g 
enough b u t the U . S . a l s o proposed to c i r c u l a t e i t to a l l U . N . ' s 
soon , w i t h a s u g g e s t i o n t h a t e x p e r t s shou ld convene i n W a s h i n g t o n 
f o r t a l k s . The B r i t i s h Government would have even p r e f e r r e d a 
g e n e r a l c o n f e r e n c e o f expe r t s to t h i s , b u t t h e i r hand was b e i n g 
f o r c e d by the U . S . and they had to f o l l o w the Amer i can l e a d . 
The B r i t i s h now c i r c u l a t e d the d r a f t o f the I . C . U . to R u s s i a , 
and C h i n a , b u t i n f o r m e d the Amer icans a t the same t i m e t h a t t h e y 
hoped a consensus o n the monetary i s sue c o u l d be agreed upon by 
t h e U . S . and the U . K . p r i o r t o the w i d e r c i r c u l a t i o n o f the 
p l a n s . The Amer icans chose t o i g n o r e t h i s r e q u e s t and w i t h 
in tense , p r e s s u r e emanat ing f r o m the T r e a s u r y the S.F. was 
( 7 5 ) Jebb , G . , Head o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Depa r tmen t , 
F .O. 19^2-^-5, M i n u t e s . Feb rua ry 19 , 19^3 , 
U 6 2 7 / 7 V 7 0 . 
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c i r c u l a t e d to the U n i t e d and A s s o c i a t e d N a t i o n s d u r i n g F e b r u a r y , 
Once a g a i n a l l the B r i t i s h c o u l d do was t o f o l l o w s u i t w i t h t he 
I . C . U . " 6 > 
Not o n l y were the B r i t i s h h a v i n g t r o u b l e o v e r the subs tance 
o f the S .F . and p r o c e d u r a l p o l i c y , they were a l s o e x p e r i e n c i n g a 
b r eak -down i n communica t ions w i t h the U .S . However , o n F e b r u a r y 
16 , P h i l l i p s had a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h A d o l f B e r l e who agreed t o 
resume b i l a t e r a l monetary t a l k s w i t h the B r i t i s h o n Feb rua ry 2 3 . 
There had been no s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c u s s i o n s s i n c e November. ^ 
Pa svo l sky and Hedvers Opie were a l s o p r e s e n t a t the m e e t i n g 
o n the 16 th and P h i l l i p s made a d e t a i l e d r e c o r d o f the i n f o r m a l 
exchange o f v iews t h a t took p l a c e . The two Amer icans r ega rded 
the S .F . and tne C . U . as p r o p o s a l s to n e g o t i a t e w h i c h would have 
t o be done o n a t y p e o f m u l t i l a t e r a l b a s i s . They s a i d i t was 
d i f f i c u l t t o e x c l u d e o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , w h i c h o f course i t now was, 
due to Amer i can a c t i o n s . They t o l d Opie and P h i l l i p s o f the 
f a v o u r a b l e r e a c t i o n s f r o m China and o f i n t e r e s t shown by R u s s i a . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , the T r e a s u r y Depar tment was p r e s s i n g f o r an even 
w i d e r c i r c u l a t i o n o f the S .F . w h i c h would p r o b a b l y occu r l a t e r 
i n the month , and indeed as we have a l r e a d y seen t h i s i s what 
happened. However, the two Amer i can o f f i c i a l s added t h a t the 
l e n g t h y t a l k s w h i c h would i n e v i t a b l y ensue, would p r o v i d e ample 
o p p o r t u n i t y f o r b i l a t e r a l A n g l o - U . S . c o n s u l t a t i o n s . P h i l l i p s 
t h e n r a i s e d the q u e s t i o n o f o t h e r economic i s s u e s upon wh ich t h e 
success o f the I . M . F . would be dependent . P a s v o l s k y r e p l i e d 
t h a t i n h i s o p i n i o n whatever the p r o g r e s s m i g h t be i n the mone ta ry 
( 7 6 ) P l a y f a i r to S h a c k l e , May 3 1 , 19^35 U 2 5 0 5 A 7 / 7 0 . 
( 7 7 ) P h i l l i p s to T r e a s u r y , Feb rua ry 1o, 19^3) U 7 M A 7 / 7 0 . 
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t a l k s , some accoun t would have t o be t a k e n o f o t h e r economic 
problems so t h a t a l l the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r rangements c o u l d *hang 
t o g e t h e r 1 , b u t he r a t h e r o m i n o u s l y a d d e d j -
" I n the monetary d i s c u s s i o n s i t would have t o be 
assumed t h a t o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s were g o i n g to be 
f u l f i l l e d . " (78 ) 
B e r l e c o n t i n u e d by s a y i n g t h a t a l t h o u g h the U . S . had made 
p r o g r e s s on a P r i m a r y P r o d u c t s Scheme and p l ans f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
I n v e s t m e n t , i n t e r e s t was n o t as u n i v e r s a l as i n monetary m a t t e r s . 
I n t he f o r m e r two areas no c o n c r e t e c o n c l u s i o n s had been r e a c h e d . 
T h i s caused f u r t h e r w o r r y f o r the B r i t i s h . They c o u l d n o t see 
how an i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary o r g a n i s a t i o n c o u l d be d e v i s e d i n 
i s o l a t i o n f r o m o t h e r economic i s s u e s . S t i l l t hey agreed g l a d l y 
t o f u r t h e r t a l k s o n the 23rd as the b e s t means o f a c h i e v i n g 
(79) 
s a t i s f a c t o r y p r o g r e s s . 
The B r i t i s h d e c i d e d t h a t the ground would have t o be 
p r epa red v e r y c a r e f u l l y f o r the new t a l k s . They began an 
i n t e n s i v e a n a l y s i s o f the two p l a n s and the problems t h a t they 
m i g h t I n v o l v e . The major d i f f e r e n c e s were c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n a 
c o m p a r a t i v e a n a l y s i s . 
( 7 8 ) I b i d 
( 7 9 ) P h i l l i p s to Eady, Feb rua ry 17 , 19^3, 
U 9 1 5 A 7 / 7 0 . 
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U a i t a s Baacor 
1 . I n i t i a l quotas l e v i e d . . . 
s u b s c r i b e d c a p i t a l . 
2 . Quotas . . . a r i g h t to purchase , 
c u r r e n c i e s . . , 
3 . P r e s u m p t i o n i n d i v i d u a l s r e m a i n 
f r e e t o d e a l i n exchange w i t h 
one ano the r f o r ' c u r r e n t 
a c c o u n t 1 p u r p o s e s . 
h. C o n t r o l o f c a p i t a l movements 
i n p r i n c i p l e b u t i n p r a c t i c e 
by ex pos t f a c t o use o f 
c o r r e c t i v e s . 
5. S a n c t i o n s p r o v i d e d a g a i n s t the 
weaker p a r t y . 
6 . Gene ra l i n t e n t i o n t o share a 
s m a l l p a r t o f e n t i r e l y f o r e i g n 
r e s o u r c e s , b u t to s top s h o r t 
o f e x p a n s i o n , whether g e n e r a l 
o r p a r t i c u l a r . 
1 . . . . c r e a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c r e d i t . 
2 . Quotas . , a r i g h t t o o v e r -
draw o n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
a c c o u n t . 
3 . Requi rement t h a t exchange 
t r a n s a c t i o n s be c e n t r a l i s e d 
w i t h the C l e a r i n g Bank t h r o u g h 
n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s . 
^ . C o n t r o l over c a p i t a l move-
ments I m p l y i n g s c r u t i n y o f 
a l l t r a n s a c t i o n s and 
p r e v e n t i v e a c t i o n . 
J . C o r r e c t i v e s d e l i b e r a t e l y 
a p p l i e d ( a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y ) 
t o the s t r o n g e r p a r t y . 
6 . Genera l i n t e n t i o n t o be 
e x p a n s i o n i s t . 
2 8 . C o n c l u s i o n ! 
From the p r a c t i c a l p o i n t o f v i ew the most 
i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s under the S .F . a re the n a t u r e 
o f the p r o v i s i o n s f o r exchange c o n t r o l , t he 
adequacy o f quotas and the w o r k a b i l i t y o f the 
proposed s o l u t i o n f o r d e a l i n g w i t h scarce c u r r e n c i e s . " 
( 8 0 ) 
T h i s a n a l y s i s was used as the b a s i s f o r f o r m u l a t i n g a s e r i e s o f 
q u e s t i o n s wh ich t he B r i t i s h hoped would c l a r i f y t he s i t u a t i o n 
and i n d i c a t e what they c o n s i d e r e d t o be some o f the dangerous 
a spec t s o f the S . F . ( 8 1 ' 
( 8 0 ) A Compara t ive A n a l y s i s o f the B r i t i s h P r o j e c t 
f o r a C l e a r i n g U n i o n and the Amer i can P r o j e c t f o r 
a S t a b i l i s a t i o n Fund, U 7 ^ 0 A 7 / 7 0 . 
( 8 1 ) See o v e r l e a f . 
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F o o t n o t e : (81 ) 
See T e l s . 908 and 909. P h i l L l p s to T r e a s u r y v i a F .O. 
F e b r u a r y 2h9 19^3• U 8 6 l A 7 / 7 0 : N . B . B l u m , O p . C i t . 
PP 237 -239 , "The ' s c a r c e c u r r e n c y ' c l a u s e b r o u g h t t he 
t r e a s u r i e s o f t h e two ttnglish-speaking c o u n t r i e s c l o s e 
t o each o t h e r . . . " He c o n t i n u e s by s a y i n g t h a t t h e r e 
were t e c h n i c a l c o n f i d e n t i a l c o n v e r s a t i o n s i n London and 
Wash ing ton u n t i l May 19^3 - as w e have seen, u n t i l 
Feb rua ry 16 , these t a l k s were n o n - e x i s t e n t . He does 
m e n t i o n " u n r e s o l v e d d i f f e r e n c e s " ove r g o l d and t h e 
degree o f commitment to i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n the 
S .F . was supposed t o embody, 
Rees, O p . C i t . C h . X , l a r g e l y based on Gardner and Blum, 
emphasises what he sees as concess ions to t he B r i t i s h 
i n the W h i t e P l a n , He suggests t h a t the r e m a i n i n g 
problems were j u s t d r a f t i n g and t e c h n i c a l ones , pp 150-153-
Gardner , O p . C i t . pp 30-95 s u b - d i v i d e s the areas o f 
r e m a i n i n g d i f f e r e n c e i n the S p r i n g o f 19V3 i n t o t h r e e . 
( 1 ) T r a n s i t i o n a l p r o b l e m s , w h i c h were i n f a c t not a 
s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t o f d i s c u s s i o n a t t h i s s t age ; 
( 2 ) The l i q u i d i t y i s s u e ; 
( 3 ) The a d j u s t m e n t i s s u e . 
Of the t h r e e w r i t e r s Gardner p laces the most emphasis o n t he 
f a c t t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s d i d r e m a i n between the U . S . and the 
U . K . , bu t even he u n d e r - e s t i m a t e d t h e i r s e v e r i t y . 
I3»t 
Before we become engrossed once again i n the nego t i a t i ons 
i n the next chapter , i t wouid be i l l u m i n a t i n g to give some 
d e t a i l e d a t t e n t i o n to the B r i t i s h a n a l y s i s . Not only w i i l 
t h i s help I n the understanding o f the complex issues i n v o l v e d , 
but also o f the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e s towards those i ssues . For 
t h i s purpose the ou ts tanding d i f f e r e n c e s between the two 
sides have been d i v i d e d i n t o f o u r areas:-
a) The p o s i t i o n o f gold 
b) C o n t r o l s , quotas and the liberura veto 
c) The a c t i v e or passive nature o f the monetary i n s t i t u t i o n 
d) The t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . 
a) The P o s i t i o n o f Gold 
As we have seen, the U.S. was the holder o f a large percent -
age o f the w o r l d ' s monetary g o l d , and Morgenthau and White were 
u n w i l l i n g to devise or accept a scheme which would dispense 
e n t i r e l y w i t h g o l d . I t was f a r p r e f e r a b l e f o r them to i nco rpo ra t e 
gold i n t o an i n t e r n a t i o n a l system which would thus endow the U.S. 
w i t h great economic and p o l i t i c a l power. Furthermore, the 
p r e v a i l i n g economic ideas i n the U.S. were more conserva t ive than 
i n the U.K. and the large gold ho ld ings were p a r t i a l l y symptomatic 
o f t h i s . Obviously someone who he ld large q u a n t i t i e s o f a good 
which had i n t r i n s i c value was r e l u c t a n t to see i t s u t i l i t y 
de t r ac t ed from which would occur i f the I . C . U . was adopted. 
B r i t a i r v ' s goal was to create an i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary system 
which would overcome the r e s t r a i n t s imposed by her small ho ld ings 
o f gold and f o r e i g n currency i n r e l a t i o n to her t rade and overseas 
l i a b i l i t i e s . The U.S. simply wanted to u t i l i s e her enormous go ld 
ho ld ings and d o l l a r s i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary system devised 
to create s t a b i l i t y by e l i m i n a t i n g short term l i q u i d i t y c r i s e s . 
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Under the C.U. i t s a u t h o r i t y would be the onLy Legal source 
and r e p o s i t o r y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange. Under the S.F. gold 
and f o r e i g n exchange were to be used as o f o l d . The c e n t r a l 
banks were simply to come to the S.F. when they had a shortage 
o f f o r e i g n cu r renc ie s . The S.F. was to complement the workings 
o f the o l d i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary system not supersede i t as the 
C.U. was intended t o . Furthermore, the r o l e o f gold In the S.F. 
was s t i l l not e x p l i c i t l y c lear to the B r i t i s h . For example, 
under the C.U. c o l l a t e r a l f o r quotas was to be a matter o f 
d i s c r e t i o n a r y choice even i n a s i t u a t i o n o f heavy indebtedness. 
Under the S.F. there was a requirement tha t 5 - 7i% o f quotas 
should be subscribed i n g o l d . But once t h i s had been paid i n t o 
the fund i t appeared to serve l i t t l e purpose. 
"These deposi t s appear to be flummery or fancy dress , 
to the wearing o f which there can be no ser ious 
o b j e c t i o n , i f i t i s thought to look w e l l . I t might 
however, be argued tha t to ape f i r s t the appearance 
o f a gold standard and second the appearance o f a 
c a p i t a l i s e d Bank w i l l not be s p e c i a l l y a t t r a c t i v e to 
p u b l i c o p i n i o n . " (32) 
The Americans claimed tha t gold subsc r ip t i ons would create 
confidence i n the new o r g a n i s a t i o n ; but they s ta ted tha t lack 
of gold on a member's pa r t would not prevent them from r e c e i v i n g 
the b e n e f i t s o f membership. I n f a c t , the Americans i n t i m a t e d 
t h a t , a f t e r the i n i t i a l s u b s c r i p t i o n s , holdings o f gold would 
not be necessary f o r the member s t a t e s . There was even a 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a r e - d r a f t i n g o f the r o l e o f gold might be i n 
o r d e r . At the same time the U.S. made i t c lear t ha t they hoped 
the S.F. would c o n t r i b u t e to the maintainance o f the gold market. 
(82) Comparative A n a l y s i s , e t c . , U 'AoA7/70 
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They also envisaged tha t coun t r i es would cont inue to s e t t l e 
t h e i r accounts on occasion wi th gold and tha t the S.F. should 
have the o p t i o n o f exchanging l o c a l currencies f o r f o r e i g n 
exchange, gold and newly mined gold acquired by a member n a t i o n 
i n excess o f the amount i t possessed when i t had jo ined the S.F, 
I n sho r t , i t was oovious tha t the Americans intended tha t gold 
should have an impor tant r o l e i n the S.F. B r i t i s h o b j e c t i o n s 
to such a p o l i c y were based on p o l i t i c a l , economic and h i s t o r i c a l 
grounds. F i r s t o f a l l the c o n t r o l o f the Fund was to be 
d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to gold hold ings which would i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e 
American p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l sca le . 
Secondly, i f gold was used i n tne Fund t h i s would give the U.S. 
a very important economic advantage because o f her enormous 
hold ings o f th;, t commodity. T h i r d l y , the B r i t i s h were b i t t e r l y 
opposed to the r e - i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a quas i -go ld standard a f t e r the 
traumas which were a t t r i b u t e d to i t du r ing the i n t e r - w a r years . 
For many, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Labour Pa r ty , i t represented 
or thodox c a p i t a l i s m , c o n t r a c t i o n o f c r e d i t , c y c l i c a l depressions 
and expensive money - th ings which were to be avoided i f a t a l l 
p o s s i b l e . ( 8 3 ) 
b) C o n t r o l , Quotas and the Llberum Veto. 
The B r i t i s h were deeply wor r i ed over the s ize o f the quotas . 
The Americans had mentioned the f i g u r e o f ^23 f o r t h e i r i n i t i a l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n to the Fund, On t h i s tx is is the B r i t i s h , a l though 
s t i l l a r r i v i n g at the ra ther o p t i m i s t i c f i g u r e o f *520B f o r the 
aggregate t o t a l o f quotas, be l i eved tha t there was a great danger 
of t h i s being inadequate. The C.U. had envisaged an i n i t i a l c r e d i t 
(83) See paras. 1 , 5, 8 and 9. Teles . 908 and 909* U861A7/7O 
and Memo. U.S.Treasury S.F. Sec t ion 2, para. 8, 
January 191+3, U627A7/70. 
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t o t a l o f 3*+OI3, 
" I n March 1 9^3 Keynes, . . . expressed to me the o p i n i o n 
tha t tne p r i n c i p l e o f subscribed c a p i t a l was academical ly 
d i s c r e d i t a b l e but not p r a c t i c a l l y impor t an t . He aiid h i s 
colleagues i n the Treasury were s e r i o u s l y d i s t u r b e d , 
however, by what they considered to be the inadequate 
s ize o f the fund proposed i n the U.S. p l a n . " (8^) 
The American p lan also proposed 1 50# o f one's quota as a 
l i m i t on purchases o f f o r e i g n currency dur ing the f i r s t two years 
o f the S.F. ' s opera t ions am 200> t h e r e a f t e r w i t h c e r t a i n 
except ions . I t was mainly the d i s c r e t i o n a r y element i nvo lved i n 
the c o n t r o l o f wi thdrawals and the vagueness o f some o f the 
proposals which caused the B r i t i s h cons t e rna t ion . For d i s c r e t i o n 
meant t ha t there could eas i ly be an opening f o r p o l i t i c a l 
dec i s i ons . The f e a r o f p o i i t i c i s a t i o n was compounded by the 
knowledge tha t under the extant proposals the U.S. alone would 
have an unbreachable defence i n terms o f a l iberum ve to . Thus, 
a l though the Americans pointed out to the B r i t i s h t h a t the Fund 
i f i t was i n i t i a l l y successfu l could be expanded to a s ize more 
amenable to B r i t a i n such an e v e n t u a l i t y would depend upon the 
U.S. I n the C.U, there were p r o v i s i o n s f o r automatic expansion 
and c o n t r a c t i o n o f funds i n accordance w i t h i n f l a t i o n a r y or 
a 
d e f l a t i o n a r y tendencies , o i v r i s e and f a l l i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e . 
I n the S .F . , on the other hand, an across the board p r o p o r t i o n a l 
increase i n quotas was only poss ib le on a f o u r t h - f i f t h s m a j o r i t y 
r u l i n g f rom the S .F . ' s c o n t r o l board. Such a m a j o r i t y was on ly 
poss ib le w i t h U.S. agreement f o r she he ld over 1/5th o f the 
quotas and thus a corresponding p o s i t i o n on the c o n t r o l board. 
(8*0 Penrose, O p . C i t . p. 51 . 
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One a l t e r n a t i v e to the expansion o f quotas would have been 
the use o f ' u n i t a s 1 whicn might loosely be descr ibed as Whi te ' s 
equ iva len t to bancor. Unfoi junately American r e p l i e s to quest ions 
r e l a t i n g to u n i t a s were vague i n the extreme. The B r i t i s h 
surmised tha t u n i t a s had been used i n previous d r a f t s as a 
poss ib le means o f r a i s i n g funds by s e l l i n g s e c u r i t i e s to the 
p u b l i c . I t d i d not appear to o f f e r a v i a b l e s o l u t i o n to the 
problem f a c i n g the B r i t i s h . The on ly other a l t e r n a t i v e e x t e r n a l 
monetary p o l i c y which could e f f e c t i v e l y counter t rade d i s e q u i l i b r -
ium was a p r o v i s i o n to a l t e r exchange r a t e s . The B r i t i s h saw 
l i t t l e danger i n c o n t r o l l e d r i g h t s to a l t e r exchange r a t e s . I n 
the C.U. there was a p r o v i s i o n which al lowed a 5% a l t e r a t i o n 
e i t h e r way. This could be done u n i l a t e r a l l y by any chronic 
c r e d i t o r or debtor n a t i o n . With the S.F. the B r i t i s h again came 
up agains t the danger o f an American liberura ve to . The Americans 
on ly wanted to a l low exchange a l t e r a t i o n s w i t h a W/^th m a j o r i t y 
o f the f u n d . The on ly concession they even o f f e r e d to consider 
a t t h i s stage was t h a t the n a t i o n whose exchange ra te was to be 
a l t e r e d should be pa r t o f the h/^ths m a j o r i t y . To the B r i t i s h 
the S.F. : -
"would seem to give more assis tance to those needing 
less, and less to those needing more." (85) 
The idea behind both theS.F. and the C.U. was to g ive 
b rea th ing space to a l l ow adjustments o f shor t term d i s e q u i l i b r i a 
i n an o r d e r l y f a s h i o n . An unde r ly ing assumption o f t h i s was t h a t 
o ther p rov i s ions f o r the post-war i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy would 
b r i n g about fundamental e q u i l i b r i u m . Occasional ad jus tment , 
when necessary, could take the form o f : -
(85) Comparative A n a l y s i s , 
U7 l+0/ l+7/70, p . 1 , para A . 
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1. u n i l a t e r a l exchange c o n t r o l s , which the Fund was t r y i n g 
to avoid oecause of t h e i r d i s c r i m i n a t o r y e f f ec t s - , 
2 . exchange r a t e a l t e r a t i o n s which would have to be e f f e c t e d 
i n an o r d e r l y manner to avoid compet i t ive deva lua t ions ; 
3. a l t e r a t i o n s to trade b a r r i e r s , which the B r i t i s h fe.voured 
on the pa r t o f c r e d i t o r nations^ 
i n t e r n a l d e f l a t i o n , reducing the volume o f impor t s . 
Both the B r i t i s h and the Americans wanted to avoid the r e s o r t 
to such p o l i c i e s i f poss ib le . But the B r i t i s h d i d not be l i eve 
tha t the size o f the Fund which the.Americans had proposed was 
adequate to overcome short term d i s e q u i l i b r i a . I n the C.U. the 
adjustments could be f inanced by u t i l i s i n g c r e d i t balances o f 
coun t r i e s who were not themselves using them. The C.U. also 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y penal ised chronic debtor and c r e d i t o r c o u n t r i e s , 
w i t h the emphasis on the c r e d i t o r s . I t was hoped t h a t such 
pressures exerted by p u n i t i v e i n t e r e s t r a tes would lead to a 
s e l f - r i g h t i n g process. Obviously i n some cases i n d i v i d u a l 
coun t r i e s would have to adopt d e f l a t i o n a r y p o l i c i e s or reduce 
t a r i f f s but such p o l i c i e s would be decided on by the sovereign 
s t a t e invo lved w i t h i n a general code o f p r a c t i c e . Two o f the 
main po in t s o f Keynes' p lan were tha t such adjustments would be 
automatic w i t h i n the framework o f the C.U. and secondly tha t the 
main onus f o r such adjustments should be placed upon those most 
able to cope, i . e . the chronic c r e d i t o r s . However, the Amerleans, 
w i t h t h e i r d i s t a s t e f o r d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g and t h e i r abhorence o f 
p e n a l i s i n g f ree -marke t economic successes, found such p rov i s ions 
d i s t a s t e f u l . The i r n o t i o n was tha t the S.F. should embody 
p r i n c i p l e s o f c o n t r o l which avoid i n f l a t i o n a r y pressures, hence 
the c o n t r i b u t o r y and l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y p r o v i s i o n s , and secondly, 
t ha t i t should e s t a b l i s h monetary s t a b i l i t y . Such p o l i c i e s were 
not as r a d i c a l as those o f the C.U. and requ i red p o l i t i c a l 
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dec i s ions and some i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s ' 
domestic economies to ensure i t s success. This problem soon 
became known as the ' a c t i v e - p a s s i v e ' dilemma. 
c) A c t i v e or Passive 
As we have seen, Keynes f o r reasons both o f n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t 
and economic p ro fe s s iona l i sm had emphasised tha t one o f the 
great a t t r i b u t e s o f the C.U. was i t s p a s s i v i t y . There was l i t t l e 
doubt i n Keynes 1 mind tna t the character o f such an i n s t i t u t i o n 
would be b e n e f i c i a l to B r i t a i n both economically and p o l i t i c a l l y 
i n the weakened p o s i t i o n tha t was envisaged f o r her i n the pos t -
war p e r i o d . White and the o ther American n e g o t i a t o r s also saw 
t h i s . The C.U. would pre-empt the Americans f rom using her 
economic s u p e r i o r i t y p o l i t i c a l l y to f u r t h e r enhance, her economic 
w e l f a r e . But , i f the Americans would not accept the s e l f - r i g h t i n g 
mechanism o f a closed banking system, then an a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n 
to the problem o f d i s e q u i l i b r i u m had to be found. I n the e a r l y 
d r a f t s o f the S.F. White had proposed tha t the member coun t r i e s 
w e r e i -
"Not to adopt any monetary or general p r i c e p o l i c y , the 
e f f e c t o f which , i n the o p i n i o n o f a m a j o r i t y o f the 
member vo tes , would be to b r i n g about sooner or l a t e r a 
ser ious d i s e q u i l i b r i u m i n the balance o f payments, i f 
f o u r f i f t h s o f the member votes o f the Fund submit to the 
country i n ques t ion t h e i r d i s app rova l o f the adopt ion o f 
the measure," (86) 
(86) Gardner, O p . C i t . p . 9 1 . For a f u l l e r account of the 
genesis o f the S.F, see John Parke Young, 'Developing 
Plans f o r an I . M . F . and a World Bank1 Dept. o f Sta te 
B u l l e t i n , November 13> 1950; Young was a t e c h n i c a l 
exper t i n the Dept. o f S t a t e , 
This was a c lea r attempt to au thor i se i n t e r f e r e n c e i n 
domestic economies by the S .F . , though once again the W/5ths 
v o t i n g requirement e f f e c t i v e l y excluded the U.S. f rom the 
poss ib le e f f e c t s o f such a p r o v i s i o n , Keynes and the B r i t i s h 
s t r o n g l y opposed such proposals and t h i s , and the idea o f c r e d i t o r 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , d i d have some e f f e c t on White . By the time the 
S.F. was pub l i shed , the p r o v i s i o n had been m o d i f i e d so tha t a 
member on ly had t o : -
" . . . g ive cons ide r a t i on to the views o f the Fund." 
(87) 
The other concession which White made was the I n c l u s i o n o f a 
scarce currency clause I n the December 12 d r a f t . This had a 
r a the r mixed r e c e p t i o n i n B r i t a i n . 
"The proposals f o r r a t i o n i n g (scarce currency) seem 
unworkable. I f , however, some k ind o f p r o t e c t i o n 
to a c r e d i t o r i s thought to be sensible I n i t s e l f or 
necessary f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons, we w i l l consider 
suggestions h i t h e r t o r e j e c t e d f o r l i m i t i n g l i a b i l i t i e s 
o f c r e d i t o r coun t r i e s to accept bancor." (38) 
However, as has been noted, Harrod rece ived the scarce currency 
clause most e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y . The po in t was though tha t the 
proposal and American i n t e n t i o n s were somewhat vague. On 
February 2ht the p o s i t i o n was c l a r i f i e d . The Americans said t h a t 
i f the scarce currency clause was brought i n t o o p e r a t i o n , then 
t rade b a r r i e r s should be lowered, f o r e i g n lending increased, e t c . 
As we s h a l l see l a t e r , t h i s was on ly to apply i n the case o f 
shortages w i t h i n the Fund and was thus nowhere near as e f f e c t i v e 
(87) I b i d i p r o v i s i o n s were worded more s t r o n g l y i f a member 
wished to exceed purchases o f f o r e i g n currency which 
were al lowed under the a r t i c l e s o f the Fund. This could 
be done by a vo te . 
(88) Comparative A n a l y s i s , U7i+oA7/70, p .3, para. 7. 
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as the C.U. i n terms o f c r e d i t o r r espons lb i I j . t y . S t i l l , t h i s 
was an impor tant admission o f some c r e d i t o r l i a b i l i t y by the U.S. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y the scarce currency clause was s t i l l not c l e a r - c u t 
and i n the view o f many B r i t i s h n e g o t i a t o r s , i t was d o u b t f u l i f 
i t could be made an e f f e c t i v e means o f e n f o r c i n g c r e d i t o r 
l i a b i l i t y . The B r i t i s h and the Americans s t i l l had a long way 
to go to resolve t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s on t h i s . 
d) The T r a n s i t i o n Period 
Keynes had o r i g i n a l l y hoped tha t h i s p lan f o r r a d i c a l l y 
r e - s t r u c t u r i n g the system o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l payments would enable 
B r i t a i n to embark upon a p o l i c y o f commercial d e - c o n t r o l and 
n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a f t e r the war. By February 19^3 the r a d i c a l 
aspect o f the C.U. was r a p i d l y d i sappear ing . I t could no longer 
be regarded as a grand s t ra tegy by which o ther economic problems 
could be so lved . I t was now inter-dependent upon other aspects 
o f economic r e - s t r u c t u r i n g f o r i t s own success. The more l i m i t e d 
scope of the S.F. made i t r e l i a n t upon p r e v a i l i n g econor.ilc 
cond i t i ons f o r i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s . With the knowledge o f t h i s and 
o f B r i t a i n ' s growing economic problems the B r i t i s h Degan to i n s i s t 
on the necess i ty f o r a t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . This was to add y e t 
another problem to tne monetary t a l k s . 
* » • 
The B r i t i s h had been a f f r o n t e d by the U.S. which had 
u n i l a t e r a l l y taken the d e c i s i o n to c i r c u l a t e the S.F. T h i s , and 
the obvious o u t s t a y i n g d i f f e r e n c e s between the S.F. and the C.U. , 
were causing the B r i t i s h much concern. They be l ieved the 
problems u r g e n t l y r equ i r ed d i s c u s s i o n . I n February they 
suggested to the U.S. tha t both plans should be publ ished a t an 
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e a r l y date and be descr ibed as t e n t a t i v e schemes by exper t s , to 
avoid garbled vers ions o f them appearing I n p u b l i c . The Americans 
evinced no enthusiasm f o r t h i s ^ ^ . I n f a c t , al though the C.U. 
was discussed i n London wi th f o r e i g n r ep re sen t a t i ve s , w i t h an 
American observer present , the U.S. re fused to a l l ow the B r i t i s h 
to c i r c u l a t e trie S.F. a t such meetings. I n r e t u r n the U.S. 
said they would not discuss the C.U. w i t h f o r e i g n r ep resen ta t ives 
u n t i l a general meeting o f experts could take place i n 
Washington. The Americans were determined tha t they should 
e x p l a i n t h e i r own S.F. i n a ser ies o f b i l a t e r a l meetings i n 
Washington. 
" . . . the Americans envisage separate d i scuss ions 
proceeding on C.U. and S.F. i n wate rb igh t compartments." 
(90) 
The exaspera t ion and concern I n the B r i t i s h Fore ign O f f i c e 
and the Treasury by ea r ly March was reaching f l a s h - p o i n t . 
On March 2 , a j o i n t F.O.-Treasury meeting was held to discuss the 
problem. Keynes, Eady, Waley, Ronald, Strang and Jebb were a l l 
present . Keynes summed up the p o s i t i o n by saying B r i t a i n had 
always wanted Jo in t t a l k s w i t h the U.S. i n the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t 
t h i s would be the qu ickes t means o f progress. However, the 
Americans, by t h e i r a c t i o n s , appeared to have abandoned t h i s 
procedure. I f t h i s r e s u l t was i n t e n t i o n a l then the Americans 
should p l a i n l y t e l l the B r i t i s h so. He c o n t i n u e d : -
" I f they were not to be moved, then some genera l 
conference would be the next best t h ing - the "monkey house 
on the desert i s l a n d " . I t would be a bad second best but 
i n any case be t t e r than the procedure proposed by M r . B e r l e , 
namely represen ta t ives o f the Uni ted Nations being 
in te rv iewed i n d i v i d u a l l y by the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n I n Washington 
and then having i n d i v i d u a l s meet each o t h e r . 
Even i f t h i s d i d not appeal to the Americans, we should 
reserve the r i g h t to have a conference o f our own I n London." 
(91) 
(89) P l a y f a i r to Shackle, May 3 1 , 19^3, U2505A7/70. 
(90) I b i d . 
(91) 3rd Treasury-F.O.Meet ing, March 2, 19^3, U983A7/70, 
On March 9, Jebb wrote to Waley that the Americans were 
going ahead w i t h t h e i r p lan f o r wider c i r c u l a t i o n o f the S.F. 
They were submi t t i ng the proposals to L a t i n America w i t h the 
excep t ion o f Argent ina and to a l l the U . N . ' s except ing E t h i o p i a 
and I r a q . ^ 9 2 ) 
Then be fo re f u r t h e r developments had time to m a t e r i a l i s e , 
leaks on both sides posed the problem o f whether the two plans 
should be publ i shed . The i n i t i a l leak appears to have stemmed 
f rom B r i t i s h consu l t a t ions w i t h f o r e i g n represen ta t ives i n London. 
(93) 
Rumours soon spread on both sides o f the A t l a n t i c and quest ions 
were soon asked i n Parl iament and Congress. On March 13 the 
F.O. informed the Washington Embassy tha t they thought p u b l i c a t i o n 
was u n a v o i d a b l e . w On March 15, the Washington Embassy r e p l i e d 
t h a t the U.S. Treasury had g iven the go-ahead so f a r as the C.U. 
was concerned but p u b l i c a t i o n o f the S.F. had to be c leared w i t h 
(95) 
Roosevel t . 7 y I n a memorandum f o r Roosevelt on March 17, 
Morgenthau requested permiss ion to g ive a press release on the 
White Plan summarising the conclus ions o f the American t e c h n i c a l 
exper t s . .Morgenthau explained t h a t questions were being bandied 
around i n Congress and he d i d not want to lose the support o f 
i n f l u e n t i a l Congressmen such as Senator Vandenberg because o f 
(92) Jebb to Waley, March 9, 191*3, U915A7/70) * 
(93) Blum, Op .C i t . p.238, s ta tes t h a t the B r i t i s h Treasury 
on ly informed the U.S. o f t h i s meeting a f t e r the event 
imp ly ing tha t B r i t a i n had sole and u n i l a t e r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
f o r the leak . B r i t i s h sources, however, i n d i c a t e tha t an 
American observer was present a t the meeting; see 
P l a y f a i r to Shackle, May 3 1 , 19**3f U2505A7/70. 
( 9 M F.O. to Washington. March 13, 19^3, U1031A7/70. 
(95) Washington to F.O. March 15, 191*3, U1155/^7/70. 
inadequate communication between the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the 
Congress. However, i t seems t h a t Morgenthau's views were changed 
s l i g h t l y by Roosevelt on the l 8 t h . ^ 6 ) R o o s e v e i t t o l d 
Morgenthau to simply e x p l a i n tha t a l l t a l k s had been e x p l o r a t o r y . 
Jus t over a week l a t e r Morgenthau t o l d P h i l l i p s t h a t the 
Pres ident had reviewed the s i t u a t i o n and i n the l i g h t o f s e n a t o r i a l 
ques t ions , he thought i t would be best not to pub l i sh at t h i s 
stage f o r f e a r o f the premature f o r m u l a t i o n o f views and op in ions 
which might p r e j u d i c e an agreeable outcome. Morgenthau also 
wanted a meeting o f experts i n Washington before p u b l i c a t i o n . 
P h i l l i p s , r a the r taken aback at t h i s , said he would i n f o r m 
Kingsley-Wood o f the American views but cons ider ing tha t the 
Chancel lor had already made a statement i n Par l iament concerning 
(07) 
p u b l i c a t i o n , f u r t h e r postponement seemed u n l i k e l y . 7 i 
Kingsley-Wood 1 s r e p l y to P h i l l i p s confirmed h i s f e a r s . The 
Chancel lor thought i t would be Impossible to delay p u b l i c a t i o n 
f o r more than 7 - 1 0 days. On A p r i l 1s t , 
" . . . the Pres ident was "very emphatic" tha t there was to 
be no " p u b l i c a t i o n o f the American P lan" . "These th ings 
are too e a r l y " , Roosevelt s a id , "We haven ' t begun to 
win the war." (99) 
(96) See Blum, Op .C i t . p.238. 
(97) P h i l l i p s to F .0 , March 2h9 19^3, U11 55/ 1+7/?0. 
(98) F .0 . to Washington, March 26,19^3, U1332A7/70. 
(99) Blum, O p . C i t . p.239; Sherwood, Op .C i t . p .718, records 
s i m i l a r views re post-war p lans . March 27, meeting 
F .D .R . j iiden, H u l l , Wel les , H a l i f a x , Strang and Hopkins 
who s a i d : -
" I thought i t would have a very bad e f f e c t , both i n 
Kngland and the Uni ted S ta tes , i f the wor ld got the 
impress ion tha t the Uni ted States and England were, 
toge ther , p lanning the f u t u r e o f the wor ld w i thou t 
consu l t i ng anyone e l se . Eden agreed . . . " 
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Never theless , the con t inu ing Leaks fo r ced the issue. 
On A p r i l 5> the ' F i n a n c i a l News' c a r r i e d a f r o n t page, accurate 
summary o f the S.F.^" 1 ^^ On the f o l l o w i n g day Morgenthau now 
f e l t ob l iged to g ive the o u t l i n e o f the plan to the Senate 
Committee on Finance and desp i te B r i t i s h o b j e c t i o n s charac te r i sed 
i t as an i n s t i t u t i o n which would be t i e d to g o l d , whose aim was 
s t a b i l i s a t i o n , not expansion and over which the U.S. would have 
a c o n t r o l l i n g I n f l u e n c e . A f t e r going t h i s f a r and wi th the 
newspaper r epor t s i n mind there now seemed l i t t l e po in t I n not 
p u b l i s h i n g . 
the Secretary had not wanted to show h i s whole hand, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r Roosevel t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s . He was 
t h e r e f o r e d i s t r e s sed by the p u b l i c a t i o n i n London o f the 
d e t a i l s o f the White p l an , which were leaked to the press 
by the f inance m i n i s t r y o f one o f the gove rnmen t s - in -ex l l e . 
"As I said to the President Morgenthau t o l d h i s 
s t a f f , "This t h i n g ought to be a lesson f o r us, tha t 
anything t h a t we want to do tha t i s r e a l l y impor t an t , ve 
Just c a n ' t take a l l these coun t r i e s i n t o our confidence, ' (1 01 ) 
This was q u i t e t rue but Morgenthau does not i n d i c a t e t ha t 
most o f the pressure to ' take a i l these count r i es i n t o our 
c o n f i d e n c e 1 , had stemmed l a r g e l y f rom h i s department. S t i l l , i t 
was f i n a l l y decided tha t the U.S. should go ahead and p u b l i s h 
the S.F. which i t d i d on A p r i l 7. I n a sense Morgenthau had been 
ho i s t ed on h i s own pe ta rd . He had wanted the p re s t i ge o f an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l meeting i n which a ser ies o f b i l a t e r a l t a l k s could 
take place , w i t h o u t the S.F. and the C.U. being pub l i shed . He 
d i d not favour p u b l i c a t i o n because o f the danger o f unfavourable 
p u b l i c comparisons o f the two p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h regard to the 
U . S . ' s eminent p o s i t i o n i n the S.F. But even the p r e p a r a t i o n f o r 
(100) Treasury to P h i l l i p s , A p r i l , 5, 19^3, U1 5 6 9 A 7 / 7 0 . 
(101) Blum, O p . C l t . pp 239-^0. 
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a ser ies o f b i l a t e r a l t a l k s i n which the U.S. would be able to 
throw her weight around had not been poss ib le w i t h o u t p u b l i c i t y . 
Now the two plans were out i n the open and a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t 
approach was to be adopted. 
The immediate r e s u l t o f the p u b l i c a t i o n s was a temporary 
pause. Roosevelt I n p a r t i c u l a r seemed somewhat h e s i t a n t . At 
the same time he su rp r i sed most people by s p r i n g i n g the idea o f 
an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Food Conference on everyone. I t was soon 
gleaned tha t the outcome o f the conference was to ac t as a 
barometer f o r the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f d i scuss ing o ther i s s u e s . ^ 1 0 2 ^ 
I n f o r m a l t a l k s d i d proceed on A r t i c l e V I I issues but a t t h i s t ime 
Roosevelt was:-
" . . . opposed to any d e f i n i t e commitments to summon a 
conference. This app l i e s as much to a conference o f 
experts as to a conference o f f inance m i n i s t e r s . " (103) 
The B r i t i s h r e a l i s e d Roosevelt intended to proceed w i t h 
c a u t i o n , but they hoped tha t a f avourab le outcome o f the Food 
Conference might create an impetus to engage i n o ther t a l k s . 
The monetary exper ts i n B r i t a i n were c e r t a i n l y r e l u c t a n t to 
i n d e f i n i t e l y postpone f u r t h e r progress on the I . C . U . and the 
S.F. On May 12 enqu i r i e s were made whether Morgenthau would 
condone a proposal to s ta te I n Parl iament t ha t the next step 
would be the summoning o f a conference o f exper t s . Morgenthau 
demurred somewhat and communicated the f o l l o w i n g statement. 
1 . Explanatory t a l k s now proceeding w i t h exper ts o f 
var ious c o u n t r i e s . 
2 . I n the next month or so there would probably be a 




Campbell ,to F.O. A p r i l ^ ,19^3, U671A7/70 . 
P h i l l i p s to Treasury, May 6, 19^3, U21OOA7/70. 
F.O. N.American Dept. Minutes R.Ashton 
U2100A7/70. 
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3. There would be an ana ly s i s o f comments made by 
non-government exper t s . 
Probably i n a month or so there would be general t a l k s 
by experts i n Washington to syntheslse va r ious ideas . 
5. I f s u f f i c i e n t agreement could be reached then there 
would be a move to e l i m i n a t e the o ther d i f f e r e n c e s 
through normal government channels. 
" F i n a l l y , a conference o f Finance M i n i s t e r s would not 
be c a l l e d unless and u n t i l i t appeared tha t there was 
such s u b s t a n t i a l agreement as would warrant expec t a t ion 
o f a success fu l outcome," (105) 
During May, conversat ions between experts were r e - s t a r t e d 
i n Washington and desp i te the Treasury ' s previous move away f rom 
close b i l a t e r a l Anglo-U.S. t a l k s the new n e g o t i a t i o n s soon began 
to take on such an appearance. To these new t a l k s we must t u r n 
to i n the next chapter . 




NEW WINE INTO OLD BOTTLES : BRETTON WOODS 
l a the previous chapter we have seen how the monetary t a l k s 
developed d r a m a t i c a l l y du r ing the l a t t e r months o f 19^2 and the 
ea r ly p a r t o f 19^3- I t was on ly w i t h re luc tance t h a t the 
Americans and the B r i t i s h had publ ished t h e i r r e spec t ive monetary 
plans which contained many ou t s t and ing po in ts o f d i f f e r e n c e . 
S t i l l , the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the documents and the developments 
which f o l l o w e d t h i s a c t i o n a f f o r d e d both sides an o p p o r t u n i t y to 
take stock o f the p o s i t i o n and prepare f o r f u t u r e e v e n t u a l i t i e s . 
Perhaps i t would be as w e l l f o r us to do the same. 
One o f the most c o n t r o v e r s i a l innova t ions which the Americans 
had made i n the recent t a l k s was the scarce currency c lause. 
This was an issue which pe r s i s t ed as a problem over a long per iod 
o f t ime . I n ea r ly 19^3 i t was a l ready p r o v i d i n g grea t food f o r 
thought . On the B r i t i s h side Keynes was t roub led over the s tand-
i n g o f the clause. The problem was tha t the U.S. Treasury had 
proposed the c lause , and y e t , i f i t was invoked, the r i g h t s o f 
trade d i s c r i m i n a t i o n which i t a l lowed contravened p r i n c i p l e s 
which the State Department had been t r y i n g to e s t a b l i s h . 
Furthermore, the a u t h o r i t y to determine trade p o l i c y was i n the 
hands o f the State Department. Th i s i n f r i ngemen t on the p o l i c y 
area o f the State Department caused considerable concern and 
t h i s was p a r t l y r e f l e c t e d I n unfavourable a t t i t u d e s toward the 
monetary plans he ld by some o f the leading members o f t ha t 
depar traent. 
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A d o l f A. B e r l e , among o t h e r s , f e l t apprehensive about the 
development o f the C.U. /S .F . t a l k s . Ber le a l ready had a 
r e p u t a t i o n i n London f o r regarding B r i t a i n unfavourab ly as 
economical ly i m p e r i a l i s t i c , p r e f e r e n t i a l and r e s t r l c t i o n i s t . I t 
was t rue tha t he had urged H u l l o r i g i n a l l y to support the S,F» 
n e g o t i a t i o n s , because he be l i eved i t would be a necessary 
c o n d i t i o n f o r the l i b e r a l i s a t i o n o f t r ad ing p r a c t i c e s , bu t h i s 
views on the C.U. proposals were somewhat more h o s t i l e . 
Be r l e b l u n t l y expressed h i s views on the C.U. to a B r i t i s h d ip lomat 
as f o l l o w s 
"What i t r e a l l y came to was a method by which American 
and poss ib ly o ther goods, could be made a v a i l a b l e to 
c e r t a i n c o u n t r i e s , notably B r i t a i n , on , what was i n f a c t , 
though not i n f o r m , a c r e d i t arrangement . . . " (2 ) 
Herbert Feis was also concerned about some of the economic 
p lanning developments. Feis d i d not want American c r e d i t to 
subs id ise B r i t i s h export goods. He f e l t tha t the anonymity o f 
character f o r the S.F. which the B r i t i s h favoured might do t h i s . ^ ^ 
The c r e d i t o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y p r i n c i p l e , and t h i s , were both causes 
o f worry f o r the S ta te Department, and q u i t e n a t u r a l l y so, w i t h 
t h e i r concern over f o r e i g n t rade . The department had a l ready 
fought hard, and l ong , w i t h the B r i t i s h over d i s c r i m i n a t o r y 
p r ac t i c e s i n the nego t i a t i ons f o r the Mutual A i d Agreement. 
Now, the Treasury was proposing a scarce currency clause which 
could e s t a b l i s h a loophole by which the B r i t i s h might circumvent 
t h e i r r a ther t e n t a t i v e commitments to the a b o l i t i o n o f 
(1) See Harrod, R.F. "The L i f e o f J.M.Keynes} London, 
MacmiUan and C o . , L t d . 1951, p- 5^ 1 . 
(2 ) Quoted i n L.C.Gardner, "Economic Aspects o f New Deal 
Diplomacy", Beacon Press, Boston p .287 , Memo of 
a conversa t ion by A . A . B e r l e . 
(3) See Fe i s , H, 'The Sinews o f Peace' , Harper Bros . N.Y.19M+, 
p .90 . 
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d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r a c t i c e s . The p r o v i s i o n s f o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n under 
the scarce currency proposals were, however, s t i l l i nde t e rmina t e . 
On March 2 , 19^3, Harrod, who was i n c l i n e d to be o v e r - o p t i m i s t i c 
about American proposa ls , wrote e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y to Keynes r ega rd -
i n g the scarce currency c l a u s e . ^ 
" I should l i k e to suggest tha t a cable ought to be sent 
to P h i l l i p s and anyone else invo lved i n d iscuss ions 
fo rma l or i n f o r m a l on t h i s paper, s t a t i n g e x p l i c i t l y t h a t 
f rom now on our main o b j e c t should be to ho ld the 
Americans to the p r i n c i p l e s o f S.F .7." 
Keynes 1 r e p l y two days l a t e r was a more accurate r e f l e c t i o n 
o f the u n c e r t a i n t y o f the s i t u a t i o n . 
I agree t h a t , read l i t e r a l l y , the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n you 
give to t h i s i s the on ly one tha t makes any sense. 
Perhaps I ought to have at tached more importance to i t . 
I i n t e r p r e t e d i t as a ha l f -baked sugges t ion , not f u l l y 
thought through, which was c e r t a i n to be dropped as soon 
as i t s f u l l consequences were apprec ia ted . I cannot 
imagine tha t the State Department r e a l l y would put fo rward 
as t h e i r own s o l u t i o n the r a t i o n i n g o f purchases f rom a 
scarce currency country . You must remember tha t the 
evidence as to the extent to which the Sta te Department 
have a c t u a l l y accepted t h i s document o f Harry Whi te ' s i s 
somewhat f l i m s y . I should expect t ha t the moment 
emphatic a t t e n t i o n was drawn to t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e , i t would 
be wi thdrawn." (6 ) 
However, the U.S. Treasury were more prepared, than Keynes 
judged, to push t h i s concession through f o r the sake o f r e c i p r o c a l 
B r i t i s h concessions. Concessions which would make the r e a l i s a t i o n 
o f the S.F. a l i k e l i e r p r o b a b i l i t y . Not on ly t h i s , but they 
achieved a p o s i t i o n o f ascendency over the Sta te Department i n the 
See Harrod, O p . C i t . p . 5^3> though a f a i r l y wide i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
appears to have been o f f e r e d by the U.S. Treasury i n 
February 19^3, See Telegrams N0.908 and 909 quest ions and 
answers: H a l i f a x to F.O. February 2h9 19^+3, U 0 6 1 A 7 / 7 0 . 
(5) See P r e l i m i n a r y D r a f t o f Proposals f o r a Uni ted and 
Associated Nat ions S.F. , January 19^3, IX 7 , U 6 2 7 A 7 / 7 0 . 
(6) Le t t e r s quoted i n Harrod, O p . C i t . pp.5^5-5^8 , dated 
March 2 and W, l 9 ^ 3 . 
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monetary t a l k s which enabled them to do t h i s . The wider i n t e r e s t 
o f the State Department was to create a system o f l i b e r a l , non-
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y I n t e r n a t i o n a l t r ade . The S .F . , f o r them, was 
simply a poss ib le means to f a c i l i t a t e t h i s end. The Treasury, 
on the o ther hand, would be s a t i s f i e d w i t h a working system, w i t h 
the p o t e n t i a l f o r l i b e r a l i s a t i o n , even i f t h i s meant the 
s a c r i f i c e o f Sta te Department p r i n c i p l e s . The key concern f o r 
the Treasury was the es tabl ishment o f monetary s t a b i l i t y through 
the S.F. This e n t a i l e d a s i g n i f i c a n t amount o f American c o n t r o l 
i n the I n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary f i e l d and a pre-eminent r o l e f o r 
the d o l l a r i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange ope ra t i ons , backed by huge 
U.S. gold reserves . How the U.S. Treasury sought to b r i n g t h i s 
about we s h a l l see s h o r t l y . 
I n London the B r i t i s h Government had t h e i r own problems 
besides the d i f f i c u l t y o f assessing the e f f e c t s o f i n t e r -
depar tmental d i f f e r e n c e s i n the American Government. 19^3 w 3- s to 
witness a number o f execut ive and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
The foremost and immediate problem a t the beginning o f the year 
was the d i f f e r e n c e s between, on the one hand, people l i k e 
Beaverbrook, Amery, Kings ley Wood, R.H.Hudson and Hubert Henderso 
( 7 ) 
and on the o ther hand people l i k e Cherwel l and R . H . H a r r o d . w 4 
The former group were suspicious and apprehensive o f American 
economic p o l i c i e s , whereas the l a t t e r group were f a r more p ro -
American. Other m i n i s t e r s , however, i n c l u d i n g C h u r c h i l l , were 
o f t e n i n c l i n e d to be d e f e r e n t i a l to the U.S. on economic p o l i c i e s 
f o r f e a r o f adversely a f f e c t i n g coopera t ion f o r the war e f f o r t . 
(7) At t h i s time Harrod was a member o f 'S Branch 1 under 
Lord Cherwel l . This was a committee which suppl ied 
i n f o r m a t i o n and s t a t i s t i c s on s c i e n t i f i c and economic 
subjec ts to C h u r c h i l l . Later i n 19^3 Harrod advised 
Cherwell on the Keynes-White t a l k s , 
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S t i l l , the group opposing, what they considered to be an 
American economic d i k t a t , was i n f l u e n t i a l and as we s h a l l see 
i n h i b i t e d excessive deference to U.S. p o l i c i e s a t t imes . 
Another compl i ca t i on arose d u r i n g 19^3 w i t h the sudden death o f 
Kings ley Wood i n September, though h i s place was very ably f i l l e d 
by S i r John Anderson* A second loss o f personnel was tha t o f 
S i r F reder ick P h i l l i p s . P h i l l i p s ' a spe r i t y had caused some 
d i f f i c u l t i e s on a personal l e v e l i n 19^1-^2, though he had an 
e x c e l l e n t grasp o f the issues i n v o l v e d . P h i l l i p s ' depar ture 
f rom the scene i n mid-19V3 held up the newly r e - s t a r t e d t a l k s , 
though t h i s was mainly because o f B r i t i s h hes i tancy ra the r than 
the sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f f a t e . There was a lso concern, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y among those i n c l i n e d to apprehension over American 
des igns , regarding Lord H a l i f a x . We have already noted h i s 
i n a b i l i t y to grasp the f i n e r p o i n t s o f economic i n t e r e s t i n the 
e a r l y months o f 19^2 and the exaspera t ion t h i s caused to bo th 
Keynes and C h u r c h i l l . I n Kenneth Young's ' C h u r c h i l l and 
Beaverbrook' the author presents documentary evidence o f 
m i n i s t e r i a l cons idera t ions concerning the removal o f H a l i f a x 
f rom h i s Washington post on no less than f o u r occasions! 
(8) N.B. S i r Freder ick L e i t h Ross i n "Money T a l k s , F i f t y Years 
o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l F inance ' , The Autobiography o f 
S i r Freder ick L e i t h Ross 1 , Hutchinson, London, 1968, p . 2 9 8 , 
descr ibes P h i l l i p s as t a c i t u r n and shy. "Even Acheson, 
who was the eas ies t man to get on w i t h , t o l d me t h a t he saw 
as l i t t l e as poss ib le o f P h i l l i p s , and when I r e p l i e d t h a t 
P h i l l i p s seemed to get on w e l l w i t h Morgenthau. Acheson 
r e p l i e d 'No doubt - as one pawnbroker w i t h a n o t h e r 1 . 
Harry White o f the Treasury t o o , was not on close terms 
w i t h P h i l l i p s 1 1 
15^ 
September 19^1, May 19^2, January 19^3 and J u l y 19^3. y 
Such u n c e r t a i n t i e s and e v e n t u a l i t i e s tha t have been 
mentioned obv ious ly complicated the working r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the two coun t r i e s and b l u r r e d the respec t ive images each he ld o f 
the o t h e r . Perhaps t h i s was most no t i ceab le w i t h the problem 
the B r i t i s h faced i n t r y i n g to assess the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f Congress 
and p u b l i c o p i n i o n , i n American p o l i c y making. The defea t o f 
Wi l son ' s p o l i c y a f t e r the F i r s t World War, the separa t ion o f the 
l e g i s l a t u r e and the execut ive and the continued i n v o c a t i o n o f 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s posed by Congress complicated and considerably 
handicapped B r i t i s h n e g o t i a t i n g freedom. These d i f f i c u l t i e s were 
o f t e n exaggerated by the Americans and manipulated to f u r t h e r 
t h e i r own purposes. For example the growing Republican c r i t i c i s m , 
supported by some Southern Democrats, tha t America was s a c r i f i c i n g 
her own i n t e r e s t s f o r the sake of i d e a l i s m , though i t was not 
p e r t i n e n t there were no ser ious at tempts to a r r e s t such c r i t i c i s m s . 
On the c o n t r a r y , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i nd i ca t ed sympathy w i t h such 
comments. Part o f the reason f o r t h i s was a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
d i s q u i e t over the mid-term Republican Congressional and Guber-
n a t o r i a l successes. They hoped t h a t the l i n e t h a t they had 
(9) Young, K. • C h u r c h i l l and Beaverbrook - A Study i n F r i e n d s h i p ' , 
Eyre and Spott iswoode, London, 1966. pp 207, 251, 255. 
Beaverbrook expressed doubts on H a l i f a x ' s a b i l i t y to a f f e c t 
American o p i n i o n i n a P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n year , p .255; 
concerning the economic issues i n 1 9 ^ he doubted i f he 
understood them, p . 2 6 l . I t should be remembered however 
tha t Young's book was based on the Beaverbrook Archives and 
t h a t Beaverbrook was prone to take v i o l e n t d i s l i k e s to people. 
Furthermore, he had had h i s eye on the Washington Embassy f o r 
h imse l f i n September 19^1 and May 19^2 but H a l i f a x remained. 
On the o the r hand i t was gene ra l l y acknowledged tha t H a l i f a x 
was too d e f e r e n t i a l to U.S. v iews. I n the Summer o f 1 9 ^ 
Keynes said to Mor^enthaui " . . . Ambassador H a l i f a x was 
hyperconscious o f the (U.S . ) e l e c t i o n , about which he repor ted 
to London at every o p p o r t u n i t y . " " I know Lord H a l i f a x i s " , 
Morgenthau s a i d , "because I know he keeps sounding out 
Republicans a l l the time as to who i s going to w i n , . . , " 
3!um, J . M . 'From the Morgenthau D i a r i e s - Years o f War 
1 9 l + 1 - ^ 5 , ) Houghton M i f f l i n Co.Boston 1967, p . 270 . 
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adopted would appease conservat ive c r i t i c s and f u r t h e r c a p i t a l 
could be gained by making America 's b u s i n e s s l i k e approach to 
post-war economic problems c lea r to her B r i t i s h a l l y . For example, 
i n February H a l i f a x repor ted tha t Henry Wallace and more 
i m p o r t a n t l y : -
"Welles has r e c e n t l y stressed tha t i n t e r e s t s o f United 
States and riot sent imenta l a l t r u i s m are to be guides 
o f American Fore ign P o l i c y . " (10) 
At the same t ime as t h i s , henry Morgenthau had i n t e n s i f i e d 
h i s f l i r t a t i o n w i t h congressional leaders to Invo lve them more i n 
the monetary t a l k s . Morgenthau paid more a t t e n t i o n to Congress 
than h i s coun te r -pa r t i n the State Department. His p o s i t i o n , 
a f t e r a l l , was r a t h e r more d i f f i c u l t . His concerns were o b v i o u s l y 
not so l e ly d i r e c t e d , nor even predominantly so, toward f o r e i g n 
r e l a t i o n s . He had the major problems o f domestic t a x a t i o n and 
f i nance to contend w i t h and poss ib le congress ional d i f f i c u l t i e s 
i n t h i s area. And indeed he s u f f e r e d a spectacular defea t on 
t a x a t i o n i n 19M* when Congress r e j e c t e d h i s proposals and a 
P r e s i d e n t i a l veto i n support o f them. S t i l l , a f t e r the p u b l i c a t i o n 
o f the two monetary p lans , Republican congressmen in t roduced a 
r e s o l u t i o n which c a l l e d f o r congressional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a t any 
f u t u r e conference i n v o l v i n g Treasury o f f i c i a l s and members o f a 
f o r e i g n count ry . This was more than Morgenthau had bargained f o r . 
On the advice o f H u l l he co l l abo ra t ed w i t h Sara Rayburn, a lead ing 
senator , on t h i s issue and managed to keep arrangements on an 
i n f o r m a l bas i s . B u t , there was no doubt tha t Congress could be 
a s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e on execut ive p o l i c y i f i t was al lowed to 
be. The quest ions f o r the B r i t i s h were s t i l l m a n i f o l d . How f a r 
would Congress be al lowed to play a r o l e by the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ? 
(10) H a l i f a x to F.O, Weekly P o l i t i c a l Summary, February 13, 
19V3, A 1 7 0 9 A I * A 5 -
156 
How f a r could i t i n s i s t on i t s views being adhered to by the 
U.S. Government? How f a r d i d i t understand f o r e i g n p o l i c y issues 
and what were i t s a c t u a l views? And f i n a l l y , how f a r was 
Congress and views a t t r i b u t e d to i t by the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n being 
manipulated to s t rengthen America 's barga in ing power? 
I n the Spr ing o f 19^3 a t the conclus ion o f h i s t r i p to 
Washington, liden said t h a t : -
" . . . he had learned o f tiie importance o f Congress and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the senate i n any post-war d i scuss ions . " (11 ) 
So the B r i t i s h were no t ing w i t h more and more i n t e r e s t 
American congress ional and p u b l i c r e a c t i o n s , i n p a r t i c u l a r a t 
t h i s time the r e a c t i o n to the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the monetary p lans . 
Bu t , s u r p r i s i n g l y , cons ider ing the expressed fea rs o f members 
o f the American n e g o t i a t i n g team, c r i t i c i s m appeared subdued 
both i n Congress and among the p u b l i c . 
"7b. Commentary on monetary plans i s s t i l l t h i n , and 
suggestion tha t B r i t i s h p lan favours B r i t a i n unduly 
and seeks to n u l l i f y Uni ted States advantage as a 
gold possessing power a l though o c c u r r i n g here and 
there , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n f i n a n c i a l press , has not ye t 
developed i n t o even a minor campaign, . . . " (12) 
On May 8 , the American Department o f the F.O. recorded 
s i m i l a r d i s i n t e r e s t e d views i n the U.S. and added tha t 
P r e s i d e n t i a l c au t ion regarding the monetary t a l k s might be eroded 
i f there was a f avourab le outcome to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Food 
Conference which Roosevelt had r e c e n t l y p roposed .^3) 
(11) March 29 , 19^3, Hopkins ' f i n a l note on the Eden v i s i t , 
Sherwood, O p . C i t . p.719. 
(12) Washington to F.O. Weekly P o l i t i c a l Summary, A p r i l 21 , 
(13) F.O. Indexed U2102A7/70 Minutes by H.Ashton, F.O. 
N.American Dept. May 8, 19^3* 
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I t should now be c l e a r , f rom the above account , tha t both 
sides were c a u t i o u s l y f e e l i n g t h e i r way. Much o f the e a r l i e r 
n e g o t i a t i o n s had been determined by war e x t r e m i t i e s , bu t now 
bo th sides were moving i n t o the f i e l d o f post-war p lanning 
which i n t e n s i f i e d cau t ion on both s ides . The U.S. was unsure 
o f the approach to adopt i n f u r t h e r t a l k s . I t was f a r more 
complex than a simple b i l a t e r a l versus m u l t i l a t e r a l approach. 
The issue was complicated by State-Treasury j e a l o u s i e s and a 
genuine conundrum o f dec id ing which was the best p o l i c y to 
f u r t h e r U.S. I n t e r e s t s . On the v;hole there was a general s h i f t 
towards a more i n t e r n a t i o n a l approach by the U.S. and m u . l t i -
l a t e r a l L y e f f e c t i v e s o l u t i o n s to economic and f i n a n c i a l problems. 
One o f the reasons f o r these s h i f t s was tha t the new s i t u a t i o n 
would avoid c o n f e r r i n g a spec ia l s ta tus on the U.K. which she 
(1 
had acquired i n close b i l a t e r a l U.S . -U.K. t a l k s . However, 
t h i s i s not to say the U.S. adopted open, f u l l y - f l e d g e d m u l t i -
l a t e r a l i s m i n a l l i t s forms by any means. The s ta tus o f 
b i l a t e r a l U .S . -U.K. t a l k s may have been lowered i n pub l i c eyes 
but b i l a t e r a l nego t i a t i ons to e s t a b l i s h m u l t i l a t e r a l l y e f f e c t i v e 
agreements was s t i l l the main t o o l o f U.S. diplomacy i n t h i s 
f i e l d , desp i te i t being cloaked w i t h an appearance o f m u l t i -
l a t e r a l i s m on a number o f occasions. Rooseve l t ' s su rp r i se 
proposal f o r an I n t e r n a t i o n a l food conference was i n f a c t , as 
the B r i t i s h were in fo rmed , to be a t e s t i n g ground f o r America 's 
more i n t e r n a t i o n a l approach. The B r i t i s h were informed tha t I f 
the Hot Spr ings ' Conference went s u c c e s s f u l l y , then i n a l l 
(1*0 See Harrod, O p . C i t . pp.553-55^. 
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p r o b a b i l i t y the U.S. would push ahead on other economic t o p i c s . 
19^3 w a s I n f a c t a very s i g n i f i c a n t year i n the development 
o f post-war p lans . A f t e r the l u l l o f 19^2, p lanning f o r the post-
war world began to p ick up as the danger o f m i l i t a r y d e f e a t 
receded. S t i l l , i n ea r ly 19^3 i n deference to American wishes, 
progress on the monetary t a l k s was ar res ted d u r i n g A p r i l and May. 
I n accordance w i t h t h e i r more I n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y the U.S. 
wanted to resume t a l k s w i t h exper ts f rom a broad range o f 
coun t r i e s which would not be poss ib le u n t i l mid-1 9^3 because o f 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f t r a v e l and the time requi red to assemble. ^ 1 
I n e a r l y June the U.S. again began to make noises f o r the 
renewal o f I n f o r m a l t a l k s , t h i s t ime among the assembly o f f o r e i g n 
exper ts who had gathered i n Washington, 3y June 8 t h , P h i l l i p s 
had accepted an i n v i t a t i o n f rom the U.S. to p a r t i c i p a t e i n pu re ly 
t e c h n i c a l t a l k s due to begin on June I j j t h . ^ ^ The B r i t i s h were 
s l i g h t l y apprehensive o f the new t a l k s . The F.O. had c o l l e c t e d 
a number o f statements o f American bankers and f i n a n c i e r s who 
ob jec ted to the monetary plans as incur s ions i n t o t h e i r own 
domain o f banking and f i n a n c e . Th i s by i t s e l f was not too 
d i s t u r b i n g , e s p e c i a l l y as these a t t i t u d e s were s t r o n g l y opposed 
by Morgenthau and the Treasury Department. What was d i s t u r b i n g 
was the o p p o s i t i o n to Keynes 1 o v e r - d r a f t p r i n c i p l e f o r the C . U . , 
which the Americans dubbed the u n l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y p roposa l . 
I n p o i n t o f f a c t i t never was s t r i c t l y speaking ' u n l i m i t e d 
l i a b i l i t y ' . U . S . l i a b i l i t y f o r example, went up to 0263 under 
ex tan t C.U. p r o v i s i o n s , but there was f l e x i b i l i t y f o r t h i s to be 
(15) See F.O. U 2 5 0 5 A 7 / 7 0 , Hay 31 , 19^3» P l a y f a i r to Shackle. 
(16) Robertson to Eady, June 8, 191*3, U 2 5 9 8 A 7 / 7 0 . 
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expanded f u r t h e r I f i t was deemed necessary by the C .U. ' s 
c o n t r o l board. However, i t was always r e f e r r e d to as the 
' u n l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y p r i n c i p l e ' so t h i s w i l l be r e t a i n e d f o r 
convenience i n the subsequent d i s c u s s i o n . I n f a c t , i t was 
becoming c lea r t ha t the Americans intended to push something 
through on the S.F. model and a l though Ashton noted tha t the 
B r i t i s h Treasury : -
" . . . are determined not to commit themselves to something 
which would be unacceptable f rom our p o i n t o f v i e w . " 
J .E , Coulson expressed wide ly held fea rs t ha t the U.K. 
would have to go a long way to meet the U.S. on the ques t ion o f 
u n l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y / 1 ^ 
The p o i n t a t issue here was the d i m i n u t i v e nature o f the 
S.F. compared to the C.U. I t s smallness e n t a i l e d an i n f l e x i b i l i t y , 
an i n a b i l i t y to change i n response to e x t e r n a l economic 
f l u c t u a t i o n s w i t h o u t s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l dec is ions being taken . 
I n shor t a l a rge r r o l e f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l and management was 
feared to be necessary by the B r i t i s h . The C.U. had been 
d r a f t e d such tha t I t would be l a r g e l y under the c o n t r o l o f the 
U.S. and the U . K . , w i t h the i n i t i a l edge going to the l a t t e r . 
However, t h i s ' c o n t r o l 1 was to be r e f l e c t e d i n the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
nature o f the Union r a the r than In day-to-day d e c i s i o n s . The 
Union had been so formula ted tha t i t would ' a u t o m a t i c a l l y ' r eac t 
to economic e v e n t u a l i t i e s . P rov i s ions f o r coping w i t h new 
economic cont ingencies were to be i n - b u i l t . The 3 . F . , on the 
o the r hand, because o f i t s smal ler c a p i t a l , was simply to 
(17) See R.Ashton, Minutes N.American Dept. F.O. U 2 7 0 6 A 7 / 7 0 , 
June 17> 19^3? a n ( i J . C o u l s o n , Minutes, N.American Dept. 
F..0. June ^k> 19^3, U 2 6 5 1 A 7 / 7 0 . 
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supplement r a the r than supersede the e x i s t i n g workings o f 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange. This e n t a i l e d a t i g h t e r shepherding o f 
f u n d s , t h e i r a c t i v e manipula t ion and a greater concen t r a t i on 
on s t a b i l i t y and avoidance o f compe t i t ive deva lua t ions , r a t h e r 
than the promotion o f economic expansion. I t was a conserva t ive 
concept ion to r e s t r a i n ha rmfu l tendencies ra ther than a r a d i c a l 
i n n o v a t i o n to place i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary r e l a t i o n s on a new 
f o o t i n g , which was the goal o f the C,U S The danger o f t h i s f o r 
the U.K. was the poss ib le i m p o s i t i o n o f r i g i d d i r e c t i v e s concern-
ing exchange ra tes and r e l a x a t i o n o f monetary c o n t r o l s which 
could r e s u l t i n a slower post-war recovery , or even cause a 
f u r t h e r dec l i ne i n B r i t a i n ' s economic f o r t u n e s . 
I n March 1 9^3 Keynes s t i l l hoped tha t many o f the dangers 
the S.F. might pose f o r the U.K. could be avoided. He said to 
K.F.Penrose i n London:-
" . . . t h a t the p r i n c i p l e o f subscribed c a p i t a l was 
"academical ly" d i s c r e d i t a b l e but not p r a c t i c a l l y 
i m p o r t a n t . " (18) 
Keynes s t i l l hoped tha t the smaller size proposed f o r the 
S.F. might s t i l l be s u f f i c i e n t to produce a monetary o r g a n i s a t i o n 
which would f u n c t i o n on l i n e s not too d i f f e r e n t f rom h i s 
proposed C,U, At t h i s time i n 19^3 there was ou ts tanding an 
American p lan f o r an I n t e r n a t i o n a l bank w i t h very large amounts 
o f c a p i t a l i n v o l v e d . There was a lso a p o s s i b i l i t y o f i nc reas ing 
the aggregate t o t a l o f subsc r ip t i ons to the Fund. Keynes thought 
t h a t loans f rom the Bank would help to counteract depressions, 
and I f the funds f o r the S.F. were o f a reasonable s i z e , i t s 
more l i m i t e d r o l e would perhaps enable i t to f u n c t i o n on accept-
able l i nes i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the Bank. 
(18) Penrose, O p . C l t . p . j l . 
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"One can y i e l d on the ques t ion o f asking s e c u r i t y and 
on the ques t ion o f l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y to the c r e d i t o r 
wi thou t y i e l d i n g on the main s t r u c t u r e . I should 
much p re fe r to make both the former concessions and 
y i e l d on the main s t r u c t u r e on ly i n the l a s t r e s o r t . 
While i n essence t h i s i s mainly a ques t ion o f appear-
ance, I fancy i t comes to much more than t h a t , i f one 
looks forward i n t o f u t u r e developments and the use o f 
the Union f o r var ious general i n t e r n a t i o n a l purposes ." (19) 
However, as Penrose concludes: -
"White was i n c l i n e d to reduce ra ther than to increase the 
Fund, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r he and Mr. Morgenthau began to 
take soundings i n Congress." (20) 
But more o f t h i s , and B r i t i s h compromise proposals to make 
the Fund t o l e r a b l e f o r them, l a t e r . 
Even i n March 19^3) Keynes was already aware tha t the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between the U.S. and the U.K. on many t e c h n i c a l and 
p o l i c y questions were cons iderable . At the same time there was 
s t i l l a re luc tance to evaluate these d i f f e r e n c e s i n terms o f 
incompat ib le c o n f l i c t s o f economic i n t e r e s t s . Penrose records 
Keynes as saying at t h i s t i m e : -
" I now consider the success o f the p lan depends on the 
w i l l to cooperate; w i thou t t ha t w i l l no man ipu la t ion 
o f v o t i n g powers w i l l he lp ; w i t h i t the d e t a i l s o f 
v o t i n g are o f secondary importance." (21) 
I t was almost as i f Keynes be l i eved he could abs t r ac t the 
q u a l i t y o f coopera t ion from the issues i n v o l v e d . But t h i s was 
not poss ib le . The problems were o f a s u b s t a n t i a l na ture . 
Could Anglo-American economic p lanning be such as to overcome 
c o n f l i c t s o f i n t e r e s t s and be perceived by both as being 
(19) Keynes to P h i l l i p s , Quoted i n Harrod, Op .C l t . p .532 , 
May 27th 191+3. 
(20) Penrose, O p . C i t . p .51 . 
(21) Penrose, O p . C i t . p .52 . 
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mutua l ly b e n e f i c i a l ? There was a great r e luc tance on both 
sides to a l low a t o t a l breakdown o f a c t i ve economic coopera t ion 
between them, bu t the extent o f tha t cooperat ion was dependent 
upon re spec t ive percept ions o f g a i n , and at times both s ides , 
but p a r t i c u l a r l y the B r i t i s h , questioned the p a y - o f f . 
During the e a r l y par t o f June American a l t e r a t i o n s to the 
S.F. began to d i s t r e s s the B r i t i s h members o f the i n f o r m a l 
conference, namely P h i l l i p s , Robertson, Opie and Robbins. 
On June 1 3 t h ) there appeared a t e n t a t i v e U.S. quota p l a n , and 
s imultaneously suggestions emerged which placed more emphasis 
on the Importance o f g o l d , a l though some r e l a x a t i o n o f U.S. 
c o n t r o l appeared i n the form o f reduced requirements f o r a 
f o u r - f i f t h s m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n . This change s t i l l excepted the 
va lue of go ld . S t i l l , the new quota proposals , which were the 
major i nnova t ions , ran as f o l l o w s . 
"5j Formula seems to give the Uni ted States o f America 
about 21$ o f the t o t a l v o t i n g r i g h t s and the Uni ted 
Kingdom about <ft:$ and the B r i t i s h Empire ^7%. This 
I s very d i f f e r e n t f rom our o r i g i n a l concept ion o f a 
C.U, i n which Uni ted States o f America and Uni ted 
Kingdom had the c o n t r o l l i n g vo i ce . I t makes surrender 
o f n a t i o n a l sovereignty much more d i f f i c u l t to get 
across and confi rms our view tha t when time comes f o r 
His Ma je s ty ' s Government to d e f i n e t h e i r a t t i t u d e , 
several p rov i s ions i n S.F. and indeec. C.U. a l so , would 
have to be made more e l a s t i c , e .g . as regards a l t e r a t i o n 
o f exchange r a t e s , and i f S.F. i s b a s i s , apportionment 
o f scarce currency under S .F .3(7 ) (See memo prepared by 
U.S.Treasury A.S .F . o f the U.N. and Assoc. Na t ions . 
January 19*+3, U 6 2 7 A 7 / 7 0 ) and o f f e r o f excess gold to 
the Fund under S.F. 3(B) ( I b i d . ) , " (22) 
(22) F.O. to Washington, 
June 17, 19*1-31 U 2 6 4 5 2 A 7 / 7 0 . 
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On June 16th , the Americans went even f u r t h e r , and w i t h 
very l i t t l e n o t i c e produced a r ev i sed v e r s i o n o f the Fund, 
which was l a r g e l y the format on which the l a t e r more f o r m a l 
d r a f t o f J u l y 10 was b a s e d . O f t h i s v e r s i o n Blum has 
commentedi-
the in t e rdepa r tmen ta l working committee i n 
Washington r a p i d l y agreed on r e v i s i o n s o f the 
White d r a f t designed to a t t r a c t B r i t i s h s u p p o r t . " ( 2 ^ ) 
I n po in t o f f a c t , the r e v i s i o n s were p r i m a r i l y designed to 
e l i c i t concessions from the B r i t i s h , and t h i s caused both a 
c o n f l i c t o f views and some hard ba rga in ing . I n d i s c u s s i o n , and 
f rom the June 17 supplementary d r a f t , i t became apparent tha t 
the U.S. was prepared to increase the s ize o f the Fund to 
#10B and a l l ow a l t e r a t i o n s i n the p r i c e o f g o l d , bu t on ly w i t h 
t h e i r concurrence as t h i s r equ i r ed the f o u r - f i f t h s m a j o r i t y 
r u l e . Also the U.S. was prepared to a l l ow more f l e x i b i l i t y I n 
the a l t e r a t i o n o f exchange r s t e s . However, even H a l i f a x who 
be l i eved the Americans were making a genuine at tempt to 
a s s i m i l a t e the S.F. and the C.U. d i d not t h i n k tha t the 
Americans went f a r enough on t h i s l a s t p o i n t . On the d e b i t 
s ide there appeared no support f rom the U . S . , or elsewhere, 
f o r the B r i t i s h o v e r - d r a f t p r i n c i p l e being incorpora ted i n t o 
the Fund. This p r i n c i p l e , though not ind ispensab le ; I f i t 
was abandoned Keynes would need considerable changes i n the 
S.F. i f the general character o f h i s v i s i o n f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
(25) 
monetary I n s t i t u t i o n was not to be l o s t . J 
(23) See S.F. dated J u l y 10, 19W3, U*f193A7/70. 
(2*0 Blum, O p . C i t . p .2V| . 
(25) See H a l i f a x to.. F.O. , June 16, 19^3, U 2 7 0 6 A 7 / 7 0 . 
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A f u r t h e r d i s t u r b i n g raove was the i n s e r t i o n o f proposals , 
by the members o f the Federal Reserve Board, f o r quotas to be 
paid i n f u l l and tha t the p r o p o r t i o n o f gold should be $0% or 
o o f a member's gold reserves , whichever was the l e ss . J 
H a l i f a x advised tha t t h i s apparent p re -occupa t lon w i t h 
gold should not be taken too s e r i o u s l y . I n f a c t , Harrod 
recorded tha t the proposals on gold received no support f rom 
the assembled exper t s . Nevertheless , the U . S . ' s c o n t i n u i n g 
concern tha t gold should have a large r o l e to play i n the S.F. 
and her p o l i c y o f gold monet i sa t ion by t y i n g d o l l a r value to 
i t , was to cause f u r t h e r t roub le l a t e r . On the Issue o f the 
Bank, which Keynes hoped might render the S.F. more p a l a t a b l e , 
the U.S. remained e l u s i v e . I n September o f 1 9^2, P h i l l i p s had 
requested White to go i n t o the d e t a i l s o f the Bank, but White 
had avoided doing so. Harrod claimed tha t t h i s u n w i l l i n g n e s s 
was due to f e a r o f the B r i t i s h o f f e r i n g to accept the Bank i f 
the U.S. would accept the C . U . , something White and Morgeathau 
(27) 
were loathe to do. On June 16, H a l i f a x repor ted th;->t the 
American p o s i t i o n remained unchanged. Morgenthau had s ta ted 
tha t he would on ly d i sc lose the plans f o r the Bank a f t e r the 
main po in t s o f the S.F. had been decided. 
On the 17 June, the ' m u l t i l a t e r a l ' t a l k s ended, bu t w i t h 
obvious Anglo-American d i f f e r e n c e s s t i l l ou t s t and ing . I t was 
thus agreed tha t the d i scuss ion o f problems such as. the 
(26) Harrod, O p . C i t . , r e f e r s to t h i s as "a v a r i a n t o f the 
S t a b i l i s a t i o n Fund . . . " p .55^. As f a r as I can see he 
I s simply r e f e r r i n g to these a l t e r a t i o n s sponsored by 
the F .R.3 . not an a l t e r n a t i v e d r a f t o f the Fund. 
(27) Harrod, O p . C i t . p.5^1. 
(23) H a l i f a x to F.O. June 16, 19^3, U27O6A7/70 . 
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p o s i t i o n o f g o l d , l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y and a renewed American 
I n t e r e s t i n B r i t a i n ' s s t e r l i n g balances should continue 
b i l a t e r a l l y between the U.K. and the U.S. on June 22. As we 
s h a l l soon d i s cove r , the caut ious r e a c t i o n o f the B r i t i s h to 
the proposals concerning the blocked balances was a symptom 
o f a growing concern regarding the e f f e c t s on B r i t a i n o f U.S. 
economic p o l i c i e s , and a r e - a p p r a i s a l o f 3 r i t i s h p o l i c y 
a l t e r n a t i v e s i n the l i g h t o f t h i s . ^ 2 ^ 
On June 22 and 23 , 1 9^3 j the 3 r i t i s h and Americans 
engaged once again I n b i l a t e r a l d iscuss ions o f the monetary 
problems i n an at tempt to reso lve t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s . The 
represen ta t ives f rom the U.S. Treasury and F .H.B . were the 
main U.S. p a r t i c i p a n t s , though there were occas iona l appearances 
by Pasvolsky and Ber le o f the State Department. The t a l k s were 
to the p o i n t , though apparent ly f r a n k and f r i e n d l y . ^ ° ) ^ne 
onus, i n f a c t , was on the Americans to c l a r i f y t h e i r p o s i t i o n 
and produce adequate answers to B r i t i s h quest ions r e l a t i n g to 
the S.F. T h i s , to a large e x t e n t , they d i d . H a l i f a x hoped 
B r i t i s h f ea r s t ha t the U.S. would impose too much r i g i d i t y on 
the S.F. , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Immediate post-war years , would 
prove to be unfounded. This Issue was pushed s t r o n g l y by the 
B r i t i s h , who i n s i s t e d tha t Parl iament and the p u b l i c would have 
to be g iven assurances tha t e r r o r s i n the i n i t i a l f i x i n g o f 
exchange ra tes could be r e c t i f i e d , avo id ing the need f o r 
domestic d e f l a t i o n . White r e t o r t e d tha t the Americans must be 
reassured tha t compe t i t ive deva lua t ions would not recur I n the 
(29) For above see Washington to F.O. June 16 and 17,19^3) 
U2717A7 /7C and U 2 7 ^ 7 A 7 / 7 0 : June 17,19^3) R.Ashton, 
N.American Dept. F.O. Minutes , U 2 7 ^ 7 A 7 / 7 0 . 
(30) H a l i f a x to F.O. June 23 , 19^3, U2322A7/70. 
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post-war w o r l d , However, even H a l i f a x , n o r m a l l y d e f e r e n t i a l 
t o American s t r e n g t h , judged t h a t they would not break o f f the 
t a l k s over t h i s . He b e l i e v e d t h a t they would p r o b a b l y compromis 
a l o n g l i n e s a c c e p t a b l e to the B r i t i s h , perhaps on the b a s i s o f i -
1. A f i v e - y e a r t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . 
2. A 10$ u n i l a t e r a l r i g h t to a l t e r exchange r a t e s a f t e r 
c o n s u l t a t i o n . 
3. F u r t h e r changes o n l y w i t h the consent o f the E x e c u t i v e 
Committee but w i t h the f o u r - f i f t h s m a j o r i t y r e q u i r e m e n t 
dispensed w i t h . ^ > 
On June 23, White took the lead i n the t a l k s . I n response 
t o a r e q u e s t from H a l i f a x , White proceeded to s p e l l o u t the 
o b j e c t i o n s American departments had to the C.U. He d i d t h i s , 
as H a l i f a x n o t e d , i n a most temperate and r e a s o n a b l e way. Two 
q u a l i t i e s not always expected o f Harry White. S t i l l , the U.S. 
were a s k i n g a g r e a t d e a l o f the B r i t i s h and they were h a r d l y 
i n a p o s i t i o n to f o r c e an agreement down B r i t i s h t h r o a t s , as 
they were t o l a t e r . White i n f a c t l a i d down the minimum 
c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e d by the U.S. He added t h a t i f they were not 
met t h e r e was so l i t t l e hope o f C o n g r e s s i o n a l concurrence t h a t 
f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s would be f u t i l e . A l though t h i s v e r y much 
resembled an u l t i m a t u m , and b r o u g h t home to tne B r i t i s h 
American d e t e r m i n a t i o n to a c h i e v e adherence t o c e r t a i n p o i n t s 
o f t h e S.F., t h e r e was a l s o c o n s i d e r a b l e scope l e f t f o r the 
B r i t i s h to amend the 5.F. to a f o r m which h o p e f u l l y would make 
i t a c c e p t a b l e . White's c o n d i t i o n s w e r e i -
(31) I b i d 
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" ( 1 ) They must be a b l e to t e L l Congress t h a t we have 
no p r e s e n t i n t e n t i o n o f abandoning e x i s t i n g d o l l a r -
s t e r l i n g r a t e , i f a t a l a t e r d ate b e f o r e i n c e p t i o n 
o f the Fund i t became necessary e i t h e r f o r us or f o r 
them to e f f e c t such an a l t e r a t i o n we or they would 
be a t l i b e r t y to do so by ( s i c . b u t ? ) the o t h e r p a r t y 
would then be f r e e o f any o b l i g a t i o n and e n t i t l e d to 
r e c o n s i d e r i t s a t t i t u d e towards the I n c e p t i o n o f the 
Fund. 
( i i ) L i m i t a t i o n on s i z e o f American i n i t i a l Committee 
(sic.commitment?) to 3 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s a t most ... 
( i l l ) . , . I t i s e s s e n t i a l f o r s a l e o f i d e a to man i n 
the s t r e e t t h a t t h i s s hould take the form o f a Fund 
i n t o which a l l n a t i o n s are b e i n g r e q u i r e d to pay 
something though amount and n a t u r e o f c o n t r i b u t i o n i s 
tempered t o t h e i r s e v e r a l c a p a c i t i e s . , ( 3 2 ) 
On June 2^ , H a l i f a x f o l l o w e d up h i s p r e v i o u s day's 
t e l e g r a m w i t h a f a i r l y o p t i m i s t i c a p p r a i s a l o f the s i t u a t i o n . 
F o r , a l t h o u g h the Americans had presented a f o r m o f u l t i m a t u m , 
they had s o f t e n e d i t w i t h i n t i m a t i o n s o f concessions and s h i f t s 
o f emphases i n o t h e r areas. Thus the U.S. was prepared to 
g i v e up her l l b e r u r a v e t o , except over the p r i c e o f g o l d and 
quota f i x i n g . They were prepared to commit themselves t o 
m u l t i l a t e r a l c l e a r i n g , though o n l y i n so f a r as t h i s was 
c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a currency becoming scarce and a c o u n t r y b e i n g 
' i n good s t a n d i n g w i t h the Fund'; whatever t h a t meant.1 
H a l i f a x was encouraged by the whole American approach t o 
l i m i t i n g r i g h t s o f recourse to the Fund's c a p i t a l r e s o u r c e s , 
though the p r o v i s i o n s were s t i l l not as c l e a r as they might 
have been. H a l i f a x was c o r r e c t , the Americans had moved towards 
the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n as expressed by the C.U. on some minor 
p o i n t s , but they were h a r d l y s u f f i c i e n t compensation f o r the 
minimum c o n d i t i o n s f o r which t h e y were r e q u e s t i n g B r i t i s h 
acceptance. As i n the A r t i c l e V I I t a l k s , H a l i f a x appears to 
have been eluded by the f i n e r p o i n t s I n v o l v e d . The i s s u e now 
coming to the f o r e f r o n t w i t h thffAmerican i n s i s t e n c e on the 
(32) I b i d . 
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fund n a t u r e o f the i n s t i t u t i o n was t h a t the p r o p o s a l s were 
simply a supplement t o the e x i s t i n g system. T h i s would 
e f f e c t i v e l y m a i n t a i n the o l d g o l d s t a n d a r d i n a s l i g h t l y 
d i s g u i s e d and more f l e x i b l e f o r m , w i t h the g o a l o f m a i n t a i n i n g 
s t a b l e c u r r e n c y r e l a t i o n s to b e n e f i t d o l l a r t r a d e . But t h i s 
would p e r p e t u a t e the b a s i c p o l i t i c a l n a t u r e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
money and the dangers to i t t h e r e f r o m . Thus, a l t h o u g h H a l i f a x 
i n f a c t d e s c r i b e s one o f the dangers o f t h i s i s s u e , he does 
so w i t h o u t any apparent concern over i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the 
U.K. 
"Whole technique o f American p l a n appears based on 
assumption o f f r e e a r b i t r a g e market i n a t any r a t e 
the l e a d i n g c u r r e n c i e s which would be h a b i t u a l l y 
used by c e n t r a l banks as w e l l as o t h e r s and o n l y 
supplement n o t supplanted by Fund," (33) 
I n s h o r t t h e r e were s t i l l a l l the o l d problems o f 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e being conducted v i t h a mixed bag o f 
c u r r e n c i e s . The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e was t h a t the U.S. was 
pr o p o s i n g an organ which would l u b r i c a t e the exchange o f such 
c u r r e n c i e s , and i f necessary impose d i s t r i b u t o r y c o n t r o l s t o 
promote i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a b i l i t y i n the exchange f i e l d . The 
U.S.'s main concession t o c o u n t r i e s l i k e B r i t a i n , who would 
p r o b a b l y s u f f e r an imbalance o f post-war t r a d e , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
w i t h the U.S., had been the scarce currency c l a u s e . I n June, 
White gave t e n t a t i v e agreement to B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l s t o r e g u l a t e 
t r a d e by d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and added ;-
"... t h a t Treasury might a d v i s e i n t h i s sense i f 
c o n s u l t e d on exchange cla u s e o f commercial 
t r e a t i e s , no member o f the S t a t e Department was 
pre s e n t a t t h i s p o i n t . " (3*0 
(33) H a l i f a x to F.u. , June 2k, 19^3, U2o3^A7/70 . 
(3*0 I b i d . 
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As we have seen, Keynes was concerned and somewhat 
pe r p l e x e d over t h i s scarce c u r r e n c y i s s u e , T h i s p e r p l e x i t y 
was not a l l e v i a t e d by the absence o f a S t a t e Department 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a t the time o f White's t e n t a t i v e p r o p o s a l 
r e g a r d i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The Treasury were o b v i o u s l y 
c o n s i d e r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f o f f e r i n g a r i g h t to d i s c r i m i n a t e 
t o the B r i t i s h i n the monetary t a l k s , but t h i s encroached upon 
the a u t h o r i t y o f the State Department, who had c o n t r o l o f 
f o r e i g n t r a d e and commercial p o l i c i e s . The B r i t i s h thought 
t h a t i t would r e s t w i t h the S t a t e Department whether o r n o t a 
go-ahead would be g i v e n f o r the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f p r o v i s i o n s t o 
enable d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t American goods i n the event o f a 
s c a r c i t y o f d o l l a r s . I n view o f the d e l i c a c y o f t h i s , Keynes 
was not v e r y o p t i m i s t i c r e g a r d i n g a s u c c e s s f u l outcome. On the 
o t h e r s i d e o f the A t l a n t i c t h e r e was L i t t l e evidence o f 
H a l i f a x g i v i n g t h i s much t h o u g h t , though he was t r o u b l e d by the 
American p r o p o s a l to a l l o w c r e d i t o r n a t i o n s to buy g o l d as a 
p a r t i a l s o l u t i o n f o r the s c a r c i t y o f i t s own c u r r e n c y . T h i s 
was something which was to concern Keynes as w e l l , l a t e r . 
H a l i f a x had c a u t i o n e d the Americans t h a t the p r e s e n t a t i o n 
o f minimum c o n d i t i o n s might e l i c i t a r e c i p r o c a l response from 
the Treasury e x p e r t s i n London, and indeed a f t e r c a r e f u l 
s c r u t i n y o f the June developments t h i s was e x a c t l y what Keynes 
s e t about d o i n g . Keynes was l e s s than sanguine about the 
r e c e n t developments. The b a s i c n a t u r e o f the C.U, was now 
b e i n g undermined and was i n danger o f b e i n g l o s t e n t i r e l y , 
though he s t i l l h e l d o u t hopes t h a t an e f f e c t i v e r e a r - g u a r d 
a c t i o n c o u l d salvage h i s most b a s i c aims. I n a document 
e n t i t l e d 'The S y n t h e s i s o f C.U. and S , F . h e d r a f t e d o u t a 
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B r i t i s h answer to the American o f f e n s i v e . 
Keynes accepted White's c o n d i t i o n s ; the U.S. f o r m u l a 
f o r v o t i n g , q u o t a s , the s u b s c r i p t i o n p r i n c i p l e , the $W s t e r l i n g 
r a t e and indeed the g e n e r a l shape o f the S.F, However, i n 
r e t u r n , Keynes demanded t h a t f i v e e s s e n t i a l B r i t i s h c o n d i t i o n s 
should be met. 
" 1 , The Fund s h a l l not d e a l i n a mixed bag o f c u r r e n c i e s 
but o n l y i n U n i t a s , h o l d i n g s o f which s h a l l be a c q u i r e d 
by members i n exchange f o r t h e i r s u b s c r i p t i o n s and which 
w i l l n ot be redeemable i n g o l d . 
2 . .. t h e g o l d s u b s c r i p t i o n namely J\2±% o f the quota 
would be a c c e p t a b l e . I f t h i s i s to be m o d i f i e d , i t must 
be i n such a way as not to g i v e the scheme too pronounced 
a g o l d - s t a n d a r d appearance and, more p a r t i c u l a r l y , must 
not unduly q u a l i f y i t s e x p a n s i o n i s t p o s s i b i l i t i e s by 
d r a i n i n g g o l d from c o u n t r i e s whose r e s e r v e s are r e l a t i v e l y 
d e f i c i e n t a l r e a d y . 
3, The balance o f the s u b s c r i p t i o n must be i n the shape 
o f a n o n - n e g o t i a b l e Government s e c u r i t y . 
^. The p r o v i s i o n s f o r e l a s t i c i t y i n changing the v a l u e 
o f a member's currency and f o r p r e s e r v i n g s o v e r e i g n t y i n 
t h i s r e s p e c t s h a l l be r e c o n s i d e r e d , 
5. The g r e a t e s t o b j e c t i o n t o S.F. i n i t s r e v i s e d v e r s i o n 
i s t h a t a c r e d i t o r c o u n t r y can go on a b s o r b i n g g r e a t 
q u a n t i t i e s o f g o l d as h e r e t o f o r e , b e f o r e airy r e a l p r e s s u r e 
i s out upon I t . ...» a c r e d i t o r c o u n t r y could absorb 
36,000[n i n g o l d b e f o r e t h e r e i s any p r e s s u r e on i t , " (36) 
T h i s l a s t p o i n t , as Keynes i n d i c a t e d , l e f t the w o r l d 
l a r g e l y dependent upon some form o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l I nvestment 
Scheme t o r e - d i s t r i b u t e what, i n p r a c t i c a l t e r ms, would be 
scarce d o l l a r s . I t would De too s t r o n g to say the U.S. were 
r e n e g i n g on the scarce c u r r e n c y p o l i c y they had o u t l i n e d t o 
P h i l l i p s i n February, b u t t h e r e was no doubt t h a t i t had been 
m o d i f i e d . Morton Blum i n n i s Diography o f Morgenthau says, f o r 
(35) See J.M.Keynes to G.Jebb, June 29, 19^3-
'The S y n t h e s i s o f the C.U. and the S.F. 
U2939A7/70. 
(36) I b i d . 
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example:-
"The e a r l i e r American p r o p o s a l on "scarce c u r r e n c i e s " 
(was) ... now somewhat m o d i f i e d to England's 
di s a d v a n t a g e ..." (37) 
To safeguard a g a i n s t dangers which I n c r e a s i n g l y appeared 
t o be i n h e r e n t l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the S.F. , Keynes d r a f t e d 
o u t s a f e g u a r d i n g p r o v i s i o n s f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the Tr e a s u r y . 
U n l i k e the C.U. the S.F. made no r e a l a t t e m p t t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s e 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r imbalances o f t r a d e , whether c r e d i t o r 
d e b i t , i n the sense t h a t any Imbalance o f t r a d e was a p o t e n t i a l 
t h r e a t to i n t e r n a t i o n a l e q u i l i b r i u m , and should thus be the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f a l l members to amend. The flummery o f 
u n i t a s under the e x t a n t S.F. d r a f t meant t h a t n a t i o n a l 
c u r r e n c i e s were t o be, as b e f o r e , the means o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r a n s a c t i o n s . T h i s c o u l d e n t a i l pressures t o adopt d e f l a t i o n a r y 
domestic p o l i c i e s as soon as a temporary a e b i t i n the balance 
o f payments arose, unless I n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange c o u l d be 
d e - p o l i t i c i s e d I n some way, and c l e a r p r o v i s i o n s f o r i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l a c t i o n t o sol v e the problem i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the Fund, 
The use o f n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c i e s l a i d the weaker n a t i o n s open to 
p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c p r e s s u r e s , not o n l y f r o m o t h e r n a t i o n s b u t 
a l s o , under the p r e s e n t p r o p o s a l s , from the S.F, i t s e l f by 
i t s c o n t r o l o f the l o c a l c u r r e n c y p r o p o r t i o n o f each c o u n t r y ' s 
quota. F i n a l l y , i f exchange s t a b i l i t y was enforced t o the 
e x t e n t envisaged, then not o n l y d i d the S.F. supply inadequate 
(37) Blum, Op,Cit. p.?1*1*-. See a l s o p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r , 
H a l i f a x t o F.O. February 2*+, 19^3, T e l s . 908 and 909, 
e s p e c i a l l y q u e s t i o n and answer 2. 
(38) See H a r r o d , Op.Cit. p.562. 
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means o f e n f o r c i n g c r e d i t o r r e - a d j u s t m e n t s back to 
e q u i l i b r i u m , but i t a l s o removed a d e b t o r ' s means o f adjustment 
o t h e r than by domestic d e f l a t i o n . To Keynes, and the B r i t i s h 
Trea s u r y , i t seemed incongruous t o place the onus o f a d j u s t -
ment o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s e q u i l i b r i u m on the weaker d e b t o r 
c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y by the most u n s a t i s f a c t o r y p o l i c y o f 
domestic d e f l a t i o n . The p r o p o s a l s Keynes put to the Treasury 
were designed to avoid such a p o s i t i o n , and I n f a c t r e a l i s e the 
f i v e minimum c o n d i t i o n s he bad proposed. 
"kkt l i v e r y member K engages t o c o n v e r t h o l d i n g s o f i t s 
currency b e l o n g i n g to a n o t h e r member N, which a r i s e 
out o f c u r r e n t t r a n s a c t i o n s , i n t o N's c u r r e n c y , u n l e s s 
the two c o n d i t i o n s are b o t h f u l f i l l e d t h a t W i s 
e x e r c i s i n g i t s o p t i o n under A3 not to accept u n i t a s 
( i . e . i f I t s h o l d i n g s o f U n i t a s less the Fund's h o l d i n g 
o f i t s Bond exceeds i t s q u o t a ) and the n e t g o l d h o l d i n g s 
o f M are l e s s than i t s quota. I f both these c o n d i t i o n s 
are f u l f i l l e d , c o u n t r y N s h a l l a c q u i r e from i t s e x p o r t e r s 
t h e i r h o l d i n g s o f M's cu r r e n c y a t the par o f exchange so 
as to m a i n t a i n the p a r i t y , and t h i s c u r r e n c y s h a l l o n l y 
be a v a i l a b l e t o pay f o r purchases o f goods and s e r v i c e s 
from M. ( T h i s i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h A. 5 oelow comes v e r y 
near to s o l v i n g the scarce currency problems.) 
A5« The Fund may a t i t s o p t i o n lend u n i t a s to a member 
or borrow u n i t a s from i t on such terms and c o n d i t i o n s as 
may be m u t u a l l y agreed. 
( T h i s clause i s more i m p o r t a n t than i t l o o k s . For i t 
covers up the whole machinery o f p r e s s u r e by which the 
Fund can make m i t i g a t i o n s to the problems b o t h o f excess-
d e b t o r s and o f excess c r e d i t o r s c o n d i t i o n a l on the a c c e p t -
ance o f I t s recommendations)." (39) 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r the B r i t i s h , the d e s i r e to reach an 
agreement w i t h the U.S. over the form o f the S.F. led them t o 
compromise a key p r i n c i p l e . Keynes i n p a r t i c u l a r had always 
f a v o u r e d a " p a s s i v e " i n s t i t u t i o n , but here because o f the 
dangers he envisaged from the post-war U.S. c r e d i t o r p o s i t i o n , 
(39) J.M.Keynes to G.Jebb, June 29,19^3, 
U2939A7/70. 
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he was f o r c e d t o r e s o r t to p r o p o s i n g d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers, 
and thus an " a c t i v e " p o t e n t i a l f o r the Fund. T h i s was to make 
i t more d i f f i c u l t t o press f o r p a s s i v i t y as a p o i n t o f 
p r i n c i p l e l a t e r . S t i l L to c o n t i n u e w i t h Keyne 1s p r o p o s a l s . 
"B9. The Fund may a t i t s o p t i o n pay o f f any p a r t o f 
a member's h o l d i n g o f u n i t a s i n excess o f i t s quota 
e i t h e r i n g o l d o r i n t h e Government s e c u r i t y o r i g i n a l l y 
s u b s c r i b e d by t h a t member. 
( I t i s o f v i t a l importance t h a t a c t i o n under 39 should 
be a t the o p t i o n o f the Fund. This goes a l i t t l e way 
to meet our e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n V. The Fund might make 
the handing over o f i t s g o l d t o an excess c r e d i t o r 
c o n d i t i o n a l on t h a t member's t a k i n g steps t o r i g h t i t s 
p o s i t i o n . I f the Fund r e t a i n s i t s g o l d , t h i s remains as 
s e c u r i t y f o r a l l net h o l d e r s o f u n i t a s and i s not 
s a c r i f i c e d i n the i n t e r e s t s o f the l e a s t d e s e r v i n g , 
namely the excess net h o l d e r ) . " C+0) 
On the a l t e r n a t e s i d e o f the c o i n , t o l e s s e n d e b t o r 
l i a b i l i t y problems, Keynes suggested a u n i l a t e r a l r i g h t to 
a l t e r the exchange r o l e by 10%, a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Fund, 
p r o v i d i n g the member's p r o p o r t i o n o f u n i t a s to quota h o l d i n g s 
r e f l e c t e d balance o f payment problems. 
While t he B r i t i s h T reasury and the F.G. were sorting o u t 
B r i t i s h minimum c o n d i t i o n s and means o f s a f e g u a r d i n g them, the 
U.S. Treasury I n t e r - D e p a r t m e n t a l Committee was busy r e - d r a f t i n g 
the S.F., l a r g e l y on l i n e s i n d i c a t e d d u r i n g t h e June t a l k s . 
At the same time t he Treasury was a l s o w o r k i n g to e s t a b l i s h 
t h e i r unquestioned supremacy over o t h e r departments i n the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary f i e l d . The S t a t e Department was the 
main t h o r n h e r e . H u l l ' s d e p a r t ^ e n t was more f a v o u r a b l y d i s p o s e d 
t h a n the Treasury toward some o f B r i t a i n ' s monetary problems, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y r e g a r d i n g the l e v e l o f B r i t a i n ' s r e s e r v e s . On the 
o t h e r hand, as we have a l r e a d y surmised, they were l e s s keen 
on the scarce c u r r e n c y p r o v i s i o n s . I n e a r l y J u l y Morgenthau 
(1+0) I b i d . 
complained s t r o n g l y t o H u l l over p r o c e d u r a l d i f f i c u l t i e s b e i n g 
caused by A.A.Berle and asked him to s p e c i f i c a l l y approve 
T r e a s u r y l e a d e r s h i p i n any f u r t h e r monetary t a l k s . D e s p i t e 
o u t s t a n d i n g d i f f e r e n c e s between the two depar t m e n t s , both over 
i s s u e s and between p e r s o n a l i t i e s , H u l l had t o agree. The o n l y 
a l t e r n a t i v e would have been a p o l i t i c a l row o f un p l e a s a n t 
p r o p o r t i o n s . H u l l s a i d t h a t I t was a b s o l u t e l y h i s d e s i r e t h a t 
t h e Treasury should be I n charge. S h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s B e r l e ' s 
p r o c e d u r a l p r o p o s a l s were withdrawn. The Treasury l e a d e r -
s h i p a l r e a d y i m p l i c i t was now r e a f f i r m e d and consequently t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f a more f a v o u r a b l e scarce c u r r e n c y clause b e i n g 
adopted, i n c r e a s e d . 
The Americans soon produced the new d r a f t o f the S.F. 
which was t o p r o v i d e the b a s i s f o r new t a l k s . J U n f o r t u n a t e l y , 
f o r the B r i t i s h , l i t t l e d e ference had been g i v e n to t h e i r v i e w s , 
and on J u l y 19> a f t e r Keynes had c a r e f u l l y s t u d i e d the r e - d r a f t 
he w r o t e : -
" I n my judgement we must be prepared t o fa c e a complete 
breakdown u n l e s s i m p o r t a n t changes are made." (^3) 
T h i s r a t h e r d r a m a t i c statement was not a r e f l e c t i o n o f a 
sudden change o f a t t i t u d e s by Keynes, but more an e x p r e s s i o n o f 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t those ' i m p o r t a n t changes 1 should and must be 
made. Keynes r e i t e r a t e d the a c c e p t a b l e p o i n t s , as; i n h i s l e t t e r 
( L.L ) 
t o Jebb o f June 29^ i n c l u d i n g White's minimum c o n d i t i o n s , 
(*M) See Blum, Op.Cit. pp.2^1-2^2. 
(t+2) Revised D r a f t o f S.F. J u l y 10,19^3, U^193/^7/?0. 
(V3) Keynes t o Eady, copies t o R.Hopkins, F . P h i l l i p s , Waley, 
Cato, P l a y f a i r and Padmore, J u l y 19, 19^3, U2939A7/70. 
(M+) See above. 
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but he then went on to enumerate t he e n t i r e l y u n a c c e p t a b l e 
f e a t u r e s o f the new d r a f t o f the S.F. There were now s i x 
d e f i n e a b l e areas o f concern, though perhaps r a t h e r a r t i f i c i a l l y 
c i r c u m s c r i b e d . 
A) The p o s i t i o n o f go l d and the s i z e o f the Fund. These 
were b o t h s t r o n g d e t e r m i n a n t s o f whether the Fund would be 
a c o n s e r v a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n , r e s t r a i n i n g moderate economic 
growth p o l i c i e s o r n o t . 
B) C r e d i t o r l i a b i l i t y and the scarce c u r r e n c y clause. 
C) Debtor l i a b i l i t y and exchange r a t e a l t e r a t i o n s . 
D) The a c t i v e and d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers o f the Fund. 
E) The I n f l e x i b i l i t y o f the Fund i n the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d 
and t h e p a u c i t y o f commercial and t r a d e p o l i c y p l a n n i n g t o 
put the S.F. i n a s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n t e x t . 
F) A growing concern, though s t i l l p e r i p h e r a l I n J u l y , w i t h 
the accumulated s t e r l i n g balances. 
O r i g i n a l l y t h e r e had been d e t a i l e d p r o v i s i o n s i n the S.F. 
to d e a l w i t h accumulated balances. However, t h e i r enormous 
s i z e and expected C o n g r e s s i o n a l o p p o s i t i o n t o trie U.S. under-
w r i t i n g t h e i r l i q u i d a t i o n , a l b e i t under the a u s p i c i e s o f an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n , had rendered the p l a n l e s s 
p a l a t a b l e by 19^3, though i t was s t i l l mentioned i n the J u l y 
d r a f t . O p p o s i t i o n to such p r o v i s i o n s a l s o came from the 
I n f l u e n t i a l American Bankers' A s s o c i a t i o n . On June 28, 
Mr. Burgess o f N a t i o n a l C i t y Bank s a i d he thought i t would be 
unwise f o r the S.F. to concern i t s e l f w i t h such balances and 
added on b e h a l f o f the Banker's A s s o c i a t i o n t h a t they d i d n ot 
want t h e U.S. to lose one i o t a o f i t s n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y 
over the d o l l a r . J 
(1*5) Memo, Opie to Jebb, June 29,19^3, 
U3030A7/70 . 
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Such views i n f g c t began to appeal to the B r i t i s h who were 
somewhat on the d e f e n s i v e i n the economic f i e l d because o f 
s u s p i c i o n and apprehensions c o n c e r n i n g American p o l i c y . Perhaps 
a f t e r a l l , i n s p i t e o f the enormous d e b t s , S t e r l i n g Area 
problems should remain the e x c l u s i v e preserve o f the s t e r l i n g 
members. We s h a l l see more d e t a i l e d reasons why l a t e r , though 
fro m now on one may n o t i c e the i n c r e a s e d r e f e r e n c e s t o the views 
o f the Bank o f England and the i d e a o f r e s u r r e c t i n g , i n some 
f o r m , a v i a b l e post-war s t e r l i n g a s s o c i a t i o n , a f t e r i t s v i r t u a l 
abandonment i n the S p r i n g o f 19^+2. S t i l l , l e t us t u r n t o the 
more Immediate r e a c t i o n o f Keynes t o the J u l y d r a f t and h i s 
c r i t i c i s m s o f i t . 
Keynes thought the B r i t i s h should concern themselves w i t h 
a c q u i r i n g a f i v e year t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d a t l e a s t , and even t h e n 
he was unsure i f t h i s would make the S.F. a c c e p t a b l e to 
P a r l i a m e n t . The p o s i t i o n o f g o l d was a l s o w o r r y i n g as i t 
a c q u i r e d more and more the appearance o f a go l d s t a n d a r d . The 
p r o v i s i o n s f o r scarce c u r r e n c y s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t c r e d i t o r 
c o u n t r i e s were s t i l l inadequate and f i n a l l y , and what now appears 
to have caused Keynes the most concern, was the a c t i v e n a t u r e o f 
the Fund and the d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers a t t a c h e d to i t by the U.S. 
the Fund would possess a mixed bag o f c u r r e n c i e s 
i n which i t would d e a l a t i t s d i s c r e t i o n . I t i s t r u e 
t h a t i t would o n l y d e a l w i t h C e n t r a l Banks and not w i t h 
the p u b l i c . But I t would e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n whether 
o r not t o accept o r supply p a r t i c u l a r c u r r e n c i e s . I t 
would purchase o n l y those c u r r e n c i e s which i t d e cided 
(on no c l e a r c r i t e r i o n ) t o be " I n good s t a n d i n g " and 
( a l s o on no c l e a r c r i t e r i o n ) the sc a l e o f which " i s 
r e q u i r e d to meet an adverse balance o f payments p r e -
d o m i n a n t l y on c u r r e n t account; 1 1 and i t would r a t i o n 
scarce c u r r e n c i e s . Moreover I t would not assure m u l t i -
l a t e r a l c l e a r i n g , s i n c e i t would not und e r t a k e to buy 
any f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y and supply any o t h e r needed c u r r e n c y 
i n exchange. 
r/7 
The Bank o f England m a i n t a i n , and w i t h reason, 
t h a t such a system c o u l d be so worked as s e r i o u s l y t o 
j e o p a r d i s e the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n o f s t e r l i n g . 
There seems to be no s e r i o u s argument on the o t h e r s i d e 
why the Americans should d e c l i n e t h i s v e r y g r e a t 
t e c h n i c a l s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . More t u r n s on t h i s t h a n 
appears on the s u r f a c e , s i n c e o t h e r w i s e , t h e r e are no 
c l e a r l i m i t s t o the a c t i v e banking f u n c t i o n s which the 
Fund might assume and i t s power to e x e r c i s e a d i s c r i m -
i n a t o r y d i s c r e t i o n a g a i n s t c e r t a i n c o u n t r i e s . " (^6) 
Keynes' s o l u t i o n t o t h i s was to expand the r o l e o f u n i t a s , some 
o f the ideas c o n c e r n i n g which have a l r e a d y been looked a t i n 
some d e t a i l when r e v i e w i n g Keynes' a p p r e c i a t i o n o f American and 
B r i t i s h minimum c o n d i t i o n s . ' 3 a s i c a l l y , the expansion o f 
the r o l e o f u n i t a s was to cloak the S.F. w i t h some o f the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f bancor, more p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s n e u t r a l ones, 
thus a l l o w i n g t r a n s a c t i o n s which would a v o i d the dangers o f 
a c t i v e and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y m a n i p u l a t i o n s o f n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c i e s . 
By J u l y the i n f o r m a l t a l k s had r e a l l y p r o g r e ssed as f a r as 
they could w i t h o u t a f a c e t o face meeting o f the two a r c h i t e c t s 
o f the monetary p l a n s , Keynes and White. However, the Americans 
had been apprehensive o f press leaks d u r i n g the t a l k s , which had 
been c a r r i e d o u t w i t h the utmost d i s c r e t i o n . A l l the B r i t i s h 
n e g o t i a t o r s were o f f i c i a l l y i n the U.S. on o t h e r b u s i n e s s , b u t 
i t was now obvious t h a t something more concrete would have t o 
be arranged. The B r i t i s h , however, s o f t - p e d a l l e d f o r a w h i l e . 
They were uneasy w i t h the absence o f progress i n o t h e r economic 
f i e l d s when t h e r e was a danger o f the monetary plans d e v e l o p i n g 
r a p i d l y . T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y so i n r e g a r d t o some o f the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s the monetary t a l k s might have i n the commercial f i e l d . 
(U-6) I b i d 
(^7) See 'The S y n t h e s i s o f C.U. and S.F.* i n Keynes to J ebb, 
June 19, 19^3, U293 l+A7/70: d i s c u s s e d above. 
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F o r t u n a t e l y f o r the 3 r i t i s h the p r o p o s a l o f a v i s i t by Keynes 
to the U.S. caused a c o n s i d e r a o l e amount o f press c r i t i c i s m i n 
America c o n c e r n i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r , d e f i c i t spending. A l t h o u g h 
i n p e r s p e c t i v e t h i s was r e a l l y a minor p o l i t i c a l i s s u e , i t was 
thought best t o postpone Keynes 1 v i s i t f o r a w h i l e . T h i s , and 
the u n t i m e l y d e p a r t u r e o f P h i l l i p s from the scene presen t e d the 
B r i t i s h w i t h the I d e a l excuses t o d a l l y f o r a w h i l e and o r g a n i s e 
on a f o o t i n g which would a l l o w economic n e g o t i a t i o n s t o proceed 
(W8) 
on a wider spectrum. I n f a c t , the U.S. i n i t s t u r n was to 
ask f o r a week's d e l a y i n the d e p a r t u r e o f the B r i t i s h n e g o t i a t o r s 
but t h i s proved i m p o s s i b l e because o f the c o m p l e x i t y o f r e -
o r g a n i s i n g the t r a v e l schedule i n such d i f f i c u l t t i m e s . Consequen 
on September 3 , the B r i t i s h m i s s i o n led by R i c h a r d Law l e f t f o r 
( l+Q ) 
Washington, 
B e f o r e the d e l e g a t i o n d e p a r t e d on September 3, the War 
Cabinet d i s c u s s e d the problems which would a r i s e i n the coming 
t a l k s . On August 10, 19^3> Keynes had w r i t t e n to White s u b s t a n t -
i a l l y a c c e p t i n g the U.S.'s minimum c o n d i t i o n s , but a t the same 
t i m e , i n s i s t i n g t h a t t h e r e would have t o be m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f 
o t h e r p a r t s o f the Fund t o make I t a c c e p t a b l e t o the 3 r i t i s h . 
The Cabinet was thus concerned w i t h what m o d i f i c a t i o n s could be 
(51 ) 
e f f e c t e d t o p r o t e c t B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . J 
(*+8) See WF( l+3)329» Memo by f o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , 
C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer and P r e s i d e n t o f the Board 
o f Trade, J u l y 22, 19^3, U3116/251/70. 
(^9) The o t h e r members o f the team I n c l u d e d , Keynes, Waley, Lee 
L-iesching, Shackle, Meade, Ronald, Clauson, K.W.Martin, 
Robbins, B a s t o r ; and Opie and Robertson from the 
Washington Embassy. 
(50) See Young, J.P. , D.O.S.B. November 1950, 'Developing Plans 
f o r an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund and a World Bank, p.782. 
(51) See e x t r a c t from War Cabinet C o n c l u s i o n s , September 2 , 19^3) 
U^ 2 2 l / 2 5 l / 7 0 . 
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The Cabinet agreed w i t h Keynes on the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f 
r e s t r i c t i n g the Fund's t r a n s a c t i o n s to u n i t a s and to d i s a l l o w 
those i n gold and c u r r e n c i e s . The P r e s i d e n t o f the Board o f Trade, 
D a l t o n , and B e v i n the M i n i s t e r f o r Labour and N a t i o n a l S e r v i c e i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , b o t h s t r o n g l y f a v o u r e d t h i s . The C h a n c e l l o r assured 
them t h f l t he had g i v e n a d i r e c t i v e on such l i n e s t o the B r i t i s h 
d e l e g a t i o n , and a l s o t h a t g o l d s u b s c r i p t i o n s to the Fund should 
not exceed 12-£$ o f a member's quota. On the q u e s t i o n o f exchange 
r a t e a l t e r a t i o n s , D a l t o n f a v o u r e d a stance o f s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n 
to the maintainance o f r i g i d exchange r a t e s , and a g a i n the 
C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer agreed, but he suggested an o b j e c t i v e 
c r i t e r i o n f o r a l t e r a t i o n s should be looked on f a v o u r a b l y . He 
was s t r o n g l y opposed t o a loss o f s o v e r e i g n c o n t r o l over exchange 
r a t e s , b u t i t was an extremely d e l i c a t e issue and a c c o r d i n g l y he 
had g i v e n the d e l e g a t i o n a l a r g e l y d i s c r e t i o n a r y b r i e f on t h i s 
p o i n t . 
I n f a c t , b o t h s i d e s were aware t h a t major mutual concessions 
were necessary. The impasse o f the p o s i t i o n s reached I n J u l y had 
to be r e s o l v e d . As we have seen, t h e r e was a r e l u c t a n t w i l l i n g -
ness on the B r i t i s h s i d e to make a nunber o f major concessions t o 
the U.S., p a r t i c u l a r l y on the s u b s c r i p t i o n i s s u e . I n r e t u r n , 
they expected concessions from the U.S. which would patch up the 
S.F. i n such a way as to p r o v i d e some o f the remedies f o r 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary problems accorded under the C.U. I t was 
s t i l l even hoped t h a t the 'basic' n a t u r e o f the C.U. could be 
ma i n t a i n e d i f adequate concessions were won. On the American 
s i d e they were w e l l aware t h a t they too would have to modify t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n to make the S.F. a c c e p t a b l e t o the U.K. government, 
P a r l i a m e n t and p u b l i c . S h o r t l y b e f o r e the Autumn t a l k s , 
Hi. F. Penrose, economic .adviser t o Ambassador Winant i n London, 
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wrote a l e n g t h y a p p r a i s a l o f the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n f or Wh 11e and 
the S t a t e Department. Penrose warned them t h a t untrammelled 
l a i s s e r f a i r e and i t s concomitant the gold s t a n d a r d , were not 
looked on f a v o u r a b l y a t a l l i n London, and i f pushed too f a r , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the d i r e c t i o n r e c e n t l y proposed by the F.R.B., 
then t h e r e could be v e r y s e r i o u s problems. Penrose c o n t i n u e d 
w i t h an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f d i f f i c u l t i e s p e r t i n e n t to the s i t u a t i o n 
o f the U.K. and which I n f a c t a n t i c i p a t e d l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n s on 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . 
" I n p r a c t i c e i t may not be easy to c o n t r o l exchanges 
and r e g u l a t e c a p i t a l movements w i t h o u t I n any way 
causing h i n d r a n c e s or d e l a y s to bona f i d e c u r r e n t 
t r a n s a c t i o n s and c a p i t a l movements t h a t lead to i n c r e a s e d 
t o t a l p r o d u c t i v i t y . But experience not o n l y w i t h the 
B r i t i s h b u t a l s o w i t h the European A l l i e d governments i n 
London leads to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t these d i f f i c u l t i e s 
w i l l have to be faced and overcome and i t w i l l n o t , a t 
l e a s t f o r s e v e r a l years a f t e r the war, be p r a c t i c a b l e 
I n B r i t a i n o r on the European c o n t i n e n t to r e t r e a t i n t o 
a p o s i t i o n i n which t h e r e i s no c o n t r o l over exchanges 
except t h a t which i s e x e r c i s e d by an exchange s t a b i l i s a t i o n 
or " e q u a l i s a t i o n " f u n d , the m a n i p u l a t i o n o f money r a t e s 
and open market o p e r a t i o n s . " (52) 
Thus, t h e r e was a g e n e r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the r e s p e c t i v e 
d i f f i c u l t i e s o f the two s i d e s as the Law M i s s i o n a r r i v e d i n 
Washington. Though, o f course, the d e t a i l s s t i l l had to be 
t h r a s h e d o u t . I n an e f f o r t t o c l a r i f y the d e t a i l s o f the monetary 
t a l k s , I t was decided t h a t a p r i v a t e meeting between Keynes and 
White would be o f b e n e f i t b e f o r e the n e g o t i a t i o n s r e a l l y got 
underway. T h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n took place on September 1^-, the 
r e s u l t s o f which Keynes d u l y informed the T r e a s u r y . White 
appeared q u i t e agreeable to e n l a r g i n g the Fund somewhat, as long 
as the U.S. c o n t r i b u t i o n d i d not exceed #3B. Keynes i n d i c a t e d 
t h a t t h i s would q u i t e c o n c e i v a b l y h a s t e n the day o f d o l l a r s c a r c i t y . 
(52) Quoted i n Penrose, Op.Cit. pp. 53"5 l + . 
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"He brushed scarce currency d i f f i c u l t y on one s i d e w i t h 
argument t h a t i f the U n i t e d S t a t e s appears t o be 
r e a c h i n g i t s c e i l i n g i t i s a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n t h a t thev 
would i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s i n c r e a s e i t . " (53) 
On t h i s o c c a s i o n , i n f a c t , White was u n c a n n i l y a c c u r a t e i n 
h i s p r e d i c t i o n . The scarce d o l l a r problem was a m e l i o r a t e d 
e v e n t u a l l y by p o s i t i v e U.S. a c t i o n , though uot w i t h the Fund 
mechanisms, nor p r i m a r i l y on economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , but 
t h r o u g h M a r s h a l l A i d . S t i l l , i n 19^3 such a c a v a l i e r a t t i t u d e , 
and such b a l d a s s e r t i o n s r e g a r d i n g f u t u r e American p o l i c y , d i d 
l i t t l e to assure the B r i t i s h , They wanted more c o n c r e t e 
p r o p o s a l s . The B r i t i s h acceptance o f a reduced s i z e f o r the 
S,F. c o n f e r r e d more Importance on the scarce c u r r e n c y clause 
and on automatic access t o the resources o f the Fund, which was 
something they were soon to press s t r o n g l y f o r . However, a t t h i s 
s t a g e , r a t h e r t h a n a t t e m p t i n g to get the U.S. to accept p o s i t i v e 
o b l i g a t i o n s such as those envisaged by the U.K. f o r p r o s p e c t i v e 
c r e d i t o r n a t i o n s , Keynes was more concerned to modify the 
i n f l e x i b i l i t y o f exchange r a t e f i x i n g s . I n h i s t a l k w i t h White, 
Keynes broached t h i s s u b j e c t and suggested the e s t a b l i s h m e n t 
o f o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a under which exchange r a t e a l t e r a t i o n s 
c o u l d be e f f e c t e d . T h i s was not an i s o l a t e d i s s u e . I t a f f e c t e d 
b o t h the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d and t h e gold standard appearance o f 
the Fund. Keynes hoped t h a t more f l e x i b l e exchange r a t e f i x i n g 
would undermine t h i s appearance and weaken the t i e o f c u r r e n c i e s 
t o g o l d v i a the d o l l a r . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , White*s r e a c t i o n to t h i s 
s u g g e s t i o n was not e n t h u s i a s t i c and Keynes, n o t w i s h i n g to f o r c e 
the i s s u e a t t h i s s t a g e , moved on t o d i s c u s s b r i e f l y the 
(53) Keynes to T r e a s u r y , September 19^3) 
U^ 3 55A7/70. 
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d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers o f the Fund and the t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d . 
On t h i s l a t t e r p o i n t White expressed a view which, a g a i n , seemed 
r a t h e r i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the l i n e adopted by the S t a t e Department 
i n t he t a l k s to e s t a b l i s h t he Mutual A i d Agreement. Concerning 
the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d White s a i d : -
" I n our own case, we should be f r e e , he s a i d , under h i s 
p r o p o s a l s , to m a i n t a i n our e x i s t i n g system o f s t e r l i n g 
area arrangements and s p e c i a l accounts f o r a p e r i o d to 
which no d e f i n i t e term was s e t . We should not be r e q u i r e d 
to d i s c u s s them u n t i l we f e l t s t r o n g enough to do w i t h o u t 
them." (5*0 
I t was a l l v e r y w e l l f o r White to g l i b l y say t h i s but the 
B r i t i s h c ould not i g n o r e t h e i r commitment under A r t i c l e V I I o f 
the Mutual A i d Agreement t o work w i t h the Americans towards the 
e l i m i n a t i o n o f d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r a c t i c e s . Keynes d i d emphasise 
i n h i s l e t t e r t o the Treasury t h a t White had been e x p r e s s i n g 
p e r s o n a l and n o t o f f i c i a l v i e w s , b u t , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e was 
l i t t l e doubt t h a t the t a l k w i t h White had added u n c e r t a i n t y t o 
some i s s u e s r a t h e r t h an c l a r i t y . F i n a l l y , the problem o f s t e r l i n g 
b alances was touched on. T h i s was to become o f i n c r e a s i n g 
concern as the p r o s p e c t s o f t r a d e l i b e r a l i s a t i o n , i n a manner 
s a t i s f a c t o r y t o the B r i t i s h d i m i n i s h e d and the adjustment 
p r o v i s i o n s f o r the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d appeared more and more 
inadeq u a t e . 
"On abnormal balances I t o l d him t h a t we were anxious t o 
p l a y t h i s down f o r the time b e i n g and to d e f e r f o r p r e s e n t 
any s e r i o u s d i s c u s s i o n o f i t . I p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i t might 
be b e t t e r to c l e a r up war balances by our own methods as 
f u l l y as p o s s i b l e , and t h i s might not be f a c i l i t a t e d i f our 
c r e d i t o r s f e l t t h a t t h e r e was another easy way o u t . He 
r e a d i l y a p p r e c i a t e d our p o i n t o f view and agreed t h a t clauses 
about abnormal balances be d e f e r r e d u n t i l we f e l t ready t o 
r a i s e them." (55) 
(5^) I b i d 
(55) I b i d 
133 
D u r i n g t he days f o l l o w i n g t h e meeting between White and 
Keynes, the i s s u e which c o n t i n u e d t o a t t r a c t B r i t i s h a t t e n t i o n 
was t h a t o f exchange r a t e a l t e r a t i o n s . This caused the T r e a s u r y 
i n London p a r t i c u l a r concern, b u t w i t h the knowledge o f the 
d e l i c a c y and importance o f the m a t t e r , hard and f a s t i n s t r u c t i o n s 
were not i s s u e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , on September 22, the Trea s u r y 
made i t c l e a r t h a t they were d i s a p p o i n t e d w i t h the low key 
r e a c t i o n o f the U.S. t o the B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l f o r o b j e c t i v e 
c r i t e r i o n by which a l t e r a t i o n s c o u l d be made. As noted above, n o t 
o n l y was the d i r e c t problem o f i n f l e x i b i l i t y i n v o l v e d b ut a l s o 
the g o l d s t a n d a r d c h a r a c t e r o f the 
(56) See Treasury t o Keynes, September 22, 19*+3, 
1^221/251/70. 
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These p o i n t s were r e a l l y c r u c i a l , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the 
t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d , where the p o s i t i o n was i n d e t e r m i n a b l e . Not 
o n l y were the exchange a l t e r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s deemed i n a d e q u a t e , 
b u t the procedures were a l s o regarded a p p r e h e n s i v e l y . 
A weakened c u r r e n c y might be exposed t o acute s p e c u l a t i o n d u r i n g 
the c o n s u l t a t i v e process, and the B r i t i s h T reasury wished t o 
av o i d this.'57) 
(57) W i t h r e g a r d t o pressure from London f o r l i b e r a l p r o v i s i o n s 
f o r exchange r a t e a l t e r a t i o n s , R.F.Harrod i n 'The P r o f . , 
A P e r s o n a l Memoir o f Lord C h e r w e l l 1 , M a c m i l l a n , London 
1959) s t a t e s t h a t i n September 19^3) w h i l e he was a d v i s i n g 
C h e r w e l l on the White-Keynes monetary t a l k s , an 
I n c o m p l e t e l y a u t h o r i s e d t e l e g r a m was sent t o Washington, 
He does not s p e c i f y the d a t e b u t i t would appear to be 
'Treasury t o Keynes', September 22, 19^3, UM-221/251/70. 
He d e s c r i b e s t h i s , as "... mischievous ana l i k e l y t o 
sabotage Keynes 1 n e g o t i a t i o n . D r a f t e d under a temporary 
s h i f t o f emphasis i n W h i t e h a l l i t r e q u i r e d Keynes t o i n s i s t 
on more l i b e r t y f o r each n a t i o n t o change the v a l u e o f i t s 
currency t h a n he had h i m s e l f proposed i n h i s o r i g i n a l p l a n 
f o r a ' C l e a r i n g Union'. For t h i s t e l e g r a m the P r o f ' s , 
assent was r e q u i r e d b u t had been m i s t a k e n l y t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d , 
s i n c e he was a t a meeting", p.p. 236-237, 
Harrod o m i t s t o p o i n t o u t t h a t the p r o v i s i o n s envisaged under 
the C.U. had o f course now been changed, and adjustment 
p r e s s u r e on c r e d i t o r c o u n t r i e s had not been f i n a l i s e d which 
a l t e r e d the s i t u a t i o n and made l i b e r a l a l t e r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s 
more necessary f o r the U.K. However, as we s h a l l see, t h e r e 
was some u n f a v o u r a b l e r e a c t i o n t o t h i s t e l e g r a m by Keynes 
and Waley, though one suspects t h i s was n o t q u i t e the problem 
Harrod makes i t o u t to be. I n f a c t , a l t h o u g h he says r , I 
b e l i e v e the m a t t e r was put r i g h t i n the end", the Cabinet 
pressed f o r more f l e x i b l e p r o v i s i o n s p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r the 
t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . 
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The B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n Washington were r a t h e r 
concerned t h a t the Treasury was p r e s s i n g f a r too much here. 
The problem was t o balance exchange s t a b i l i t y w i t h freedom to 
a d j u s t o u t o f fundamental d i s e q u i l i b r i u m . I n f a c t , as Waley 
i n d i c a t e d i n a l e t t e r o f r e p l y , September 23, 19^3, a l e t t e r 
which was r a t i f i e d by Keynes, the p o s i t i o n was b e g i n n i n g t o 
look q u i t e f a v o u r a b l e , b o t h i n the monetary and the commercial 
t a l k s . I t was thus u n d e s i r a b l e t o j e o p a r d i s e A r t i c l e V I I t a l k s 
as a whole, by no t b e i n g too f o r t h c o m i n g i n the monetary 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n p a r t i c u l a r Waley suggested t h a t the T r e a s u r y 
had u n d e r - e s t i m a t e d the dangers o f d e p r e c i a t i o n by o t h e r 
c o u n t r i e s , f o r inadequate reasons, i f s u f f i c i e n t l y c o n c r e t e 
c r i t e r i a and a c e r t a i n amount o f i n f l e x i b i l i t y was not b u i l t 
i n t o the agreement. ^ Whereas B r i t a i n , because o f her c l o s e 
a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the U.S. and her eminent p o s i t i o n i n i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l monetary and f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s , may f i n d t h a t 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o t h e r than the I.M.F. would i n h i b i t her from 
d e p r e c i a t i n g as r e a d i l y as o t h e r c o u n t r i e s might. 
"Taking a s e v e r e l y p r a c t i c a l p o i n t o f view our p r o p o s a l s 
g i v e us c o m p l e t e l y f r e e hand t o d e p r e c i a t e t o the e x t e n t 
o f 10/5 and anot h e r 10% w i t h o u t the n e c e s s i t y o f s e c u r i n g 
committee's a p p r o v a l . W h i l s t l a y i n g down s a t i s f a c t o r y 
r u l e s on circumstances i n which c o u n t r i e s should o r should 
not be a l l o w e d t o d e p r e c i a t e f u r t h e r . " (59) 
T h i s p o s i t i o n should not be misunderstood, Keynes was 
p r e s s i n g f o r a r e l a x a t i o n o f the i n f l e x i b i l i t y o f American 
p r o p o s a l s on exchange r a t e a l t e r a t i o n s , b u t he was al s o aware 
o f the f i n e balance t h a t was r e q u i r e d h e r e . I n l a t e September 
he had persuaded White t o concede a u n i l a t e r a l r i g h t to w i t h -
draw from the Fund. I n t h i s , he had been aided by White's numbe 
(58) See Waley t o F.O., September 23, 19^3-, U*+221/25t/70. 
(59) I b i d . 
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one t e c h n i c a l a d v i s e r , E. M. B e r n s t e i n , who had pointed out that 
i f White did not allow such a r i g h t , the U.S. could have trouble 
with Congress. This emphasised the image of a f r e e 
a s s o c i a t i o n of nations and undermined the more s t r i n g e n t 
c r i t i c i s m s that the U.S. vas imposing a r i g i d gold t i e d d o l l a r 
upon the r e s t of the members. I t was a s i g n i f i c a n t move toward 
the type of f l e x i b i l i t y Keynes wanted for the Fund. Nevertheless, 
the B r i t i s h Cabinet were s t i l l uneasy over the p o s i t i o n of 
exchange r a t e s and passed on to Keynes i n the form of a Cabinet 
Paper the government's views. 
The Cabinet agreed with Waley that an untrammelled u n i l a t e r a l 
r i g h t to devalue should be avoided because of the obvious 
dangers of competitive devaluation. They agreed on the a t t r a c t i o n 
of o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a but had some queries regarding the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the r u l e s and procedure f o r exchange 
a l t e r a t i o n s and whether there should be such a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n 
i n the t r a n s i t i o n period. The point was, that the Cabinet 
wanted to secure sovereign a u t h o r i t y to e x p e d i t i o u s l y a l t e r 
exchange r a t e s , i f necessary, i n the t r a n s i t i o n period. To make 
t h i s p o s s i b l e , the suggestion, i n e f f e c t , was that the ' r u l e s ' 
to be complied with f o r exchange a l t e r a t i o n s should c o n s i s t 
simply of a c o n s u l t a t i v e procedure. To emphasise the apprehension 
over t h i s the Cabinet addedi-
"We think i t q u i t e premature to estimate now whether 
permissable range of 10# w i l l meet i n e v i t a b l e a d j u s t -
ments of experimental r a t e s . " (62) 
(60) See Harrod, Op.Clt. p.565. 
(61) See WP(1^3)lf28 which was drawn up by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer. John Anderson, October 2 , 19^3, UM?86/25l/70, 
communicated to Washington, F.O. to Washington, Tel.No,6702, 
October 5 , 19^3» U W 6 2 / 2 5 1 / 7 0 . 
(62) I b i d , 
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Even i f such a f i g u r e were i n s e r t e d i t would have to be 
s u b j e c t to q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , though hopefully q u a l i f i c a t i o n s which 
would not be voted on by the management board. The Cabinet 
requested Keynes et a l to urge on the Americans s t a b i l i s a t i o n i n 
the form of: 
1. D e f i n i t e agreement to accept the S.F, as the b a s i s of 
economic r e l a t i o n s . 
2. Exchange a l t e r a t i o n s should be i n accordance with o b j e c t i v e 
c r i t e r i a . 
3* The S.F. should become o p e r a t i o n a l as soon as p o s s i b l e . 
"There should be agreement i n the instrument that no 
adjustment of exchange r a t e s s h a l l be made except 
a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n with the Board though not s u b j e c t 
to the Board's approval*" 
5. A f i v e year t r a n s i t i o n a l period, or l e s s i f members agree, 
then r u l e s should be e s t a b l i s h e d f or f u r t h e r exchange 
adjustments. (63) 
Thus, i n general, the Cabinet was i n agreement with the 
negotiators i n Washington, apart from two points* the f i r s t 
was a d e s i r e f or more complete sovereign c o n t r o l over exchange 
r a t e a l t e r a t i o n s and the second point of concern was t h a t i -
"... the M i n i s t e r s do not b e l i e v e that the proposals 
are r e a l l y adequate for the immediate post-war period, 
say about 3 years from the inauguration f o r the 
currency o r g a n i s a t i o n . " (6*0 
They suggested that Keynes and Waley should attempt to 
c l a r i f y f u r t h e r such points. 
I n Washington events developed r a p i d l y . Keynes secured 
U.S. agreement to a 10> a l t e r a t i o n r i g h t simply with 
c o n s u l t a t i o n and a r i g h t to a second 10$ with toe d e c i s i o n of the 
(63) I b i d . 
(6k) I b i d . 
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Fund being r e q u i r e d , but w i t h i n two days of the a p p l i c a t i o n . 
Keynes tol d the Treasury that he had argued s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t 
the d i s c r e t i o n a r y c o n t r o l over the second 10# d e v a l u a t i o n , but 
i f he had forced the i s s u e f u r t h e r the r e p e r c u s s i o n s could have 
been very harmful. 
" I n the course of the d i s c u s s i o n s we informed them that 
London f e l t somewhat st r o n g l y that requirements of 
c o n s u l t a t i o n without requirements of approval by formal 
voting was more adv i s a b l e . But a l l American Departments 
in c l u d i n g F e d e r a l Reserve Board reacted v i o l e n t l y a g a i n s t 
t h i s as being a departure from what they regarded as a 
c e n t r a l p r i n c i p l e of plan and an e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n of 
American p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h i s i s one of the few occasions 
on which we have r e c e i v e d no support or sympathy from 
any American quarter. F e d e r a l Reserve Board i n p a r t i c u l a r 
have f r e q u e n t l y supported our views a g a i n s t t h e i r Treasury, 
We f e e l t h erefore that we should j e o p a r d i s e hope of f u t u r e 
progress i f we were to press t h i s f u r t h e r . " (66) 
I n r e t r o s p e c t , i t would appear that Keynes was f i g h t f o r there 
was a considerable amount of consensus reached on monetary 
problems during the following days. Perhaps the best way to t r e a t 
these extremely complicated n e g o t i a t i o n s would be to abandon, 
temporarily, the chronological n a r r a t i v e , and d e a l with the s i x 
main areas of concern s u c c e s s i v e l y . 
The f i r s t i s s u e i s r e l a t i v e l y simple f o r the p r o v i s i o n s which 
had been d r a f t e d by October 7> were those which were incorporated 
i n t o the f i n a l agreement. This was the debtor adjustment problem, 
on which the Americans had been p a r t i c u l a r l y forthcoming. They 
had admittedly bauliced at the Idea of a second 10# a l t e r a t i o n i n 
the exchange r a t e without s p e c i f i c acquiescence by the Fund, 
but B r i t i s h Government f e a r s of the consequences of a delay i n 
exchange adjustments were ameliorated by the two day l i m i t placed 
(65) T h i s was i n f a c t the form i n which i t was incorporated i n t o 
the J o i n t Statement, See "I.M.F. Proceedings and Documents 
of the U.N. Monetary and F i n a n c i a l Conference - B r e t t o n 
Woods, J u l y 1 - 2 2 , 1 9 ^ , Vols. I and I I . " p. 163M-, U.S. 
Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 19W8. 
(66) Keynes to Treasury, October 7 , 19^3, U^903 /2J1 /70 . 
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on the d e l i b e r a t i o n s of a request. I n short, even the B r i t i s h 
o f f i c i a l s , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r r e f l e c t i n g on the dangers of 
competitive d e v a l u a t i o n s , were more than pleased with the r e s u l t s . 
I n f a c t , B r i t i s h views on the exchange problem had f l u c t u a t e d . 
Keynes 1 views had gradually changed to favour greater f l e x i b i l i t y 
as the American goals for the nature of the S.F. c l a r i f i e d 
p a r t i c u l a r l y regarding i t s s i z e and i t s gradual divorce from 
other economic i s s u e s , which were o r i g i n a l l y envisaged as part 
and p a r c e l of the C.U. On the f l e x i b i l i t y i s s u e Keynes on 
October 1?j wrote to Viner. 
"On t h i s point we i n London have come round e n t i r e l y to 
your point of view* With some d i f f i c u l t y , we have 
persuaded White to come a long way to meet us. I hope 
you w i l l f i n d the new formula acceptable. My f e e l i n g now 
i s that i t goes f a r enough.11 ( 6 7 ) 
The p r o v i s i o n s d i d appear to safeguard adequately sovereign 
c o n t r o l over exchange r a t e s and supply a l a s t r e s o r t l i n e of 
a c t i o n to avoid h i g h l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e forms of domestic d e f l a t i o n . 
The p o s i t i o n of gold and the gold standard appearance of the 
Fund had a l s o been considerably modified. The new American 
formula for gold s u b s c r i p t i o n s , although d i f f e r e n t i n form from 
the B r i t i s h proposals, was e f f e c t i v e l y the same. As f o r the 
u n i l a t e r a l r i g h t to withdraw, Keynes told a meeting of Dominion 
and I n d i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , i n Washington, that the plan was 
now simply for the establishment of a voluntary a s s o c i a t i o n , 
which would continue only as long as i t was i n a nation's 
i n t e r e s t s that i t should do so , v y T h i s was perhaps a r a t h e r 
( 6 7 ) Quoted i n Gardner, H., Gp.Clt. p . 1 1 1 * . Keynes to Viner, 
October 1 7 , 1 9 ^ 3 -
( 6 8 ) See Washington to Treasury U 5 0 6 6 / 2 5 1 / 7 0 , October 1 3 , 19 ^ 3 . 
( 6 9 ) Keynes to meeting of Dominion and I n d i a n R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
i n Washington, October 1 3 , 1 9 ^ 3 , U 7 6 / 6 / 7 0 . 
naive c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the Fund. The withdrawal r i g h t was 
c e r t a i n l y ignored by c r i t i c s who branded the Fund as the imposer 
of a new gold standard, which to a large extent i t was. There 
were, i n a c t u a l f a c t , numerous pressures o p e r a t i v e to maintain 
a nation's a s s o c i a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n regard to B r i t a i n with 
her dependence on trade, the importance of s t e r l i n g and her c l o s e 
connections with the U.S. Thus, i f i t was not going to be so 
easy to walk out of the Fund the question of a r i g i d gold 
standard and f i x e d rater, of exchange, to a large extent, remained. 
Furthermore, B r i t a i n ' s aim f o r a 010 - 12B minimum aggregate 
c a p i t a l s u b s c r i p t i o n t o t a l , now appeared h i g h l y u n l i k e l y of 
success. A smaller aggregate c a p i t a l would f u r t h e r accentuate 
r e s t r i c t l o n i s t and d e f l a t i o n a r y tendencies already e s t a b l i s h e d 
by the maintainance of gold as a r e f e r e n t of value. I n the f i n a l 
a n a l y s i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i q u i d i t y was going to be dependent upon 
confidence i n the two major i n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange c u r r e n c i e s , 
s t e r l i n g and d o l l a r s , both of which were t i e d to gold, one 
d i r e c t l y and one by pressure from the other. I f confidence 
began to crumble, then once again, gold would be seen to be the 
only t r u l y i n t e r n a t i o n a l medium of exchange. D o l l a r s would be 
redeemed i n gold and a de f a c t o gold standard would operate. 
Unfortunately, there was not an unlimited amount of gold 
a v a i l a b l e , so i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i q u i d i t y would be l a r g e l y r e s t r i c t e d 
by (1) the r e l a t i o n of d o l l a r s and s t e r l i n g to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
gold r e s e r v e s ; (2) confidence i n d o l l a r s and s t e r l i n g . 
T h i s could mean the perpetuation of the t r a d i t i o n a l r e s t r a i n t 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r e d i t c r e a t i o n s to t i d e a country over a short 
term imbalance of payments. I n s t e a d of expanding c r e d i t as i n 
the C.U. the 19^3 proposals were b a s i c a l l y to maintain the 
conservative nature of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary system. 
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C r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s appeared to be inadequate. Domestic prosperity-
was once again to be . endangered by the need for the s t a b i l i t y 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange r a t e s . The g o l d / d o l l a r standard and 
the r e l a t i v e l y small s u b s c r i p t i o n s f o r the S . F . ^ 1 ^ meant sm a l l e r 
a v a i l a b l e c r e d i t s and the perpetuation of the p o l l t i c l s a t i o n o f 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l money, by what the U.S. saw as a need to apply 
d i s c r e t i o n a r y c o n t r o l s to shepherd the smaller c a p i t a l a v a i l a b l e . 
The B r i t i s h modified a l t e r n a t i v e was to ensure confidence I n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange by making a c c e s s , even to the reduced 
funds, automatic. Thus there were s t i l l dangers involved f o r 
the B r i t i s h , dangers which a f f e c t e d other aspects of the S.F. 
and began to challenge Keynes* b a s i c conception of an i n t e r -
(71) 
n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n . ' 
The Americans were w e l l aware j u s t what a challenge t h e i r 
r e j e c t i o n s of the ove r - d r a f t p r i n c i p l e and the smaller fund 
nature of the proposed i n s t i t u t i o n was to the o r i g i n a l ideas 
the B r i t i s h , had put forward. I t was l a r g e l y because of t h i s that 
White had c o n s i s t e n t l y pressed on the B r i t i s h the e f f i c a c y of a 
scar c e currency c l a u s e . By mid-October Keynes was f a r more 
sanguine than he had been e a r l i e r i n the year on t h i s c r e d i t o r 
l i a b i l i t y i s s u e . On June 9, 19^3» he had w r i t t e n to V i n e r t -
"Over here we f i n d t h i s f e a t u r e of the S.F. rath e r obscure. 
Are you c l e a r how i t ( i . e . s c a r c e currency c l a u s e ) would 
work? Do you think that i t i s a s a t i s f a c t o r y way out?' 1 (72) 
(70) Only 28.8B i n i t s f i n a l form, 
(71) See following page - "Harrod, as quoted..." 
(72) Quoted i n Gardner R., Op.Cit. p.116. 
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(71) Harrod, as quoted above, d i s c u s s e s Keynes' commit-
ment to a 'basic s t r u c t u r e 1 f o r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
monetary i n s t i t u t i o n . Unfortunately he does not 
c l e a r l y e x p l a i n what t h i s c o n s i s t e d of. One point 
was the p o t e n t i a l f o r future developments i n the 
f i e l d s of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and development and comm-
odi t y p r i c e c o n t r o l s , but t h i s , I think, was simply 
a symptom of t h e ' b a s i c nature' which was a very 
large pool of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r e d i t and i t s ready 
a v a i l a b i l i t y . Harrod, Op.Cit. p.56l, makes i t appear 
as i f the 'basic nature i s s u e ' revolved round the 
use of 'cherokee 1, Keynes 1 e x p r e s s i o n for American 
t e c h n i c a l jargon, or C h r i s t i a n E n g l i s h , which i s 
s u r e l y misleading. J.P.Young, D.O.S.B. November 
1950, p.783, Op.Cit. says of the Washington 
Negotiations 19^3> "These d i s c u s s i o n s revealed a 
fundamental d i f f e r e n c e i n viewpoint between the 
United Kingdom and the United S t a t e s regarding the 
nature of the proposed Fund and i t s operations.... 
The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e d that the Fund should operate 
as an automatic i n s t i t u t i o n with a minimum of 
d i s c r e t i o n on the p a r t of i t s management, whereas 
the United S t a t e s b e l i e v e d the Fund could be most 
e f f e c t i v e i n achieving i t s purposes i f i t s operations 
were conducted on a d i s c r e t i o n a r y b a s i s . " 
Harrod, p.562, does i n d i c a t e the dangers of 
' d i s c r e t i o n * and the danger of inopportune s e l l i n g 
of B r i t i s h s e c u r i t i e s by the Fund, but he does not 
adequately e x p l a i n the i m p l i c a t i o n s ' d i s c r e t i o n ' 
had for the r e s t of the Fund nor the goals and 
conditions the Americans had e s t a b l i s h e d for the 
Fund which i n t h e i r view made d i s c r e t i o n a r y operations 
necessary. I n f a c t , contrary to Harrod's judgement, 
Op.Cit. p.561, the evidence i n d i c a t e s that Keynes 
be l i e v e d he had q u a l i f i e d the American proposals 
to an extent which salvaged much of h i s concept of 
the b a s i c nature of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . Though as Keynes had said i n e a r l y 
19^3) much depended upon the w i l l to cooperate, 
which i n e f f e c t meant could the B r i t i s h and Americans 
overcome t h e i r s u b s t a n t i a l c o n f l i c t of I n t e r e s t s . 
I n f a c t , the f i n a l answer to t h i s would be how the 
Fund a c t u a l l y operated. 
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Anil t h i s was i n s p i t e of the favourable answers the U.S. 
had given the B r i t i s h regarding the s c a r c e currency clause i n 
(7-3) 
February. J Keynes wanted to Incorporate p r o v i s i o n s i n the 
S.F. for pressures to be brought on a chronic c r e d i t o r n a t i o n 
to f o r c e i t to c o r r e c t I t s imbalance by e i t h e r reducing i t s 
own import d u t i e s , or allowing f o r e i g n countries to d i s c r i m i n a t e 
a g a i n s t i t s goods. The S.F. published i n 1 9*+3 provided that the 
S.F. should i s s u e a report to the c r e d i t o r country, and that 
i n s t r u c t i o n s should be given c a r e f u l and immediate a t t e n t i o n . 
As Keynes d i s c u s s e d these I s s u e s with White, be became more and 
more o p t i m i s t i c and convinced, not only of the need, but a l s o of 
the v i a b i l i t y of the scarce currency c l a u s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
view of the reduced s i z e of the Fund. On r e t u r n i n g to London i n 
October, Keynes wrote to John Anderson that the s c a r c e currency 
c l a u s e : -
"... puts the c r e d i t o r country on the spot so acutely that 
i n view of a l l of us, the c r e d i t o r country simply cannot 
aff o r d to l e t such a s i t u a t i o n a r i s e i f the Americans 
r e a l l y l i v e up to t h e i r present proposals, I t w i l l be the 
U.S.A. and not the r e s t of us which w i l l get i n t o r e a l 
trouble, i f the U.S.A. develops a favourable balance of 
payments which i s not adequately disposed of by f o r e i g n 
lending i n some way." (75) 
However, there were some modifications e f f e c t e d to the 
October p o s i t i o n . I n I t s f i n a l form A r t i c l e V I I s e c t i o n 3 ( b ) ^ 7 ^ 
was somewhat d i f f e r e n t , i n p a r t i c u l a r the recommendatory p r o v i s i o n s 
(77) 
of S e c t i o n I I I paragraph 6 , were abandoned. I n f a c t , as we 
(73) See telegrams No. 908 and 909, H a l i f a x to F.O. 
U861A7/70. 
(7*0 S.F. S e c t i o n I I I paragraph 6 , J u l y 10, 191*3, U*+193A7/70. 
(75) Quoted i n D. Rees, Op.Cit. pp 227-228. 
(76) A Decade of U.S. Foreign P o l i c y , e t c . , Op.Cit. p.282. 
(77) See above. 
s h a l l see, the p o s i t i o n o f c r e d i t o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y became even 
more e q u i v o c a l as the iss u e was d i s c u s s e d i n t h e U.S. a f t e r 
B r e t t o n Woods. 
The problems o f the t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d and the accumulated 
s t e r l i n g b a l ances were so c l o s e l y i n t e r - r e l a t e d t h a t i t i s b e t t e r 
t h a t they be c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r . Both is s u e s i n f a c t were not 
d e a l t w i t h t h o r o u g h l y d u r i n g the Washington t a l k s . , b u t they were 
b o t h causing the B r i t i s h grave concern. The B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n on 
the whole spectrum o f p l a n n i n g f o r the post-war economy was 
b e g i n n i n g to s h i f t towards a type o f b a l a n c i n g a c t . A t the 
b e g i n n i n g o f 19^2, f e a r s had been expressed t h a t the l o w e r i n g o f 
B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e , because o f her s e r i e s o f d e f e a t s , had rendered 
the i d e a o f r e s u r r e c t i n g the s t e r l i n g area as a t r a d e and 
f i n a n c i a l b l o c u n r e a l i s t i c . By the end o f 19^3, the s i t u a t i o n 
was changing a g a i n . The v i c t o r i e s o f A u c h i n l e c k and Montgomery 
i n the d e s e r t , the Anglo-American l a n d i n g s i n N o r t h A f r i c a and 
R.A.F. Bomber Command's r a i d s on Germany began to r e s u s c i t a t e 
B r i t a i n ' s p r e s t i g e . A'; the same t i m e , the B r i t i s h were becoming 
s u s p i c i o u s o f the U.S. and d o u b t f u l about the success o f economic 
c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h them. The American c a p t u r e o f B r i t i s h e x p o r t 
markets, t r o u b l e over o i l i n the Middle East and the q u e s t i o n o f 
the s u p e r c e s s i o n o f the Lead-Lease E x p o r t White Paper, were a l l 
causing s e r i o u s concern. The Washington t a l k s produced two 
i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t s c o n c e r n i n g B r i t a i n ' s renewed i n t e r e s t i n the 
S t e r l i n g Area. F i r s t o f a l l B r i t a i n oecame v e r y r e l u c t a n t even 
t o countenance a p l a n f o r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y o r g a n i s e d l i q u i d a -
t i o n o f the s t e r l i n g balances. Secondly, though t h i s was not 
f i n a l l y s o r t e d o u t u n t i l the S p r i n g o f 19M+, the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d 
was to a l l o w the raaintainance o f the s t e r l i n g area exchange 
c o n t r o l s . B r i t i s h f a i t h i n m u l t i l a t e r a l s o l u t i o n s and the 
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e f f i c a c y o f i n - d e p t h c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h the U.S. was 
e x p e r i e n c i n g some s e r i o u s r e s e r v a t i o n s . 
D u r i n g the Washington t a l k s the t r a n s i t i o n a l problems were 
o n l y s u p e r f i c i a l l y considered and L i t t l e progress towards d e t a i l s 
o c c u r r e d . There was m i n i s t e r i a l concern r e g a r d i n g t h i s and f o r 
the American acknowledgement o f the need f o r adjustments b ut 
w i t h o u t any c l e a r c r i t e r i o n b e i n g suggested, 
"6 V I I now re a d s , 'because o f extreme u n c e r t a i n t i e s 
o f immediate post-war p e r i o d and r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t 
r a t e s e s t a b l i s h e d d u r i n g such p e r i o d w i l l o f n e c e s s i t y 
be t e n t a t L v e i n many i n s t a n c e s , d u r i n g f i r s t t h r e e 
y ears fund s h a l l r e cognise t h a t t h e r e w i l l be need f o r 
many changes and adjustments and s h a l l r e s o l v e cases o f 
reasonable doubt i n favour o f c o u n t r y r e q u e s t i n g changes 
i n r a t e s ' . " (78) 
Such p r o v i s i o n s were regarded as i n s u b s t a n t i a l by the 
B r i t i s h and d i d L i t t l e t o a l l a y t h e i r w o r r i e s on a number o f 
iss u e s which would be c r i t i c a l t o B r i t a i n ' s economic h e a l t h 
(79) 
d u r i n g the immediate post-war y e a r s . ' I t was t r u e , t h a t 
the Americans had g i v e n way on a number o f i s s u e s , n o t a b l y 
exchange r a t e f i x i n g , b u t the r e were a number o f o t h e r 
s i g n i f i c a n t problems. For 3 r i t a i n , one o f the key problems was 
the massive accumulated balances o f Higypt and I n d i a . I t was 
fe a r e d t h a t such balances would put an i n t o l e r a b l e s t r a i n c n 
s t e r l i n g once i t became f r e e l y c o n v e r t i b l e , u n l e s s adequate 
, , (80) p r o v i s i o n s were maae. 
(73) Keynes to T r e a s u r y , October 13, 19^3, U5O66/251/7O. 
(79) See J.M.Keynes to Tre a s u r v , October 7, 19^3 > 1^903/251/70: 
F.O. to Washington, October 5, 19^3, I t ^8O2/251/70 and 
J.M.Keynes to Trea s u r y , October 13, 19^3, U5066/251/70, 
(80) See 'The Overseas Assets and L i a b i l i t i e s o f the U n i t e d 
Kingdom', September 2, 19^3; Approved i n P r i n c i p l e by 
th e ^ C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer, AD(t+3)2, UK500/251/70. 
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Such p r o v i s i o n s c o u l d be e i t h e r i -
1. a major s c a l i n g down o f the balances and some i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
assumption o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r g r a d u a l and e v e n t u a l 
l i q u i d a t i o n . 
2 . n e g o t i a t e d s c a l i n g down o f balances to a much s m a l l e r e x t e n t 
combined w i t h the r e t e n t i o n o f s t e r l i n g a rea monetary 
c o n t r o l s to p e r p e t u a t e a s t e r l i n g based t r a d e and commercial 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
The p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v e d i n these two p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s 
w i l l soon be e l a b o r a t e d upon. 
I n a d d i t i o n t o the above w o r r y , t h e r e was a l s o c o n s t e r n a t i o n 
about American p r e v a r i c a t i o n and i n t r a n s i g e n c e over the t a l k s f o r 
the s u p e r c e s s i o n o f the E x p o r t White Paper and American m a n i p u l -
a t i o n s , under i t s a u t h o r i t y , o f the l e v e l o f B r i t i s h g o l d and 
c u r r e n c y r e s e r v e s , which were seen as t h r e a t s t o B r i t a i n ' s 
economic p r o s p e c t s i n the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . I n e f f e c t B r i t i s h 
e x p o r t r e c o v e r y was b e i n g p o s i t i v e l y i n h i b i t e d by the U.S.., and 
h e r r e s e r v e p o s i t i o n was b e i n g rendered most weak. An e x p o r t 
l e d r e c o v e r y f o r the B r i t i s h economy was b e i n g p r e c l u d e d by the 
U.S. The envisaged economic s t r i n g e n c y o f the post-war p e r i o d 
and s u s p i c i o n s o f American motives were i n t u r n a f f e c t i n g B r i t i s h 
p o l i c i e s towards the r e l i e f o r g a n i s a t i o n s such as U.iN.R.R.A, and 
t h e I.B.R.D. I n b o t h these cases the need t o r e s t r i c t B r i t a i n ' s 
f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s , l a c k o f d e c i s i v e B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e and 
the danger o f I n t e r f e r e n c e i n the B r i t i s h economy were the 
d e c i s i v e f a c t o r s r a t h e r t h a n a t t e m p t i n g to d e s i g n the i n s t i t u t i o n s 
(8l) 
i n such a manner t h a t B r i t a i n c o u l d r e c e i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i d . 
(81) See f o l l o w i n g page - "The B r i t i s h f e l t 197 
F o o t n o t e ; 
( 81 ) The B r i t i s h f e l t U.N.R.R.A. should be r e s t r i c t e d t o 
a narrow scope so t h a t B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e by way o f 
the Combined Boards c o u l d be p e r p e t u a t e d . See D r a f t 
Memo N.B.Ronald f o r M i n i s t e r o f S t a t e , November 1 0 , 
19^3> U5679/5 /73 ' I f Not U.N.R.R.A. What? 1. 
I n paragraph 4-, he s a i d , "Taking a f a i r l y long view, 
say up to the end o f s i x months a f t e r the end o f 
h o s t i l i t i e s w i t h Japan, t h a t I s the p e r i o d d u r i n g 
which we ought t o be a b l e t o count f a i r l y c o n f i d e n t l y 
on c o n t i n u a t i o n o f Lend-Lease ..." T h i s type o f 
r a t h e r n * l v e c o n f i d e n c e was t o be r u d e l y s h a t t e r e d 
l a t e r , but o f course even u n t i l l a t e 19^5 Keynes 
s t i l l hoped f o r a U.S. g r a n t - i n - a i d , o r a t the v e r y 
w o r s t an i n t e r e s t f r e e l o a n . 
On November 9 i 19^3 , U.N.R.R.A, was signed and i n 
f i r s t s e s s i o n Keynes proposed t h a t U.N.R.R.A. r e l i e f 
s h o uld o n l y be f o r ex-occupied t e r r i t o r i e s , a l s o 
t h a t any c o u n t r y w i t h e x t e r n a l a s s e t s should u t i l i s e 
them f i r s t b e f o r e approaching U.N.R.R.A., WP (^3)567, 
December 17 , 19^3» U6636/5/71 see a l s o C h a n c e l l o r 
o f Exchequer Memo, 'Finance o f R e l i e f , December 2 2 , 
19^-3, U6636/5 /73 . U.K. c o n t r i b u t i o n t o U.N.R.R.A. 
£80m p.a, approx. \% o f G.N.P. 
As f o r t h e I.3.R.D. the U.K. proposed, a t A t l a n t i c 
C i t y , t h a t the c a p i t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s should be c u t 
d r a s t i c a l l y t o 20£ o f each c o u n t r y ' s q u o t a , i . e . 
o n l y 20# o f a c o u n t r y ' s quota was t o be p a i d i n t o 
the Bankj See J . P. Young, Op.Cit. p.786. 
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The caution the B r i t i s h evinced over the I.B.R.D. and 
U.W.ft.H.A. was very much a symptom of an untoward development 
i n the monetary taLks. B a s i c a l l y , the problem was t h a t these 
t a l k s had progressed f a r ahead of what the B r i t i s h considered 
to be the complementary commodity and trade t a l k s . So, although 
great progress had occurred i n the monetary t a l k s , the B r i t i s h 
s t i l l regarded t h i s as only a p a r t o f a larger jig-saw, whose 
o v e r a l l nature was s t i l l unclear. The u n c e r t a i n t y was 
compounded f u r t h e r by the f r i c t i o n between the State and Treasury 
Departments and the ambiguity concerning the American p o s i t i o n 
on trade p o l i c y which r e s u l t e d from t h i s . As we have seen, the 
Treasury had, from time to time, condoned the maintainance o f 
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r a c t i c e s i n i t s hard bargaining w i t h the U.K., 
but t h i s was r e a l l y the preserve of the State Department. I n 
short w i t h the previous problems i n mind t h i s ambiguity was 
something the B r i t i s h f e l t should be removed. Accordingly on 
December 18, 19*+3» Keynes wrote to Harry White about the 
t r a n s i t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . 
"This t r a n s i t i o n a l clause, as we intend i t , would allow 
us not only to maintain s t e r l i n g area arrangements, and 
payments agreements w i t h other countries o f general 
character now i n force but to adopt and extend these as 
f o r example by concluding payments agreements w i t h any 
part of the s t e r l i n g area w i t h which we could not reach 
an a l t e r n a t i v e s a t i s f a c t o r y arrangement. I t would also 
allow us to make new inter-governmental or i n t e r - C e n t r a l 
Bank c r e d i t or c l e a r i n g arrangements on the model f o r 
example of the recent Belgo-Dutch agreement or our own 
Anglo-French Agreement ... 
The conditions w i l l be a sequel to the war and the 
d e f i c i e n c y w i l l i n f a c t be a delayed instalment of the 
costs o f the war and should be handled as a p a r t of the 
wartime finance and not regarded as belonging to a 
subsequent peace time regime." (82) 
(82) I n White Papers P.U.L., and quoted i n 
Gardner H., Op.Cit. p.120, December 18,19*0, 
Also i n F.O. U6539/251/70. J.M.Keynes to 
H.D.White, December 18, 19^3. 
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This i n f a c t went hand i n glove w i t h the c a l l f o r the 
s p e c i f i c r e n u n c i a t i o n by the I.M.F. of any concern w i t h r e l i e f , 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n or indebtedness in c u r r e d during the war. This has 
perplexed a number of h i s t o r i a n s i n view of the U.K.'s vast 
overseas l i a b i l i t i e s . However, by l a t e 1 9^3 both the U.K. and 
the U.S. were r e l u c t a n t to place the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the 
l i q u i d a t i o n of the accumulated war balances under the a u t h o r i t y 
o f the Fund. One reason was t h e i r enormous size i n r e l a t i o n to 
the Fund 1s resources which could have undermined i t s working 
v i a b i l i t y . As f a r as the U.S. was concerned, there was also the 
thought that Congress vould not look favourably on f u r t h e r under-
w r i t i n g of f o r e i g n e r s ' debts by the U.S. As f o r B r i t a i n , w e l l 
as we have seen, she was already searching f o r a possible economic 
l i f e - b e l t i f American p o l i c i e s proved to be too harmful f o r the 
B r i t i s h economy. The s t e r l i n g debts could act as a major 
co n s o l i d a t i n g f orce i n the S t e r l i n g Area thus c r e a t i n g s u f f i c i e n t 
cohesion to provide a working economic framework w i t h i n which 
the B r i t i s h economy could f u n c t i o n . The a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y o f 
d r a s t i c a l l y reducing the s t e r l i n g balances followed by the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y organised l i q u i d a t i o n o f residue would r e f l e c t 
badly on England's r o l e i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy and would 
cause widespread p o l i t i c a l and economic repercussions i n the 
Commonwealth and Empire. Repercussions which could destroy f o r 
good the v i a b i l i t y o f the S t e r l i n g Area as an a s s o c i a t i o n o f 
nations cooperating together on economic and p o l i t i c a l Issues. 
With the demise of such a p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e would also go the 
world r o l e of s t e r l i n g and the p r o f i t a b i l i t y o f the C i t y / 3 3 ) 
This concern f o r the malntainance o f the S t e r l i n g Area was 
c o n s i s t e n t l y maintained at B r e t t o n Woods. At the Conference i n 
New Hampshire the issue o f the accumulated war balances was 
brought up by the Egyptian delegate and l a t e r by the In d i a n 
delegate Mr. A. D. Shroff on J u l y 6 , 19^^. We have seen above 
the reasons of both the B r i t i s h , and the Americans f o r wishing to 
keep t h i s problem outside the scope of the Fund. And as i t was 
b a s i c a l l y a B r i t i s h problem, White had agreed t h a t any i n i t i a t i v e 
on t h i s should be l e f t to the U.K. However, the B r i t i s h were 
of course r e l u c t a n t to s p e l l out i n d e t a i l t h e i r p o s i t i o n on the 
s t e r l i n g balances and so simply s t a t e d j -
"... that t h i s i s a matter f o r b i l a t e r a l arrangements 
between the p a r t i e s and i n t e r e s t s concerned." (85) 
(83) Or so i t was believed a t the time, though subsequent 
developments have i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t i s the expertise 
of the C i t y rather than s t e r l i n g which i s the d e c i s i v e 
f a c t o r here. 
(8*0 See J. M. Keynes to Treasury, September ^kf 19V} , UW355A7/70. 
(85) Proceedings and Documents, e t c . 1 Op.Cit. p. l+2 l+. 
E. F. Penrose. Op.Cit. p.57, ascribes the reasons f o r t h i s 
B r i t i s h Insistence on b i l a t e r a l s e t t l i n g o f the debts to a 
naive b e l i e f t h a t the c r e d i t o r countries would accept 
"... the overwhelming moral case f o r w r i t i n g o f f a large 
p a r t o f the debts..." I n f a c t l i t t l e e f f o r t was made by 
the B r i t i s h Government to get the c r e d i t o r countries to do 
t h i s . 
There were some other r e l a t i v e l y minor problems connected 
w i t h the t r a n s i t i o n a l period such as the inaugural date f o r the 
Fund. Most of the problems were regarded by Keynes as s o l u b l e i -
"... without excessive d i f f i c u l t y or our g i v i n g away 
what we consider e s s e n t i a l . " (86) 
There was one problem however which was to cause more and more 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . This was the question the part r u n i t a s f was to play 
i n the Fund. I n f a c t the r o l e o f u n i t a s was part of the much 
wider issue o f the a c t i v e or passive nature of the Fund, 
The problem of p a s s i v i t y was to pose f u r t h e r ambiguities f o r 
the B r i t i s h . The u n c e r t a i n t i e s o f t h i s issue were not so wide 
ranging as the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n question was but i t was o f v i t a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e so f a r as the monetary t a l k s themselves were concerned. 
(86) J. M. Keynes to Treasury, October 13, 19^3, U5066/251/7O: 
the remaining problems were contained i n reserved passages, 
"A) amount of gold s u b s c r i p t i o n although now American 
formula of 2$% of quota or 1C# o f gold and f r e e f o r e i g n 
exchange whichever i s l e s s , would n o t work out appreciably 
d i f f e r e n t from ours i n our own case. 
B) Whether gold s u b s c r i p t i o n i s held as a pledge, 
C) Whether fund should be given powers i n extreme cases 
to d i s c i p l i n e a country having "adequate" gold and f r e e 
exchange must use t h i s p a r i passu w i t h f a c i l i t i e s o f the Fund. 
E) Whether a country i n c r e a s i n g i t s f r e e f o r e i g n exchange 
must t u r n over a part of t h i s fund i f i t i s using fund 
f a c i l i t i e s , 
F) Whether r i g h t to change established r a t e by 10^ should 
be renewed each successive decade, 
G) Whether a country while using f a c i l i t i e s o f the fund 
should be f r e e to employ i t s reserves held outside fund to 
finance outward movements of c a p i t a l f o r any other purpose 
without r e s t r i c t i o n . 
H) Whether substance of proposals should be expressed i n 
terms of monetised u n i t a s . " I b i d . 
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For example, J. P. Young ear-marks p a s s i v i t y as the fundamentally 
d i v i s i v e issue between the U.S. and the U.K. at the Washington 
t a l k s . Despite the obvious s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s issue, i t 
i s q u i t e p l a i n t h a t Keynes was unsure of the provisions which 
would f i n a l l y p e r t a i n , and t h i s i s r e f l e c t e d i n the varying r e p o r t s 
he sent to London. On October 8 , he believed t h a t he h a d i -
"... f u l l y assured the p a s s i v i t y of the Fund, ..." (88) 
By October I 7 j Keynes was less c e r t a i n of the p o s i t i o n and wrote 
to Viner t h a t i -
"Our view has been very s t r o n g l y t h a t i f countries are 
to be given s u f f i c i e n t confidence they must be able to 
r e l y i n a l l normal circumstances on drawing a s u b s t a n t i a l 
part o f t h e i r quota without p o l i c i n g or f a c i n g unforeseen 
obstacles... ( p a s s i v i t y was) one o f the matters on which 
we have not yet reached f i n a l accommodation." (89) 
For, although the U.S. had accepted the general p r i n c i p l e 
of p a s s i v i t y , the procedures involved s t i l l had to be c l e a r l y 
d e f i n e d . H o w e v e r , the concession by the U.S., to allow 
u n i l a t e r a l withdrawal from the Fund d i d provide an escape route 
i f the 3.F. ever d i d become over-involved i n domestic economic 
a f f a i r s and t h i s , to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , reassured the B r i t i s h . 
A f t e r Keynes 1 r e t u r n to England, he was i n c l i n e d once again to 
be o p t i m i s t i c . He w r o t e j -
" I t was a very great concession on t h e i r p a r t to come 
round to our view o f the Fund as a reserve o f resources, 
e n t i r e l y passive, except i n the more extreme contingencies, 
where count r i e s were running towards the l i m i t of t h e i r 
f a c i l i t i e s i n one d i r e c t i o n or another." (91) 
( 8 ? ) See Young, Op.Cit. p.782. 
(88) Keynes to Treasury, October 8 , 19^+3, U*+910/251/70. 
(89) Keynes to Viner, October 17, 19^3, Quoted i n Gardner, 
Op.Cit. p.113. 
(90) See Blum, Op.Cit. p.2M*. 
(91) Quoted i n Harrod, Op.Cit. p.570. 
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While Keynes 1 view of the p a s s i v i t y problem f l u c t u a t e d from 
optimism to pessimism,opinion i n Che U.S. began to take on a more 
coherent and s o l i d aspect. I n the State Department, Berle and 
Feis were prominent moulders of o p i n i o n on t h i s , not only from 
the basis o f t h e i r own personal r e s e r v a t i o n s , but also from f e a r s 
of untoward p u b l i c r e a c t i o n to a S.F. which was 'passive 1, but at 
the same time l a r g e l y financed oy the U.S. They envisaged a 
danger of i n d i s c r i m i n a t e d o l i n g out of money to subsidise f o r e i g n 
competitors, possibly i n the f i e l d o f a v i a t i o n or o i l where the 
(92) 
U.S. had strong n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . ' I n a d d i t i o n to these 
developments i n the State Department, Morgenthau's continuing 
f l i r t a t i o n w i t h Congress led to i n f o r m a l discussions to e x p l a i n 
the monetary provisions to Congress on October which was soon 
to be followed by the establishment of a l i a i s o n committee. The 
I n t r o d u c t i o n of the l e g i s l a t i v e branch of the government to the 
monetary t a l k s , the fears of the State Department and Morgenthau's 
own convictions though tempered w i t h the need not to r u f f l e the 
B r i t i s h too much, a l l added to the ambiguous element I n the 
development o f the p a s s i v i t y p r o v i s i o n s . I n the J o i n t Statement 
ambiguity was already present, but i t was to become even more 
pronounced i n the f i n a l agreement. At t h i s time the q u a l i f i c a t i o n 
f o r access to the Fund's resources was only expressed i n a negative 
way. Fund resources would be made a v a i l a b l e I f : -
"The Fund has not previously given appropriate notice 
that the member i s suspended from making f u r t h e r use 
of the Fund's resources on the ground t h a t i t i s using 
them i n a manner contrary to the purposes and p o l i c i e s 
of the Fund " (93) 
( 9 2 ) See 'Economic Aspects o f New Deal Diplomacy'. Gardner, L.C., 
Beacon Press, Boston 196<+, p.287 : Feis, H. 'The Sinews of 
Peace', Harper Bros, N.Y. 1 , p.90; Economics and Peace, 
Foreign P o l i c y Reports XX, A p r i l , 1 9 ^ -
(93) 'Proceedings o f the U.N. Monetary and F i n a n c i a l Conference, 
B r e t t o n Woods, New Hampshire, J u l y 1-22, 1 9**V , U.S. 
Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 2 v o l s . 19^8, Appendix IV 
pp 1631-1632. ' 
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S t i l l , even before the J o i n t Statement the p a s s i v i t y p r i n c i p l e 
became i n e x t r i c a b l y i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h B r i t i s h proposals f o r a 
monetised v e r s i o n o f u n i t a s . They hoped that t h i s would increase 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i q u i d i t y and help to d e - p o l i t i c i s e the f i n a n c i a l 
workings of the Fund, thus strengthening the p a s s i v i t y p r i n c i p l e . 
Furthermore, a d i r e c t consequence of t h i s would be the undermining 
of the key r o l e the g o l d / d o l l a r standard was intended to play by 
the Americans. During September and October Keynes had t r i e d to 
reduce the r o l e of gold i n the Fund, and as we have seen was 
p a r t i a l l y successful. However, the r e s t r i c t i o n s the U.S. wished 
to impose on unitas were such as to prevent i t competing w i t h 
gold. As Blum r e c o r d s j -
" I n p a r t i c u l a r , the B r i t i s h opposed any reference to 
White*s u n i t a s , because they were defined i n terms of 
grains of gold." (9*0 
What the B r i t i s h d i d not o b j e c t t o , and i n f a c t s t r o n g l y 
favoured, was a monetised form o f u n i t a s . Keynes presented a 
memorandum 'Suggestions For The Monetisation o f U n i t a s 1 to the 
Americans during the Washington Conference but l i t t l e progress 
( 9 5 ) 
was made at that time. w ^ Nevertheless, there was strong 
support f o r Keynes' idea i n the U.K. and i n January 1 9^s-
" A f t e r f u r t h e r c o nsideration Treasury g r e a t l y prefer 
u n i t a s version because i t i s much more clear and simple. 
Moreover despite safeguards introduced f o r keeping fund 
passive, view i s s t i l l held i n some quarters here t h a t 
fund i n S t a b i l i s a t i o n Fund shape must i n e v i t a b l y develop 
technique o f dealing i n exchange w i t h danger that s t e r l i n g 
held by Fund would c o n s t i t u t e a l i v e l i a b i l i t y . " (96) 
(9*+) Blum, Op.Clt. p.2^7s 310 = 3 7 i grains of f i n e eold, 
'Monetary and Finance Conference', Op.Cit. pp 1619-1628. 
(95) See Young, J.P., Op.Cit. p.783. 
(96) Secretary o f State to I n d i a n Finance Department, 
January 5, 1 9 ^ , . U6i+06/251/70. 
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During the next three months, t h i s problem continued to 
plague Anglo-U.S. r e l a t i o n s . Furthermore, i n October 19^3, as 
we have already noted, Morgenthau had encouraged the establishment 
of a b i p a r t i s a n congressional l i a i s o n committee, to which monetary 
questions could be c o n t i n u a l l y r e f e r r e d . Whether t h i s was a ploy 
by Morgenthau to attempt to keep Congress sweet and avoid the 
p i t f a l l s t h a t President Wilson stumbled i n t o , or whether i t was 
designed to increase backwoodsman pressure to help consolidate 
American i n t e r e s t s i n the S,F. and ward o f f pressures from B r i t a i n 
f o r f u r t h e r m o d i f i c a t i o n s i s d i f f i c u l t to judge on the evidence 
a v a i l a b l e . I t was c e r t a i n l y unsuccessful i n curbing Congressional 
c r i t i c i s m s , though they were confined to a f a i r l y small but vocal 
o p p o s i t i o n . Nevertheless, there was an increase o f c r i t i c i s m s of 
the developments i n the monetary t a l k s a t t h i s time, of which 
much was made by the U.S. Treasury. On January 17j 1 9 ^ , White 
expressed fears to hedvers Opie t h a t Congress whipped up by 
conservative Republicans could create t r o u b l e f o r the Fund. Also, 
I f progress was not speeded up and an earl y conference held then 
things would have to be postponed f o r a considerable time because 
( 9 7 ) 
o f the November P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . 7 ' By the end of 
January, the u n i t a s question had s t i l l not been resolved. At t h i s 
p o i nt the i n f l u e n t i a l President o f the American Bankers 1 
Association, Mr. Hemmingway, added h i s voice to the c r i t i c s o f 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y . He indi c a t e d the i n c o m p a t a b l l i t y o f B r i t i s h and 
American p o l i c i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of the f a c t s t h a t the 
U.S. was tu r n i n g more toward Republicanism and B r i t a i n toward a 
s t a t e - c o n t r o l l e d s o c i a l i s t economy. A f u r t h e r symptom of the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between the U.S. and the U.K. was B r i t a i n ' s reluctance 
(97) See Opie to F.O. January 17, 19**S U>+10/6/70. 
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to t i e s t e r l i n g value to gold. Under such c o n d i t i o n s , Hemmingway 
al l e g e d , there were dangers of s t e r l i n g ' s value being manipulated 
to the detriment o f the d o l l a r . 
There was concern on the other side of the A t l a n t i c as w e l l . 
On February 21, 1 9 ^ j Beaverbrook presented a paper to C h u r c h i l l 
expressing h i s worries over the o i l , a v i a t i o n and, as he termed 
i t , the gold standard conference. Agreement on a l l of these 
t o p i c s , under extant proposals, he believed, should have been 
r e s i s t e d . He added:-
"That we should pursue f r i e n d s h i p and c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h 
the United States i s an unchallengeable p r i n c i p l e . 
But i n seeking that f r i e n d s h i p we should aim, w i t h an 
equal consistency, at maintaining and strengthening our 
own p o s i t i o n as a world power. 
The two o b j e c t i v e s are riot i r r e c o n c i l e a b l e " (98) 
Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal at t h i s time, s t r o n g l y represented 
the views and fe a r s o f the Bank o f England regarding the Fund. 
His comments, although they went f u r t h e r than the predominant 
Treasury and Foreign O f f i c e o pinions, they d i d r e f l e c t the 
r a t i o n a l e behind the safeguards which were being i n s e r t e d by the 
B r i t i s h i n t o politico-economic discussions, which would enable a 
r e s u r r e c t i o n of a modified post-war s t e r l i n g area. I n a War 
Cabinet Paper of March 6, Beaverbrook wrote:-
(98) Quoted i n Young, Op.Cit. p . 261 . 
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"The Bank (of England) take the view that i t i s e s s e n t i a l 
to s u s t a i n and strengthen f a i t h i n s t e r l i n g . To do so, 
the S t e r l i n g Area must be persuaded to b e l i e v e i n i t s own 
currency. Any doubt or misgiving w i l l r e s u l t i n a f l i g h t 
from s t e r l i n g , with holders, t r y i n g to s e l l f o r any other 
currency. 
Para. 5l I f we keep f a i t h i n s t e r l i n g , the Bank believe 
t h a t i t i s po s s i b l e , although not easy, to s u s t a i n the 
S t e r l i n g Area i n f u t u r e i n the face of the d e b i t balances 
i n I n d i a and Egypt," (99) 
This was an a l t e r n a t i v e to accepting the Fund as i t stood. 
The Bank's view was t h a t the Fund would be an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
o f a d o l l a r / g o l d standard, which would eventually usurp the r o l e 
o f s t e r l i n g as the predominant currency of i n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange. 
I n A p r i l 1 9 ^ 5 Ambassador Winant explained to the Secretary of 
State the o p p o s i t i o n to the Fund from the Bank of England and 
B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l i s t s such as Amery. The o p p o s i t i o n was such, he 
sa i d , that C h u r c h i l l had expressed reluctance f o r making a 
d e c i s i o n on the proposals as they stood, 
(99) WP (MO 1M3 Memo by Lord Privy Seal, March 6, 19M+, 
U1972/6/70: even C h u r c h i l l who r a r e l y involved himself 
i n economic issues d i d so at t h i s time, and f o r example 
raemoed. a month l a t e r , 'We should not be prepared to submit 
to an economic, f i n a n c i a l and monetary system l a i d down by, 
say, Russia or the United States with her faggot vote 
China 1, May, 19Mf, Quoted i n Cadogan, Op.Cit. p.62?, 
E d i t o r i a l Comment. 
(100) Winant to Secretary o f State, A p r i l 12, 19M+, Quoted i n 
Gardner, Op.Cit. p.123 : i n f a c t Winant's i n f o r m a t i o n may 
have been d e f e c t i v e ; i t was more with regard to the 
commercial t a l k s that C h u r c h i l l expressed a reluctance to 
allow a d e c i s i o n to oe made. 
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During the f i r s t week i n March, White reported to Morgenthau 
th a t there was only one outstanding issue o f importance between 
the U.S. and the U.K., obviously r e f e r r i n g to the uni t a s question. 
He added that the B r i t i s h had promised to transmit a d e c i s i o n on 
t h i s w i t h i n two weeks. S t i l l , by the 2 1 s t , there was no response 
from the B r i t i s h , and at t h i s p o int White expressed h i s concern 
over the timing of the proposed monetary conference. I f I t was 
to be i n June 1 9 ^ ^ they would r e q u i r e a d e c i s i o n on u n i t a s by the 
end of the m o n t h / 1 0 1 ^ On the 2 3 r d , Grant wrote the B r i t i s h 
Treasury d e s c r i b i n g White's impatience and disappointment. White 
apparently wanted speedy r e s u l t s , p a r t l y to rebut Congressional 
c r i t i c i s m s and p a r t l y to brand opponents as negative out-and-
out i s o l a t i o n i s t s / 1 0 2 ' ' I n e a r l y A p r i l White again appealed to 
Morgenthau to b r i n g pressure to bear to expedite matters, which 
he agreed to do. On A p r i l 5> i n response to a j o i n t plea by H u l l 
and Morgenthau, Hoosevelt agreed to endorse the proposed conference 
but only i f the B r i t i s h agreed. 
The Americans now r e a l l y turned on the pressure. On A p r i l 7 , 
Winant wrote to Anderson enclosing a l e t t e r from Morgenthau which 
contained a t h i n l y v e i l e d t h r e a t . 
" I f i t i s not held then ( i . e . the coherence i n May 19L+l^) 
there i s no saving i f and when a conference can be held." 
( 1 0 3 ) 
Anderson sent a personal message to Morgenthau v i a the 
Embassy i n Washington which explained his concern over B r i t a i n ' s 
probable post-war f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n arid the possible dangerous 
consequences f o r the U.K. i f i t adhered to the Fund i n i t s present 
( 1 0 1 ) See Blum, Op.Cit. p.2h6. 
( 1 0 2 ) Grant to Treasury, March 2 3 , 1 9 ^ , U2*+Ol /6 /70 . 
( 1 0 3 ) Winant to Anderson with Morgenthau's l e t t e r enclosed, 
A p r i l 7 , 19*+S U 2 9 9 V 6 / 7 0 . 
(TO1*) Anderson to Morgenthau, v i a H a l i f a x , A p r i l 7, 19M+, 
U2906 /6/70. ' ' 
However, as we s h a l l see, H a l i f a x had much to say regarding the 
wisdom of d e l i v e r i n g such opinions to Morgenthau. 
By A p r i l , the Americans were making much of the dangers o f 
Republican o p p o s i t i o n . The Republican banker, C.S.Dewey, w i t h 
the support of the New York bankers, was proposing to introduce 
an a l t e r n a t i v e d r a f t f o r a monetary i n s t i t u t i o n i n t o Congress, 
which was an emasculation of the Anglo-U.S. J o i n t Statement. 
The U.S. Treasury now argued t h a t they wanted to pre-empt hearings 
on the proposed Dewey B i l l scheduled f o r A p r i l 25 , by Morgenthau 
presenting the J o i n t Statement proposals to Congress p r i o r to 
th a t date. The B r i t i s h t r i e d to e x p l a i n the possible d i f f i c u l t i e s 
f o r the government w i t h Parliament, the press and pu b l i c o p i n i o n 
i f they agreed to the J o i n t Statement as i t stood, but such 
arguments at t h i s time impressed the Americans l i t t l e , ^ ^ 5 ) 
The U.S. Treasury continued to press hard, f o r B r i t i s h agreement. 
On A p r i l 12, Morgenthau wrote to Wlnant. 
"Unless we hear, that the J o i n t Statement can be published 
next week then i t i s my personal o p i n i o n t h a t we s h a l l not 
be able to hold a conference t h i s year". (106) 
Morgenthau added that even o p p o s i t i o n from Beaverbrook and 
the Bank of iSngland was now no longer s u f f i c i e n t reason f o r f u r t h e r 
delay. The American stance was also r e i n f o r c e d by a personal 
l e t t e r from H a l i f a x to Anderson of A p r i l 12, 19M+.^ 1 0^ 
(10?) See Harrod, Op.Cit. p . 560 . 
(106) Morgenthau to Winant A p r i l 1 2 , 1 9 ^ , Quoted i n Blum, 
Op.Cit. p.247. 
(107) See Personal, H a l i f a x to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
A p r i l 12, 1 9 ^ , U31 5 7 / 6 / 7 0 . 
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H a l i f a x expressed the o p i n i o n that the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n was now 
unreasonable, and he considered the Chancellor's l e t t e r to 
Morgenthau of A p r i l 7, unwise. F i r s t of a l l , because i t gave 
the impression that Anderson had only j u s t been informed of the 
U.S. p o s i t i o n on u n i t a s , whereas, according to H a l i f a x , the U.S. 
had made i t clear since the Autumn o f 19^3 t h a t t h i s would 
c o n s t i t u t e a breaking point i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s , i f the American 
p o s i t i o n was not met i n some form. Secondly, the U.S. had been 
very forthcoming on the t r a n s i t i o n a l issue and t h i r d l y because 
of the time f a c t o r Imposed by the impending P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . 
(108 
Due to t h i s , and pressure from Morgenthau and Winant, the 
B r i t i s h decided they would have to r e l y on American verbal 
assurances of p a s s i v i t y regarding the workings of the Fund. On 
A p r i l l l f t h 19*+S t h e Foreign O f f i c e informed Ople i n Washington, 
t h a t Anderson expected to communicate w i t h the Americans on the 
f o l l o w i n g l i n e s w i t h i n f o r t y e i g h t hours. The B r i t i s h would agree 
to the non-unitas version of the Fund provided t h a t i t was 
i n d i c a t e d that the J o i n t Statement was a t e n t a t i v e plan of experts, 
t h a t the proposed i n s t i t u t i o n s were to be p a r t and parcel of a 
broader scheme f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic recovery which would 
all o w t r a n s i t i o n a l safeguards and f i n a l l y , r e a l l y r e i t e r a t i n g 
t h i s l a s t p o i n t , the Fund was to go i n t o f u l l o p e r a t i o n i n stages. 
(109) 
(108) Even Morgenthau admitted to Keynes that H a l i f a x was 
hypersensitive to the coming P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n , 
See Blum, Op.Cit. p.270. 
(109) F.O. to Washington, ApriL, 1^, 19M*, U2906 /6 /70, 
See also Blum, Op.Cit. p.2V7. 
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That r e a l l y , as f a r as the J o i n t Statement waa concerned, 
was t h a t . Morgenthau s t i l l had to perform some r a t n e r sharp 
t a c t i c s to get Ru s s i a n acquiescence f o r the statement on the 2 1 s t , 
b u t Anderson's d e c i s i o n o f the l ^ t h , was r e a l l y the green l i g h t . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , B r i t i s h p r e v a r i c a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the go-ahead f o r 
the statement d i d cause some resentment and s u s p i c i o n s on the 
American s i d e o f the A t l a n t i c , b u t these were l a r g e l y c l e a r e d up 
i n the ensuing weeks. 
The s e t t i n g was now v i r t u a l l y complete. The B r i t i s h had 
committed themselves to a co n f e r e n c e . There was L i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f d r a w i n g oack. The best would have to oe made o f the o u t l i n e s 
a l r e a d y drawn up. At A t l a n t i c C i t y , New J e r s e y , f o r two weeks 
i n June the B r i t i s h and Americans hammered o u t the f i n a l t e c h n i c a l 
d e t a i l s and d i f f e r e n c e s between them. Some minor concessions were 
made, b o t h here and a t B r e t t o n Woods, l a r g e l y by the B r i t i s h , b u t 
the major c o n t r o v e r s i e s had oeen r e s o l v e d u e f o r e the J o i n t S t a t e -
ment, or put i n t o v e r b a l l i m b o , o n l y t o be f i n a l l y d e c i d e d i n the 
p r a c t i c e o f the Fund, The A m e r i c a n s were i n f a c t r e a s o n a b l y 
pleased w i t h the Fund p r o p o s a l s and even some o f the c o n s e r v a t i v e 
o p p o s i t i o n t o the Fund oegan t o s h i f t t o a more f a v o u r a u l e o p i n i o n . 
"By the time o f the B r e t t o n Woods Conference, U.S. 
support f o r the Fund was w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n the Congress, and the o p p o s i t i o n o f the American Bankers' 
A s s o c i a t i o n c o u l d be almost ( b u t not e n t i r e l y ) i g n o r e d , so 
t h a t the U.S. t e c h n i c i a n s were l e s s concerned about a l a r g e r 
Fund. (which was one o f the U.S. c o n c e s s i o n s ) . " (111) 
(110) See H a l i f a x t o C h a n c e l l o r o f Exchequer U3?9 t ;i/6 / 70 , 
A p r i l 3 0 ) and May 2, C h a n c e l l o r o f Exchequer to H a l i f a x , 
i n which he agrees to a June Conference and suggests t h a t 
H a l i f a x might have a f r a n k t a l k w i t h Morgenthau to c l e a r 
up misunder s t a n d i n g s , U3799/6 / 7 0 . 
(111) Quoted i n Kees, Op.Cit. l e t t e r to the a u t h o r f r o m 
E. B e r n s t e i n , dated A p r i l 17, 1971. 
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Reactions i n B r i t a i n a f t e r the J o i n t Statement was p u b l i s h e d 
were, however, somewhat more c a u s t i c . D u r i n g Kay the B r i t i s h 
P a r l i a m e n t debated the proposals and the c r i t i c i s m s t h a t arose 
t h e r e and those put f o r w a r d i n the B r i t i s h press were conveyed to 
W a s h i n g t o n . ^ 1 1 2 ^ The S e c r e t a r i e s o f S t a t e and T r e a s u r y were 
i n f o r m e d by Mr. Casady, an o f f i c i a l o f the U.S. Embassy i n London, 
t h a t : -
"... the o u t s t a n d i n g psychology o f the debate seemed t o be, 
f i r s t the f e a r t h a t a post-war slump i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s 
i s I n e v i t a b l e , and second, the f e a r t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s 
does not a l l o w B r i t a i n and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s to adopt the 
necessary measures o f s e l f - d e f e n c e and t h a t , c o n s e q u e n t l y , 
the U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l d r a g the whole w o r l d down w i t h her 
i n t o the abyss." ( 1 1 3 ) 
The Americans knew t h a t they had pushed the B r i t i s h a long 
way from t h e i r o r i g i n a l v i s i o n o f a C.U. and a t the time o f B r e t t o n 
Woods were c a r e f u l not to press them to concede a n y t h i n g more a t 
t h i s stage. Ned Brown, an i n f l u e n t i a l Chicago banker and a member 
o f the U.S. d e l e g a t i o n a t B r e t t o n Woods, s a i d to h i s f e l l o w 
d e l e g a t e s i -
"... The B r i t i s h have a very s t r o n g o l o c a t home which 
o e l i e v e they are b e t t e r o f f keeping the s t e r l i n g 
b l o c . . . Any p l a n t h a t i s put up i s g o i n g to have v e r y 
rough s l e d d i n g i n the House o f Commons. They may g i v e 
something, but they w i l l break o f f i f we i n s i s t on too 
much." (11^) 
White a l s o warned the U.S. d e l e g a t e s i n a s i m i l a r manner and 
Morgenthau added the p o i n t t h a t B r i t a i n had enormous s t e r l i n g 
d e b t s which;-
"... governed t h e i r approach to economic i s s u e s . " (115) 
( 1 1 2 ) See House o f Commons Deoates 3 9 9 , 1 9 3 5 - 2 0 ^ 6 , 1 9 M * . 
( 1 1 3 ) L e t t e r dated May 1 3 , 1 9 ^ ) Quoted i n Gardner R. Op. Ci t . p. 1 2h 
( 1 1 ^ ) Blum, Op.Cit. Quoted i n , p.2 5 8 . 
( 1 1 5 ) I b i d . p.2 5 9 . 
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However, before we f i n a l l y t u r n to consider the kind o f 
Fund the B r i t i s h accepted, despite or because of t h e i r general 
economic p o s i t i o n and prospects, we must b r i e f l y consider one or 
two a l t e r a t i o n s between the J o i n t Statement and the B r e t t o n Woods 
Agreement. 
F i r s t of a l l , there was a continuing unease experienced by 
the B r i t i s h , on the issue of p a s s i v i t y and d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers. 
They had agreed to drop t h e i r plans f o r the monetisation of u n i t a s , 
which would have gone a long way to ensure the p a s s i v i t y o f the 
Fund and m u l t i l a t e r a l c l e a r i n g , but ear l y i n the conference at 
B r e t t o n Woods the U.S. appeared to be reneging once again on i t s 
commitment to a passive p o l i c y f o r the Fund. 
"... Keynes objected to a p r o v i s i o n I n the American d r a f t 
p e r m i t t i n g the Fund to inform a n a t i o n t h a t i t was pursuing 
i n f l a t i o n a r y p o l i c i e s . 'How would you l i k e i t ' , Keynes 
asked White, ' i f the Fund informed your government that the 
O.P.M. wasn't doing a good job and as a r e s u l t of that you 
had r i s i n g prices?' I n r e p l y White suggested empowering the 
Fund to make i n f o r m a l r e p o r t s at any time, but allowing the 
p u b l i c a t i o n of formal reports only w i t h the permission o f 
the government whose a f f a i r s were under consi d e r a t i o n . 
Under th a t scheme, Keynes could assure Parliament that the 
Fund could not b u t t i n t o B r i t i s h domestic p o l i t i c s . " (116) 
There were also minor issues o f d i f f e r e n c e such as the s i t e 
f o r the Fund headquarters, the su b s c r i p t i o n s to the I.B.R.D, and 
the problem of the s t e r l i n g balances. These l a t t e r two poi n t s 
have been d e a l t w i t h above. On the former p o i n t , the issue was 
resolved by a formula that s p e c i f i e d the country with the l a r g e s t 
quota, rather than s p e c i f i c a l l y naming the U.S., would be the 
home of the Fund. This was s u f f i c i e n t to appease B r i t i s h pride 
which had to look on while the U.S. appropriated the monetary 
and f i n a n c i a l importance once the preserve of the C i t y of London, 
(117) 
( 1 1 6 ) Blum, Op.Cit. pp 2 6 7 - 2 6 8 . 
(117) See Blum, Op.Cit. 
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Let us now draw to a close f o r the moment the c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
of the monetary and f i n a n c i a l t a l k s by b r i e f l y summarising the 
p o s i t i o n s of key importance reached i n the B r e t t o n Woods1Agreement. 
F i r s t of a l l , the size of the Fund and the p o s i t i o n o f gold. 
19^3 that the B r i t i s h knew they would have to give way to the 
Americans on the s u b s c r i p t i o n issue and, thus, i n d i r e c t l y on the 
size of the Fund. The f i n a l agreement was a s l i g h t compromise by 
the Americans but, a l l i n a l l , i t was consistent w i t h the i n i t i a l 
U.S. v i s i o n of a more conservative s t a b i l i s a t i o n programme l i n k e d 
to gold. On the gold issue the B r i t i s h had also to concede much, 
wi t h again minor concessions i n r e t u r n , p a r t i c u l a r l y on the gold 
and f o r e i g n currency proportions of the quotas. Once the 
Americans had b a s i c a l l y won t h e i r way on these p o i n t s , i t was a 
matter of the B r i t i s h attempting to gain counter-concessions i n 
other areas which would Impart to the S.F. some of the character-
i s t i c s of the C.U, Unlike Harrod, I do not t h i n k that Keynes 
ever gave up on the fundamental character of the monetary 
i n s t i t u t i o n . This fundamental character was f r e e access, a l b e i t 
to a reduced pool, o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange. I n i t s reduced 
form and more l i m i t e d character, the S.F. e n t a i l e d a requirement 
f o r c e r t a i n p r ovisions i f Keynes' fundamental, goal was to be 
r e a l i s e d . These were, more f l e x i b i l i t y , e s p e c i a l l y i n the 
t r a n s i t i o n period, the acceptance of c r e d i t o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and 
The narrower scope of o p e r a t i o n i n combination w i t h what appeared 
to be general trends i n American p o l i c i e s also led to s p e c i f i c 
d e c l a r a t i o n s t h a t the Fund was not to concern i t s e l f w i t h r e l i e f 
and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . There were other f a c t o r s o p e r a t i o n a l here, 
such as B r i t a i n ' s p a r t i a l d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h America's idea of 
Well i t was obvious from the s t o r y o f the n e g o t i a t i o n s from e a r l y 
f e g f a ^ ds against sa the over a c t i v e use of d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers. 
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m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m , and the methods to be employed to reach such 
a s t a t e . There was also the paucity o f funds i n the B r i t i s h 
carap f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l i e f and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and the 
renewed concern f o r the S t e r l i n g Area, 
As we have seen, on the p a s s i v i t y issue, the b a t t l e continued 
r i g h t to the f i n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . And i n f a c t , even t h a t was not 
to be the end. With such fundamental d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n on 
t h i s issue i t was i n a way, unavoidable that t h e i r temporary 
r e s o l u t i o n would be an embodiment o f ambiguity. Although a member 
was ' e n t i t l e d 1 to f o r e i g n currency from the Fund i f i t was 
consistent w i t h the A r t i c l e s of Agreement, A r t i c l e V, s e c t i o n 
5, addedi-
"Whenever the Fund i s of the o p i n i o n that any member i s 
using the resources of the Fund i n a manner contrary to 
the purposes o f the Fund i t s h a l l present to the momber 
a re p o r t s e t t i n g f o r t h the views of the Fund and 
pr e s c r i b i n g a s u i t a b l e time f o r r e p l y . A f t e r presenting 
such a r e p o r t to a member the Fund may l i m i t the use o f 
i t s resources or may, a f t e r g i v i n g reasonable n o t i c e to 
the member declare i t i n e l i g i b l e to use the resources o f 
the Fund." (119 ) 
I n a d d i t i o n , A r t i c l e V I I I , Section 5» required that any 
na t i o n , on request, would supply i n f o r m a t i o n to the Fund concern-
ing gold and reserve holdings, gold production and f i g u r e s on the 
domestic economy. The U.S. had given a number of commitments not 
to impose 'the school mistress' s t y l e , as Keynes dubbed i t , on 
the Fund and yet i t was f a i r l y obvious from the wording o f the 
agreement that there were s u f f i c i e n t p r o v i s i o n s , of s u f f i c i e n t 
vagueness, to allow the Fund to exercise both d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
powers and I n t e r f e r i n g influences upon the n a t i o n a l economies, 
(118) See A r t i c l e V, Section 3 a , 3 a ( i ) , 'Basic Documents 1 9 ^ 1 - ^ 9 . . 
Op.Cit. p.278. 
(119) I b i d . p.279. 
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The key to t h i s wouLd be the nature of the Fund's executive and 
t h i s was not decided upon u n t i l the inaugural meeting at 
Savanah i n March 1 9 ^ 6 , when B r i t i s h expectations were rudely 
disappointed. 
On the t r a n s i t i o n a l issue, the B r i t i s h had had a cl e a r e r 
success; f o r the time being anyway. Although the provisions 
appeared incompatible with the expressed aims o f the State Depart-
ment, and t h i s was to t e l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y l a t e r , under A r t i c l e 
XIV, s e c t i o n 2 , a country was allowed to maintain war-time 
r e s t r i c t i o n s f o r three years. A f t e r the three year period, and 
t h i s was a notable concession, gained by the B r i t i s h at B r e t t o n 
Woods, there was to be a f u r t h e r two-year extension when r e s t r i c t -
ions would simply be subject to an annual review by the Fund. 
A f t e r the f i v e years, r e s t r i c t i o n s would be subject to Fund 
sanctions under A r t i c l e XV, s e c t i o n 2 a , i f they were i n c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h the purposes of the Fund. These provisions l a r g e l y a l l a y e d 
B r i t i s h a n x i e t i e s i n the monetary f i e l d regarding the t r a n s i t i o n a l 
p eriod, p a r t i c u l a r l y so f a r as the S t e r l i n g Area was concerned. 
I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s the procedure f o r exchange r a t e adjustments, 
both i n the short and long term,seemed reasonably acceptable. 
On the Issue o f c r e d i t o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the Americans 
appeared to have been most forthcoming, more so than the B r i t i s h 
had r e a l l y expected. The Fund was not only authorised to r a t i o n 
scarce currencies, but members were also allowed complete 
j u r i s d i c t i o n i n imposing temporary l i m i t a t i o n s on freedom of 
exchange. ^ ^ 0 ) However, t h i s would depend l a r g e l y upon the 
acceptance of the n o t i o n of ' c r e d i t o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' . As 
Richard Gardner has pointed out, there could be a danger of 
(120) See I b i d , A r t i c l e V I I , Section 3 ( b ) . 
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s c a r c i t y a r i s i n g outside the Fund. For example, the U.S., 
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h the l i m i t e d size o f the Fund, could increase 
i t s quota to supply more d o l l a r s to the Fund and t e c h n i c a l l y 
there would be no shortage i f i t Increased i t s quota to the l i m i t 
of the aggregate t o t a l of a l l other members of the Fund, I n 
e f f e c t even t h i s would be dependent upon the U.S. accepting t o t a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the d i s e q u i l i b r i u m . I t would be f a r more 
l i k e l y that the U.S. would argue t h a t the imbalance was due to 
i r r e s p o n s i b l e acceptanje o f d e o i t balances of trade by c e r t a i n 
members, and a l l e g e that t h i s was contrary to the aims of the 
Fund under A r t i c l e V, s e c t i o n 5- Thus, a l o t would depend 
on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the clause. Once again, we s h a l l see 
much was said i n the U.S. when the Fund was discussed before 
Congress and the public which was to cast a d o u b t f u l shadow over 
the workings o f the scarce currency clause and the balance between 
c r e d i t o r and debtor r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
Angl so t h i s was the outcome of f i v e years of t a l k s , p r i m a r i l y 
between the U.S. and the U.K., on monetary problems. We have 
seen a great deal of the problems s p e c i f i c to the monetary and 
f i n a n c i a l t a l k s and some of a more general economic nature. We 
have also seen the concern d i r e c t e d towards f i t t i n g the monetary 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t o a wider context of economic planning f o r the 
t r a n s i t i o n period and f o r the longer term problems of trade and 
commodity c o n t r o l s . To these problems we must now t u r n back to 
and attempt to f i l l i n a more comprehensive p i c t u r e of the 
economic d i f f e r e n c e s , the plans and the a s p i r a t i o n s of the two 
sides and the stage that they had reached as the war drew to an 
end. 
(121 ) See I b i d . 
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CHAPTER 5. 
Trade and Reserves: The D i s t o r t i o n s o f 
War and the Price of Help. 
A f t e r 19^0 the whole basis of the B r i t i s h economy was 
a l t e r e d . U n t i l 19^0) as we have seen, the U.K. attempted to 
pay f o r the war e f f o r t by an export d r i v e , the r e d u c t i o n o f her 
gold and reserve holdings and the l i q u i d a t i o n o f her overseas 
assets. Despite these d r a s t i c p o l i c i e s by the Autumn of 19^-0 
B r i t i s h orders f o r American supplies were at a s t a n d s t i l l due 
to s c a r c i t y o f d o l l a r s , Some i n t e r i m measures, such as the 
R.F.C. Loan, the sale of the Viscose Corporation, Canadian 
generosity, e t c . , were p a r t i a l l y and temporarily successful, 
though unpalatable to the B r i t i s h . I n d i c a t i v e o f t h i s was the 
r e a c t i o n to Jesse Jones' 'war d i s a s t e r clause 1 i n the R.F.C.Loan, 
and the low r e t u r n on the pressurised sale o f the Viscose Co. 
I t was not u n t i l the i n c e p t i o n o f the Lend-Lease arrangement t h a t 
a long term s o l u t i o n to the supply problem was discovered. 
The Lend-Lease supply mechanisms had a number of important 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r B r i t a i n . A large p r o p o r t i o n of her f o r e i g n 
trade was now on a non-commercial basis. She was supplied by the 
U.S. w i t h m a t e r i a l necessary to wage war against Germany and her 
a l l i e s . The export d r i v e was now abandoned by the U.K. and 
domestic i n d u s t r y geared to war production. The m o b i l i s a t i o n o f 
the U.K. f o r war production was p r o p o r t i o n a l l y f a r higher than 
the U.S. While B r i t a i n abandoned her export markets the U.S. 
began to step i n t o her place, supplying p a r t i c u l a r l y i n L a t i n 
America countries which previously had been the preserve o f the 
U.K. export i n d u s t r i e s . Not content w i t h t h i s , r e s t r i c t i o n s 
were also placed on B r i t a i n ' s remaining export p o t e n t i a l . 
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The Americans d i d not want B r i t a i n to e f f e c t i v e l y subsidise her 
exports by the use of materials obtained on Lend-Lease. As the 
war continued the B r i t i s h became very concerned w i t h these 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . I n e f f e c t they would i n h i b i t the r e s u s c i t a t i o n o f 
B r i t i s h exports and i t was feared t h a t t h e i r c o n t i n u a t i o n would 
s e r i o u s l y prejudice the chances of B r i t i s h reconversion and post-
war economic recovery. The d e t a i l s o f the Lend-Lease saga and 
t a l k s f o r the supercesslon of the export white paper w i l l be 
considered s h o r t l y . F i r s t , however, part of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r 
Lend-Lease should be looked a t . We have already studied the 
progress of the monetary t a l k s . Their complement was the 
commercial t a l k s which took place over a s i m i l a r period of time. 
The U.S. decided that i f the U.K. could not pay i n kind f o r 
Lend Lease then some p o l i t i c a l and economic concessions of a 
s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t s o r t would have to be made. I n the commercial 
t a l k s t h i s consisted of reducing trade b a r r i e r s to the advantage 
of the U.S. and opening I m p e r i a l and Commonwealth markets to the 
U.S. The a u t h o r i t y f o r such demands stemmed from t he p r i n c i p l e s 
embodied I n A r t i c l e 7 of the Mutual Assistance Agreement. 
However, at the same time the U.S. were prepared to perpetuate 
anomalies, and even support the i n t r o d u c t i o n of such anomalies, 
I f t h e i r i n c e p t i o n was to t he advantage of the U.S. S t i l l , the 
Mutual Assistance Act was followed by months of i n a c t i v i t y on 
the American side w i t h l i t t l e progress on post-war planning 
except f o r the p r e l i m i n a r i e s to the f i n a n c i a l t a l k s . However, 
on both sides o f the A t l a n t i c , thoughts were being d i r e c t e d 
towards the p o l i c i e s o f post-war trade and commerce. By 19^3 
both the B r i t i s h and the Americans were t u r n i n g towards t he idea 
of an i n f o r m a l exchange of ideas i n the context o f the A r t i c l e 7 
p r o v i s i o n s . As L i o n e l Kobbins records:-
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"... we had signed the Lend-Lease Agreement; and, whatever 
the s t r i c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s to be placed upon the exact 
wording thereof, no one could deny t h a t we had pledged 
ourselves to a j o i n t e x p l o r a t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f 
cr e a t i n g a more s a t i s f a c t o r y framework f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
economic r e l a t i o n s . To anyone at a l l acquainted w i t h the 
p o l i t i c a l scene i n the United States, the danger to our 
f u t u r e i f we renounced t h i s undertaking and began an 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of a l l those p r a c t i c e s which the Lend-Lease 
agreement was intended to d i m i n i s h was not encouraging to 
put i t m i l d l y . I t would have been regarded as a p l a i n 
d e c l a r a t i o n of economic warfare." ( 1 ) 
There was considerable concern i n the U.K. over American 
enthusiasm f o r a rapid r e s t o r a t i o n of trade, commercial and 
monetary l a i s s e z - f a i r e . The B r i t i s h concurred i n t h i s p o l i c y 
provided that the economic s i t u a t i o n was appropriate. C e r t a i n 
conditions would have to be met i f the d i s s o l u t i o n of economic 
and monetary c o n t r o l s were to be possible. Keynes, as we have 
seen, was g r e a t l y annoyed by Pasvolsky's references to him as a 
proponent of economic c o n t r o l s without q u a l i f i c a t i o n and regardless 
( 2 ) 
o f c o n d i t i o n s . The Americans appeared r e l u c t a n t , or perhaps 
unable, at times, to recognise the problems which would face 
B r i t a i n i n the reconversion period. The B r i t i s h c o n s i s t e n t l y 
argued that i n the face of the loss of overseas assets, shipping, 
export markets and reserves, her own and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
problems of reconversion to a peace-time economy, the U.K. would 
have to r e l y on a vast expansion of her exuort trade, to pay her 
way i n the world. Even as l a t e as August 19M+ t h i s was s t i l l 
(1 ) Lord Robbins, 'Autobiography of an hiconomist 1, Macmillan 
1 9 7 1 , P.195. The Economic Section of the War Cabinet O f f i c e s 
i n 19^0 was headed by John Jewkes. The s e c t i o n was 
i n v i g o r a t e d under the leadership of S i r John Anderson, 
Lord President, October 3 , 1 91+0-September 2 ^ , 1 9 ^ 3 - Shortly 
a f t e r October 19^0 Jewkes was moved to the M i n i s t r y of 
A i r c r a f t Production and was succeeded i n the Economic Section 
by Lord Bobbins. 
( 2 ) See 'The Pasvolsky Memo.' i n H a l i f a x to iflden, December 16,19L*-1 
W 3 6 7 / 8 1 A 9 , and Keynes's notes on i t , January 5, 19^2 , 
W 3 6 7 / 8 1 A 9 . 
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B r i t a i n ' s answer to her economic problems. ^ I n B r i t i s h 
o p i n i o n t h i s could best be e f f e c t e d by m u l t i l a t e r a l reductions o f 
trade b a r r i e r s over an extended p e r i o d , such tnat there would be 
a q u a l i t a t i v e change i n the whole sphere of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r a n s a c t i o n s . Only as a very i n f e r i o r second best was a system 
of p r o t e c t i o n based on the S t e r l i n g Area considered at t h i s time. 
Support was added to a s l i g h t extent to t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e by the 
p o l i t i c a l requirement that any export led recovery should not be 
at the expense of domestic d e f l a t i o n , a consequence p r o t e c t i o n 
was thought to avoid. Nevertheless, there was a clear preference 
i n the Board o f Trade, the Treasury, the War Cabinet Economic 
Section and Lord Cherwell's group of economists r e f e r r e d to as 
'S1 Branch, f o r m u l t i l a t e r a l trade and monetary arrangements on a 
l i b e r a l basis. There were opponents to t h i s across the spectrum 
of m i n i s t r i e s and p a r t i c u l a r l y from the Burma O f f i c e , the I n d i a 
O f f i c e , the A g r i c u l t u r a l M i n i s t r y and the Dominions O f f i c e . 
Nevertheless, the prevalent wish was f o r m u l t i l a t e r a l i s n , provided 
complementary conditions and p o l i c i e s were also i n evidence. 
Thus, i n February, Shackle at the Board o f Tfade i n a memorandum 
wrote the f o l l o w i n g : - , 
3 
'M. I d e a l l y , the Board of Trade regard a m u l t i l a t e r a l syste 
as the d e s i r a b l e basis f o r t h i s country's trade and f o r 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l trade generally. They take t h i s view both on 
economic grounds and on general grounds. Economic because 
(a) under favourable conditions a m u l t i l a t e r a l system should 
render possible a greater volume of trade that (sic.than?) 
any system o f b i l a t e r a l payments arrangements.... 
(b; because a m u l t i l a t e r a l system would favour some r e s t o r a t 
i o n of t h i s country's p o s i t i o n , as a centre of merchanting, 
shipping, insurance and finance." (Wj 
( 3 ) See note on the meeting between Anderson and Morgenthau, 
August 1 1 , 1 9 ^ , Uti / 7 6 5 / 5 / 7 1 • 
C1*-) Board of Trade Memo, Shackle to P.O. February 12 , 19^2 , 
W2317 /27A9 -
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At the same time the Board o f Trade noted t h a t there were 
a number of u n s a t i s f a c t o r y p o i n t s i n the U.S. proposals to move 
towards the establishment of such a system. The M.F.N, p r i n c i p l e 
which the U.S. had advocated so f e r v e n t l y could simply mean 
e q u a l i t y o f treatment before a high t a r i f f w a l l . The U.S. 
concentration on preferences as the main e v i l of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
commerce was also too s i m p l i s t i c . Reductions i n t h i s f i e l d would 
also have to include t a r i f f s as w e l l , and at th a t time i n 19^2 
there were few suggestions as to how to deal w i t h the very complex 
and time consuming procedures, to date necessary, f o r t h e i r 
r e d u c t i o n . I n the face of these problems, the Board o f Trade 
expressed the o p i n i o n that the U.K. would probably .nave to continue 
w i t h the economic c o n t r o l s and b i l a t e r a l arrangements a f t e r the 
(5) 
war f o r some time, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the t r a n s i t i o n p eriod. '* 
The Board was thus aware of the need f o r some pragmatism 
i n i t s approach to post-war planning to ensure the necessary 
f l e x i b i l i t y i n the morass of f l u c t u a t i n g economic and p o l i t i c a l 
contingencies. No one economic issue or p o l i c y could solve 
B r i t a i n ' s economic d i f f i c u l t i e s . The problem had to be attacked 
on a broad f r o n t . I n the Autumn of 1 9 l +1 , Keynes drew up proposals 
f o r a b u f f e r stock scheme. I n t h i s he was motivated p a r t l y by 
pressure from Harrod and h i s strong r e a c t i o n to the U.S. wheat 
proposals and the conference which he described ass-
"... a shameless example of ' d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ' against 
countries which were not p a r t i e s to I t ..." ( 6 ) 
( 5 ) f o r above see I b i d , i n which para 15 states t h a t t h i s i s the 
"... general o u t l i n e of the Board o f Trade's views i n the 
matter o f commercial p o l i c y . . . " The Board o f Trade at t h i s 
time was experiencing a number of changes i n i t s m i n i s t e r i a l 
leadership: S i r A. Duncan, June 2 9 , 19^1 -February K} 19^2 ; 
L l e w e l l i n to February 2 2 , 19^+2; Dalton to 19^5- These 
changes e s p e c i a l l y to Dalton do not seem to have r a d i c a l l y 
a f f e c t e d the Board's p o l i c i e s . 
( 6 ) See Harrod, Op.Cit. p.531. 
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ALso i n the Autumn of 194-1 the B r i t i s h were considering the 
17) 
1Gulick-Hansen proposals." The proposals, sponsored by the 
State Department never became o f c e n t r a l concern though they 
r e f l e c t e d the m u l t i l a t e r a l approach and t h e i r ideas were l a t e r 
incorporated I n the U.S. commercial convention plan and also i n 
the B r i t i s h commercial union i n s t i g a t e d l a r g e l y by J.E.Meade. 
Yet, despite the concern over various aspects of commercial p o l i c y 
as we have seen i n chapter two, there was l i t t l e progress made i n 
terms of nego t i a t i o n s between the two countries d u r i n g 19^2. 
This i s not to say there was a complete void. Often, i n the 
gradual e v o l u t i o n of the monetary t a l k s towards the end of the 
year, some of the commercial problems l i k e l y to a r i s e were touched 
upon and there was s t i l l a c o n t i n u i n g , though d e s u l t r y , exchange 
of views on the supplementary trade agreement proposals. The 
delay on the American side to enter i n t o A r t i c l e 7 t a l k s ^ ^ 
allowed the U.K. some time to draw up d e t a i l e d plans f o r commercis. 
p o l i c y . Hugh Dalton, who had become President of the Board of 
Trade the day a f t e r the signing o f the Mutual Aid Agreement, 
established a ^roup o f economists to d r a f t out what was to become 
the proposals f o r a commercial union. The prep a r a t i o n o f the 
( 9 ) 
study was entrusted to S i r P e r c i v a l Liesching ' and the 
economises b r a i n behind the planning was to be that of J.E.Meade. 
Meade was seconded from the Economic Section of the Cabinet 
O f f i c e s f o r t h i s . 
( 7 ) Professor A l v i n Hansen was a w e l l Known U.S. economist and 
government adviser. Gulick was a consultant of the National 
Planning Board and an expert on T.V.A.) 
(8 ) See Chapter 2 . 
( 9 ) Who had been I n the Dominions O f f i c e 194-1-4-2, 194-2-46 Second 
Secretary Board of Trade. 
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By January 19^+3 planning on commercial, commodity and 
monetary p o l i c i e s had progressed i n the U.K. to a f a i r l y advanced 
stage. The procedure f o r f u r t h e r i n g these plans i n the i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l f i e l d , however, was s t i l l i n doubt. N.B.Ronald ( 1°\ 
on January 2 6 , 1 9 ^ 3 , wrote to Liesching on t h i s question. Ronald 
was i n c l i n e d to be rather apprehensive about B r i t a i n ' s economic 
f u t u r e and of American p o l i c i e s . He expressed the hope to Liesch-
ing that the commercial t a l k s would be held a f t e r the monetary 
ones and i d e a l l y a f t e i the commodity and investment t a l k s i -
"... and any how not before we have reason to fear that 
we are about to be confronted w i t h a set o f American 
proposals so unacceptable to us as to put us on the bad 
tempered 'defensive 1." (11) 
Ronald was d o u b t f u l about the p r a c t i c a l i t y of any B r i t i s h commit-
ments to m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m f o r some time to come, and deprecated 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of entering i n t o formal commitments at such an 
e a r l y stage while h o s t i l i t i e s were placing I n question a l l 
e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s . His procedural proposals only went as f a r 
as an i n f o r m a l conference, t r a n s i t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s , c o l l a b o r a t i o n 
w i t h i n e x i s t i n g provisions and the r e s t was e f f e c t u a l l y r e s t r i c t e d 
to statements of a s p i r a t i o n s . He concluded: 
" I t seems to be impossible to foresee w i t h any degree of 
accuracy what the considered response of the U.S. w i l l 
be to the Plan. Their i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n i s f a i r l y c e r t a i n 
to be tinged w i t h suspicion coupled with extreme reluctance 
to contemplate so large a s a c r i f i c e of f i s c a l independence 
as i s demanded by the scheme." ( 12 ) 
(10 ) Assistant Under-Secretary at the F.O. i n charge of the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department, which was concerned 
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h post-war problems 194-2-!+7. 
(11 ) Ronald to Liesching, January 2 6 , 1 9 ^ 3 , U 2 1 5 A 7 / 7 0 . 
(12 ) I b i d . 
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However, Ronald was by no means an extremist on t h i s . 
S i r Hubert Henderson^^^ was even more pe s s i m i s t i c and suspicious 
of American motives. These doubts were also p a r t l y shared by 
S i r F. P h i l l i p s . P h i l l i p s thought t h a t the U.S. would not be very 
pleased about the proposed d e f i n i t e shelving o f the supplementary 
trade agreement t a l k s and a move to more general discussions. 
The B r i t i s h proposals, as f a r as the Americans were aware of them 
already, appeared to go beyond what was acceptable to the 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n or Congress. Indeed, P h i l l i p s cautioned London 
tha t some of the proposals could prove embarasslng to the U.K. 
i f c onditions were to change somewhat. He suggested that a more 
t e n t a t i v e l i n e should be adopted, i n c l u d i n g the i n s i s t e n c e t h a t 
a s a t i s f a c t o r y monetary arrangement should be a sine qua non f o r 
C14-) 
the adoption o f a l a i s s e z - f a i r e commercial p o l i c y . 
Both Ronald and Hopkins saw the p o s i t i o n I n the l i g h t of 
securing safeguards to enable B r i t a i n to recoup i t s trade losses 
before being committed to any hard and f a s t t r a d i n g p r i n c i p l e s 
which might, as conditions changed, prove p r e j u d i c i a l to t h a t 
recovery. Hence t h e i r reluctance to see the commercial t a l k s 
advance ahead of the monetary commodity and investment planning. 
A f t e r a l l , t h i s would have a d i r e c t bearing on the type of 
commercial p o l i c y t h a t B r i t a i n could adhere t o . Liesching on 
the other hand while recognising the need to advance on a broad 
f r o n t , believed Ronald had gone too f a r . He argued that i t was 
the very inter-dependence which made i t necessary that a f u l l 
spectrum of p r e l i m i n a r y t a l k s be c a r r i e d out so t h a t p r i o r i t i e s 
(13 ) Economic Adviser to the Treasury, 194-1-4-4-. 




could be c l e a r l y established i n a general p i c t u r e ^ 1 ^ \ I n f a c t , 
one o f the things t h a t was worrying Ronald and P h i l l i p s , the 
ab o r t i v e attempts during 1 9*+2 to oegln A r t i c l e 7 t a l k s began to 
be eroded i n the e a r l y Spring by American I n i t i a t i v e s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n the monetary t a l k s . 
I n f a c t , e a r l y i n 19^3) Ambassador Winant suggested to Eden 
tha t the two countries should attempt to make some progress on 
A r t i c l e 7 issues and Eden responded favourably. P h i l l i p s and 
Opie I n Washington began to engage i n exp l o r a t o r y t a l k s . I t was 
obvious t h a t trie Americans had been doing some work on s i m i l a r 
l i n e s to the B r i t i s h and i n mid-February Pasvolsky said to them 
th a t I n h i s o p i n i o n , regardless of the eventual procedure ado p ted, 
account would have to be taken so th a t a l l the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
arrangements hang together. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , at the same time, 
A.A.Berle added t h a t although they had made some progress on 
investment and commodity schemes i n t e r e s t was f a r from u n i v e r s a l 
and enthusiasm l a c k i n g . So the reassurance from one that a 
comprehensive approach would be considered was immediately 
(17) 
q u a l i f i e d by the other i n terms o f p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c a l i t i e s . 
I n B r i t a i n by e a r l y February, a d e t a i l e d d r a f t of a commodity 
scheme had been produced and was issued i n the form of a 
Cabinet Memorandum from S i r Wil l i a m J o w i t t , the Mi n i s t e r without 
p o r t f o l i o , on March 5- The scheme was intended to s t a b i l i s e the 
prices of some basic commodities by means of b u f f e r stocks held 
by a c e n t r a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o u n c i l , wnich were to be bought and 
sold c o n t r a - c y c l i c a l l y . I n cases of chronic i n s t a b i l i t y t h i s 
(15) See Lieschlng to Ronald, January 2 8 , 19^3 j U l+63A7/70. 
(16 ) See Chapter 2 and i n p a r t i c u l a r Ronald to Campbell, February 
18 , 19L+-3, and Campbell to Ronald i n r e p l y , A p r i l W ,191+3, 
both U671A7/70. 
(17) See P h i l l i p s to Eady, February 17 , 1 9 ^ 3j meeting at State 
Dept. on post-war currency proposals P h i l l i p s , Opie, u e r l e and Pasvolsky, U 9 1 5 A 7 / 7 0 . F ' P » u e r j - e 
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was to be combined w i t h production r e g u l a t i o n . One of the more 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l points was the maintenance of subsidies to ensure 
an adequate standard of l i v i n g f o r home producers; but they:-
"... should be confined w i t h i n moderate l i m i t s and l i m i t e d 
to produce which i s consumed as w e l l as produced at home." 
( 18 ) 
The B r i t i s h Government had given a number of assurances that the 
expansion of domestic a g r i c u l t u r e would not be simply a war-time 
expedient. This e n t a i l e d government f i n a n c i a l support i n one 
form or another, i n t h i s case i t was to be subsidies. On the 
other side of the A t l a n t i c the Americans were eagerly looking f o r 
markets i n which to s e l l t h e i r Western Hemisphere surpluses. We 
have already seen t h e i r unscrupulous waiving o f t h e i r own trade 
p r i n c i p l e s during the ab o r t i v e wheat t a l k s so they were obviously 
going to have some reservations over these new B r i t i s h commodity 
proposals. The U.S. were also u n l i k e l y to approve of proposed 
powers i n the commodity cou n c i l to i n v i t e countries under c e r t a i n 
conditions - to abate t a r i f f s , nor of the a l l o c a t i o n of power 
w i t h i n the council which was to be s i m i l a r to the provisions i n the 
C.U. 
During March there again appeared to be t r o u b l e w i t h the 
Americans and t h e i r d e s i r e to proceed wi t h the U.K. on A r t i c l e 7 
t a l k s . A p a r t from the monetary t a l k s , the Americans 
appeared somewhat i l l - p r e p a r e d and the ever r e c u r r e n t i n t e r n a l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s were causing a d d i t i o n a l problems. 
On May 13 , Robbins i n a l e t t e r to Eady expressed concern 
over submitting the B r i t i s h document on commodity c o n t r o l s to the 
U.S., p a r t i c u l a r l y Ln view of the proposals f o r v o t i n g r i g h t s 
( 18 ) I n t e r n a t i o n a l Regulation of Primary Products dated 
February 5 ,19 I +3 ) Memo by M i n i s t e r without P o r t f o l i o , 
S i r W.Jowitt, WP(^3)97, March 5 , 1 9 ^ 3 , U1716 /310 /70 . 
( 19 ) See Ch .2 , e s p e c i a l l y March 2 , 19^3» Keynes i n t h i r d 
Treasury/F.O. meeting U 9 3 3 A 7 / 7 0 . 
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which had already caused trouble i n the monetary t a l k s . Robbins 
suggested t h a t more innocuous proposals should be put forward and 
submitted to the Americans i f a s u i t a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y arose. 
On May 16 , a memorandum on b u f f e r stocks was handed to Acheson 
and Pasvolsky to help the State department f a m i l i a r i s e i t s e l f w i t h 
B r i t i s h t h i n k i n g . ( 2 0 ) ^ h i s i n f a c t was becoming o f more concern 
because of the Hot Springs Conference on food. By May 21 s t , 
a f t e r t a l k i n g w i t h Pasvolsky, i t appeared to the B r i t i s h t h a t he 
was i n favour o f discussing p r i n c i p l e s o f commodity c o n t r o l at 
the coherence, but not the d e t a i l s , and he suggested t h a t the 
d e t a i l e d B r i t i s h document should only be produced a f t e r the 
conference, i f at a l l . This was a f a i r i n d i c a t i o n of the 
reservations the State Department had developed about some of the 
provisions the U.K. had submitted to them. Before we progress 
any f u r t h e r i t would c l a r i f y things somewhat i f the Hot Springs' 
Conference was b r i e f l y studied. The conference was very much of 
a s u r p r i s e package from F.D.R. The idea was to organise a m u l t i -
l a t e r a l conference on a f a i r l y n on-controvercial t o p i c as a 
t e s t i n g ground f o r t h i s type of procedure. The U.S. i n t i m a t e d 
t h a t i f the outcome of t h i s conference was auspicious then the 
U.S. would be more disposed to proceed w i t h dispatch to the 
consideration of other economic issues. 
The Conference May 18-June 1 9 , was regarded by the State 
Department as very much of a side show, organised by the President 
i n h i s and Morgenthau's growing i n c l i n a t i o n f o r m u l t i l a t e r a l 
conferences. H u l l also favoured t h i s approach, though other 
members o f h i s department were less e n t h u s i a s t i c , nevertheless 
(20 ) See Wright to G.Jebb, Minute of a conversation U 2 9 7 ^ / 8 1 0 / 7 0 . 
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even he was concerned w i t h wider commercial plans. Acheson's 
comment on the conference was t h a t s -
"... nothing o f much account happened..." (21 ) 
The conference was chaired by Judge Marvin Jones of the U.S. 
Court of Claims, w i t h Appleby under-secretary o f a g r i c u l t u r e and 
W.L.Clayton, a s s i s t a n t secretary o f commerce as the main U.S. 
p a r t i c i p a n t s . On the B r i t i s h side Law and Hobbins were the two 
most prominent delegates. The American notice f o r the conference 
was p a r t i c u l a r l y b r i e f and indeed was postponed f o r a while due 
to U.K. and Soviet p r o t e s t s . The B r i t i s h at l e a s t d i d have some 
In f o r m a l exchanges, p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h Pasvolsky, over some of the 
problems t h a t were l i k e l y to a r i s e , and they were also allowed 
a preview of the agenda. The U.K. was concerned that the 
conference might lead to a premature c o n s i d e r a t i o n of problems 
connected to other areas of economic a c t i v i t y . The M i n i s t r y o f 
( 22 ) 
Food, now under Lord Woolton , did however receive the 
i n v i t a t i o n eagerly. They saw i t as an o p p o r t u n i t y to press f o r 
the expansion of world food production. Even Woolton saw 
problems though. The main v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the U.K. i n t h i s area 
stemmed from the f a c t t h a t she was a major importer of food-
s t u f f s . B r i t a i n wanted to put forward the argument t h a t there 
would be a great food s c a r c i t y a f t e r the war. This of course 
would enable the B r i t i s h to argue f o r a reasonable productive 
capacity f o r her own farmers and to safeguard i t i n the form o f 
subsidies. However, i f the p o i n t was pushed too f a r , there was 
a danger of f o r e i g n requests to make r a t i o n i n g s t r i c t e r and f o r 
( 21 ) Acheson, Op.Cit. p.7?. 
(22 ) May 13 , 1 94-O-November 1 1 , 1 9*+3 . 
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i n s u r a n c e f o r the major s u p p l i e r s a g a i n s t a slump. Thus, the 
cleavage between the i m p o r t i n g and the e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s , which 
had a l r e a d y been demonstrated a t the wheat n e g o t i a t i o n s , c o u l d be 
exacerbated r a t h e r than a m e l i o r a t e d by the t a l k s . There were 
a l s o doubts about the c h a r a c t e r o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l l i n g 
body. However, the B r i t i s h , i n the face o f a p o s s i b l e o n s l a u g h t 
f r o m the pro d u c e r s , decided some p o s i t i v e i n i t i a t i v e on t h e i r 
b e h a l f was necessary. 
" I t was f e l t t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the U n i t e d Kingdom d e l e g a t i o n 
ought r a t h e r t o take the l e a d i n pr o p o s i n g t h a t a new 
o r g a n i s a t i o n be set up; b u t should endeavour t o secure t h a t 
i t be endowed w i t h no e x e c u t i v e powers, and indeed t h a t no 
at t e m p t be made by the Conference i t s e l f t o d r a f t a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . Rather should some c o n t i n u i n g committee be 
l e f t w i t h the task o f w o r k i n g o u t olans f o r b r i b i n g i t i n t o 
use." ' ( 2 3 ) 
I n f a c t , the outcome o f the conference was e x t r e m e l y t e n t a t i v e . 
On the whole the B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n f a r e d w e l l , and R i c h a r d Law i n 
p a r t i c u l a r . There were l i v e l y d i s c u s s i o n s o f the problem o f raw 
m a t e r i a l s a c c o r d i n g t o E.F.Penrose, and somewhat d i v e r g e n t o p i n i o n s 
w i t h i n the B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n on the Issue o f b u f f e r s t o c k s as a 
p a r t i a l s o l u t i o n to the problem o f commodity su p p l y f l u c t u a t i o n s . 
Appelby was more sy m p a t h e t i c t h a n C l a y t o n t o t h e B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l s , 
b u t t h e r e was g e n e r a l agreement t h a t f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the 
problem was necessary, and the d e t a i l e d B r i t i s h paper was 
w i t h h e l d pending f u r t h e r t a l k s . 
( 2 3 ) H i s t o r y o f the Second World War, U.K. C i v i l S e r i e s Food I , 
W.K.Hancock, London 1 9 5 1 j HMSO and Longman's Green & Co. 
p. 3 5 8 . See a l s o Ch . 2 8 f o r f u r t h e r d e c a i l s . The B r i t i s h 
d e l e g a t i o n was to concern i t s e l f w i t h f o r m u l a t i n g the aims 
o f the o r g a n i s a t i o n i n terms o f s h o r t term post-war d u t i e s , 
r e s e a r c h and n u t r i t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s . On A p r i l 2 2 , 1 9 ^ 3 ) the 
above was approved by the War Cabinet w i t h one amendment. 
The U.K. d e l e g a t e s were n o t to propose t he c o n t i n u a t i o n o f 
r a t i o n i n g post-war, b u t , t o support the U.S. on t h i s i f they 
took the i n i t i a t i v e . 
( 2 * 0 See Penrose, Op.Clt. p . 7 6 . 
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Both Apnelby and C l a y t o n thought t h a t more a t t e n t i o n would have 
to be pa i d to the a c t u a l c o n t r o l o f p r o d u c t i o n t o make the b u f f e r 
s t o c k i d e a work. The g e n e r a l t e n t a t l v e n e s s and avoidance o f 
d e t a i l i n d i c a t e d t h a t l i t t l e s u b s t a n t i a l progress was made a t Hot 
S p r i n g s , indeed t h i s was e p i t o m i s e d i n the g e n e r a l i t y o f A r t i c l e 
2 5 : -
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l commodity arrangements may p l a y a u s e f u l 
p a r t i n the advancement o f these ends." ( 2 ? ) 
but f u r t h e r study i s ecessary to e s t a b l i s h the p r e c i s e forms 
which these arrangements should take and whether and to what 
e x t e n t r e g u l a t i o n s o f p r o d u c t i o n may be needed. 
The t h i r t y r e s o l u t i o n s o f the conference c o n s i s t e d o f r a t h e r 
p l a t i t u d i n o u s g e n e r a l recommendations, c r i t i c i s e d h a r m f u l 
r e s t r i c t i o n s , c a l l e d f o r b e t t e r use o f resources and d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f p r o d u c t s and c a l l e d f o r an i n t e r i m commission to be set up not 
l a t e r t h an J u l y 1 9 ^ 3 , to execute the alms o f the confe r e n c e . 
( ? 7 ) 
As W.K.Hancock notes the measures o f more immediate concern 
were recommendations pushed by the B r i t i s h f o r the i n t e r i m p e r i o d , 
which encouraged a c e r e a l p r o d u c t i o n d r i v e and p e r p e t u a t e d the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n and a l l o c a t i o n o f food and s h i p p i n g . 
A l t h o u g h a l l seemed w e l l a t Hot S p r i n g s , and indeed i t d i d 
g i v e some encouragement to t i i e U.S. to speed t h i n g s up somewhat 
i n o t h ^ r economic spheres, the conference i t s e l f had been r a t h e r 
( 2 5 ) i . e . , more even f l o w o f produce, e q u i t a b l e r e t u r n s and p r i c e s 
e t c . 
( 2 6 ) Cmd. 6^+51 , 1 9 V 3 , Hot S p r i n g s Conference, F i n a l A c t . 
( 2 7 ) Op.Cit. p p . 3 6 1 - 3 6 2 . 
(23) The i n t e r i m committee which i s o f l i t t l e f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t 
to us d i d come i n t o e f f e c t and was the nucleus from which 
the U.N. F.A.O. g r a d u a l l y emerged. For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s on 
food p o l i c y see Hancock, Op.Cit. 
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d e v o i d o f s u b s t a n t i a l i s s u e s . The problems o f B r i t i s h a g r i c u l t u r e 
had not been d e a l t w i t h f u l l y and indeed any d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
o f the key i s s u e - the c o n t r o l o f commodity f l u c t u a t i o n s had been 
v i r t u a l l y i g n o r e d . More d e t a i l e d and s p e c i f i c t a l k s were r e q u i r e d . 
T h i s was s l o w l y a p p r e c i a t e d and g r a d u a l l y the o n / o f f s t a t u s o f the 
A r t i c l e 7 t a l k s began t o change. On June 1 8 t h , P h i l l i p s , Robbins, 
Pasvolsky, Hawkins and Stinebower d i n e d w i t h a B r i t i s h Embassy 
o f f i c i a l , M.H.Wright, to d i s c u s s the problem o f b u f f e r s t o c k s and 
(29) 
the f u t u r e o f A r t i c l e 7 t a L k s . 7 The B r i t i s h were a l r e a d y aware 
t h a t t h e r e were some d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n between the S t a t e and 
A g r i c u l t u r a l Departments on commodity c o n t r o l s . The A g r i c u l t u r a l 
Department f a v o u r e d a separate c o n t r o l body f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l 
p r o d u c t s and raw m a t e r i a l s . The A g r i c u l t u r e Department was l e s s 
c o n s i s t e n t on the i s s u e o f d e c o n t r o l and r e d u c t i o n o f t r a d e 
b a r r i e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y as they were l i k e l y t o s u f f e r f r o m such 
measures under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , and t h e department f o r t h i s and 
p r e s t i g e reasons wanted a more autonomous c o n t r o l o f what i t 
c o n s i d e r e d to be i t s own a f f a i r s . The S t a t e Department on the 
o t h e r hand, always j e a l o u s o f i n c u r s i o n s i n t o i t s c o n t r o l o f the 
f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s o f the U.S., took a d i f f e r e n t l i n e . S t a t e wanted 
a s i n g l e body w i t h perhaps a s p e c i a l i s e d agency t o d e a l w i t h such 
m a t t e r s , o r a l a r g e r wider r a n g i n g oody d e a l i n g w i t h a l l r e l a t e d 
m a t t e r s . The s u r p r i s e on June l 8 t h came from Stinehower fro m 
S t a t e who, u n l i k e Pasvolsky and Hawkins, took the A g r i c u l t u r e 
Department's l i n e on commodities and a l s o q u e s t i o n e d the 
( 2 9 ) See W r i g h t to Jebb, Minute o f a C o n v e r s a t i o n , June 1 8 t h 1 9*+3 > 
U 2 9 7 V 8 1 0 / 7 0 . 
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f e a s i b i l i t y o f b u f f e r s t o c k s . The B r i t i s h e l a b o r a t e d on t h i s 
l a t t e r p o i n t and e x p l a i n e d t h e i r ideas more c a r e f u l l y , b u t i t was 
ob v i o u s t h a t t h e r e was going to be more widespread o p p o s i t i o n t o 
B r i t i s h commodity c o n t r o l p r o p o s a l s t h a n had been thought a t Hot 
S p r i n g s . I t was agreed t h a t some b i l a t e r a l e x p l o r a t i o n o f the 
commodity problem should be c a r r i e d o u t b e f o r e i n t r o d u c i n g o t h e r 
c o u n t r i e s t o the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d . A l s o , the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
comoining commodity and commercial p o l i c i e s was c o n s i d e r e d and 
thou g h t d e s i r a b l e , though the D a s i c commercial arrangements would 
have t o be made f i r s t as they would l a r g e l y d e t e r m i n e the n a t u r e 
and e x t e n t o f the commodity arrangements. On b o t h s i d e s o f the 
A t l a n t i c the p r e p a r a t o r y p l a n n i n g on v a r i o u s aspects o f i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l economic l i f e c o n t i n u e d and i t became more and more 
o b v i o u s t h a t c l o s e r and wider d i s c u s s i o n s between the U.S. and 
the U.K. was b o t h necessary and d e s l r a o l e . The main impetus f o r 
t h i s came from the monetary t a l k s d i s c u s s e d above. 
D u r i n g mid-summer ftien, K i n g s l e y Wood and D a l t o n drew up a 
memorandum on economic p o l i c y and the course o f a c t i o n the U.K. 
should a d o p t . ( 3 0 ) 
D u r i n g June the U.K. had c a r r i e d o u t a s e r i e s o f t a l k s w i t h 
the I n d i a n and Dominion governments over a two-week p e r i o d ending 
on t he 3 0 t h , which had proved s a t i s f a c t o r y . The main outcome was 
the a s s i m i l a t i o n o f views on commercial and r e l a t e d p o l i c i e s , which 
were emuodied i n amendments to the e x t a n t B r i t i s h documents on 
such economic i s s u e s . The B r i t i s h were i n f a c t f e e l i n g 
( 3 0 ) WP ( L +3)329 Memo by the C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer, 
F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y and the P r e s i d e n t o f the Board o f Trade 
which was approved by the War Cabinet b e f o r e the end o f 
J u l y . Dated J u l y 2 2 , 1 9 ^ 3 , U 1 1 6 / 2 5 1 / 7 0 . 
( 3 1 ) See aide memoire annexe 'Br approved by the U.K.Government, 
dated 6 August 1 9 ^ 3 , U 3 M W / 2 5 1 / 7 0 , d i s p a t c h e d by F . 0 , Jebb 
to H a l i f a x . 
s t r e n g t h e n e d by r e c e n t developments. The t a l k s i n June had 
s t r e n g t h e n e d and c o n s o l i d a t e d the Dominions and I n d i a and the Hot 
S p r i n g s conference had a l s o been q u i t e a success f o r the U.K. 
Thus they were now prepared to b e g i n a f r e s h round o f t a l k s f r o m 
what they c o n s i d e r e d to be r e l a t i v e l y a p o s i t i o n o f s t r e n g t h . ^ 
They d i d not want the monetary t a l k s to p r o g r e s s too f a r ahead o f 
o t h e r economic i s s u e s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n ; i n a d d i t i o n t h e r e was 
concern over a rumour t h a t K o o s e v e l t was t h i n k i n g o f c a l l i n g a 
conference on the l i n e s o f Hot S p r i n g s to d i s c u s s m e t a l s . The 
3 r i t i s h ^ 3 ) were not f a v o u r a b l y d i s p o s e d to such an i d e a and 
p r e f e r r e d i n t e g r a t e d t a l k s on a wider range o f s u b j e c t s . F u r t h e r -
more, such an approach would place a u t h o r i t y s q u a r e l y on the U.S. 
S t a t e Department, who were more amicably disposed and had more 
e x p e r t i s e than some o f the o t h e r departments who would become 
i n v o l v e d o t h e r w i s e . The B r i t i s h were even prepared to a e l a y t a l k s 
i f they c o u l d secure an across the board c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f economic 
problems. There was a danger t h a t the Southern Dominions might 
p r e j u d i c e the a d o p t i o n o f a m u l t i l a t e r a l economic poLicy f a v o u r e d 
by the U.K. as they s t i l l had the p o s s i b i l i t y o f g a i n i n g f r o m the 
U.S. under the K.T.A.A., which Canada and the U.K. d i d n o t , and 
t h i s might encourage the U.S. to c o n t i n u e w i t h b i l a t e r a l and 
piecemeal t a l k s . On the o t h e r nand, a temporary d e l a y to enable 
a comprehensive approach, would enhance the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f success 
f o r B r i t a i n ' s commercial p o l i c i e s . I n f a c t , a t one stage, t h i s 
approach i s d e s c r i b e d as having overwhelming advantages. B r i t a i n 
a l s o had an a v a i l a b l e excuse f o r t e m p o r a r i l y d e l a y i n g the t a l k s 
(32) WP(l+3)329 quoted i n f u l l above. 
(33) Who had heard o f t h i s p r i v a t e l y from a member o f the S t a t e 
Department. 
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w h i l e they f i n a l i s e d t h e i r documents f o r d i s c u s s i o n . S i r F r e d e r i c k 
P h i l l i p s was s e r i o u s l y i l l i n Washington. T h i s , i n a d d i t i o n to a 
s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d r e q u e s t to the U.S. f o r a d e l a y t o complete the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n o f the B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n would enable the t a l k s t o 
c o i n c i d e w i t h developments which h o p e f u l l y would s t r e n g t h e n the 
B r i t i s h b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . 
"We hope s h o r t l y to s e t t l e w i t h the Americans a number o f 
o u t s t a n d i n g p o i n t s connected w i t h Lend-Lease and r e c i p r o c a l 
a i d . As p a r t o f our c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h i s s e t t l e m e n t i n the 
course o f which we expect to o b t a i n s u b s t a n t i a l r e l i e f f r o m 
the l i m i t a t i o n s Imposed on our e x p o r t t r a d e , we i n t e n d , i f 
the War Cabinet approve, to agree to p r o v i d e raw m a t e r i a l s 
from the B r i t i s h Empire as p a r t o f r e c i p r o c a l t r a d e . I t i s 
d e s i r a b l e to take advantage o f the f a v o u r a b l e atmosphere 
which these arrangements are l i k e l y to produce." (3*+) 
On August U-th, H a l i f a x handed a note to the U.S. s u g g e s t i n g 
the f u l l renewal o f t a l k s on A r t i c l e 7 and by the 2 1 s t , the U.S. 
agreed to the p r e p a r a t i o n o f an o r d e r l y agenda. They i n s i s t e d on 
one p r o v i s o which was t h a t the money t a l k s should c o n t i n u e on t h e i r 
p r e s e n t o a s i s between the two T r e a s u r i e s , 
D u r i n g August, p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the t a l k s w i t h the U.S. 
i n t e n s i f i e d and London began to i n s t r u c t the Embassy i n Washington 
o f the l i n e to adopt. The June t a l k s had been p a r t i c u l a r l y 
h e l p f u l I n c l a r i f y i n g the p o s i t i o n and on August 6, an a i d e memoire 
was sent to H a l i f a x s e t t i n g o u t the U.K. broad p o l i c y o u t l i n e s . ^ 
( 3 lO I b i d . We s h a l l i n f a c t see the r e s u l t o f these i n t e n t i o n s 
r e g a r d i n g Lend-Lease i n the second p a r t o f t h i s c h a p t e r . 
( 3 5 ) See Dom. O f f i c e to Canada, N.Z., A u s t r a l i a and 
R e p u b l i c o f 3.A. August 21 , 19^3, U3138 /251 /70 . 
(36) See F.O, to H a l i f a x w i t h e s p e c i a l r e f e r e n c e t o enclosed 
annexe ' B *, August 6, 191+3, U3"+1 V 2 5 1 / 7 0 . 
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The B r i t i s h s t a t e d t h e i r aims t o be the c r e a t i o n o f a h i g h 
l e v e l o f domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic a c t i v i t y w i t h 
c u r r e n c i e s f r e e l y c o n v e r t i b l e and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n 
governed by s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . On 
the commercial Issu e b i l a t e r a l i s m , a l t h o u g h not abandoned, was 
r e l e g a t e d t o secondary importance. The pri m a r y method o f commercial 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n should be, i n the view o f the B r i t i s h , m u l t i l a t e r a l l y 
e f f e c t i v e agreements. They had developed the view t h a t i f they 
were committed to the a b o l i t i o n o f d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p o l i c i e s , t h e i r 
main type o f p r o t e c t i o n , t h e n the U.S., should commit h e r s e l f 
t o a type o f p o l i c y t h a t would ensure a d r a s t i c r e d u c t i o n o f her 
t a r i f f s . T h i s was something the B r i t i s h f e a r e d might come i n f o r 
s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n from the U.S. They s t i l l r e l i e d v e r y much on 
the R.T.A.A. and the M.F.N, p r i n c i p l e , b o t h pet p o l i c i e s o f 
S e c r e t a r y H u l l . S t i l l , a l t h o u g h the B r i t i s h document appeared t o 
s t r o n g l y favour r a p i d l i b e r a l i s a t i o n o f commercial p o l i c y , and 
s u r p r i s i n g l y so f o r some Americans, w i t h the p o s i t i o n s t i l l so 
u n c e r t a i n the B r i t i s h c o n t i n u e d t o add s a f e g u a r d i n g q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . 
"Any q u a l i f i c a t i o n s we may have to make w i l l be due to 
the s p e c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s o f the immediate post-war 
p e r i o d and the pres e n t u n c e r t a i n t y as to what i n f a c t 
w i l l l i e w i t h i n our power and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . " (37) 
The B r i t i s h i n d i c a t e d a w i l l i n g n e s s on t h e i r p a r t t o accept 
a L i m i t o f moderate h e i g h t i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h the c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
o f i n f a n t i n d u s t r i e s . T h i s l a t t e r p o i n t had much t o do w i t h the 
d e v e l o p i n g commonwealth c o u n t r i e s . Q u a n t i t a t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s 
were n o t to be used t o support domestic i n d u s t r i e s b ut would be 
(37) I b i d , p o i n t 3 . 
(38) See para 7 i n rains, o f meeting w i t h r e p s , o f Doras, and 
I n d i a i n Washington, September 22, 19^3, U? 6 / 6 / 7 0 . 
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admissable f o r s p e c i a l purposes, e.g. the a d j u s t m e n t o f oalance 
o f payments problems. Q u a n t i t a t i v e i m p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s i n 
p a r t i c u l a r should be on a m u t u a l l y n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y b a s i s , and 
i t was hoped t h a t e x p o r t subsidies c o u l d be avoided. The p o i n t 
w i t h the g r e a t e s t p o t e n t i a l c o n t r o v e r s y , however, was p o i n t s i x 
which d e a l t w i t h p r e f e r e n c e s . 
" Q u i t e a p a r t f r o m our own' p o s i t i o n a g e n e r a l p l a n should 
leave room f o r s p e c i a l arrangements w i t h i n p o l i t i c a l and 
g e o g r a p h i c a l groups, s i n c e these are l i k e l y t o be asked 
f o r and c o u l d be p r o p e r l y conceded i n many cases. As p a r t 
o f a comprehensive scheme f o r the b e t t e r m e n t o f the t r a d e 
o f the w o r l d as a whole, we should be prepared to p l a y our 
f u l l p a r t i n any g e n e r a l scheme f o r r e d u c i n g p r e f e r e n c e s . " 
( 3 9 ) 
As may be remembered, t h i s was s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t to the 
commitment under A r t i c l e 7> as the Americans were soon to p o i n t o u t . 
B e f o r e f i n a l l y moving on to the Washington n e g o t i a t i o n s o f 
September and Octooer 1 9 l *3 j i t would perhaps h e l p to c o n s i d e r the 
g e n e r a l B r i t l s n p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e i r economic d i f f i c u l t i e s . The 
concern w i t h B r i t a i n ' s post-war balance o f payments cannot be 
o v e r - s t a t e d . So much hinged on B r i t a i n 1 s e x p o r t performance. The 
success o f the e x p o r t d r i v e was t o : -
a) s t r e n g t h e n trie U.K. and her f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n e s p e c i a l l y 
v i s - a - v i s the U.S.A. and the Commonwealth. 
b) enable B r i t a i n t o p a r t i c i p a t e f u l l y i n plans f o r the 
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n o f t r a a e and monetary c l e a r i x i g s . 
c) f a c i l i t a t e r e c o n v e r s i o n to a peace-time economy w i t h o u t 
r e s o r t to the most o b j e c t i o n a b l e types o f economic c o n t r o l . 
And y e t a l l these g o a l s , to a l a r g e e x t e n t , depended on the 
s t a b i l i t y and v l a o i l i t y o f s t e r l i n g as a post-war medium o f 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange. U n f o r t u n a t e l y s t e r l i n g ' s p o s i t i o n was 
Deing undermined by the a c c u m u l a t i o n o f l a r g e debts backed w i t h 
o n l y s m a l l r e s e r v e s . As has a l r e a d y been i n d i c a t e d i n the monetary 
t a l k s , one o f the main concerns as they reached a c l i m a x i n 1 9 ^ > 
( 3 9 ) I b i d . 
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was w i t h the p r o v i s i o n o f adequate safeguards f o r the U.K. d u r i n g 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f the post-war t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . On September 
2 » 1 9 ^ 3> j u s t p r i o r t o the Washington t a l k s , the T r e a s u r y 
produced a l e n g t h y document on the 'Overseas Assets and L i a b i l i t i e s 
o f the U n i t e d Kingdom' . T h i s document c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d the 
problems and the v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f B r i t a i n ' s t r a d i n g p o s i t i o n , her 
lack o f as s e t s t o support s t e r l i n g and the i n t e r - r e l a t e d problems 
o f the dangers o f inadequate r e s e r v e s and a d i m i n i s h e d t r a d i n g 
base, Hot a s t r o n g p o s i t i o n t o launch an e x p o r t d r i v e from nor 
d i v e s t o n e s e l f o f economic p r o t e c t i o n w i t h o u t a l t e r n a t i v e 
p r o v i s i o n s . S t i l l , t h i s i s more d i r e c t l y l i n k e d w i t h the problems 
o f t he Lend-Lease w h i t e Paper which i s t o oe d e a l t w i t h i n the 
second p a r t o f t h i s c h a p t e r . 
The t a l k s f i n a l l y got underway on September 17 th , a f t e r an 
a t t e m p t , t h i s time by the Americans t o d e l a y them f o r another week 
which however proved too troublesome due to the problems i n v o l v e d 
( i + i ) 
o f a l t e r i n g the complex B r i t i s h p l a n s f o r t r a n s p o r t and s e c u r i t y . 
On the B r i t i s h s i d e the Board o f Trade was p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious 
about t h e i r hopes t h a t an agreement c o u l d oe hammered o u t b i l a t e r a l ^ 
between the two c o u n t r i e s wnich would be m u l t i l a t e r a l l y e f f e c t i v e . 
S t i l l , by September 22, the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d were oeg 1 fining to 
emerge and a f t e r the second p l e n a r y s e s s i o n L i e s c h i n g showed a f u l l 
d r a f t o f B r i t i s h ideas on commercial p o l i c y to Hawkins who t o t h e i r 
(*+2) 
s u r p r i s e accepted i t as a o a s i s f o r n e g o t i a t i o n . The 
document was i n f a c t d i s c u s s e d paragraph by paragr a p h , i n a s e r i e s 
(L+0) AJj(l+3) 2 ,September 2 n d 1 9"+3 , U l +500/25l/70. 
See Campbell t o F.O. September 1, 19^3, U^053/251/70. 
(^2) These were i n f a c t the ideas c o n t a i n e d i n Annex ' B ' drawn 
up a f t e r the June c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Dominions 
U3W1 Lf /251 /70 . 
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o f meetings. The U.S. were p r o v i n g to De s u r p r i s i n g L y amenaole 
to B r i t i s n i d e a s . On the i s s u e o f s u b s i d i e s , something o f g r e a t 
importance to B r i t i s h f a r m e r s , the Americans appeared a i l s e t t o 
accept the s u b s i d i s a t i o n o f domestic p r o d u c t i o n as a s a f e t y v a l v e 
i n t he absence o f o t h e r types o f r e s t r i c t i o n s . However, on the 
q u e s t i o n o f e x p o r t s u b s i d i e s t h i n g s were not q u i t e so s t r a i g h t -
f o r w a r d . The A g r i c u l t u r e Act o f 1 9 3 5 had p r o v i s i o n s f o r t h i r t y % 
o f gross customs d u t i e s to De used to encourage e x p o r t s . I t was 
thought t h a t t h e r e would be s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n to any measures 
which would impede the s a l e s o f Western Hemisphere s u r p l u s e s . 
T a r i f f s and p r e f e r e n c e s were c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r , b u t the 
d i f f e r e n c e s on t a r i f f s was such t h a t i t was d e c i d e d to postpone 
d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n on t h i s . On p r e f e r e n c e s , a g a i n the Americans 
were l e s s t h a n f o r t h c o m i n g , they r e f e r r e d to the p r o v i s i o n s o f 
A r t i c l e 7 and:-
"... f r e e and f r a n k d i s c u s s i o n s on t h i s t o p i c had t a k e n 
p l a c e , i n t he course o f which i t had been made c l e a r t o 
the U.S. a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t p r e s s u r e f o r the immediate 
a b o l i t i o n o f I m p e r i a l P r e f e r e n c e s would c r e a t e p o l i t i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the U n i t e d Kingdom n o t l e s s g r e a t than 
those t h a t surrounded the t a r i f f i s s u e i n the U n i t e d 
S t a t e s . " ( W 3 ) 
On a number o f o t h e r m a t t e r s t h e r e seemed a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f 
agreement, e.g. q u a n t a t i v e i m p o r t c o n t r o l s , s t a t e t r a d i n g , e x p o r t 
taxes and i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s . S t i l l the B r i t i s h r e c o g n i s e d 
tha t : -
"Although p r o g r e s s had been encouraging i t should n o t be 
f o r g o t t e n t h a t t h e r e were d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n among the 
U.S. o f f i c i a l s p a r t i c i p a t i n g whether the t e c h n i c a l and 
p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s which would have to be surmounted i n 
p u t t i n g i n t o e f f e c t a m u l t i l a t e r a l c o n v e n t i o n on the l i n e s 
suggested could be overcome. I n p a r t i c u l a r d i f f e r e n t views 
were taken as to the probable r e a c t i o n s o f Congress. I t 
should n o t , t h e r e f o r e , be assumed t h a t a l l was l i k e l y to be 
p l a i n s a i l i n g . " (MO 
C+3) See minutes o f a meeting i n the Ambassador's room, Washington, 
w i t h I n d i a n and Dominion r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , September 2 2 , 
1 9 ^ 3 , U 7 6 / 6 / 7 0 . 
(MO I b i d . 
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By the second week o f the commercial t a l k s , R.I.Campbell 
was a b l e t o r e p o r t s a t i s f a c t o r y p r o g r e s s though as was expected, 
t h e r e was some tough argument over t a r i f f s and p r e f e r e n c e s . 
The a m b i g u i t i e s o f the 19*+2 Mutual A i d Agreement now began to t e l l . 
For the d i s c u s s i o n the B r i t i s h proposed 2% t a r i f f c e i i i n g , 2% 
c u t below c e i l i n g and a ^0% cut i n p r e f e r e n c e s . The Americans 
s t r o n g l y o b j e c t e d and p o i n t e d t o the commitment i n A r t i c l e 7 to 
a b o l i s h p r e f e r e n c e s . The 3 r i t i s h r e p l i e d t h a t t h e r e was a l s o a 
clause which c a l l e d f o r j o i n t and agreed a c t i o n , f u r t h e r m o r e , i f 
the U.S. c o n t i n u e d to a c t as i f p r e f e r e n c e s should n o t e x i s t t h e r e 
was a danger o f adverse Commonwealth r e a c t i o n . I t appeared t h a t 
t h i s d i d have some a f f e c t on the U.S. n e g o t i a t o r s , but i t was 
obvious t h a t t h e r e was going t o oe f u r t h e r c o n t r o v e r s y over these 
Issues i n the next round o f t a l k s . 
Perhaps the i s s u e which caused the B r i t i s h the most s u r p r i s e 
was the American response to the s u g g e s t i o n o f a m u l t i l a t e r a l 
s o l u t i o n t o the problem o f t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n . The B r i t i s h had 
expected the U.S. to r e j e c t t h i s i n fa v o u r o f a c o n t i n u e d r e l i a n c e 
on.l.T.A.A. and the M.F.U. p r i n c i p l e , p a r t l y i n d e f e r e n c e t o 
Congress, but m a i n l y because such D i l a t e r a l l y n e g o t i a t e d agreements 
gave more scope t o the U.S. to m o b i l i s e her economic aud p o l i t i c a l 
power i n her own i n t e r e s t s . However, as i n t i m a t e d aoove, the 
Americans were prepared, o r so i t seemed, to s e r i o u s l y d i s c u s s an 
across the board r e d u c t i o n o f t a r i f f s and some maximum and 
(1+7) 
minimum ad valorem f i g u r e s . . As Kouoins, one o f the c h i e l 
( h $ ) B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n Washington, 1 9^ -1 —^5-
(*+6) Campbell to F.O., October i f , 19^3, UU013/251/70. 
(L+7) See Gardner, Op.Cit. pp 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 and Penrose, Op.Cit. pp92-93. 
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B r i t i s h economic n e g o t i a t o r s commented;-
" I n the b e g i n n i n g the American n e g o t i a t o r s were not averse 
to t h i s s u g g e s t i o n . " ( W 
On October 2 8 t h , the i n f o r m a l t a l k s were completed and 
Campbell was a b l e t o r e p o r t on the p r o g r e s s made. No c l e a r c u t 
d e c i s i o n s had been taken on the i n f o r m a l l e v e l o f the meeting o f 
e x p e r t s . However, t h e r e was reason f o r guarded optimism on some 
p o i n t s though the i s s u e o f p r e f e r e n c e s was undoubtedly a very 
s e n s i t i v e problem. The B r i t i s h hopes f o r an agreement w i t h 
m u l t i l a t e r a l e f f e c t s on t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s , i n terms o f American 
r e a c t i o n , d i d i i o t appear as hopeless as was f i r s t t h o u g h t . 
A l t h o u g h no s e l e c t i o n o f a f o r m u l a had oeen t a k e n , t h e r e had been 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f such f o r m u l a e . C o n s i d e r a t i o n s were a l s o made 
o f o t h e r t r a d e r e s t r i c t i o n s , s u b s i d i e s and methods f o r i m p l e m e n t i n g 
f u t u r e d e c i s i o n s on such t o p i c s , i n the form o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
body. The o n l y area where any s u b s t a n t i a l p r o g r e s s had been 
made however seemed to be on s t a t e t r a d i n g , 
"... I t was apparent from d i s c u s s i o n s t h a t t h i s problem 
should p r e s e n t no g r e a t d i f f i c u l t i e s . " (*+9) 
S t i l l t h i s had been v e r y much a conference t o break the I c e and 
i t wns o n l y t o be expected t h a t many problems would remain i n 
evidence. Even on s t a t e t r a d i n g , I n f a c t , t h i n g s were perhaps 
not q u i t e as s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d as a t f i r s t appeared. On October 8 t h , 
Keynes wrote to L i e s c h i n g : -
"Thanks f o r your note on S t a t e t r a d i n g . I f i n t h i s m a t t e r 
you leave l o o p - h o l e s i n your scheme, I t w i l l n ot upset me. 
Indeed, the more loop-holes you leave the wiser you w i l l oe 
i n ray o p i n i o n . As you know, I am, I am a f r a i d , a hopeless 
s c e p t i c about t h i s r e t u r n t o n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y l a i s s e z - f a i r e , 
f o r which you and the S t a t e Department seem to have such a 
n o s t a l g i a . " (50) 
(L+8) 'Autobiography o f an Economist', Lord HoDDins, M a c m l l l a n 
1971 , p.201 . 
(^9) Campbell t o F.O., October 1 8,19*+3>U51 93 /251 /70 . 
(50) Quoted i n H a r r o d , Op.Cit. p.5^9. 
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However, c o n c e r n i n g the above, Harrod comments t n a t i t should 
not be taken 'au grand seriaux* b u t Hob b i n s w r i t e s o f these t a l k s ; -
"At t h i s stage Keynes was not deeply i n v o l v e d ! indeed he 
took a c a p t i o u s d e l i g h t I n emphasising h i s detachment and 
h i s d e f i c i e n c y o f sympathy f o r the u n d e r l y i n g o u t l o o k . " (51) 
A t l e a s t views had been a i r e d and i t was now up to the p o l i t -
i c i a n s t o decide on f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s . 
C l o s e l y a l l i e d , i f i i o t r e a l l y an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f the 
commercial t a l k s were d i s c u s s i o n s on commodity c o n t r o l s , c a r t e l s 
and employment. The B r i t i s h soon r a n i n t o t r o u b l e over ttie 
commodity c o n t r o l p l a n s . As we have seen, the key to the B r i t i s h 
p r o p o s a l s was the b u f f e r s t o c k scheme, but the B r i t i s h i d eas were 
opposed by the two most v o c i f e r o u s members o f the U.3. commodity 
committee on separate grounds. F i r s t o f a l l Appelby from the 
A g r i c u l t u r e Department opposed the Idea on the grounds t h a t i t 
would tend t o b i a s the market i n f a v o u r o f the consuming c o u n t r i e s , 
and though he was i n f a v o u r o f some form o f c o n t r o l , n i s major 
concern was t h a t i t should r a i s e the average l e v e l o f a g r i c u l t u r a l 
p r i c e s : a g o a l d e f i n i t e l y frowned upon by the U.K., as the 
l a r g e s t w o r l d i m p o r t e r o f foo d . C l a y t o n f r o m the Commerce Depart-
ment was opposed t o commodity c o n t r o l s o f any k i n d , p r e f e r r i n g 
the o p e r a t i o n s o f the f r e e market economy axid broad measures o f 
supp o r t f o r i t sucn as the IMF. There were hopes t h a t the S t a t e 
Department r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , a t t h a t time i l l , would lead the 
Commerce and A g r i c u l t u r a l Departments to a middle l i n e , which 
would h o p e f u l l y be an a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n . 
( 5 1 ) Bobbins, Op.Cit. p . 2 0 0 . 
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I t was hoped, i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t C l a y t o n c o u l d be persuaded t o 
accept t h i s as a p i s - a l l e r . But the S t a t e Department r e p r e s e n t -
a t i v e was Stinebower whose r e s e r v a t i o n s we have a l r e a d y come 
across r e g a r d i n g B r i t a i n ' s b u f f e r s t o c k i d e a . The U.S. on the 
whole seemed somewhat confused about the U.K. pr o p o s a l s and as they 
were p r e p a r i n g a l e n g t h y document on the s u b j e c t , i t was de c i d e d 
t o submit the f u l l B r i t i s h document to the U.S. w i t h the a d v i c e 
t h a t i t was not to be considered as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f HMG and t h a t 
the e x p e r t s who had drawn i t up had subsequ e n t l y moved c l o s e r t o 
the U.S. p o s i t i o n , i . e . r e s t r i c t i o n s should o n l y be i n t r o d u c e d i n 
e x c e p t i o n a l cases, and as a f i n a l r e s o r t . ^ 2 ) 
By October 2 , the B r i t i s h had r e c e i v e d the U.S.document on 
commodity c o n t r o l s and had produced a document comparing i t w i t h 
the B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l s . ^ 3 ) ^ 
I n the B r i t i s h document which compared the U.S. and the U.K. 
p r o p o s a l s , i t was c l e a r t h a t t h e r e were a number o f p o i n t s o f 
d i v e r s i o n i n t h e i r views. P a r t i c u l a r l y on the i s s u e o f b u f f e r 
s t o c k s the B r i t i s h wanted t o go i n t o more d e t a i l than the U.S. 
was prepared t o . The B r i t i s h proposed the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f an 
e q u i l i b r i u m p r i c e which would o n l y be a l l o w e d to f l u c t u a t e by 1Ojfc 
e i t h e r way, and i f argument arose over the o r i g i n a l p r i c e t h e n 
the g e n e r a l e x e c u t i v e o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l l i n g body would 
d e c i d e . They a l s o proposed e x p o r t quotas and i m p o r t r a t i o n i n g I n 
(52) See Campbell t o F.O. , September 2^, 1 9 ^ 3 , U L .-593/25l/70. 
(53) See F.G.Lee, Board o f Trade to Magowan, October 2,19^+3, 
Appendix, ' D i f f e r e n c e s between the pro p o s a l s f o r the 
r e g u l a t i o n o f raw m a t e r i a l s i n the B r i t i s h and American 
documents U7^/6 /70: Lee was l a t e r to become the head c i v i l 
s e r v a n t i n the Board o f Trade, a t t h i s time he was i n charge 
o f commercial and c a r t e l t a l k s a t the Smbassy i n Washington, 
iiedvers Opie was i n o v e r a l l charge o f the A r t i c l e 7 t a l k s i n 
the U.S. 
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times o f f a i l i n g p r i c e s and r i s i n g p r i c e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . On 
these t h r e e i s s u e s the U.S. had no p a r a l l e l p r o v i s i o n s or o n l y 
v e r y vague ones. 
I n f a c t i t was c l e a r from the j o i n t statement issued l a t e r , 
t h a t t h e r e was a v e r y l a r g e area over which t h e r e had been a 
t a c i t mutual agreement to d i f f e r a t t h i s t i m e . Campbell had 
n o t i c e d d u r i n g the d r a f t i n g o f the statement t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s were 
s t i l l i n evidence among the U.S. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ; and the 3 r i t i s h 
were r e l u c t a n t to be too i n s i s t e n t i n case they t o r e the f r a i l 
f a b r i c o f agreement, t e m p o r a r i l y e s t a b l i s h e d , on the U.S.side. 
For example, Campbell decided to accept the p o s i t i o n on q u a l i t a t i v e 
r e g u l a t i o n s though i t was f a r from d e f i n l t e : -
"... i t w i l l be s a t i s f a c t o r y from our s t a n d p o i n t , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n so f a r as schemes i n v o l v i n g q u a l i t a t i v e 
r e g u l a t i o n w i l l be d e c l a r e d t o be I n e f f e c t to be 
emergency measures to be a p p l i e d o n l y under s p e c i a l 
circumstances and s u b j e c t t o s p e c i f i c safeguards designed 
to p r o t e c t consumer and i n harmony w i t h g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n 
o f an expanding w c r l d economy." (5^) 
I t was c l e a r from the j o i n t s t a t e m e n t , completed a t the f i n a l 
meeting on October 16, t h a t t h e r e was g e n e r a l agreement on the 
broad aims and p r i n c i p l e s , m i t i g a t i o n o f p r i c e f l u c t u a t i o n s , 
f a c i l i t a t i n g o r d e r l y exchange o f goods, arid so on, but over the 
means o f a c h i e v i n g such goals t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n t r o v e r s y . 
On b u f f e r s t o c k s as we have seen the p o s i t i o n o f the two c o u n t r i e s 
d i v e r g e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y and i n tii e j o i n t statement f u r t h e r s t u d i e s 
were recommended:-
"... too much must not be hoped from such arrangements i f 
extreme c o n d i t i o n s r e c u r r such as those which were 
experienced more than once i n the i n t e r - w a r p e r i o d . " (55) 
(5^) Campbell t o F.O., October 12, 1 9 l O , U5027/251/70. 
(55) J o i n t Statement on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commodity P o l i c y , 
October 16, 19^3, U7^/6 /70 . 
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There were a l s o s e r i o u s d i v i s i o n s on q u a n t i t a t i v e arrangements 
and s u b s i d i e s . 
"There I s a c e r t a i n d i f f e r e n c e o f emphasis between the 
two groups i n r e g a r d to such schemes. The U.K.group i s 
h o p e f u l t h a t i n p r a c t i c e i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e i n the case 
o f most commodities to a l l o w l o n g - t e r m p r i c e t r e n d s to 
f o l l o w supply and demand and t o c o n s t i t u t e the p r i m a r y 
means o f e f f e c t i n g a d j u s t m e n t s i n p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y to 
balance demand. The U.S.group co n s i d e r t h a t i t may w e l l 
be necessary t o have g r e a t e r r e c o u r s e to q u a n t i t a t i v e 
r e g u l a t i o n schemes than i s envisaged by the U.K. group, 
i n o r d e r to m i t i g a t e the h a r d s h i p s which would f a l l on 
producers d u r i n g t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d s and t o f a c i l i t a t e 
o r d e r l y s h i f t i n g o f p r o d u c t i o n by governmental a c t i o n d u r i n g 
such p e r i o d s . " (56) 
T h i s was a b l a t a n t a t t e m p t by the U.S. a g r i c u l t u r e Department, 
r e p r e s e n t e d by Appelby, to safeguard American prod u c e r s . As we 
s h a l l see s h o r t l y , B r i t i s h r e l u c t a n c e to press the Issues was to 
prove t a c t i c a l l y v e r y s e r i o u s d o m e s t i c a l l y , f o r on d i s c u s s i o n I n 
the U.K. the B r i t i s h A g r i c u l t u r e M i n i s t r y p r o t e s t e d most s t r o n g l y 
over the t r e n d o f the r e c e n t t a l k s . Appelby had adopted a l i n e o f 
p o l i c y s i m i l a r to t h a t used d u r i n g the wheat n e g o t i a t i o n s , and 
now, as t h e n , i t appeared as a rank d i g r e s s i o n f r o m the p r i n c i p l e s 
the U.S. was a t t e m p t i n g to press the U.K. to adhere t o . F u r t h e r -
more, B r i t i s h a g r i c u l t u r e was t o be denied what was c o n s i d e r e d , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y by Hudson, the best means o f c a r r y i n g o u t B r i t i s h 
Government pledges to s u s t a i n a h e a l t h y post-war a g r i c u l t u r a l 
system i n England, s u b s i d i e s . The U.S. argued t h a t s u b s i d i e s 
would reduce the f r e e market area a v a i l a b l e f o r c o m p e t i t i o n f o r 
more e f f i c i e n t producers and could undermine the b u f f e r s t o c k 
i d e a i f c o u n t r i e s could dump s u b s i d i s e d commodities onto the 
market i n l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s . The U.S., t h u s , proposed v e r y L i m i t e d 
s u b s i d i e s and o n l y t h e n i f t i e d to q u a n t i t a t i v e c o n t r o l s on the 
o a s i s o f some p r e v i o u s p r o d u c t i o n base. Even then i t would be 
(56) I b i d . 
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p r e f e r a b l e i n A m e r i c a n o p i n i o n i f t h e r e was a g r a d u a l movement 
t o reduce s u b s i d i s e d p r o d u c t i o n below t h a t base. Of c o u r s e , the 
p r o b l e m here was t h a t B r i t i s h a g r i c u l t u r e had expanded enormous ly 
d u r i n g the war a;id p r e v i o u s base l e v e l s would be h o p e l e s s l y 
i n a d e q u a t e and make the p ledge to B r i t i s h f a r m e r s v e r y d i f f i c u l t 
t o redeem a f t e r the war . The i n t r o d u c t i o n o f q u a n t i t a t i v e 
c o n t r o l s i n the B r i t i s h v i e w would r a i s e s e r i o u s p o l i t i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n o t h e r a r ea s . Thus , c o u n t r i e s who had p r e v i o u s l y 
r e l i e d o n t a r i f f and q u a n t i t a t i v e i m p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s , w h i c h wou ld 
be l a r g e l y i f n o t w h o l l y renounced under the proposed commerc i a l 
c o n v e n t i o n , were h a r d l y l i k e l y to do so i f t hey c o u l d n o t use 
moderate s u b s i d i e s t o enab le s t a p l e i n d u s t r i e s , and e s p e c i a l l y 
a g r i c u l t u r e , to c o n t i n u e . I n e f f e c t , t he B r i t i s h hoped t h a t 
p r e s s u r e f r o m t a x payers would keep s u b s i d i e s down to moderate 
l e v e l s . Of course the d i f f e r e n c e s be tween the two c o u n t r i e s 
r e f l e c t e d B r i t i s h p r i m a r y conce rn as a consumer and the U . S ' s . 
as a p r o d u c e r . So a l t h o u g h Robbins m i g h t express s u r p r i s e a t 
U . S . appa ren t a m e n a b i l i t y towards q u a n t i t a t i v e c o n t r o l s as t h i s 
was c o n t r a r y to the p r e v a l e n t v i e w o f l i b e r a l , l a i s s e z - f a i r e 
economic p o l i c i e s i t was no t a l l t h a t s u r p r i s i n g r e a l l y c o n s i d e r -
i n g p r e v i o u s d i v e r s i o n s f r o m dogma when i t had ueen i n the 
i n t e r e s t o f the U . S . to do so. I n f a c t , the type o f q u a n t i t a t i v e 
c o n t r o l s f a v o u r e d by the U .S . were concerned w i t h p r o d u c t i o n 
c o n t r o l s to r a i s e the p r i c e s o f a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s , whereas 
the B r i t i s h were more concerned w i t h the p e r p e t u a t i o n o f 
c o n t r o l s to c o r r e c t , a l o e i t as a l a s t r e s o r t , imbalances o f 
t r a d e . w The r e p o r t on the commodity t a l k s conc luded w i t h an 
e x p r e s s i o n o f hope t h a t the t a l k s c o u l d be resumed a f t e r 
( 5 7 ) See T r e a s u r y M e e t i n g , December 3 1 , 1 9^3 > H o b b i n s ' v i ews 
U 1 0 0 / 6 / 7 0 . 
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m i n i s t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i n f o u r to f i v e months . We s h a l l see 
s h o r t l y what the r e s u l t o f these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s was. 
On October 2 1 s t , L i e s c h i n g , Meade and S h a c k l e completed 
t h e i r r e p o r t on the commerc ia l t a l k s September 2 0 - 0 c t o b e r 6 t h . 
They r e p o r t e d t h a t the c e n t r a l conce rn d u r i n g the t a l k s had been 
w i t h the B r i t i s h m u l t i l a t e r a l l y e f f e c t i v e p r o p o s a l s . The 
b i l a t e r a l t a l k s between the U . S . , i'lew Zea land and South A f r i c a , 
a t t h i s t i m e suspended, were not broached u n t i l the end o f the 
t a l k s . Such b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s i f they reached an agreement 
s tage would r e q u i r e b i l a t e r a l conces s ions f r o m the U . K . which 
HawKins was t o l d the B r i t i s h had l i t t l e en thus i a sm f o r , no t o n l y 
on p r i n c i p l e b u t a l s o because they migh t undermine the m u l t i l a t e r 
approach f a v o u r e d by the B r i t i s h . Hawkins was u n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t 
i n d i c a t e d t h a t n o t h i n g c o u l d r e a l l y be dec ided u n t i l H u l l ' s r e t u r 
f r o m the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r ' s Confe rence i n M o s c o w . w ^ 
( 5 8 ) See Repor t on Commercia l P o l i c y s igned by 
L i e s c h i n g , Shack le a/id Meade, October 2 1 , 1 9 ^ 3 > 
U 5 6 9 0 / 2 5 1 / 7 0 . 
( 5 9 ) October 1 3 - 3 0 . T h i s was H u l l ' s major appearance i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e s d u r i n g the war and was o f 
tremendous p r e s t i g e v a l u e to h i m . The immedia te r e s u l t s 
o f the c o n f e r e n c e seemed most s u c c e s s f u l and the 
r e l a t i o n s between the t h r e e a l l i e s h a r m o n i o u s . The U . S . 
i n p a r t i c u l a r t r i e d to e s t a b l i s h c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
the S o v i e t U n i o n p a r t l y i n the hope t h a t they would commit 
themselves a g a i n s t the Japanese out m a i n l y because H u l l 
b e l i e v e d R u s s i a ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o s t - w a r w o r l d was 
e s s e n t i a l f o r economic p r o s p e r i t y and s e c u r i t y . He hoped 
t h a t the 'Four Power D e c l a r a t i o n ' he succeeded i n g e t t i n g 
would be the oa s i s f o r t h i s . T h i s c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h 
the S o v i e t s however d i d e n t a i l a d i m i n u t i o n o f the c l o s e 
b i l a t e r a l w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p the B r i t i s h had had w i t h 
the U . S . For a b r i e f b u t adequate account o f the Moscow 
c o n f e r e n c e see J . W . W h e e l e r - B e n n e t , O p . C i t . pp 1 0 3 - 1 2 1 . 
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I n f a c t , a l r e a d y in, f o r m a l t a l k s w i t h members o f the S t a t e 
Depa r tmen t , i t had oecorae o b v i o u s to the B r i t i s h t h a t t h e r e 
would be problems w i t h H u l l r e g a r d i n g the f e a s a b i l i t y o f a 
m u l t i l a t e r a l l y e f f e c t i v e agreement . P a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h the 19M* 
P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n b e g i n n i n g to loom l a r g e , p r e s su re was 
a l r e a d y b e g i n n i n g t o be f e l t w h i c h was i n d i c a t e d i n terras o f some 
r e l u c t a n c e by the Amer icans to De f o r t h c o m i n g on c e r t a i n 
commerc ia l i s s u e s . A l l the U . S . o f f i c i a l s had acknowledged t h a t 
a m u l t i l a t e r a l agreement was i d e a l l y p r e f e r a o l e , b u t they 
d e c l a i m e d i t s p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . There were v a r i o u s shades 
o f o p i n i o n on t h i s g o i n g f r o m some members o f the S t a t e Depar tmen t 
who were the l e a s t s c e p t i c a l , t o s t r o n g r e s e r v a t i o n s b u t s t i l l 
open to p e r s u a s i o n , the p o s i t i o n of Wheeler f r o m the A g r i c u l t u r a l 
Depa r tmen t . The t h i r d group c o n s i s t e d o f v e r y s t r o n g opponents 
l i k e P a u l Appelby a l s o f r o m the A g r i c u l t u r a l Depar tment who 
i n t e r v e n e d f r o m o u t s i d e the commi t t ee d e a l i n g w i t h the p rob lem to 
s t r e s s the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , and Mr, n y u e r , Chairman o f the 
T a r i f f s Commission, who h e l d s i m i l a r v i e w s . A f t e r the U . S . 
had e x p l a i n e d t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s ove r t a r i f f s they l i s t e n e d v e r y 
a t t e n t i v e l y to the B r i t i s h e x p l a i n t h e i r p rob lems ove r 
p r e f e r e n c e s . B u t , the B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l s f o r a $0% r e d u c t i o n i n 
p r e f e r e n c e s f o r the i m p o s i t i o n o f a 25;* «d v a l o r e m l i m i t seemed 
u n a c c e p t a b l e . For the acceptance o f such a l i m i t the U .S . had 
i n t i m a t e d t h a t they expec ted the a b o l i t i o n o f p r e f e r e n c e s . 
The o t h e r m a j o r i s s u e which was a l s o t i e u i n w i t h the 
commodity c o n t r o l p l a n s , was ove r the p r o t e c t i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r a l 
p r o d u c t s . The B r i t i s h f a v o u r e d s u b s i d i s a t i o n b u t t h e U . S . 
( 6 0 ) See Hepor t L i e ^ c h i n g , e t a l , October 2 1 , 1 9 ^ 3 , U 5 6 9 0 / 2 5 1 / 7 0 . 
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q u a n t i t a t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s . The B r i t i s h r e p o r t on t h i s c e r t a i n l y 
d i d n o t a t t e m p t to d i s g u i s e these d i f r e r e n c e s i -
"To us i t appeared t h a t d i r e c t s u b s i d i s a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n 
was the l e a s t o b j e c t i o n a b l e method. I n p a r t i c u l a r we 
argued t h a t the l i m i t a t i o n s proposed f o r the use o f 
t a r i f f s , o f q u a n t i t a t i v e I m p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s and o f s t a t e 
t r a d i n g would s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t the U n i t e d Kingdom. I t 
was e s s e n t i a l , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the s u b s i d i s a t i o n o f 
a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n s h o u l d be p e r m i t t e d . " ( 6 1 ) 
Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t deve lopment f r o m the Wash ing ton 
t a l k s was the p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e f r o m b o t h s i d e s w h i c h d i s t o r t e d 
what consensus had been r eached . A t f i r s t t h i s came f r o m the U . S . 
i n the person o f C o r n e l l H u l l . Something w h i c h , o n the w h o l e , 
was n o t e n t i r e l y u n e x p e c t e d , though n o t i n the f o r m t h u t i t t o o k . 
F i r s t o f a l l the S t a t e Depar tment had p r e s e n t e d to toe R u s s i a n s , 
a p p a r e n t l y on b e h a l f o f themselves AL'iD the U . K . a summary o f the 
Wash ing ton n e g o t i a t i o n s . The no te i n c l u d e d the phrase ' s u b s t a n t i a l 
a b o l i t i o n o f p r e f e r e n c e s ' i n r e t u r n f o r u n s p e c i f i e d r e d u c t i o n s i n 
t a r i f f s . T h i s was t o t a l l y u n a c c e p t a o l e to the l i r i t i s h , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n v i e w o f the long and c a r e f u l d i s c u s s i o n s o f the t a r i f f / 
p r e f e r e n c e i s sues arid the a t t a i n m e n t o f an u n d e r s t a n d i n g ou b o t h 
s ides o f the d e l i c a c y o f the m a t t e r . S e c o n d l y , H u l l , w i t h h i s 
penchant f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n , and o t h e r s , 
o f an economic n a t u r e , was d e t e r m i n e d to b e f r i e n d the S o v i e t U n i o n , 
which he c o n s i d e r e d a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r t h e i r success . T h i s , and 
h i s d e s i r e th-nt such i n t e r n a t i o n a l u n i t y shou ld n o t be d i s r u p t e d 
by A n g l o - U . S . e x c l u s i v e c o l l a b o r a t i o n , had a l r e a d y o n a number 
o f o c c a s i o n s , i n c l i n e d h im towards m u l t i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , and 
i n Moscow he sugges ted j u s t such a p r o c e d u r e . T h i s a g a i n was 
c o n t r a r y to the A n g l o - U . S . u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f e a r l y October t h a t 
( 6 1 ) I b i d . 
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t a l k s shou ld proceed a f t e r a f ew months on a c o n t i n u i n g b i l a t e r a l 
o a s i s . On October 25 ,19^3, F .O. w r o t e to the B r i t i s h Embassy I n 
Moscow;-
"We a t t a c h g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e to ou r w o r d i n g o f pa ragraph 5j 
P r e s i d e n t o f the Board o f Trade f e e l s s t r o n g l y and I 
agree w i t h h i m , t h a t we must n o t ( r e p e a t n o t ) be 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h any c o m m u n i c a t i o n to the Russ ians w h i c h 
commits us to the w o r d i n g i n tne Amer ican no te and 
e s p e c i a l l y t o the phrase ' s u b s t a n t i a l a b o l i t i o n o f 
p r e f e r e n c e s ' . " ( 6 2 ) 
A c c o r d i n g to L i e s c h i n g , the agreed w o r d i n g had b e e n ; -
" f i c t i o n d i r e c t e d towards the e l i m i n a t i o n o f p r e f e r e n t i a l 
t r e a t m e n t - r e l a t i o n to r e d u c t i o n o f t a r i f f s . " ( 6 3 ) 
L i e s c h i n g asked Magowan to draw A m e r i c a n a t t e n t i o n to the 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n w o r d i n g between t h i s and pa ragraph 5 ° f t e l e g r a m 
U-72o5^^ which wss the f o r m o f the Amer i can no te to tne R u s s i a n s . 
As L l e s c h i n g emphas i sed , the B r i t i s h wanted to a v o i d language l i k e 
t h i s and they had i n f a c t d i s a s s o c i a t e d there-selves f r o m the 
w o r d i n g o f tne A m e r i c a n n o t e . 
S t i l l , as l a t e as December 17» t he C a b i n e t was not c o m p l e t e l y 
d i s i l l u s i o n e d nor o u t o f tune w i t h the guarded o p t i m i s m o f the 
members o f the Law m i s s i o n . The C a b i n e t no ted the problems and 
the p rog re s s as p r e s e n t e d by the l e a d e r s o f the m i s s i o n and 
r e s o l v e d on f u r t h e r i n f o r m a l A n g l o - U . 3 . t a l k s . 
however , t h e r e was a l r e a d y o p p o s i t i o n g r o w i n g to the i d e a 
o f f u r t h e r t a L k s . O p p o s i t i o n was s t r o n g l y v o i c e d by Hudson, 
and the n e g l e c t o f B r i t i s h a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t s a t Wash ing ton 
( 6 2 ) F .O. to Moscow, OctoDer 2 5 , 1 9 ^ 3 , U 5 1 9 3 / 2 5 1 / 7 0 . 
( 6 3 ) See enc losed l e t t e r to Magowan i n L i e s c h i n g to Cou l son 
November 1 7 , 1 9 ^ 3 , l e t t e r d a t e d November 2 3 , U 5 8 5 1 / 2 5 1 / 7 0 . 
(6h) Campbel l to F .O. Octooer 1 8 , 1 9U3 ,1)51 9 3 / 2 5 1 / 7 0 . 
( 6 5 ) WP(i*3)559 December 17 ,19*+3 , U 6 6 8 7 / 2 5 1 / 5 0 . 
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was made much o f . Beaverbrook and Amery were a l s o l oud i n 
condemna t ion , the f o r m e r w r o t e to W.S.C. a coup le o f months 
l a t e r and put i n w r i t i n g h i s o p i n i o n o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
the U .S . 
"Th-^t we s h o u l d pursue f r i e n d s h i p and c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h 
the U n i t e d S t a t e s i s an u n c h a l l e n g a o l e p r i n c i p l e . But 
i n s e e k i n g t h a t f r i e n d s h i p we s h o u l d a i m , w i t h an e q u a l 
c o n s t a n c y , a t m a i n t a i n i n g our own p o s i t i o n as a w o r l d 
power ." ( 6 6 ) 
And i t was f a i r l y o b v i o u s t h a t Beaverbrook d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t 
f u r t h e r t a l k s o n commerc ia l p o l i c y a t t h i s t i m e w i t h the Amer icans 
would i n f a c t s t r e n g t h e n B r i t a i n ' s ^ p o s i t i o n . As the p o s i t i o n 
/A 7 
d e t e r i o r a t e d even f u r t h e r the d i f f e r e n c e s i n t he C a b i n e t w idened , ' 
The B r i t i s h had c o n s i d e r a o l e w o r r i e s ove r Lend-Lease a t t n i s t i m e 
o v e r the e x p o r t w h i t e paper and whe the r the S .F . would be Drought 
to f r u i t i o n i n an a c c e p t a b l e f o r m i n the f a c e o f g r o w i n g c r i t i c i s m s 
(Aft 1 
i n the U . S . A l l o f which f a c t o r s o b v i o u s l y had a d i r e c t 
b e a r i n g on the p o s i t i o n o f B r i t a i n as a t r a d i n g n a t i o n and the 
t ype o f t r a d e and commerc i a l commitments she c o u l d e n t e r i n t o . 
Cause f o r f u r t h e r c o n c e r n came f r o m H a l i f a x on January 11, who 
f o r w a r d e d R o b e r t s o n ' s account o f the U . S . / C a n a d i a n commerc ia l 
t a l k s to the F . u , A c c o r d i n g to K o b e r t s o n , the U . S . now appeared 
t o be r e t r e a t i n g f r o m the p o s i t i o n t hey had adopted a t Wash ing ton 
and were e v i n c i n g s i g n s o f sna rper s p l i t s on the p o l i t i c a l 
p r a c t i c a l i t i e s o f some of the i s s u e s on w h i c h a t e n t a t i v e 
consensus f o r a t l e a s t f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n had a p p a r e n t l y been 
r eached . 
( 6 6 ) Februa ry 2 1 , 19 ^ 1 - , quoted i n K . Y o u n g , O p . C i t . 
( 6 7 ) See Chp3; and a l s o R . N . Gardner , O p . C i t . p.1*+5 and 
Penrose O p . C i t . pp 1 0 1 - 1 0 6 . 
( 6 8 ) See Opie t o F .O. on a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h W.-ii te, 
J anua ry 7 , 1 9 ^ , 0 / 6 / 7 0 , and Opie to J . M . K . J anua ry 1 0 , 
1 9 M t , U l + 7 0 / 6 / 7 0 . 
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11 3 ) The Amer icans who s i d e w i t h Hawkins w i l l advocate 
a ?CrJ> r e d u c t i o n t h r o u g h a m u l t i l a t e r a l agreement 
p r o v i d e d s u b s t a n t i a l e l i m i n a t i o n o f p r e f e r e n c e i s 
assured by p r o v i s i o n s f o r g i v i n g up ( a ) v i r t u a l l y 
n o n - o p e r a t L v e p r e f e r e n c e s , ( b ) c e r t a i n p r e f e r e n c e s o n 
p o l l t l e a l l y i m p o r t a n t commodi t i e s , ( c ) p r e f e r e n c e s 
g i v e n by c o l o n i e s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y those wh ich were 
•open d o o r ' areas p r i o r to 1 9 3 2 ) . They were i n c l i n e d 
- a l t h o u g h g r u d g i n g l y - to m o d i f y t h e i r p r o p o s a l s f o r 
a s t r a i g h t 50$ r e d u c t i o n o f t a r i f f s by conced ing a 1 0/b 
1 f l o o r 1 . 
h-) They r e j e c t e d as p o l i t i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e Canadian 
s u g g e s t i o n o f a m u l t i l a t e r a l agreement f o r a ^Ofo c u t 
a l l round i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e ( t h u s e f f e e t i n g some 
r e d u c t i o n s and t h i s s u s p i c i o n would m i t i g a t e a g a i n s t 
t h e i r a c c e p t i n g the m u l t i l a t e r a l a g r e e m e n t ) . The 
T a r i f f Commission r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were t h r o u g h o u t 
s c e p t i c a l o f even the p o s s i b i l i t y o f o b t a i n i n g Congress -
i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r one m u l t i l a t e r a l scheme o f the 
magni tude p roposed . 
5) As r e g a r d s commodity agreements the Canadians o b t a i n e d 
the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t the Amer icans were d i v i d e d among 
themselves and had receded f r o m t h e i r p r e v i o u s q u a l i f i e d 
a p p r o v a l o f b u f f e r s t o c k s . Depar tment o f A g r i c u l t u r e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s looked a t the p r o b l e m l a r g e l y i n terms 
o f p e r s i s t i n g s u r p l u s p r o d u c t i o n w h i c h would need c o n t i n -
u i n g r e s t r i c t i v e agreements to c o r r e c t , though they 
a d m i t t e d t ne d e s i r a b i l i t y o f l i m i t i n g t h e i r t e rm, " 
( 6 9 ) 
The b r i t l s h were e x c e e d i n g l y w o r r i e d by these deve lopments 
and d i v i s i o n w i t h i n the B r i t i s h C a b i n e t deepened. The B r i t i s h 
were i n somewhat o f a d i l emma. There was a d e v e l o p i n g b e l i e f 
t h a t the U .S . a i d n o t f u i i y a p p r e c i a t e the d i r e s t r a i g h t s w h i c h 
the U . K . economy would be i n a f t e r the war and y e t i n the f a c e o f 
the r u t h l e s s p u r s u i t o f i t s own i n t e r e s t s by tne U . S . i t was 
c o n s i d e r e d perhaps unwise to expose the f u l l weakness o f the 
B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n to the U . S . ^ * * ^ 
( 6 9 ) H a l i f a x to F . U . r e p o r t i n g R o b e r t s o n ' s accoun t o f the U . S . / 
Canadian commerc ia l t a l k s J a n u a r y 1 1 , 1 9 ^ , U W 3 7 / 6 / 7 O . 
( 7 0 ) See Opie to J . M . K e y n e s , J a n u a r y 1 0 , 1 9 ^ , U * + 7 0 / 6 / 7 0 . 
I n a memorandum o f February 7 , Hicnm-d Law perhaps u n w i t t i n g l y 
pu t h i s f i n g e r on t h i s d a n g e r o u s l y c l o s e i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n o f 
A n g l o - U . S . economic r e l a t i o n s . Law i n d i c a t e d the c l ause i n the 
M u t u a l A i d Agreement wh ich s t a t e d t h a t the repayment o f Lend-Lease 
s h o u l d no t bu rden the commerce o f the two c o u n t r i e s and added 
t h a t t h i s j -
" . . . i s g o i n g to be our sheet anchor when we come to the 
f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t o f Lend-Lease . " (71 ) 
T h i s , w h i l e p a r t i a l l y t r u e , was n o t the whole s t o r y by f a r . 
Lend-Lease had i n v o l v e d B r i t a i n i n s e r i o u s c o m p l i c a t i o n s by 
commitments to commerc i a l p r i n c i p l e s , arid w h i l e many m i n i s t e r s , 
and n o t j u s t those who were opposed to an e a r l y c o n t i n u a t i o n o f 
the t a l k s , b e l i e v e d t h a t a l i o e r a l s e t t l e m e n t o f Lend-Lease 
w h i l e a b s o l u t e l y necessary was no t a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r 
B r i t a i n ' s f u t u r e economic h e a l t h . Some p o s i t i v e s a f egua rds and 
p o s s i b l y f u r t n e r a i d i n some f o r m would be necessa ry which c o u l d 
a b r o g a t e the p r i n c i p l e s the U . S . had g a i n e d . B r i t a i n ' s t e c h n i c a l 
adherence t o . On May 13) B u c k n e l l o f the U . S . iimbassy i n London, 
r e c o r d e d symptoms o f such f e a r s . 
"Grave conce rn i s f e l t h e r e , r e g a r d i n g the aosence as y e t o f 
any s p e c i f i c measures to f i l l the gap between the end o f 
Lend-Lease and the r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the B r i t i s h e x p o r t 
t r a d e , and such absence makes p r o h i b i t i o n s o f q u a n t i t a t i v e 
c o n t r o l s apoear to be an i d e a l which i s remote &nd academic . " 
(72) 
There was indeed concern g e n e r a l l y among B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r s 
r e g a r d i n g the s o l u t i o n o f such p rob l ems . I t was the methods t h a t 
were d i v i s i v e . As we have seen a l r e a d y i n the monetary t a l k s , 
the i m p e r i a l i s t s and those s u s p i c i o u s o f Amer i can i n t e n t i o n s , 
(71) Memo by Law on the Wash ing ton C o n v e r s a t i o n s , WP(M081 
February 7, 19 l + l + -
(72) B u c k n e l l to S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , Mav 13> 1 9 ^ ) Whi te Papers 
PUL quoted i n Gardner , O p . C i t . p.14-5. 
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were making t h e i r f e a r s t e l l i n the f o r m o f s a f e g u a r d s and 
t r a n s i t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s to p r o t e c t B r i t a i n ' s weak p o s i t i o n . 
However , t h i s l e d t o a compromise i n the sense o f U . S . accep tance 
o f such p r o v i s i o n s . On t i i e commerc ia l i s s u e s the d i f f e r e n c e s 
were much sharper and were t h r e a t e n i n g to d i v i d e the B r i t i s h 
C a b i n e t . C h u r c h i l l d e c i d e d t h a t the s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n o f the 
war was so c r i t i c a l he d e c i d e d t o s i d e - s t e p the i s s u e . The whole 
q u e s t i o n o f commerc i a l and t r a d e n e g o t i a t i o n s was f i r m l y p l aced to 
one s i d e f o r the t i m e b e i n g , b o b b i n s w r i t e s : -
" . . . S u b s t a n t i a l p rogress had been made . . . But t h e n came 
a h a l t . For more t h a n t w e l v e months t h e r e was s i l e n c e on 
ou r s i d e ; we were f o r b i d d e n to say a n y t h i n g to our 
o p p o s i t e numbers. iSven a f t e r t h a t , c o n v e r s a t i o n s were o n l y 
resumed i n London I n the most i n f o r m a l way on the most 
s t r i c t l y h y p o t h e t i c a l b a s t s . " (73) 
I n a d d i t i o n to the proolems w i t h the C a b i n e t , the p r o g r e s s 
I n the Wash ing ton t a l k s a l s o had to be d i s c u s s e d w i t h the 
Domin ions and I n d i a , which i t was; Feb rua ry 23-Harch 2 1 . 
T h i s p r o v i d e d a good excuse f o r the i n i t i a l d e l a y , and was o f 
some genuine c o n c e r n . There was p a r t i c u l a r l y conce rn ove r the l a c k 
o f en thus i a sm f r o m A u s t r a l i a and New Zea land r e g a r d i n g I m p e r i a l 
P r e f e r e n c e s . The A u s t r a l i a n H igh Commissioner i n f o r m e d Law on 
Februa ry 2 ^ , t h a t A u s t r a l i a would o n l y r e g a r d I m p e r i a l P r e f e r e n c e 
as s i g n i f i c a n t i n c o r i d i t i o n s such as those e x p e r i e n c e d i n the 
( 7 ^ ) 
d e p r e s s i o n y e a r s . ' So the U . K . p o s i t i o n was f u r t h e r weakened 
by l a c k o f u n i t e d Commonwealth s u p p o r t f o r the p r e f e r e n c e s the 
Amer icans so vehemen t ly d e s i r e d to be a b o l i s h e d . S t i l l , these 
were a l l r a t h e r p e r i p h e r a l m a t t e r s . The more s i g n i f i c a n t w o r r i e s 
(73) H o b b i n s , O p . C I t . p .203 . 
(7k) See A S D ( M f ) l 6 , March 21 19-Mf f o r a summary. 
(75) See F .O. minu tes on v i s i t to H.Law oy the A u s t r a l i a n H i g h 
Commiss ioner , Feb rua ry 2k, 1 9 ^ , U 2 1 1 9 / 6 / 7 0 . 
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and reasons f o r d e l a y on the B r i t i s h s i d e were c o n s i d e r e d by 
Anderson l a t e r i n the year and he enumerated the c r i t i c i s m s made 
w i t h i n the C a b i n e t wh ich had t h r e a t e n e d t o cause a s p l i t i n the 
government as f o l l o w s : 
1. P r e c l u s i o n o f t r a n s i t i o n measures to s a f e g u a r d B r i t a i n ' s 
ba lance o f payments; 
2„ T a r i f f f o r m u l a would be advantageous to p re -war h i g h 
t a r i f f c o u n t r i e s and would p r e c l u d e the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f 
new t a r i f f s excep t f o r i n f a n t i n d u s t r i e s . 
3 . I f o n l y p a r t i a l s t a t e t r a d i n g was employed t h e r e would 
not be the same scope a l l o w e d f o r b u l k p u r c h a s i n g as 
f o r a c o u n t r y t h a t used s t a t e t r a d i n g u n i v e r s a l l y . 
P r e c l u s i o n o f q u a n t i t a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n o f i m p o r t s as 
an e x p e d i e n t t o c o r r e c t b a l a n c e o f payment p rob l ems . 
(76) 
The t a l k s i n f a c t had pu t i n t o f u r t h e r doub t i s s u e s the B r i t i s h 
had hoped to g a i n c l a r i f i c a t i o n o n . F i r s t o f a l l t h e i r d o u b t s 
abou t the r e d u c t i o n o f t a r i f f b a r r i e r s i n the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . 
Even i f the Amer icans accepted p r o p o s a l s f o r an ac ross tne board 
r e d u c t i o n o f t a r i f f s such measures would s t i l l f a v o u r p re -war 
h i g h t a r i f f c o u n t r i e s . On the o t h e r nand , the U .S . had made i t 
c l e a r t h a t the v i r t u a l e l i m i n a t i o n o f p r e f e r e n t i a l t a r i f f s would 
be r e q u i r e d i n r e t u r n . The B r i t i s h as we s h a l l see, demurred 
somewhat o n t n i s and s t i l l u e l i e v e d t h a t they c o u l d m a i n t a i n 
Empire P r e f e r e n c e s to some e x t e n t o n the b a s i s o f the F . D . K . / 
W.S.C, exchange o f l e t t e r s i n 19^2, though they r e c o g n i s e d t h a t 
t h i s would p r o b a b l y a f f e c t the s i z e o f the A m e r i c a n t a r i f f 
r e d u c t i o n s . The Amer icans pers is ted o n the l i n e t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d 
(76) See CCP( 1 + l i-)I, no te oy the C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer , 
A n d e r s o n , September 1 2 , 1 9 ^ , UE1 33^/1 ^3/53 • 
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be no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between d i s c r i m i n a t o r y t r a d e p r a c t i c e s and 
t h a t B r i t a i n was i n f a c t commi t t ed to the a b o l i t i o n o f i m p e r i a l 
P r e f e r e n c e s . 
On a g r i c u l t u r e the U . S . appeared r e l u c t a n t to a l l o w a degree 
o f s u b s i d i s a t i o n i n the U . K . w h i c h would ensure a h e a l t h y B r i t i s h 
a g r i c u l t u r a l i n d u s t r y something a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were 
commi t t ed t o . R.S.Huds.on proved p a r t i c u l a r l y o b d u r a t e o v e r t h i s . 
To some e x t e n t the problem t i e d I n w i t h the d i f f e r e n c e s on 
commodity c o n t r o l s . For o f course B r i t a i n ' s p r o p o s a l s to s t a b i l i s e 
p r i m a r y and a g r i c u l t u r a l p r i c e s by means o f b u f f e r s t o c k s was 
v e r y much i n he r own i n t e r e s t s as the w o r l d ' s m a j o r i m p o r t e r o f 
such c o m m o d i t i e s . The U . S . on the o t h e r hand wanted to a c t i v e l y 
promote a h i g h e r p r i c e f o r such goods as a ma jo r s u r p l u s p r o d u c e r , 
by means o f q u a n t i t a t i v e p r o d u c t i o n c o n t r o l s . T h i s was a g a i n seen 
by the B r i t i s h as a t h r e a t to t h e i r ba l ance o f payments p o s i t i o n 
by r a i s i n g the p r i c e o f I m p o r t s . 
Thus , the t a l k s were t e m p o r a r i l y abandoned. T h i s was 
symptomat ic no t o f I n d i f f e r e n c e b u t o f grave c o n c e r n by the 
B r i t i s h . Throughou t the l a t e r months o f 1 9^ t the B r i t i s h 
c o n t i n u e d to w o r r y o v e r the env i saged pos t -wa r p rob l ems . A l t h o u g h 
a t t h i s t ime a c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the U . S . c e n t r e d o n the 
E x p o r t W h i t e Paper and the monetary t a l k s , n a t u r a l l y enough the 
commerc ia l were s t i l l o f v i t a l c o n c e r n , bu t deve lopments were 
f o r c i n g the B r i t i s h to be even more c a u t i o u s . The Lend-Lease 
t a l k s i n p a r t i c u l a r c o m p l i c a t e d the p o s i t i o n ; added co t h i s was 
g r o w i n g p o p u l a r , P a r l i a m e n t a r y and i n d u s t r i a l u n r e s t , 
w h i c h f o r c e d 3 r i t a i n v e r y much o n t h e d e f e n s i v e . I n A p r i l , 
C h u r c h i l l I n the House o f Commons made a s t a t e m e n t , the a u t h o r i t y 
f o r w h i c h l a y I n the c o n f i d e n t i a l exchange o f l e t t e r s be tween 
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h i m arid K o o s e v e l t i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r to the s i g n i n g o f the M u t u a l 
A i d Agreement , t h a t B r i t a i n was no more commi t t ed t o the a b o l i t i o n 
o f her I m p e r i a l P r e f e r e n c e s t h a n the U . S . was commit ted to the 
a b o l i t i o n o f her h i g h t a r i f f p o l i c y . T h i s w h i l e a b o l d s t a t e m e n t 
t h a t B r i t a i n was xiot g o i n g t o be r a i l r o a d e d by the U . S . , 
p e r p e t u a t e d and caused a renewed i n t e r e s t I n t he a m b i g u i t i e s o f 
B r i t a i n ' s u n d e r t a k i n g s r e g a r d i n g I m p e r i a l P r e f e r e n c e . I t was 
soon to r e c e i v e a r e p l y f r o m H u l l who s t a t e d a t a press c o n f e r e n c e 
s h o r t l y a f t e r : -
" I t i s n o t to be assumed t h a t t h i s s t a t emen t was i n t e n d e d 
to i m p l y abandonment o f the v i e w t h a t the U n i t e d Kingdom 
and a l l U n i t e d N a t i o n s , each i n accordance w i t h i t s own 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p roces ses , s h o u l d be b o t h d i s p o s e d and a b l e 
to press f o r w a r d s t r o n g l y i n c o o p e r a t i o n f o r economic 
advancement arid p r o s p e r i t y w i t h measures w h i c h w i l l expand 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e r a t h e r t h a n r e s t r i c t i t . " (77) 
However, t h e r e was to be no s t r o n g f o r w a r d movement f o r some 
t i m e . I t had a l r e a d y been v i r t u a l l y she lved by the r e f u s a l o f 
C h u r c h i l l to a l l o w h i s C a b i n e t to make a d e c i s i o n which would be 
d i v i s i v e a t a c r i t i c a l s tage i n the war . I n a t e l e g r a m o f May 2 , 
d e a l i n g w i t h the monetary t a l k s , Ande r son s a i d q u i t e c l e a r l y t h a t : 
" I t h i n k t h a t d e l a y o n the Commerc ia l and Commodity P o l i c y 
may be i n e v i t a b l e . . . " (7&) 
We have a l r e a d y no t ed above the reasons g i v e n f o r o p p o s i t i o n 
t o the document embodying the outcome o f the W a s h i i i g t o n t a l k s . 
A n d e r s o n , i n September , c i r c u l a t e d a r e v i e w o f the o b j e c t i o n s 
d r a f t e d by the Commercia l P o l i c y Commi t t ee . On the whole i t 
agreed t h a t t h e r e was some subs tance to tnem, w i t h the e x c e p t i o n 
o f the l a c k o f f r eedom i n the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d , bu t suggested 
t h a t t h e r e had oeen c o n s i d e r a b l e e x a g g e r a t i o n . 
(77) Wash ing ton to F .O. A p r i l 26, 19M+, r e p o r t o f Press 
C o n f e r e n c e , U 3 1 6 9 / 6 / 7 O . 
(78) Anderson to W a s h i n g t o n , May 2 , 1 9 ^ , U 3 7 9 9 / 6 / 7 0 . 
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" T h i s be ing so , the i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n i s no t to aec i ae 
whether the Wash ing ton document as i t s t ands i s 
a c c e p t a b l e b u t t o c o n s i d e r whether i t i s possiDle a t 
the same t i m e to o b t a i n r e a l advantages f o r ou r e x p o r t 
t r a d e and to s a f e g u a r d our r i g h t to g i v e to B r i t i s h 
a g r i c u l t u r e t h a t measure o f s u p p o r t wh ich we s h a l l have 
to g i v e to I t a f t e r the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d , w i t h o u t 
abandoning the c o n c e p t i o n o f a m u l t i l a t e r a l commerc ia l 
c o n v e n t i o n o r g o i n g back o n t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f 
A r t i c l e 7, t o w h i c h we a re p l e d g e d . I t i s ou r c o n s i d e r e d 
v i e w t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to do s o . " (79) 
The s o l u t i o n was seen i n the use o f p r o t e c t i v e measures 
wh ich the m u l t i l a t e r a l c o n v e n t i o n would not a b o l i s h such as b u l k 
pu rchases , l e v y s u b s i d i e s and so o n , so l o n g as they were no t 
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y and d i d n o t r e s u l t i n more t h a n a 25> p r i c e 
i n c r e a s e above the market p r i c e . The B r i t i s h hoped t h a t t h i s 
c o u l d be agreed t o w i t h the Amer icans o n the b a s i s o f some 
o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i o n . D e s p i t e these r a t h e r o p t i m i s t i c v iews the 
group was p r epa red t o concede t h a t t he p rob lem o f n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
was s t i l l most p r o b l e m a t i c a l . 
" I n the exchange o f l e t t e r s between the Pr ime M i n i s t e r 
and the P r e s i d e n t i t has been made c l e a r t h a t we do not 
r e g a r d t h i s c l a u s e ( i . e . A r t i c l e 7 o f 19^2 M u t u a l A i d A g r e e -
ment) as r e q u i r i n g the e l i m i n a t i o n o f I m p e r i a l P r e f e r e n c e . 
There can , however , be no d o u b t t h a t express a r rangements 
f o r d i r e c t i n g ou r purchases t o those c o u n t r i e s wh ich buy 
f r o m us would be ' d i s c r i m i n a t o r y ' i n the sense o f A r t i c l e 7 
and a re t h e r e f o r e r u l e d o u t by the M u t u a l A i d Agreement . 
On the o t h e r hand , t a r i f f s w h i c h s e l e c t s p e c i a l c a t e g o r i e s 
o r c l a s se s o f goods f o r heavy d u t y , a l t h o u g h i t i s w e l l 
known t h a t these goods come p r e d o m i n a n t l y f r o m a f ew 
s p e c i a l i s e d s u p p l i e r s , have no t been r ega rded h i t h e r t o as 
' d i s c r i m i n a t o r y ' . I t f o l l o w s t h a t I t i s n o t easy t o draw 
the l i n e , e s p e c i a l l y i n the case o f b u l k purchases and 
i m p o r t r e g u l a t i o n , and the d o c t r i n e o f n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
i s no t one w h i c h (can?) c o n v e n i e n t l y be pushed to a l o g i c a l 
c o n c l u s i o n . " (80) 
H e v i e w i n g the r e p o r t I n a no t e d a t e d September 18, Ande r son 
s t r o n g l y warned a g a i n s t the l i n e o f t h o u g h t d e v e l o p i n g i n the 
p ress and P a r l i a m e n t t h a t the U . K . s h o u l d f a l l back o n b i l a t e r a l i s m 
and b a r t e r i n g to recoup her economic losses a f t e r the war . 
(79) CCP (MOl, September 12, Committee o n Commerc ia l P o l i c y 
u e p o r t o f : - 'U*i33>+A3/53 . 
(80) l a i d . 
Anderson e x p l a i n e d t h a t the a d o p t i o n o f such p o l i c i e s would have 
s e r i o u s consequences because ; -
1. I t would be c o n t r a r y t o A r t i c l e 7 , 
2 . Lend-Lease would have been o b t a i n e d under f a l s e p r e t e n c e s . 
3 . I t would be c o n t r a r y t o the 1938 A n g l o - U . 3 . Trade Agreement , 
A r t i c l e s h and 5. 
h. I t would cause s e r i o u s o p p o s i t i o n f r o m H u l l and the S t a t e D e p a r t -
ment , and B r i t a i n would i n e f f e c t ge t no s u p p o r t f r o m anywhere 
i n the U . S . f o r a t r a d i n g b l o c wh ich would be a c o m p e t i t o r to 
h e r . I n f a c t i t was a l s o d o u b t f u l i n the l i g h t o f t h i s whe ther 
many c o u n t r i e s wou ld s u p p o r t B r i t a i n i n such a p o s i t i o n o f 
c o m p e t i t i o n . 
5. Canada was too dependent upon the U . S . to oppose her i n 
commerc i a l p o l i c y . 
6. Kven d i s r e g a r d i n g o b j e c t i o n s 1-5j t h e r e were s e r i o u s dangers 
i n b i l a t e r a l and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p o l i c i e s o f a r e b o u n d i n g n a t u r e . 
I n v i ew o f the above, Anderson t h o u g h t t h a t a de f a c t o b reak 
w i t h the U.S . w.'iich the a d o p t i o n o f d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p o l i c i e s would 
mean must be r u l e d o u t . F u r t h e r m o r e t h i s s h o u l d be made known 
and a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y o f c o l l a o o r a t i o n worked o u t . 
However, i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s Ande r son e q u i v o c a t e d , 
"To a v o i d any p o s s i b l e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , l e t me make i t c l e a r : 
a) Tha t the above does not a p p l y t o the t r a n s i t i o n a l 
p e r i o d ; - the Americans have a l r e a d y agreed a t B r e t t o n 
Woods to a l l o w us t e m p o r a r i l y t o c o n t i n u e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y 
p r a c t i c e s u n t i l we have escaped f r o m our immedia te p o s t -
war ba lance o f t r a d e d i f f i c u l t i e s , and we a re n o t l i k e l y m 
to ( s i c l i k e l y t o ? ) need any o t h e r i n s t r u m e n t t h a n t h a t , 
s i n c e i t enables us to r e q u i r e those f r o m whom we buy to 
spend w i t h u s . 
b ) Tha t the above does n o t a p p l y to n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y b u l k 
purchases o r i m p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n wh ich r e m a i n m a t t e r s f o r 
d i s c u s s i o n . 
c ) Tha t i f the ar rangements f o r a saner w o r l d wh ich we a re 
h o p i n g to o r g a n i s e i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h the U n i t e d 
S t a t e s and the B r i t i s h Commonwealth and o t h e r s a l s o , do 
u l t i m a t e l y break down t h e n u n q u e s t i o n a b l y , we have go t 
to t h i n k a g a i n on t h i s and many o t h e r m a t t e r s . " (81) 
(81) I b i d . 
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On the o t h e r s i d e o f the A t l a n t i c H u l l had i n f a c t oeen 
p r e s s i n g f o r the r e n e w a l o f commerc ia l t a l k s a f t e r the B r e t t o n 
(82) 
Woods Confe r ence "out Law had had t o r e f u s e t h i s . The B r i t i s h 
were s t i l l concerned over the problems t h a t had emerged a t the 
b e g i n n i n g o f the yea r b u t Law t o l d H u l l t h a t the B r i t i s h would be 
ready f o r f r e s h t a l k s i n the Autumn and moves were b e i n g t a k e n i n 
t h i s d i r e c t i o n . By November 16, the C h a n c e l l o r ' s Commit tee had 
produced y e t ano the r War C a b i n e t Paper which covered what was by 
now f a m i l i a r g r o u n d . 
I n a no te on what had been the main o b s t a c l e to the 
c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t a l k s which was b e c a u s e : -
" . . . the A g r i c u l t u r e M i n i s t e r s f e a r e d t h a t p r o p o s a l s 
f o r a m u l t i l a t e r a l C o n v e n t i o n p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d 
w i t h the Amer icans migh t p r e v e n t our redeeming our 
p ledge to m a i n t a i n a h e a l t h y and w e l l oa lanced 
a g r i c u l t u r e a f t e r the w a r . " (3*0 
however , s i n c e e a r l y 1 t h i n g s had improved somewhat o n the 
s t r a t e g i c f r o n t and i f such economic problems were t o be r e s o l v e d 
t h e n i t was o b v i o u s t h a t new t a l k s had to be u n d e r t a k e n . I n l a t e 
November t e n t a t i v e t a l k s began t o ge t underway once a g a i n . The 
l a s t l ap had begun. 
A l m o s t as soon as Lend-Lease became o p e r a t i o n a l on March 11, 
19^1, a l l e g a t i o n s were made i n the U . S . t h a t i t was b e i n g misused 
Al though s e c t i o n f o u r o f the a c t f o r b a d e the t r a n s f e r o f a r t i c l e s 
f r o m the B r i t i s h Government to o t h e r agents w i t h o u t the consent 
o f the U . S . , i t was, o f c o u r s e , i m p o s s i o l e to e x e r c i s e absolute 
c o n t r o l . There were i n e v i t a b l e o p p o r t u n i t i e s , 
(82) H u l l , O p . C i t . p . l V / 7 . 
(83) See CCP(I)M+ and WP(Mt )66 l , November 1 6 , 1 9 L ^ » U2313 / 1 ^3/53 • 
(3*0 Note o n WP(M*)661 by J . E . C o u l s o n , U2313/1 ^3/53• 
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d u r i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f a r t i c l e s and t h e i r i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o 
e x p o r t commodi t ies f o r p r o f i t e e r i n g . I n response to t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n , the U .S . demanded assurances t h a t B r i t i s h p r i v a t e 
i n d u s t r y would no t make e x o r b i t a n t p r o f i t s , n o r , more i m p o r t a n t , 
e f f e c t i v e l y s u b s i d i s e e x p o r t s by the use o f Lend-Lease goods. 
D e s p i t e the a l r e a d y s u b s t a n t i a l s a c r i f i c e s B r i t a i n had made i n 
l i q u i d a t i n g overseas a s se t s and c o n v e r t i n g he r economy to war 
p r o d u c t i o n , thus s t a r v i n g her e x p o r t m a r k e t s , the U . S . s t i l l 
seemed f e a r f u l o f the u t i l i s a t i o n o f Lend-Lease a r t i c l e s i n 
B r i t a i n ' s p a l t r y r e m a i n i n g e x p o r t c a p a c i t y . 
By the summer o f 19^-1, U . S . a c c u s a t i o n s o f t he misuse o f 
Lend-Lease by the B r i t i s h had become q u i t e s e r i o u s . On J u l y 9» 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e O'Connor t a b l e d a r e s o l u t i o n f o r t he i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
o f B r i t a i n ' s r e m a i n i n g t r a d e , w i t h L a t i n A m e r i c a . A l t h o u g h 
Keynes on the t e n t h , and R o o s e v e l t a t a press c o h e r e n c e s h o r t l y 
a f t e r w a r d s d e n i e d these a l l e g a t i o n s o f misuse , i t was o b v i o u s 
t h a t someth ing f u r t h e r would have to be done and i n f a c t 
n e g o t i a t i o n s on the i s s u e were a l r e a d y underway i n Wash ing ton 
and London. On Augus t 1, 19^1, a d r a f t s t a t e m e n t r e f e r r e d t o 
as t h e ' B u r n ' s L e t t e r s ' , a f t e r G e n e r a l Burns the e x e c u t i v e 
o f f i c e r i n charge o f Lend-Lease was cab led to London . I t 
c o n t a i n e d s u g g e s t i o n s o n r e s t r i c t i o n s wh ich c o u l d perhaps oe 
p l a c e d on B r i t i s h e x p o r t s to p r e v e n t improper use o f Lend-Lease 
m a t e r i a l s . However , i n London, i n l a t e J u l y , Ambassador Winan t 
had t a k e n up the I s sue i n London and had handed a memorandum t o 
C h u r c h i l l and the L o r d P r e s i d e n t on the s u b j e c t . He a l s o h i n t e d 
to t he C h a n c e l l o r o f t he Exchequer t h a t he f e a r e d the P r e s i d e n t 
f o r e s a w d i f f i c u l t i e s ove r Lend-Lease s u p p l i e s . As a r e s u l t o f 
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t h i s OP. J u l y 28, m i n i s t e r s , b a d l y o r i e f e c i and w i t h the P r e s i d e n t 
o f t h ^ Board o f Trade absent, met w i t h the Americans and 
conceded on v i r t u a l l y a l l the p o i n t s r a i s e d . U n f o r t u n a t e l y i n the 
c o n f u s i o n o f simultaneous t a l k s i n London and Washington, the 
B r i t i s h had not r e a l i s e d t h a t t he Burn's L e t t e r s were supplementary 
to the J u l y 2 8 t h t a l k s , and were not excluded by them. I n e f f e c t 
the Americans had r e s t r i c t e d B r i t i s h e x p o r t s t o goods which the 
U.S. d i d not compete w i t h such as Scotch Whisky, H a r r i s Tweeds, 
e t c . A r a t h e r i n s u l t i n g and D i c k e n s i a n c a r i c a t u r e o f B r i t a i n ' s 
t r u e e x p o r t p o t e n t i a l i n peace-time. The B r i t i s h , i n no 
p o s i t i o n to be a r g u m e n t a t i v e , d i d not renounce the accord reached, 
d e s p i t e the m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s , b u t s i m p l y prayed f o r the day when 
the U.S. would become a c o - b e l l i g e r e n t . The accord was f o r m a l i s e d 
i n a u n i l a t e r a l statement o f p o l i c y by F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y Eden on 
September 10. The phrase which most c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d the n a t u r e 
o f the agreement, and o f course 'agreement 1 i t was de f a c t o t o 
be, was t h a t : -
t he U n i t e d Kingdom e x p o r t t r a d e i s r e s t r i c t e d 
t o the i r r e d u c i b l e minimum necessary to s u p p l y o r 
o b t a i n m a t e r i a l s e s s e n t i a l to the war e f f o r t . " (86) 
There w i l l be o c c a s i o n to look a t the r e s t r i c t i o n s i n d e t a i l 
s h o r t l y . 
Even b e f o r e the c l o s e o f 19^-2 the B r i t i s h were concerned, 
over the e x p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s , b u t f o r a w h i l e l i t t l e was done i n 
the hope t n a t her b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n would improve. U n f o r t u n a t e l y 
i t d i d not do so. By the S p r i n g o f 19^2 B r i t a i n ' s immediate 
t a c t i c a l p o s i t i o n had d e t e r i o r a t e d s e r i o u s l y and p o l i t i c a l 
(85) See Sayers, Op.Cit. pp W01-hoh and Hargreaves and Gowing, 
Op.Cit. pp 11*5-151 • 
(86) See Crad. 6311, September 10, 1 9*+1 . 
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d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the U.S. had deveioped i n an almost s y r a e t r i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
The B r i t i s h hoped to persuade the Americans t h a t B r i t a i n ' s 
r e s e r v e s should be a l l o w e d to grow p r o p o r t i o n a l l y as her 
l i a b i l i t i e s grew. T h i s would e n t a i l a r e l a x a t i o n o f the e x p o r t 
r e s t r i c t i o n s and a t the same time t h e growth o f r e s e r v e s would 
a l l e v i a t e the economic problems o f the post-war t r a n s i t i o n 
p e r i o d by p r o v i d i n g a sound b a s i s f o r an e x p o r t l e d r e c o v e r y . 
A t the same t i m e , the B r i t i s h were r e l u c t a n t to supply the 
Americans w i t h f u l l d e t a i l s o f t h e i r f i n a n c i a l embarrassment, 
f o r a number o f reasons. F i r s t o f a l l , they d i d n o t wish to 
expose t h e i r economic weakness to the f u l l i n case i t weakened 
t h e i r b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n i n f o r t h c o m i n g monetary and commercial 
t a l k s . Secondly, f o r obvious reasons the y d i d n o t wish to put 
i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e i r p o s i t i o n as a good c r e d i t r i s k so f a r as 
Lend-Lease was concerned. And t h i r d l y , t h e y wanted the 
a c c u m u l a t i o n o f s t e r l i n g debts w i t h i n the S t e r l i n g Area, to 
remain a 'domestic i m p e r i a l economic problem', as p r e f e r e n c e s 
were to be. S t i l l , i n A p r i l 19^2 t h e y had heard u n o f f i c i a l l y 
t h a t G.L.L.A., a l t h o u g h w i s h i n g to r e t a i n the White Paper, was 
prepared to g i v e i t a more l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and so 
B r i t a i n ' s g e n e r a l economic problems were set o u t i n a f o r m a l 
memorandum presente d i n Washington on A p r i l 18, 19^2. The 
problem s t a t e d s i m p l y was t h a t , e x c l u d i n g l i a b i l i t i e s to the U.S. 
and Canada, B r i t a i n ' s a c c u m u l a t i n g war debts exceeded by f o u r 
times the annual g o l d p r o d u c t i o n j f the S t e r l i n g Area. I t was 
(87) For d e t a i l s see C h . I I and G.C.Wrigley and H.D.Hall, 
H i s t o r y o f the Second World War, U.K. C i v i l S e r i e s . 
S t u d i e s o f Overseas Supply H.M.S.O. and Longman's Green 
and Co. 1956, p.121. 
(88) See Sayers, Op.Cit. pAO1*. 
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thus suggested t h a t tne U.S. might a l l o w the U.K. to hoard the 
S t e r l i n g Area g o l d p r o d u c t i o n w h i l e a t the same time a l i m i t 
would be' placed on the a c c u m u l a t i o n o f U.S. d o l l a r s . 
I n f a c t a c l e a r 'no' was not g i v e n by the U.S. Treasury u n t i l 
October when p r e d i c t a b l y they p o i n t e d o u t t h a t g o l d and d o l l a r s 
were i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e . I n t h a t month both Morgenthau and White 
came to "England p r i m a r i l y to d e a l w i t h the c u r r e n c y problems 
i n v o l v e d i n the a l l i e d i n v a s i o n o f Nort h A f r i c a , though i t was 
a l s o an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r Morgenthau to observe, a t f i r s t hand, 
the B r i t i s h economic p o s i t i o n . P r i o r t o l e a v i n g Morgenthau had 
an i n t e r v i e w w i t h Roosevelt who di s c u s s e d w i t h him B r i t i s h 
e x c l u s i o n o f U.S. t r a d e from some o f her c o l o n i e s ; and B r i t i s h 
o i l c oncessions. Roosevelt commented t h a t he wanted a l l these 
c o l o n i e s opened up f o r U.S. t r a d e a f t e r the w a r . ^ 0 ^ So, r i g h t 
from the s t a r t , Morgenthau had h a r d l y s e t o u t s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y 
d i s p o s e d to B r i t a i n ' s economic p l i g h t and a f t e r t a l k s i n mid-
October w i t h B r i t i s h Treasury o f f i c i a l s , b e l i e v e d he had h i s 
wor s t f e a r s confirmed about B r i t i s h f i n a n c e s . Morgenthau 
de c i d e d not to r e l a x the r e s t r i c t i o n s but to t i g h t e n them d e s p i t e 
White's assurances to the B r i t i s h t h a t t h e r e would be no f u r t h e r 
(91 ) 
a c t i v e r e d u c t i o n o f B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s . w 
On h i s r e t u r n to the U.S. Morgenthau w i t h Wallace, H u l l , 
Stlrason and S t e t t i n i u s , r e p o r t e d to Roosevelt on January 3 > 19L +31 
t h a t the U.K. had accumulated #1B i n reserves and t h a t t h i s 
would c o n t i n u e to grow unless a l t e r a t i o n s i n Lead-Lease s u p p l i e s 
(89) See Sayers, Op.Cit. pp ^29-^31. 
(90) See Blum, Op.Cit. p.127-
(91) See Sayers, Op.Cit. pp V31-^32. 
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were e f f e c t e d . They proposed a L i m i t o f ^600 - 1000tn on 
B r i t a i n ' s r e s e r v e s . To e x p e d i t e t h i s the U.S. should d i s c o n t i n u e 
c i v i l i a n goods s u p p l i e s to South A f r i c a and o n l y supply m i l i t a r y 
goods on a b a s i s o f e q u i v a l e n t r e c i p r o c a l a i d . A u s t r a l i a and 
New Zealand would r e q u i r e f u r t h e r s t u d y , Also a new committee 
c h a i r e d by the S e c r e t a r y o f the Tr e a s u r y should be e s t a b l i s h e d 
t o o v e r l o o k Lend-Lease and o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n about a l l i e d monetary 
(92) 
r e s e r v e s . On January 11, R o o s e v e l t a p p r o v e d . w 
On January 19th , K i n g s l e y Wood wrote a p e r s o n a l l e t t e r to 
Morgenthau on the Lend-Lease problems. Morgenthau r e p l i e d t h a t 
he was always ready to d i s c u s s problems but the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
was coming under c r i t i c i s m on the d e t a i l s o f the Lend-Lease 
Agreement and the m a t t e r had been r e f e r r e d t o the P r e s i d e n t . 
Morgenthau d i d n ot f e e l a b le t o c o n f i d e t o the C h a n c e l l o r t h a t 
from January 3 , i t had been U.S. p o l i c y , decided u n i l a t e r a l l y , 
t o l i m i t the U.K. re s e r v e s to a maximum o f #1B. Not even c o n t e n t 
w i t h t h i s f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n o f B r i t a i n ' s economic independence 
the U.S. began t o urge the abandonment by B r i t a i n o f c e r t a i n 
e x p o r t p r o d u c t i o n l i n e s such as b i c y c l e s and a g r i c u l t u r a l hand 
t o o l s , to a l l o w her to c o n c e n t r a t e more on war p r o d u c t i o n . I t 
was p o i n t e d out t h a t U.S. s u r p l u s l a b o u r could take over such 
p r o d u c t i o n i n s t e a d . W J T h i s was s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d by the U.K. 
and i n May, the P r e s i d e n t o f the Board o f Trade, dee p l y a n x i o u s , 
t o l d h i s c o l l e a g u e s t h a t i -
(92) See Blum, Op.Cit. p.131; Sayers i m p l i e s t h a t Morgenthau 
was not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the d e c i s i o n t o l i m i t B r i t i s h 
r e s e r v e s as he was absent f r o m the Cabinet meeting which 
t e c h n i c a l l y took the o f f i c i a l d e c i s i o n b u t as can oe seen 
from the above, i n p a r t i c u l a r the r e p o r t o f January 3 j he 
was i n f a c t most i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h i s d e c i s i o n . Sayers, 
u p . C i t . pp.1+31-2. 
(93) See H u r s t f i e l d , Op.Cit. p . 3 0 6 . 
"... he f u l l y accepted the p o l i c y o f combined Anglo-
American p l a n n i n g to meet the minimum c i v i l i a n r e q u i r e -
ments o f the non-axis w o r l d , but he p o i n t e d o u t t h r e e 
dangers i n the c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n . F i r s t , t h e r e was the 
i n c r e a s i n g r e s t i v e n e s s o f B r i t i s h i n d u s t r i a l i s t s a r i s i n g 
f r o m the f e e l i n g t h a t t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l markets were being 
handed over to American e x p o r t e r s . Secondly, t h e r e was 
u n c e r t a i n t y as to whether the Americans would be able to 
supply the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f the non-Axis w o r l d as they 
became more f u l l y m o b i l i s e d . T h i r d l y , t h e r e was evidence 
t h a t t h e Americans were u s i n g the White Paper as an 
i n s t r u m e n t f o r p r e s s i n g t h e i r p o i n t o f view i n the f o r m u l -
a t i o n o f j o i n t e x p o r t programmes. He h i m s e l f wished to see 
the s u p e r c e s s i o n o f the White Paper as soon as p o s s i b l e and 
i t s replacement by a j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n ..." (9*+) 
I n the same month H a l i f a x began to make c o m p l a i n t s to the 
Americans about p o l i c i e s which were g r a d u a l l y c a p t u r i n g B r i t i s h 
e x p o r t markets i n South America. H a l i f a x proposed the a d o p t i o n 
o f the f o l l o w i n g u n a e r s t a n d i n g ; -
1. That e x p o r t s from e i t h e r c o u n t r y should be determined by the 
p r i n c i p l e o f Che b e s t use o f r e s o u r c e s . 
2. That s a c r i f i c e s o f e x p o r t markets because o f war p r o d u c t i o n 
should not be taken advantage o f i n the post-war w o r l d . 
H a l i f a x a l s o urged the w i t h d r a w a l o f A r t i c l e U- o f the White 
Paper which f o r b a d e B r i t a i n to e x p o r t , Lend-Lease goods or t h e i r 
s i m i l i t u d e , nor goods which were i n s h o r t supply i n the U.S. w i t h 
a few minor exemptions. The r e a s o n i n g on pre-war markets was 
embodied i n an aide memoire which was handed to tha-Americans, 
b u t l i t t l e response was f o r t h c o m i n g . On August 2 , the S t a t e 
Department was a g a i n asked by the B r i t i s h to r e c o n s i d e r and agree 
t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s i n the J u l y a i d e memoire. The S t a t e Department 
demurred. I t was "unduly r e s t r i c t i v e " , they s a i d , and would have 
to be t i e d to i n c r e a s e s i n r e c i p r o c a l Le^id-Lease i f agreement was 
(9*0 Hargreaves and Gowing, Op.Cit, quoted p.160. 
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to be r e a c h e d . 7 ^ T h i s p a r t i c u l a r l i n e o f approach was now 
abandoned by the B r i t i s h . 
As August o f 19^3 approached, the B r i t i s h g r a d u a l l y began 
to r e a l i s e t h a t d e c i s i o n s had been t a k e n by the U.S. which were 
a f f e c t i n g t h e f l o w o f Lend-Lease goods t o B r i t a i n . O.L.L.A. 
o f f i c i a l s were becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y p e t u l a n t aDout the supply 
o f c e r t a i n commodities and i n the new 19^3 a p p r o p r i a t i o n s #^8m 
w o r t h o f c i v i l i a n tobacco was removed from the sup p l y l i s t s . 
However, back i n October 19^ +2 d u r i n g the London t a l k s w i t h White 
and Morgenthau the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 3 r i t a i n e x t e n d i n g R e c i p r o c a l 
Lend-Lease raw m a t e r i a l s u p p l i e s w o r t h #130m had been mentioned. 
D u r i n g June and J u l y o f 19^3, the U.S. a g a i n began to press f o r 
such raw m a t e r i a l s . The B r i t i s h now looked on t h i s f a v o u r a b l y 
f o r a v a r i e t y o f reasons. F i r s t o f a l l i t c o u l d be p u b l i c i s e d 
to q u e l l American c r i t i c s , secondly I t c o uld be used as a l e v e r 
to press the Americans t o r e l a x e x p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s , t h i r d l y , 
i t would emphasise the concept o f ' p o o l i n g r e s o u r c e s ' , and 
f i n a l l y , i t was hoped t h a t i t would c r e a t e an atmosphere f a v o u r -
a ble t o B r i t a i n t h a t c o u l d be taken advantage o f i n o t h e r 
n e g o t i a t i n g f i e l d s . 
D u r i n g June and J u l y the n e g o t i a t i o n s on r e c i p r o c a l Lend-
Lease appeared t o make good p r o g r e s s . Both the B r i t i s h and 
S t e t t i n i u s w i t h h i s immediate a s s o c i a t e s i n O.L.L.A. favoured t h e 
p u b l i c a t i o n o f s t a t i s t i c s on, and the expansion of, r e c i p r o c a l a i d . 
There were some d i f f i c u l t i e s and d e l a y s w i t h I n d i a and the 
Dominions, w i t h whom separate t a l k s had to be h e l d . But, as f a r 
(95) See I b i d , a l s o Kolko, Op.Cit. and F.K.I9W3 I I I 6 l -62, rA. 
(96) See above and WP( l*3)329, J u l y 22,19^3. Hemo by tiden, 
Wood and D a l t o n . U311 6 / 2 [ ? l / 7 0 . 
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as the U.K. and C o l o n i e s were concerned, approximate q u a n t i t i e s 
o f s u p p l i e s and the commencement d a t e , October 1, nad been 
decided on. D u r i n g t h e f i r s t days o f August, the t a l k s were i n 
the process o f f i n a l i s i n g d e t a i l s f o r the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the 
White Paper on August 5 t h . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , unknown to the B r i t i s h , S t e t t i n i u s had k e p t 
the t a l k s s e c r e t f r o m the U.S.Treasury Department u n t i l the l a s t 
minute. T h i s was p a r t l y due to h i s p e r s o n a l r i v a l r y w i t h 
Morgenthau and a l s o Decause, he, l i k e the S t a t e Department, was 
more sympathetic towards B r i t a i n ' s f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
L i t e r a l l y hours o e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n , Morgenthau s a i d t h a t he would 
p u b l i c l y d i s a s s o c i a t e h i m s e l f from the agreement i f i t was 
p u b l i s h e d . I n the f a c e o f such a t h r e a t t h e r e was o n l y one 
course o f a c t i o n ; p u b l i c a t i o n was postponed. 
ft. S. Sayers I n h i s account o f t n i s episode i s u n c e r t a i n 
o f the motive behind Morgenthau's r e a c t i o n . He puts f o r w a r d a 
number o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , a l l o f v a r y i n g r e l e v a n c e . For example, 
one o f Morgenthau's o b j e c t i o n s was t h a t the d e l i v e r y o f s u p p l i e s 
to government departments, as proposed by the U.K., would lead to 
i n e f f i c i e n c y and would usurp the j o b o f the g r e a t American f r e e -
e n t e r p r i s e system. T h i s argument was r e i n f o r c e d i n October w i t h 
the r e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f America's f o r e i g n economic r e l a t i o n s . 
There had oeen c o n f u s i o n f o r some time over d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g 
a u t h o r i t y i n t h i s f i e l d and on October 26, i t was f i n a l l y 
c e n t r a l i s e d under the a u t h o r i t y o f Leo. T. Crowley and the F.ii.A. 
T h i s appointment o f new o f f i c i a l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y Crowley, was 
f a v o u r a b l e to the i n t e r e s t s o f p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e and s u p p o r t e d 
Morgenthau's l i n e on the R e c i p r o c a l Lead-Lease i s s u e . I t a l s o , 
i n c i d e n t a l l y , d i s r u p t e d the r a p p o r t t h a t had been p r e v i o u s l y 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h i s f i e l d oetween E n g l i s h and American o f f i c i a l s . 
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Morgenthau a l s o o b j e c t e d t o the l e v e l o f r e c i p r o c a l a i d 
which he claimed was too low. He not o n l y suggested a b s o l u t e 
i n c r e a s e s , b ut a l s o t h a t i t should be back-dated t o J u l y 1, thus 
making B r i t a i n r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y l i a b l e to repay d o l l a r s f r o m t h a t 
d a t e . Morgenthau claimed t h a t Congress expected r e c i p r o c a l a i d 
o f the magnitude #1-J-B and t h a t u n l e s s t h i s was f o r t h c o m i n g , he 
expected net Lend-Lease, J u l y 1,19^3 to June 3 0 , 1 9 ^ , to be 
l i m i t e d t o 2200-300M. ^ ) I n September the C h a n c e l l o r wrote t o 
Morgenthau t h a t such s u g g e s t i o n s o f r e t r o s p e c t i v e l i a b i l i t y had 
no p l a c e i n the f r e e exchange o f raw m a t e r i a l s between the two 
a l l i e s , and a t t a c h e d a s t a t i s t i c a l memorandum to i n d i c a t e the 
dangers o f the B r i t i s h r e s e r v e p o s i t i o n . To t h i s , Morgenthau 
made no r e p l y . ^98) Anderson, K i n g s l e y Woods' successor, 
re-emphasised the dangers and added t h a t the U.S. p r o p o s a l s 
(99) 
would put too g r e a t a s t r a i n on the S t e r l i n g A r e a . " The U.S., 
however, remained unmoved and c o n t i n u e d t o demand a d e l a y i n 
p u b l i c a t i o n u s i n g t h e n o n s e n s i c a l argument t h a t i t would provoke 
t r o u b l e on the eve o f a C o n g r e s s i o n a l e n q u i r y i n t o Lend-Lease. 
The i n v e s t i g a t i o n had been i n s t i g a t e d due to the much p u b l i c i s e d 
a l l e g a t i o n s o f f i v e s e n a t o r s , who had toured the war zones, 
t h a t Lend-Lease was b e i n g mishandled. To the B r i t i s h t h i s seemed 
a most eminent reason f o r p u b l i s h i n g , as a t l e a s t a p a r t i a l defence 
o f the U.K. p o s i t i o n . Plans went ahead f o r the r e v i s i o n o f the 
(97) Blum, Op.Cit. p.132. 
(93) See Sayers, Op.Cit. pp ^32-^33. 
(99) Blum, Up.Cit. p.132. 
270 
White Paper w i t h both Keynes and Beaverbrook i n f u l l accord f o r 
once, h e l p i n g I n the r e - d r a f t . Meanwhile, B r i t i s h hopes r e c e i v e d 
another setback on September 1 7 t h , when K o o s e v e l t went out o f h i s 
way to r e p u d i a t e an o f f i c i a l ' s b o l d e n u n c i a t i o n o f the p o o l i n g 
p r i n c i p l e . I n r e p l y t o the state m e n t ; 
"The Congress I n passing and e x t e n d i n g the Lend-Lease 
Act made i t p l a i n t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s wants no new 
war debts t o j e o p a r d i s e the coming peace. V i c t o r y and 
a secure peace, are the o n l y c o i n I n which we can be r e -
paid'.' " 
Ko o s e v e l t s a i d : -
"He would not have worded the second sentence the way 
i t had been ... There were a l l k i n d s o f c o i n , whether 
or n ot they j i n g l e d . " (100) 
And s t i l l , the U.K. was not w h o l l y w i t h o u t support f o r i t s 
p o s i t i o n on r e s e r v e s . Some members o f the S t a t e Department, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y Acheson, thought t h a t adequate r e s e r v e s f o r B r i t a i n 
were e s s e n t i a l i f she was to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the post-war 
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n o f t r a d e , so f a v o u r e d by a l l U.S. Departments. 
Fu r t h e r m o r e , i f the U.S. pressed t h e i s s u e t oo f a r , the U.K. 
might i n s i s t on r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n s being p l a c e d on the U.S. 
w i t h r e g a r d t o the r e - e x p o r t o f goods c o n t a i n i n g raw m a t e r i a l s 
o b t a i n e d on r e c i p r o c a l Lena-Lease. So a t t h e ; -
"... 'working l e v e l ' - H a r r y White ( T r . ) John McCloy 
(War) and myself ( S t . ) - the b a t t l e c o n t i n u e d over the 
l e v e l o f B r i t i s h g o l d and d o l l a r r e s e r v e s which might be 
accumulated under Lend-Lease. McCloy and I would acuse 
the Treasury o f e n v i s a g i n g v i c t o r y where b o t h enemies and 
a l l i e s were p r o s t r a t e - e n e m i e s by m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , a l l i e s 
by b a n k r u p t c y . We f i n a l l y worked the 3 r i t i s h reserves' up 
from rock bottom to double the T r e a s u r y ' s minimum,... " 
(101 ) 
(100) See Sayers, Op.Cit. F o o t n o t e p.h2y. 
But see H o l b o r n , Op.Cit. V o l . 1 . Quotes House Doc.No.799> 
7 7 t h Cong. 2nd Sess. p.21 - 2 3 , F.D.K's 5 t h Kep. to Cong, 
on L-L Ops. when i n f a c t he d i d . 
(101) Acheson, Op.Cit. p.23. 
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But Morgenthau was not to be persuaded. I n f a c t , as s h a l l 
be seen, he suspected the S t a t e Department o f coLLusion w i t h Che 
U.K. c o n t r a r y to the i n t e r e s t s o f the U.S., the f r e e e n t e r p r i s e 
system, and perhaps most i m p o r t a n t the U.S. T r e a s u r y Department. 
Morgenthau became even more r e c a l c i t r a n t and l a t e r i n November 
blo c k e d Acheson's p r o p o s a l f o r a p r o p o r t i o n a l o a s i s o f a s s e t s to 
l i a b i l i t i e s f o r the B r i t i s h r e s e r v e l e v e l / 1 0 2 ^ T h i s , o f c o urse, 
was the r e a l i s s u e , B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s . I n J u l y 19^3> d e s p i t e the 
p o l i c y o f s i n i s t e r c o n t r o l u n i l a t e r a l l y adopted i n January, the 
B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s had begun to r i s e . R e l a x a t i o n o f the e x p o r t 
r e s t r i c t i o n s , which the B r i t i s h were known to f a v o u r s t r o n g l y , 
would a c c e l e r a t e t h i s t r e n d . Such r e l a x a t i o n s i n exchange f o r 
de f a c t o acceptance o f a f r e e l y o f f e r e d e x t e n s i o n o f r e c i p r o c a l 
a i d would oe t a c t i c a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t t o oppose. 
O b j e c t i o n s had to be made b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n and t h i s i s what 
Morgenthau had done. A l t h o u g h t h i s i s somewhat c o n j e c t u r a l , 
what i s n o t , was Morgenthau 1s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o keep B r i t i s h 
r e s e r v e s down, and t h i s seems the o n l y reasonable e x p l a n a t i o n o f 
h i s o p p o s i t i o n to the r e c i p r o c a l a i d agreement, which would, on 
the f a c e o f i t have d e p r i v e d the U.K. o f a c e r t a i n amount o f 
d o l l a r e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y . The problem was t h a t under the e x t a n t 
p r o v i s i o n s , Morgenthau d i d not b e l i e v e the l o s s would be 
s u b s t a n t i a l enough. Furthermore, the 3 r l t i s h were i n s i s t i n g t h a t 
s i m i l a r r e s t r i c t i o n s should a p p l y to r e c i p r o c a l Lend-Lease as to 
Lend-Lease. T h i s was something the U.S. WHS v e r y r e l u c t a n t t o 
agree to but which i n August seemed the o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t o 
r e l a x i n g the e x p o r t w h i t e paper r e s t r i c t i o n s . Morgenthau was 
determined not to a l l o w t h i s because o f the consequent r i s e i n 
B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s , which was bound t o f o l l o w . 
(102) See K o l k o , Op.Cit. p.232. 
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D e s p i t e f i g u r e s from the B r i t i s h i n d i c a t i n g t h a t her 
q u i c k l i a b i l i t i e s exceeded by 700# her q u i c k a s s e t s ^ 1 0 - ^ , 
Morgenthau on November 1, s u b m i t t e d a memorandum t o F.D.R. 
su g g e s t i n g t h a t more a c t i v e steps should be ta k e n t o reduce 
B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s t o #1B as Ro o s e v e l t had approved I n January. 
They were now #1 ,3B - #1.7B, a c c o r d i n g t o U.K. and U.S. 
r e s p e c t i v e a s s e s s m e n t s . ^ M o r g e n t h a u s a i d he wanted t o 
av o i d c r i t i c i s r n f t e f f i Congress which was e i t h e r f a c i l e s o p h i s t r y or 
evidence o f gross incompetence i n p o l i t i c a l assessment. As we 
s h a l l see the C o n g r e s s i o n a l e n q u i r y was a damp s q u i b . I n a d a i t i o n 
Morgenthau a l l e g e d t h a t the B r i t i s h were u s i n g Lend-Lease i n 
p r i v a t e business to an u n f a i r advantage. The F.E.A., and the War 
Department concurred i n these s e n t i m e n t s and on November 6 , 
R o o s e v e l t I n d i s c u s s i o n o f the B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s : -
"... t o l d Crowley to keep them as they were, n o t to 
l e t them get any h i g h e r . " (105) 
I n the U.K., pl a n s were now going ahead f o r u n i l a t e r a l 
p u b l i c a t i o n . A f t e r the w h i t e paper had been r e v i s e d , the War 
Cabi n e t decided p u b l i c a t i o n should go ahead a f t e r W.3.C. had 
made a p e r s o n a l appeal t o Roosevelt f o r h i s s u p p o r t on the i s s u e s 
i n v o l v e d . B e f ore t h i s happened, Keynes r e t u r n e d f r o m the U.S. 
w i t h the news t h a t the much vaunted C o n g r e s s i o n a l E n q u i r y had 
gone " o f f a t h a l f c o c k " ^ 1 0 ^ and t h a t the more f a v o u r a b l e views 
o f the S t a t e Department now p r e v a i l e d and the U.S. was i n f a v o u r 
o f Immediate p u b l i c a t i o n . The r e a s o n i n g behind t h i s sudden 
(103) For f u l l and d e t a i l e d f i g u r e s and the method by which U.K. 
accumulated some r e s e r v e s , see 'The Overseas Assets and 
L i a b i l i t i e s o f the U.K.' Approved I n P r i n c i p l e by the 
C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer AD ( ^3) 2 , d a t e d September 2 , 
191*3, UU500/251 /70 . 
( 1 0 ^ ) See Kol k o , Op.Cit. p.283. 
(105 ) Blum, Op.Cit. p.133. 
(106) See Sayers, Op.Cit. p , L +25. 
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change i s not e n t i r e l y a c c u r a t e o r comprehensive. F i r s t o f a l l 
the S t a t e Department's views were not so p r e v a l e n t as to g a i n a 
p r o p o r t i o n a l b a s i s f o r B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s , and seco n d l y , and most 
i m p o r t a n t , Morgenthau had persuaded the P r e s i d e n t t o agree t o 
f u r t h e r a c t i o n on the B r i t i s h r e s e r v e p o s i t i o n . The d e c i s i o n 
had been taken t o h o l d the B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s where they were -
the r e c i p r o c a l a i d c o u l d now f l o w . 
The new arrangements f o r raw m a t e r i a l s sup:)lies t o the 
U.S. were announced i n the House o f Commons on November 11, 19^3, 
by trie P r e s i d e n t o f the Board o f Trade. ^ 
O a l t o n commented t h a t i n the view o f che changed c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
the Government c o n s i d e r e d t h a t ; 
'the u n i l a t e r a l u n d e r t a k i n g c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s White 
Paper (Cmd .6311, September 10,19^1) should be 
r e p l a c e d by a new statement. H i s Majesty's Government 
and the U n i t e d S t a t e s Government are now engaged i n 
n e g o t i a t i o n s as to the form which a new j o i n t and 
r e c i p r o c a l d e c l a r a t i o n should t a k e . " (108) 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y circumstances were not very a u s p i c i o u s . 
Most, i f not a l l , o f B r i t i s h hopes i n J u n e / J u l y 19^3) had been 
t h w a r t e d . R o o s e v e l t ' s statement had put i n t o q u e s t i o n the 
p r i n c i p l e o f p o o l i n g resources and Morgenthau's v i o l e n t 
o p p o s i t i o n and the r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n which r e s u l t e d i n the 
emergence o f the F o r e i g n Economic A d m i n i s t r a t i o n had soured the 
n e g o t i a t i n g atmosphere. The B r i t i s h had not so f a r succeeded i n 
hav i n g the e x p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s r e l a x e d , i n f a c t q u i t e the o p p o s i t e 
(107) See 'Survey o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 1939-^6, America, 
B r i t a i n and R u s s i a } T h e i r C o o p e r a t i o n end C o n f l i c t 19^1-1+6f, W.H.McWeil, h . I . I . A . O.U.P. London 1953, 
Appendix I I by S i r Uavid Waley, 'The Ph i l o s o p h y o f 
Lend-Lease *, p, 782. 
(103) House o f Commons Jeoates, V o l . 393i Col. 1312, 
November 1 1 , 19W3. 
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had happened. B r i t a i n was now s t i l l f a ced w i t h e x p o r t d i f f i c u l t i e s 
b u t a l s o had the a d d i t i o n a l burden o f raw m a t e r i a l s u p p l i e s to 
the U.S. Her a t t e m p t s t o impose s i m i l a r e x p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s upon 
the U.S. were never s e r i o u s l y p r e s s e d , the p o l i t i c a l uproar i n 
the U.S. would have been too much to bear and the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
an o v e r - l o a d on B r i t i s h c a p a b i l i t i e s , though i n the w h i t e paper 
the key paragraph r e a d : -
"... i n f u r t h e r a n c e o f the g e n e r a l p o l i c y o f p o o l i n g 
r e s o u r c e s , His Majesty's Government have decided to 
extend r e c i p r o c a l a i d to raw m a t e r i a l s and f o o d s t u f f s 
purchased by the Government o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s from 
the U n i t e d Kingdom and the C o l o n i a l Empire which would 
thus be made a v a i l a b l e on terms analogous t o Lend-Lease." 
(109) 
I t was merely an e q u i t a o l e n o t i o n h e l d by the B r i t i s h out 
abandoned i n the l i g h t o f p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s . 
C e r t a i n l y on the o t h e r s i d e o f the A t l a n t i c , d e s p i t e growing 
apprehensions i n t h e S t a t e Department, t h e r e was l i t t l e thought 
o f r e v i s i n g the Lend-Lease White Paper. On November 
Morgenthau e x p l a i n e d t o H a l i f a x the f e e l i n g s o f the T r e a s u r y , 
the r . i i . A . , the White House and the Truman Committee. He s a i d 
t h e r e was a d i s l i k e o f • B r i t a i n * s use o f Lend-Lease to i n c r e a s e 
her r e s e r v e s . Morgenthau d i s p a r a g e d the c o l l u s i o n , F±S he saw i t , 
w i t h trie S t a t e Department t o achieve t h i s and c o n f i d e d t h a t : -
" A f t e r a l l , i f you people wouId only agree w i t h me t h a t 
your balances should !JB cut down, I would be glad t o 
t a c k l e your o t h e r post-war problem o f what you're goLng 
to do w i t h your b i g s t e r l i n g balances." (110) 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y as Mor^enthau s a i d , he d i d not know i f he had 
a s o l u t i o n to '..he U.K.'s problems b u t what he d i d know was t h a t 
Lend-Lease was not to be used as i t had been by the B r i t i s h f o r 
t h i s was never the i n t e n t i o n o f the Lend-Lease A c t . The B r i t i s h 
(109) Cmd. 6^83, 'Report on Mutual A i d ' , November 11,19^3. 
(110) Blum, Op.Clt. p.133. 
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were not to be drawn however by such I n s u b s t a n t i a l , b a i t . 
S i r David Waley s t r o n g l y opposed such s u g g e s t i o n s . On 
November 17, Mbrgenthau was even more candid w i t h H a l i f a x and 
a d m i t t e d t h a t he could not c o m f i t the U.S. to any post-war 
commercial p o l i c i e s to h e l p B r i t a i n . His p r e v i o u s o f f e r o f h e l p 
now seemed even more vacuousP"^^ 
S h o r t l y a f t e r t h i s w h i t e reviewed the r e c e n t t a l k s and i n 
a memorandum i n t e n d e d f o r u o o s e v e l t , recommended the d i s c o n t i n -
u a t i o n o f c e r t a i n k i n d s o f n o n - m i l i c a r y Le.id-Lease m a t e r i a l s to 
b r i n g the B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s down to #1B. I n f a c t t h e r e was 
o p p o s i t i o n to the proposed technique o f d o i n g t h i s from Oscar Cox, 
Crowley's deputy a t the K, b, A. , who on rlove^Der 23 , proposed t h a t 
the r e d u c t i o n s should oe e f f e c t e d by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o b j e c t i o n s to 
Br i t i s h supply reques t s . He p o i n t e d out tha t t h i s wouId a v o i d 
a sharp B r i t i s h r e a c t i o n a:>d poss i o l e d i f f i c u l t i e s a t m i n i s t e r i a l 
l e v e l i f White's p r o p o s a l s were adopted. Both Morgenthau and 
Crowley supported t h i s , though the l a t t e r was not sanguine about 
i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n r e d u c i n g the D a l a n c e s a d e q u a t e l y . ^ 1 
Meanwhile, i n December, trie v e r y e v e n t u a l i t y Cox f e a r e d , 
o c c u r r e d at t h e C a i r o Conference. C h u r c n i l l broached the 
s u b j e c t o f r e s e r v e s w i t h h o o s e v e l t who a p p a r e n t l y agreed t h a t the 
U.K. should n o t oe t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y from France ana Hussia. 
A t t h e conference a memorandum on the r e s e r v e i s s u e was a l s o 
handed to Ha r r y Hopkins f o r c o n s i d e r e t i o n . I n a c t u a l f a c t t h e r e 
were two immediate is s u e s i n v o l v e d : 
(1) which the B r i t i s h were prepared to accept f o r 
n e g o t i a t i o n w??s the g r a d u a l e l i m i n a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l l y 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l Lend-Lease a r r . i c l e s . 
(111 ) I b i d , p.13*+. 
(112) See Blum, p.13^. 
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( 2 ) the issue o f u n i l a t e r a l U.S. a c t i o n to l i m i t 
B r i t i s h reserves by manipulating Lend-Lease. 
At Cairo i t appeared that C h u r c h i l l had gained Roosevelt's 
acceptance of the B r i t i s h views. 
Yet s t i l l the saga continued. On December 15 Crowley 
complained to Morgenthau t h a t the State Department were s t i l l 
supporting the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n and tha t F.JS.A. were encountering 
s t i f f o p p o s i t i o n to the e l i m i n a t i o n of s p e c i f i c Lend-Lease 
t r a n s f e r s . ^ 1 ^ On December 31> H u l l at an Inter-departmental 
meeting, expressed fears o f B r i t i s h r e t a l i a t i o n over U.S. attempts 
to i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e i r reserves i n the way Crowley and Morgenthau 
were doing. Crowley r e t o r t e d that the U.S. Government would be 
i n a serious s i t u a t i o n I f the American public discovered the size 
of the B r i t i s h reserves. Consequently Morgenthau and. H u l l 
produced a j o i n t memorandum f o r the President, and H u l l an 
a d d i t i o n a l one i n c o r p o r a t i n g the views of Acheson. H u l l agreed 
w i t h Morgenthau on the gradual e l i m i n a t i o n of s p e c i f i c Lend-Lease 
t r a n s f e r s but wanted to i n s t i g a t e f u r t h e r t a l k s on the issue o f 
B r i t a i n ' s gold and d o l l a r reserve l e v e l s . Morgenthau, objected 
vehemently to t h i s because of the renewal o f acrimony and possible 
B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n which would cause serious t r o u b l e 
when, f o r the time being, the tension had subsided somewhat. 
(113) s^e Chancellor of the Exchequer to P.M. February 2 ^ ,1 9Mt , 
U 1 8 3 V 1 2 / 7 1 . 
N.B, There i s some confusion over the date of the WSC/FDH 
t a l k s on the reserves issue, which ought to be cleared up. 
On March 9 , 19M+, W.S.C. i n a l e t t e r to F.D.R. r e f e r s to 
the date of the t a l k s as December 8 , 1 9 ^ 3 . As Wheeler 
Bennett has pointed out t h i s was impossible as F.D.R. l e f t 
Cairo on December 7 , 1 9 ^ 3 . See Op.Cit. p.653, Note 6 8 , ch . 8 . 
I n f a c t the mistake o r i g i n a t e d w i t h Anderson i n a note to 
P.M. February 2 ^ , 1 9 M f , U183W/12/71 , where he r e f e r s to a 
l e t t e r from W.S.C. to himself concerning the conversation 
on reserves which was dated December 8 . Anderson i n 
February 1 9 ^ simply assumed that the t a l k s took place on 
that day and as he d r a f t e d the telegram to F.D.H. o f 
March 9 , f o r W.S.C. t h i s i s how the i n c o r r e c t date appeared. 
The t a l k s probably took place on the 7 t h or the 6 t h . 
Blum, Op.Cit. p.13^. 
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On January 5> Roosevelt agreed on the Issue o f s p e c i f i c 
Lend-Lease t r a n s f e r s and compromised on the second issue. He 
suggested f u r t h e r t a l k s between the B r i t i s h and the State Depart-
ment but w i t h February 7 , 1 s e t as a deadline f o r a decision.^ 1 1 
Roosevelt's p o s i t i o n on the B r i t i s h reserve p o s i t i o n appeared to 
be very changeable and v a c i l l a t e d according to the p o l i t i c a l 
pressure brought to bear. His stance i n January c e r t a i n l y seemed 
to d i f f e r from t h a t adopted a t the Cairo Conference. 
As f a r as the F.E.A. was concerned, Crowley's fears concern-
ing the course o f a c t i o n proposed by h i s deputy Cox seemed to have 
been substantiated by B r i t i s h resistance to F.E.A. a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
pressure and on January h 9 they attempted to remedy t h i s by 
handing to the B r i t i s h a u n i l a t e r a l l y decided l i s t o f goods to be 
-removed from Lend-Lease.^ 1^ A l l Commonwealth and Empire missions 
i n Washington were informed and a l l agreed such a c t i o n was 
i n t o l e r a b l e . On January 7? H u l l c a l l e d H a l i f a x f o r t a l k s on the 
subject w i t h Morgenthau, White, Crowley, Cox, Acheson and 
Lauchlln C u r r i e , H a l i f a x was accompanied by Waley and Ben Smith. . 
At t h i s meeting on the 7 t h , Crowley handed the l i s t of 
p o l i t i c a l l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l Lend-Lease items to H a l i f a x who accepted 
them w i t h the comment that they would have to be examined and 
added t h a t o f course the U.S. would not r e a l l y go ahead wi t h such 
e l i m i n a t i o n s u n i l a t e r a l l y . 1 Mr. Ben Smith, the B r i t i s h ittesident 
M i n i s t e r Ibr S u p p l y ^ 1 1 ^ pointed out Parliamentary d i f f i c u l t i e s 
f o r H.M.G. i f i t was discovered the U.S. was taking u n i l a t e r a l 
(115) See Blum, Op.Cit. pp. 1 3 5 - 6 . 
(116) See Washington to F.O. January h 9 ^ ^ h k y U 2 0 V 1 2 / 7 1 . 
( 117 ) November 1 1 , 19^3 - 19^5-
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d e c i s i o n s wh ich p l aced a maximum l i m i t on B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s . 
Waley c o n t i n u e d by r e m i n d i n g the Amer icans o f S t e t t i n i u s ' s 
p romise i n J u l y 19^3 t h a t the p r i n c i p l e o f p o o l i n g r e s o u r c e s , 
3poken about so much by F . D . K , i n h i s e a r l y Lead-Lease r e p o r t s , 
wou ld be more a c c e p t a b l e i f B r i t a i n was t o i n c r e a s e her 
r e c i p r o c a l Lend-Lease , However, she had done so , o n l y t o be met 
w i t h more r e s t r i c t i o n s on her e x p o r t s . The r e s t r i c t i o n s were 
even h a r d e r to bear when no such r e g u l a t i o n s a p p l i e d f o r 
example to R u s s i a , 
" Mr, Morgenthau s a i d t h a t t he p o l i c y i s t o e l i m i n a t e 
i t e m by i t e m those i t ems o f Lend-Lease w h i c h r a i s e 
p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . He (g roup undec ided? c l e a r l y ) 
i m p l i e d t h a t i t i s n o t a t p r e s e n t i n t e n d e d t o reduce 
our d o l l a r ba l ances i n any o t h e r way ," (118) 
On the w h o l e , H a l i f a x expressed h i m s e l f s a t i s f i e d w i t h the 
t a l k s excep t f o r the l a c k o f an e x p l i c i t w r i t t e n acceptance o f 
the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n o n her r e s e r v e b a l a n c e s , w h i c h was he 
a d m i t t e d ' p r o f o u n d l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ' . S t i l l , t he U . S . now seemed 
t o have abandoned t e m p o r a r i l y her a t t e m p t s t o u n i l a t e r a l l y remove 
i t e m s f r o m Lend-Lease and i n t e r f e r e w i t h the l e v e l o f B r i t i s h 
r e s e r v e s . A c c o r d i n g t o e x t a n t U . S . p r o p o s a l s f o r the r emova l o f 
m a t e r i a l s f r o m Lend-Lease the r e s u l t i n g loss o f d o l l a r s would be 
s m a l l e r t han the expec t ed i n c r e a s e o f d o l l a r s f r o m the expend-
i t u r e o f the expand ing numbers o f U . S . p e r s o n n e l i n the U .K. 
I t was s t i l l d i s c o n c e r t i n g though f o r the B r i t i s h t h a t c o n f l i c t i n g 
and u n c o o r d i n a t e d v i e w s shou ld e x i s t among the U . S . depa r tmen t s 
because t h i s r e n d e r e d a l l p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n c r e t e assurances 
about B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s n e x t to w o r t h l e s s . F o r t u n a t e l y , a t t h i s 
t i m e , the r e s e r v e p o s i t i o n seemed somewhat l e s s a s s a i l a b l e and 
(118) Washington to F . O . S p e c i a l f o r T r e a s u r y , January 7 , 1 9 ^ , 
Ul*f5/12/71. See a l s o B l u m , O p . C i t . p . 1 3 ^ . 
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the goods to come o f f Lena-Lease had i n f a c t Deen c l a r i f i e d 
somewhat. I n October 19^3 the U . S . had I n d i c a t e d t h a t as f r o m 
November 1 5 , c e r t a i n goods , i . e . c a p i t a l goods , wou ld have to 
be p a i d f o r when n o t r e q u i s i t i o n e d f o r s t r i c t l y m i l i t a r y purposes 
By J a n u a r y 7 ) t he l i s t had been ex tended t o o f f - s h o r e purchases 
o f I c e l a n d i c f i s h and C a r i b b e a n sugar and o i l , c i v i l i a n goods f o r 
J a m a i c a , S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a , the M i d d l e E a s t , e t c . , tobacco f o r 
t h e armed s e r v i c e s and c e r t a i n o t h e r c o n t r o v e r s i a l i t e m s . 
On J a n u a r y 17 , T . W . C h i l d s w r o t e to t he r e s i d e n t m i n i s t e r i n 
W a s h i n g t o n t h a t a l t h o u g h F . E . A . had n o t c l a r i f i e d t he whole l i s t 
o f goods t o come o f f Lend-Lease he proposed t h a t t he U . K . s h o u l d 
agree to ' A ' - the c a p i t a l goods l i s t and ' B ' - o f f - s h o r e purchas 
l i m i t e d t o C a r i b b e a n sugar and molasses and I c e l a n d i c f i s h . 1 * 1 2 ^ 
I n f a t t i t was recommended to a l l Empire M i s s i o n s i n Wash ing ton 
and t o London t h a t t h i s shou ld be a c c e p t e d . However , o t h e r p a r t s 
o f t he l i s t s t i l l r e q u i r e d c l a r i f i c a t i o n and were p r o v i n g t r o u b l e 
some. 
I n London the F . O . was s t i l l r a n k l e d by the h igh-handedness 
o f U . S . a c t i o n d e s p i t e t h e i r p a r t i a l c l i m b - d o w n o n Janua ry 7 -
On J a n u a r y 2*+, N . B . R o n a l d cab l ed R . I . C a m p b e l l ! 
"The Amer ican A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a re a t t e m p t i n g t o reduce 
l e n d - l e a s e to t he l o w e s t p o s s i b l e f i g u r e , t h a t i s to 
say . they b l e e d us as near as p o s s i b l e w h i t e and j u s t 
c o n t r i b u t e enough t o p r e v e n t ou r p a s s i n g o u t o f e x i s t e n c e . 
They never r e f u s e l e n d - l e a s e o n the grounds t h a t Amer ica 
i s unab l e to a f f o r d i t , b u t o n the ground t h a t we a re 
g e t t i n g a l l we need t o keep us g o i n g and a n y t h i n g f u r t h e r 
w i l l be u n a c c e p t a b l e t o A m e r i c a n p u b l i c o p i n i o n . " ( 1 2 1 ) 
(119) Wash ing ton to F . O . January 7 , 19^3» U 1 8 7 / 1 2 / 7 1 . 
( 1 2 0 ) T . W . C h i l d s t o R e s i d e n t M i n i s t e r , J a n u a r y 1 7 , 1 9 ^ > 
U 1 0 7 9 1 / 1 2 / 7 1 . 
( 1 2 1 ) Rona ld t o C a m p b e l l , J a n u a r y 2 ^ , 1 9 ^ , U11+5/1 2 / 7 1 . 
280 
A c c o r d i n g to B l u m ' s a c c o u n t , based o n M o r g e n t h a u ' s d i a r i e s , 
the n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h i s i s s u e c o n t i n u e d i n ' f u t i l e d e b a t e 1 
u n t i l J anuary 27 , 19*+S when the C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer 
w r o t e t o Morgenthau o n t h e s u b j e c t . T h i s seems h a r d l y a c c u r a t e 
w i t h r e g a r d to t he p a r t i a l agreement over a r t i c l e s under the 
(122) 
h e a d i n g A and B , as we have seen. Anderson v r o t e i -
"My f i n a n c i a l a n x i e t i e s a r i s i n g o u t o f p r o s p e c t i v e 
e x t e r n a l payments a r e i n c r e a s i n g as t he war advances 
. . . and i t may be a d v i s a b l e t h a t we s h o u l d have an 
e a r l y exchange o f v i e w s abou t what the p o s i t i o n w i l l 
be i n the e a r l y p e r i o d . ( I am c o n f i d e n t t h a t i n the 
f u t u r e , as i n the p a s t , we can r e l y on you r f r i e n d l y 
c o o p e r a t i o n ) . n (123; 
A c c o r d i n g to B l u m , t h i s c o n f i d e n c e was n o t m i s p l a c e d and by 
the end o f J a n u a r y , Morgeathau h a d i -
" . . . come a l m o s t e n t i r e l y to accep t Acheson ' s a t t i t u d e 
toward the n e g o t i a t i o n s . " (12^) 
What he had d e c i d e d i n f a c t was t o l e ave i n abeyance f o r a 
w h i l e , i n s i s t e n c e on a maximum f i g u r e f o r the B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s . 
I n s t e a d o f t h i s he d e c i d e d to c o n c e n t r a t e on the r e a l l y s u b s t a n t 
i a l and e f f e c t i v e i s s u e , what was t o be aiui what was n o t to be 
removed f r o m Lend-Lease . On F e b r u a r y 2 , Blum r e l a t e s t h a t 
Morgenthau agreed t o a programme, a l s o a c c e p t a b l e t o Crowley and 
t h e B r i t i s h , t o e l i m i n a t e C a r i b b e a n molasses and s u g a r , I c e l a n d ! 
f i s h , Canadian a l c o h o l and p e t r o l e u m products*, a n d , s u b j e c t t o 
d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n s , some o t h e r n o n - m i l i t a r y goods . T h i s would 
amount to a p p r o x i m a t e l y #283m. , o r about h a l f M o r g e n t h a u ' s 
o r i g i n a l g o a l . The F . E . A . a l s o had t o compromise, much to 
C r o w l e y ' s d i s g u s t , and agreed to c o n t i n u e s u p p l y i n g t o b a c c o , 
(122) 10791/12/71, C h i l d s to R e s i d e n t M i n i s t e r J anua ry 17,1 9M*. 
(123) Anderson t o Morgen thau , J a n u a r y 7 , 191*-1*-. Quoted I n 
B lum, O p . C i t . p . 1 3 6 . 
(12*0 I b i d , 
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c e r t a i n paper p r o d u c t s , a g r i c u l t u r a l machinery and v a r i o u s 
s h i p p i n g s e r v i c e s . Blum g i v e s the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h i s conc luded 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y f o r a w h i l e the c o n t r o v e r s i e s ove r Lend-Lease , 
r e d u c t i o n s , b u t t h i s was f a r f r o m the case . 
On Feb rua ry 3 , the F . O . sen t a l e n g t h y c a b l e to 
W a s h i n g t o n i n d i c a t i n g s e r i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h the U . S . even 
ove r t h e i r more r e c e n t p r o p o s a l s . E f f e c t i v e l y t h e r e was l i t t l e 
c o n s o l a t i o n f o r the B r i t i s h i n h a v i n g succeeded i n p o s t p o n i n g 
f o r a w h i l e the use o f a l i m i t o n B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s . The i s s u e 
w h i c h would s u b s t a n t i a l l y d e t e r m i n e the l e v e l o f B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s 
was s t i l l o u t s t a n d i n g } the q u e s t i o n o f the r e m o v a l o f goods f r o m 
Lend-Lease and the o p e r a t i o n s o f the Whi t e Paper . I t was t r u e 
t he B r i t i s h were becoming I n c r e a s i n g l y i n c l i n e d t o i n c u r d o l l a r 
expenses f o r some raw m a t e r i a l s and c a p i t a l goods to enable them 
t o renew the e x p o r t o f p r o d u c t s c o n t a i n i n g such m a t e r i a l s , b u t 
even here t h e r e were p r o b l e m s . 
The F .O . r e p o r t e d t o Wash ing ton i n c r e a s i n g s i g n s o f 
p o l i t i c a l p r e s su re i n England r e g a r d i n g the W h i t e Paper i s s u e s . 
" T h i s p r e s s u r e m i g h t a t any t i m e become so a c u t e as 
g r a v e l y t o embarrass M i n i s t e r s , p r e j u d i c e n e g o t i a t i o n s 
and p o i s o n p o l i t i c a l a tmosphere , n o t so much because 
o f the l i m i t a t i o n s w h i c h t he W h i t e Paper now imposes , 
as because o f the l i m i t a t i o n s wh ich i t wou ld s t i l l 
impose o n the employment o f c a p a c i t y when the European 
war i s o v e r . " (125) 
For example , the B r i t i s h were n o t a l l o w e d t o o b t a i n a n y t h i n g 
f r o m the U . S . t h a t c o u l d be o b t a i n e d f r o m the S t e r l i n g A r e a . 
B u t the U . K . was n o t a l l o w e d under the W h i t e Paper t o e x p o r t good 
such as t r u c k s and h u r r i c a n e lamps now r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e i n the 
U . K . , t o the S t e r l i n g Area to pay f o r such i m p o r t s . The U . K . had 
o r i g i n a l l y asked the Empire i n 19M t o o b t a i n such goods f r o m the 
U . S . , b u t now the r e v e r s a l o f such p o l i c i e s seemed i n e q u i t a b l y 
(125) F .O . to W a s h i n g t o n , Feb rua ry 3 , 1 9 ^ , U718/12/71 . I t was 
approved by the C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer , M i n i s t e r o f 
P r o d u c t i o n and the P r e s i d e n t o f the ;3oard o f T r a d e . 
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d i f f i c u l t . Ano the r o b j e c t i o n a b l e case was I n F r e n c h , N o r t h and 
West A f r i c a , where the F . E . A . were e f f e c t i v e l y i n s i s t i n g t h a t : -
" . . . the W h i t e Paper shou ld be i n t e r p r e t e d o n the spo t by 
t h e i r own r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , and t h a t the U n i t e d Kingdom 
shou ld be e x c l u d e d as the source o f s u p p l y o f any a r t i c l e 
wh ich F . E . A . o r i t s l o c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e deems t o f a l l w i t h i n 
the l i m i t a t i o n s o f the W h i t e Paper . " (126) 
I n e f f e c t the U . S . were t a k i n g the W h i t e Paper wh ich D a l t o n 
had e x p l a i n e d i n P a r l i a m e n t t o be a u n i l a t e r a l U . K . d e c l a r a t i o n 
o f p o l i c y , as an agreement be tween the t w o . Not o n l y t h i s , b u t 
a l s o an agreement f o r w h i c h t he U . S . h e l d the p r e r o g a t i v e t o 
i n t e r p r e t . The F .O . t h o u g h t A m e r i c a n p r o p o s a l s were f a r f r o m 
s a t i s f a c t o r y o r even a p p r o a c h i n g a b a s i s f o r agreement . 
1 1 . . . p a r t i c u l a r l y . . . (one p r o p o s a l w h i c h ) . . . appears 
t o i n v o l v e j o i n t agreement i n advance o n e x p o r t s , 
c o n t a i n i n g m a t e r i a l s w h i c h were no t scarce and n o t -
w i t h s t a n d i n g t h a t we s h o u l d have p a i d f o r them. We 
c o u l d n o t p o s s i b l y a ccep t such a p r o v i s i o n . " (127) 
The s i t u a t i o n was c o n s i d e r e d so s e r i o u s t h a t the F . O . 
i n f o r m e d Wash ing ton t h a t S i r Samuel Bealas and S t i r l i n g wou ld be 
l e a v i n g f o r Wash ing ton about F e b r u a r y 8, t o s o r t t h i n g s o u t 
(1 ?ft} 
u n l e s s t h e r e were s t r o n g o b j e c t i o n s . 
So, d e s p i t e the i n c r e a s e i n r e c i p r o c a l Lend-Lease i t was 
o b v i o u s t h a t t he F . E . A . and t h e T r e a s u r y were s t i l l d e t e r m i n e d 
t o keep the B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s a t a round the #1B mark. 
I n a d d i t i o n , B r i t i s h a t t e m p t s t o g a i n acceptance by the U . S . o f 
the ' p o o l i n g r e s e r v e s 1 p r i n c i p l e d e s p i t e the P r e s i d e n t u s i n g 
(126) I b i d . 
(127) I b i d . 
(128) I b i d . Mr . H o b e r t H a l l was t o a s s i s t Bea les i n 
Wash ing ton and L i a i s o n w i t h London was t o be v i a 
S i r Henry S e l f who was m i n i s t e r ' s depu ty i n Wash ing ton 
and B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o n Combined P r o d u c t i o n and 
Resources B o a r d , 19^3—^5* 
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such n o t i o n s i n h i s e a r l y Lend-Lease r e p o r t s t o Congress , 
p roved a f a i l u r e . D u r i n g the l a t t e r p a r t o f 19^3 and e a r l y 
1 9 ^ , t h e U . S . had a l s o s h i f t e d the emphasis away f r o m the 
c r i t e r i o n o f sca rce m a t e r i a l s f o r c o n t r o l l i n g B r i t i s h e x p o r t s 
t o t h a t o f m a n u f a c t u r e d a r t i c l e s r e c e i v e d o n Lend-Lease , o r 
i d e n t i c a l o r f u l l y s u b s t l t u t a b l e t h e r e w i t h . T h i s made B r i t a i n ' 
p o s i t i o n p o t e n t i a l l y even more d i f f i c u l t . I n t he U . S . t he 
S t a t e Depar tment was becoming even more concerned o v e r F . f i . A . 
and T r e a s u r y p o l i c i e s , and i n F e b r u a r y warned R o o s e v e l t t h a t t h 
B r i t i s h : 
" . . . must f i n i s h t he war w i t h enough a s se t s t o c a r r y 
t h r o u g h such a program ( i . e . o f m u l t i l a t e r a l t r a d e ) . 
Even as t h i n g s s tand now, i t wou ld be d i f f i c u l t f o r 
t he B r i t i s h t o c o n s i d e r u n f r e e z i n g s t e r l i n g a t o r near 
t h e end o f the war , o r g i v i n g up many o f t h e i r o t h e r 
economic c o n t r o l s . . . we t h e r e b y reduce ou r chance t o 
a c h i e v e the b a s i c economic p o l i c y we want and n e e d . " (129) 
On F e b r u a r y 18 th , a t a C a b i n e t mee t ing f r o m w h i c h 
Morgen thau was absen t because o f i n f l u e n z a , C rowley a g a i n 
b r o u g h t up t he i s s u e o f the B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s . R o o s e v e l t s a i d 
t h a t the F . E . A . , the T r e a s u r y and S t a t e Depar tment s h o u l d d r a f t 
a l e t t e r j o i n t l y w h i c h he would t h e n send to C h u r c h i l l . Now 
Blum i n h i s accoun t p u t s f o r w a r d an a p o l o g y f o r Morgen thau and 
almost"makes i t appear as i f Morgen thau was c o n t e n t w i t h the 
s i t u a t i o n as i t s t o o d . I n f a c t , Morgenthau was s i m p l y w o r r i e d 
t h a t any new approaches made a t t h i s t i m e would cause r e p e r -
c u s s i o n s such t h a t B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n m i g h t 
undermine U . S . a t t e m p t s t o l i m i t B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s . A c c o r d i n g 
t o B l u m , the l e t t e r F . D . R . sen t t o W.S.C. on F e b r u a r y 23 , was 
d r a f t e d by S t e t t i n i u s b u t was n o t a u t h o r i s e d by the F . E . A . o r 
t he T r e a s u r y . The p e c u l i a r i t y o f t he l e t t e r l i e s i n the f a c t 
(129) Quoted i n K o l k o , O p . C i t . p.281*-. 
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t h a t the i s s u e o f l i m i t i n g B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s to #1B, was a g a i n 
r a i s e d by a member o f the depa r tmen t most s y m p a t h e t i c to 
B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , Blum h i m s e l f comments i -
" . . . ( S t e t t l n i u s ) hoped t o m i n i m i s e r a t h e r t h a n to 
i n c r e a s e A n g l o - A m e r i c a n t e n s i o n . 1 1 (130) 
I n f a c t i t appeared t h a t Bea les had bean making some 
s a t i s f a c t o r y p rog re s s w i t h the A m e r i c a n s . He was d i s c u s s i n g 
the problems w i t h Acheson and had access to S t e t t i n i u s I f i t 
was n e c e s s a r y , ^ 1 ^ and o n the d e t a i l s o f Lend-Lease , r e d u c t i o n s , 
some consensus was b e g i n n i n g t o emerge. Then o n F e b r u a r y 2ky 
the l e t t e r d r a f t e d by S t e t t i n i u s was sen t to C h u r c h i l l , 
"May I ask y o u r h e l p i n s o l v i n g a t roub lesome p r o b l e m 
w h i c h I s o f deep p o l i t i c a l c o n c e r n f o r b o t h y o u and us? 
O f f i c e r s o f ou r Government have l a t e l y d i s c u s s e d w i t h 
L o r d H a l i f a x , Mr . Ben. S m i t h a n d S i r D a v i d Waley , t he 
p o s s i b l e t e r m i n a t i o n o f c e r t a i n Lend-Lease t r a n s a c t i o n s 
w h i c h we have f o u n d t o be e m b a r r a s s i n g and no l o n g e r 
neces sa ry . Your people h a v e , as I u n d e r s t a n d i t , p r o m p t l y 
agreed t o t a k e ove r the purchase o f goods w h i c h cos t abou t 
f o u r hundred m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . F i n a l agreement o n the 
whole l i s t o f a r t i c l e s I s e x p e c t e d soon , and t h e 
n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n v i e w o f t h e i r c o m p l e x i t y , have gone v e r y 
w e l l . 
Q u i t e a p a r t f r o m these Lend-Lease n e g o t i a t i o n s , I have 
been w o n d e r i n g whether I t w o u l d be f e a s i b l e f o r y o u t o 
c o n s i d e r so o r d e r i n g your f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s as t o reduce 
y o u r g o l d and d o l l a r h o l d i n g s a v a i l a b l e i n t h i s c o u n t r y 
t o the ne ighbourhood o f abou t one b i l l i o n d o l l a r s . 
What do y o u t h i n k can and s h o u l d be done?" (132) 
I t was l e f t t o Anderson t o d e a l w i t h t h i s . He w r o t e a 
l e n g t h y memorandum f o r W.S.C. d e s c r i b i n g t he h i s t o r y o f t he 
i s s u e s i n v o l v e d . A n d e r s o n p o i n t e d o u t t h a t the second pa rag raph 
was y e t a n o t h e r a t t e m p t t o d i s c u s s some l i m i t o n B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s . 
(130) B l u m , O p . C i t . p . 1 3 7 . 
(131) S t e t t l n i u s was now U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e a f t e r 
W e l l e s ' s " r e s i g n a t i o n " i n September 19^3. 
(132) S e c r e t and P e r s o n a l , F . D . R . to W.S.C. d a t e d F e b r u a r y 23 , 
1 9 ^ , U1753/12/71 . 
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An i s s u e w h i c h had been banded abou t w i t h Morgen thau , f o r o v e r a 
y e a r . On September 3 , 1 ° A 3 , K i n g s Ley Wood had s en t a l o n g l e t t e r 
t o Morgen thau o n t h i s p rob lem t o w h i c h o n l y a s i m p l e acknowledge -
ment was r e c e i v e d . The i s s u e had been r a i s e d w i t h R o o s e v e l t and 
H o p k i n s a t C a i r o and a g a i n w i t h Morgen thau o n J a n u a r y 7. (133) 
A t t he l a s t m e e t i n g Morgen thau h i m s e l f had s a i d t h a t the p r e s e n t 
p o l i c y was to reduce i t e m by i t e m those goods o n Lead-Lease 
o f a c o n t r o v e r s i a l n a t u r e and c l e a r l y i m p l i e d t h a t i t was n o t 
h i s i n t e n t i o n to reduce U . K . d o l l a r ba lances i n any o t h e r way. 
So, o n the b a s i s o f t h i s and R o o s e v e l t ' s o p i n i o n expressed a t 
C a i r o , t h a t t he U . K . s h o u l d n o t be t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y f r o m 
France or R u s s i a , t he B r i t i s h had begun to agree t o the 
e l i m i n a t i o n o f i t e m s f r o m Lead-Lease . Anderson was u n d e r s t a n d -
a b l y f u r i o u s . Here were t he Amer icans b r i n g i n g up the whole 
i s s u e o f r e s e r v e s a g a i n , Ande r son w r o t e i -
" T h i s i s a l t o g e t h e r u n r e a s o n a b l e . I f we were t o accep t 
t he P r e s i d e n t ' s p r o p o s a l s , we s h o u l d have l o s t our 
f i n a n c i a l independence , i n any case , p r e c a r i o u s , as soon 
as Lend-Lease comes to an end , and would emerge f r o m t h e 
war , v i c t o r i o u s i n d e e d , b u t q u i t e h e l p l e s s f i n a n c i a l l y 
w i t h r e s e r v e s f o r i n f e r i o r n o t o n l y to R u s s i a b u t even 
t o France and H o l l a n d . " (13*0 
Not o n l y was t h e r e the i s s u e o f p l a c i n g B r i t a i n ' s r e s e r v e s 
i n q u e s t i o n a g a i n , b u t i t appeared v e r y much as i f the U . S . had 
p r o c u r e d U . K . agreement o n Lead-Lease r e d u c t i o n s o n f a l s e 
p r e t e n c e s . I n f a c t , C h u r c h i l l t oned down the d r a f t r e p l y 
A n d e r s o n sent h i m by o m i t t i n g t he l a s t s en t ence , though he d i d 
say i t was I n e q u i t a b l e and i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t he e q u a l t r e a t m e n t 
(133) I n C h a n c e l l o r ' s document he g i v e s the d a t e i n c o r r e c t l y 
as J a n u a r y 8 . 
(13*0 C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer t o Pr ime M i n i s t e r , 
Feb rua ry 2*+, 1 9 ^ , U183I+/12/71. 
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o f a l l i e s . He went o n : -
" S i n c e our t a l k , Lo rd H a l i f a x met Mr . H u l l and 
Mr. Morgenthau as l a t e as J anua ry 8, ( i n f a c t J a n u a r y 7 ) , 
when the m a t t e r s ment ioned i n the f i r s t p a r a g r a p h o f 
t he t e l e g r a m under r e p l y were d i s c u s s e d ( i . e . F . D . R ' s 
l e t t e r o f F e b r u a r y 23) . L o r d H a l i f a x r e p o r t e d to us t h a t 
Mr . Morgenthau c l e a r l y I m p l i e d t o h i m t h a t i t was n o t a t 
p r e s e n t i n t e n d e d t o reduce our d o l l a r ba l ances i n any 
o t h e r way. I t was i n r e l i a n c e on t h i s p e r s o n a l assurance 
t o L o r d H a l i f a x t h a t we agreed t o t he e x c l u s i o n o f the 
p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t i t e m s f r o m Lend-Lease . " ( " I f 
t h e r e f o r e , t h i s m a t t e r i s r eopened , i t i s c l e a r t h a t the 
a s s o c i a t e d m a t t e r s where agreement has been so h a p p i l y 
r e a c h e d , wou ld a l s o have t o be r e c o n s i d e r e d . " ) (135) 
A t a C a b i n e t M e e t i n g on March 10, d e s p i t e h i s appa ren t 
i r r i t a t i o n ove r S t e t t i n l u s ' s l e t t e r w h i c h had reopened t h i s 
d e l i c a t e s u b j e c t a r e a , Morgenthau r e i t e r a t e d h i s v i e w t h a t 
B r i t i s h r e se rves s h o u l d be r e s t r i c t e d to # I B , though he s a i d 
t h a t he t h o u g h t I t was bad t a c t i c s t o pursue such a l i n e o p e n l y 
a t t h i s t i m e . ^ 1 - ^ C h u r c h i l l ' s t e s t y r e p l y had c e r t a i n l y 
caused conce rn i n t h e U . S . and Morgenthau was i r r i t a t e d by what 
he c o n s i d e r e d S t a t e Depar tment i n e p t i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h i s 
m a t t e r . On March 13, H u l l p romised t o s t and o n the T r e a s u r y 
commitments o f J a n u a r y 7, and a l t h o u g h i t appears f r o m t h i s 
ep i sode t h a t i t was the S t a t e Depar tment who was push ing f o r a 
#1B l i m i t o n B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s , t h i s may n o t i n f a c t have been 
the case . I t c e r t a i n l y c o n t r a d i c t s the p o l i c y p r o m u l g a t e d by 
the S t a t e Depar tment up t o t h i s t i m e i f i t was the case . 
What seems most l i k e l y was t h a t the c r i s i s was caused by a genu ine 
m i s t a k e , o r m i s a p p r a i s a l o f the s i t u a t i o n by S t e t t i n i u s . 
(135) The l a s t sentence was o m i t t e d I n l e t t e r o f March 9, 
W3C to FDh, See ' C l o s i n g the R i n g 1 , W.S.C. Casse l and 
Co. 1950, p .697, and A n d e r s o n ' s d r a f t r e p l y , 
F e b r u a r y 2 4 , I9M+, UI83I+/12/71. 
(136) See B l u m , O p . C i t . p.137. 
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As has been seen above, a c c o r d i n g t o B l u m , he had i n t e n d e d t o 
a m e l i o r a t e n o t a g g r a v a t e t he s i t u a t i o n . ^ 3 7 ) rp h Q m o s t 
s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t however i s t h a t b o t h Morgenthau and Crowley 
s t i l l f a v o u r e d l i m i t s o n B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s and a f t e r t h i s 
d e p a r t m e n t a l d e b a c l e o f F e b r u a r y / M a r c h , H u l L and Morgenthau were 
t o l d by F .D .R . to ge t t o g e t h e r and s o r t t h i n g s o u t . The r e s u l t 
was t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n t h i s a rea was s q u a r e l y p l aced o n 
M o r g e n t h a u ' s s h o u l d e r s , much t o h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and B r i t i s h 
c o n c e r n . R o o s e v e l t e v e n t u a l l y r e p l i e d t o C h u r c h i l l o n March 25, 
and was l e s s t h a n c o n c i l i a t o r y o r h e l p f u l . I t d i d n o t deny 
M o r g e n t h a u ' s commitment o f J a n u a r y 7» b u t d i d p o i n t o u t t h a t 
t h e r e was no commitment to i n d e f i n i t e l y pos tpone the i s s u e . 
The end ing o f t he l e t t e r was, to say the l e a s t , p e r e m p t o r y . 
" . . . / I am s o r r y i f ray message caused y o u a n x i e t y . 
There I s no d i s p u t e as t o t he u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n the 
h a n d l i n g o f q u e s t i o n a b l e i t ems under Lend-Lease w h i c h 
was reached between Mr . C r o w l e y , S e c r e t a r y H u l l , 
S e c r e t a r y Morgen thau and L o r d H a l i f a x , and to wh ich I had 
g i v e n my p r i o r a p p r o v a l . As S e c r e t a r y Morgen thau s t a t e d 
a t t he m e e t i n g , t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g d i d n o t d e a l w i t h the 
d o l l a r p o s i t i o n q u e s t i o n and d i d n o t p r e c l u d e the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f ou r r e o p e n i n g t h a t q u e s t i o n i n the f u t u r e 
s h o u l d the s i t u a t i o n seem to c a l l f o r i t . 
I n any f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s o f these m a t t e r s , the 
T r e a s u r y would be the normal c e n t r e o f such c o n v e r s a t i o n s . " 
(138) 
(137) O p i n i o n s o f S t e t t l n l u s ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s were n o t v e r y 
f l a t t e r i n g , see Vandenberg, O p . C i t . , J ebb , O p . C i t . , who 
d e s c r i b e s h i m as " . . . n a i v e and b a d l y i n f o r m e d . " and 
Cadogan, O p . C i t . , p .717 who i n a l e t t e r to H a l i f a x s a i d 
t h a t S t e t t i n i u s had l e t them down a number o f t imes a t 
Y a l t a , b u t t h i s was n o t i n t e n t i o n a l , he j u s t d i d n ' t 
unde r s t and what was g o i n g o n . 
( 138 ) F .D .R . to W . S . C . , March 2 5 , 1 9 ^ , U 2 5 1 8 / 1 2 / 7 1 . 
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D e s p i t e the tenseness o f R o o s e v e l t ' s r e p l y , t he I s sue o f 
p u t t i n g an a c t u a l maximum f i g u r e o n B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s was now 
d r o p p e d , though the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Bea les o n r e d u c t i o n s i n 
Lend-Lease c o n t i n u e d . 
By March 12, Bea les i n f a c t b e l i e v e d he had reached some 
f o r m o f a c c e p t a b l e agreement w i t h the U . S . There was no 
d e n y i n g t h a t t h e r e had been s e r i o u s problems n o t l e a s t o f wh ich 
was t h e u n r e l i a b l e o p i n i o n s o f U . S . r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s due t o the 
c o n s t a n t s h i f t s b r o u g h t about by t he compet ing v i e w s o f v a r i o u s 
d e p a r t m e n t s and g r o u p s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Beales w r o t e t o the Board 
o f T rade o n March 12, summaris ing the p o s i t i o n t h a t had been 
r e a c h e d . I t was o b v i o u s f r o m B e a l e s 1 r e p o r t t h a t he and h i s 
c o l l e a g u e s had been f o r c e d t o make concess ions w h i c h would make 
the j o b o f the Board o f Trade more d i f f i c u l t when i t came t o 
r e s u s c i t a t i n g t he B r i t i s h e x p o r t t r a d e . Bea les had come to 
accep t the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t Lead-Lease would be v u l n e r a b l e t o 
p o l i t i c a l a t t a c k i f the B r i t i s h d i d n o t p r o v i d e a document w h i c h 
c o u l d be used as a d e f e n c e a g a i n s t such c r i t i c i s m , and thus he 
had conceded a number o f p o i n t s . There had a r i s e n t h r e e main 
s u b s t a n t i a l and t e c h n i c a l p r o b l e m s . 
1 . Bea l e s b e l i e v e d t h a t B r i t a i n wou ld be on i n d e f e n s i b l e g round 
u n l e s s they agreed t h a t t h e r e would be no e x p o r t o f 
a r t i c l e s l i k e those r e c e i v e d under Lend-Lease , w i t h o u t 
t he consent o f a combined b o d y . Beales was o b v i o u s l y i n 
f a v o u r o f conced ing t h i s t o the U .S . 
2. The main s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f i c u l t y was ove r the e x p o r t o f 
m a t e r i a l s i n s h o r t s u p p l y . The Americans d i d n o t appear 
e n t i r e l y opposed i n p r i n c i p l e t o such e x p o r t s , b u t to 
meet t h e i r d o m e s t i c c r i t i c s t h e y wanted an ar rangement so 
t h a t the e x p o r t o f such a r t i c l e s c o u l d be shown t o be w i t h 
p r i o r knowledge , and agreement o f and by the U . S . 
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3. T h i s a g a i n Beales was p repared t o concede as l o n g as t h e r e 
was a s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n t o t e c h n i c a l p rob lems o f 
p r e s e n t a t i o n . 
"Our main s t r u g g l e has been o v e r the means wherebv they 
c o u l d be pu t i n a p o s i t i o n to c l a i m ( r e p e a t c l a i m ; t h a t 
t hey had c o n s i d e r e d i n advance a programme o f the 
d e b a t a b l e f i e l d o f e x p o r t s w i t h o u t ( a ) ou r s u r r e n d e r i n g 
s o v e r e i g n t y over a wide f i e l d o f our e x p o r t t r a d e and ( b ) 
ou r u n d e r t a k i n g to produce programmes and e s t i m a t e s i n 
g r e a t e r d e t a i l and p r o f u s i o n t h a n the manpower r e sou rces 
o f Board o f Trade would a l l o w . " (139) 
The d r a f t compromise s o l u t i o n was t h a t the U . K . shou ld g i v e 
f o r w a r d e s t i m a t e s and r e t r o s p e c t i v e f i g u r e s f o r h e r e x p o r t s o f 
m a t e r i a l s under Lead-Lease r e s t r i c t i o n s . These f i g u r e s were t h e n 
t o be s u b m i t t e d a l o n g w i t h c o r r e s p o n d i n g U . S . e s t i m a t e s t o the 
Combined E x p o r t s Committee ( C . E . C . ) . I t would t h e n be open to 
e i t h e r government t o ask f o r f u r t h e r e x p o r t d e t a i l s though i t 
wou ld be l e f t to the C . t t .C . to recommend s u i t a b l e a c t i o n . The 
agreement was to be embodied i n a j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n and s a f e -
guarded by an i n t e r p r e t a t i v e document wh ich would n o t be 
p u b l i s h e d , b u t whose substance would be made p u b l i c . (1^0) 
Thus , by m i d - M a r c h , i t a t l a s t l ooked as i f the B r i t i s h 
were g o i n g to be s u c c e s s f u l i n r emov ing the u n i l a t e r a l l y imposed 
r e s t r i c t i o n s o n he r e x p o r t s . The agreement was to be r e c i p r o c a l , 
though B r i t a i n ' s g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e o n the U .S . made the r e s t r i c t i o n s 
o f more p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t i n the U . K . The U . S . s t i l l would n o t 
(139) Wash ing ton to P.O. Bea les f o r Board o f T r a d e , 
March 12, 1 9 ^ , U20V7/12/71 . 
(1^0) For 3 e a l e s ' r e p o r t see I b i d . The o n l y t o p i c o f r e m a i n i n g 
conce rn a t t h i s t i m e was t he p o s i t i o n o f t he Combined 
Boards and e x i s t i n g a rea c o m m i t t e e s , where t he U . K . 
a l r e a d y had en t r enched p o s i t i o n s o f power w h i c h t hey d i d 
n o t want t o be weakened by i n n o v a t i o n s . A p a r t f r o m t h i s , 
a l l B r i t i s h Wash ing ton M i s s i o n s agreed w i t h Bea les o n the 
a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f t he p r o p o s a l s . 
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r e c o g n i s e B r i t a i n ' s need to e x p o r t as an e x p o r t - d e p e n d e n t 
i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r y , b u t o n l y " i n o r d e r t o s u p p o r t t he common 
war e f f o r t " and to " o b t a i n f r o m t h i r d c o u n t r i e s goods r e q u i r e d 
f o r the p r o s e c u t i o n o f the w a r . " Goods l i k e those r e c e i v e d o n 
Lend-Lease were n o t to be e x p o r t e d w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , haw m a t e r i a l s 
used i n e x p o r t s had to be p a i d f o r and such m a t e r i a l s t h a t were 
s c a r c e . F i n a l l y , a combined commit tee was to be s e t up to 
o v e r l o o k the whole a p p l i c a t i o n o f t he agreement . I n a d d i t i o n 
a r t i c l e s removed f r o m Lend-Lease S u p p l y c o u l d s t i l l have 
r e s t r i c t i o n s m a i n t a i n e d o n them f o r up to 6 months , depdnd ing o n 
t h e l e v e l s o f s u p p l y o f t he m a t e r i a l ove r the p r e v i o u s 6 months . 
On the p e n u l t i m a t e p o i n t t h e r e had been some c o n f u s i o n . There 
had been hopes o n the B r i t i s h s i d e t h a t p a y i n g i n f u l l even f o r 
scarce m a t e r i a l s would enable t he U . S . to a l l o w comple te f r e e d o m 
to e x p o r t . But i t soon appeared t h a t t h i s was n o t t o be . 
The Amer icans demanded p r i o r knowledge o f such proposed e x p o r t s , 
and t h a t the p o s i t i o n c o u l d be c l e a r l y e x p l a i n e d to the A m e r i c a n 
p u b l i c . The B r i t i s h managed to e x t r a c t some concess ions o n t h i s , 
f o r example , t h a t m a t e r i a l s shou ld n o t be c o n s i d e r e d scarce i f 
caused by e x c e s s i v e U . S . domes t i c consumpt ion^ b u t even so , t h i s 
remained a t roub le some i s s u e . As l a t e as September t h e r e 
were u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n the U . K . as t o whether e x p o r t o f a scarce 
m a t e r i a l meant t h a t t h a t e x p o r t m a t e r i a l would have t o be p a i d 
f o r o r a l l s u p p l i e s o f such m a t e r i a l ^ 1 ^ ^ . Bea les o b v i o u s l y had 
(1^1) See Note by Mr . Helraore , P .O.Annex . ' P o i n t s o f 
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n on t h e Quebec C o n v e r s a t i o n R e l a t i n g 
to E x p o r t s - H i s t o r i c a l ' . September 30, 1 9 ^ i 
U E 1 5 5 V 5 / 7 1 . 
( 1 ^ 2 ) See I b i d . 
291 
t o m o d i f y h i s hopes J / , and a l t h o u g h i t appeared t h a t t h e r e 
wou ld g r a d u a l l y be g r e a t e r e x p o r t f r e e d o m , the Amer icans had 
I n s i s t e d t h a t the r e l a x a t i o n s wou ld have to be i n l i n e w i t h 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the war e f f o r t , p rogramming , e t c . ^ 1 * * ^ 
The Lord P r e s i d e n t ' s Committee o n A p r i l 21st a u t h o r i s e d 
D a l t o n t o accep t the p r o p o s a l s , though w i t h some a t t e m p t s t o 
g a i n minor amendments w h i c h were n o t to be pushed f o r i f 
o p p o s i t i o n was e n c o u n t e r e d . So, i n r e t u r n f o r t h e i n c r e a s e i n 
r e c i p r o c a l a i d , s i n c e J u l y 1 , 19^3, and the s u p p l y o f s t a t i s t i c a l 
i n f o r m a t i o n about the B r i t i s h economy, f i n a l l y an acknowledgment 
f r o m the U . S . had been ga ined t h a t A n g l o - U . S . s u p p l y r e l a t i o n s 
s h o u l d be p l aced o n a t r u l y r e c i p r o c a l b a s i s . A t t he same t i m e , 
l a r g e l y as a consequence o f t h i s , t he U . S . had loosened the 
r e s t r i c t i o n s o n B r i t i s h f r e e d o m to e x p o r t . On the w h o l e , the 
p o s i t i o n looked p r o m i s i n g . On A p r i l 17, D a l t o n i n h i s p r e f a t o r y 
remarks to the p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the D e c l a r a t i o n and P r o c e d u r a l 
Supplement had s a i d ; -
" I recommend t h a t we s h o u l d now t e l l t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
Government t h a t we a re ready to s i g n ; b u t t h a t , b e f o r e 
s i g n a t u r e , our n e g o t i a t o r s s h o u l d t r y , v e r y c a u t i o u s l y , f o r 
a f ew c l a r i f y i n g amendments, w i t h f i r m I n s t r u c t i o n s n o t to 
press f o r t h e s e , i f i t seems to j e o p a r d i s e the ag reement , " 
(1^5) 
(l*+3) See LP(l+l+)69 Annex A . R e p o r t by B e a l e s , c i r c u l a t e d by 
P r e s i d e n t o f the Board o f T r a d e , A p r i l 17 , 1 9 ^ , U3609/12/71 . 
(1MO See Clause Annex B , The D e c l a r a t i o n o f P o l i c y , d a t e d 
March 18, and S e c t i o n s V and V I , Annex C, d a t e d March 22, 
P r o c e d u r a l Supplement , I b i d . 
(1^5) I b i d . 
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T h i s , and B e a l e s 1 own r e p o r t c o n v i n c e d the L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s 
Commi t t ee , Bea les i n h i s r e p o r t d a t e d A p r i l 15> s a i d i -
" I r e c o g n i s e the I m p e r f e c t i o n s o f d r a f t i n g and I r e a l i s e 
t h e i r danger i n v i e w o f the f r e q u e n c y o f changes i n 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o n the A m e r i c a n s i d e . On the o t h e r hand , 
I t must be remembered t h a t we had to d e a l w i t h n e g o t i a t o r s 
who began by s u s p e c t i n g ou r m o t i v e s , who showed an a l m o s t 
m o r b i d d i s i n c l i n a t i o n to express c l e a r l y any p o i n t w h i c h 
t h e y had been f o r c e d to concede, and whose U3e o f the 
E n g l i s h language d i f f e r s n o t a b l y f r o m ou r own. I n g e n e r a l 
t he S t a t e Depar tment were , e i t h e r o p e n l y o r b e h i n d the 
scenes , f i g h t i n g o n our s i d e a g a i n s t the F o r e i g n Economic 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , who a lways seemed p a i n f u l l y aware o f t h e i r 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to Congress , more e s p e c i a l l y i n v i ew o f t h e 
impend ing a p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r Lend-Lease . . . . I n my case 
the documents r e p r e s e n t i n my judgemen t , the b e s t b a r g a i n s 
we a re l i k e l y to o b t a i n a t the p r e s e n t t i m e . 
. . . i t would be dangerous to p res s f o r them ( i . e . amend-
m e n t s ) , i n v i e w o f the d e l i c a c y o f t he b a l a n c e o f power 
be tween the S t a t e Depar tment and the F . E . A . " (1^6) 
The B r i t i s h o p t i m i s m was soon t o prove u n f o u n d e d , by a s h i f t 
i n A m e r i c a n o p i n i o n . The d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t the A n g l o - A m e r i c a n 
commerc i a l t a l k s r a n i n t o i n l a t e and e a r l y 19M*- have 
a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d . C h u r c h i l l had r e f u s e d t o a l l o w t h e 
C a b i n e t t o t a k e a d i v i s i v e d e c i s i o n o n the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d . 
Of p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e r n was the renewed U . S . a s s a u l t o n I m p e r i a l 
P r e f e r e n c e s . P r i o r t o the s i g n i n g o f the 19*+2 M u t u a l A i d 
Agreement , R o o s e v e l t had g i v e n C h u r c h i l l a p e r s o n a l assurance 
t h a t the U . K . was n o t t r a d i n g the a b o l i t i o n o f I m p e r i a l P r e f e r e n c e s 
as a q u i d p ro quo f o r Lend-Lease . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the l a c k o f 
p r e c i s i o n i n t he agreement and the passage o f t i m e had encouraged , 
c e r t a i n l y t he S t a t e Depa r tmen t , t o u rge such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o n the B r i t i s h . W i t h p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous deve lopments i n the 
commerc ia l t a l k s C h u r c h i l l i n A p r i l , was moved t o deny 
(1V6) Annex ' A ' , I b i d . A p r i l 15, S igned by B e a l e s . 
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B r i t i s h commitments t o a b o l i s h I m p e r i a l P r e f e r e n c e s , i n the 
(1 k*?) 
House o f Commons. 1 
The I s sues o f t r a d e I n b o t h t he n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the 
s u p e r c e s s i o n o f the Lend-Lease W h i t e Paper and the commerc ia l 
t a l k s were I n e x t r i c a b l y i n t e r t w i n e d . I f the p o s i t i o n o f B r i t a i n ' s 
economy was p r e c a r i o u s a t the end o f the war , t h e n as the B r i t i s h 
had r e p e a t e d l y t o l d the U . S . , i m p o r t q u o t a s , b i l a t e r a l agreements , 
e t c . , would have t o be r e t a i n e d f o r some t i m e . Now i f , as i t now 
seemed to the A m e r i c a n s , the B r i t i s h were moving away f r o m a c t i v e 
c o o p e r a t i o n d i r e c t e d towards the d i s m a n t l i n g o f economic 
r e s t r i c t i o n s , t h e n f u r t h e r p r e s su re s would have to be b r o u g h t to 
b e a r . I t seems h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t t he U . S . change o f p o l i c y 
i n A p r i l was p u r e l y c o i n c i d e n t a l . The U . S . once a g a i n began to 
make c o n d i t i o n s on e x p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s such t h a t i t was i m p o s s i b l e 
f o r the U . K . to accep t such s u p e r c e s s i o n p r o p o s a l s . Of course 
i f the Americans o b s t r u c t e d the r e c o v e r y o f B r i t a i n * s e x p o r t s , 
t h e n B r i t a i n would be i n an e x t r e m e l y p r e c a r i o u s p o s i t i o n and 
would be f o r c e d to t u r n t o the U . S . as the o n l y source o f c a p i t a l 
and goods . I f such o c c a s i o n a r o s e , t h e n once a g a i n the U . S . 
would h o l d a d e c i s i v e i n i t i a t i v e and would perhaps demand more 
c o n c r e t e a c t i o n r e g a r d i n g the S t e r l i n g A r e a . 
A f t e r S t i r l i n g r e t u r n e d t o the U . S . i n May, s e r i o u s problems 
began t o a r i s e w i t h the A m e r i c a n s . The F .O . had unde r s tood t h a t 
Annex ' A ' and »c'^ll+^ were to be c a r r i e d o u t I n a s p i r i t o f 
c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t he C .E .C. o v e r c o m i n g such a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
t r o u b l e t h a t had been encoun te red w i t h the F . E . A . d u r i n g t he 
(1*+7) See Above , a l s o quoted I n H o l b o r n , War and Peace A i m s , 
pp 1 4 - 8 3 V o l . 2 . World Peace F o u n d a t i o n , B o s t o n 19^ +8. 
(1^8) See Above . 
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p r e v i o u s t w e l v e months . I t now appeared t h a t the I n f l u e n c e o f 
the F . E . A . was a g a i n ' t i g h t e n i n g the s c r e w 1 , though i t was 
unknown a t t h i s s t age whether s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s such as Crowley 
o r Acheson were aware o f t h i s . The nub o f the p rob lem was t h a t 
t h e : -
" B a s i s o f U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h a t w h i l e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s s u p p l i e s o f c i v i l i a n goods t o U n i t e d 
Kingdom f o r c e s i n U n i t e d Kingdom Impose an o b l i g a t i o n 
o n the U n i t e d Kingdom to o b t a i n consent t o e x p o r t o f 
l i k e goods , m u t u a l a i d s u p p l i e s t o U n i t e d S t a t e s Forces 
imposes no such o b l i g a t i o n o n the U n i t e d S t a t e s u n l e s s 
we s u p p l y c i v i l i a n goods to the U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e s i n 
the U n i t e d S t a t e s . On t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Lend-Lease 
s u p p l i e s , w h i c h because t h i s c o u n t r y i s a base o f 
o p e r a t i o n s , happen n e c e s s a r i l y t o be sen t to U n i t e d 
Kingdom f o r c e s h e r e , s u b j e c t us t o onerous o b l i g a t i o n s 
whereas s u p p l i e s wh ich we make to U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e s , 
wh ich f o r the same reason a re s u p p l i e d t o them h e r e , 
Impose no c o r r e s p o n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n s on the U n i t e d S t a t e s , 
a l t h o u g h these s u p p l i e s can o f t e n o n l y be p r o v i d e d by 
s e v e r e l y r e d u c i n g , o r even e l i m i n a t i n g the p r o d u c t i v e 
c a p a c i t y a v a i l a b l e to U n i t e d Kingdom e x p o r t e r s . " (1^9) 
The main p rob lem was o f course the i m p l i c a t i o n f o r m i l i t a r y 
s u p p l i e s w h i c h would cause the most one-s idedness and p l a c e an 
i n t o l e r a b l e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b u r d e n on B r i t a i n u n l e s s t h i s was 
i n t e r p r e t e d l i b e r a l l y . As we s h a l l see , the B r i t i s h were even 
p repa red to accep t t h i s p r o v i d i n g such assurances c o u l d be g i v e n . 
( 1 5 0 ) 
However, t h i n g s were n o t w h o l l y b l e a k a t t h i s t i m e . 
S t e t t l n l u s , M o r g e n t h a u ' s p e r s o n a l r i v a l , i n c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h 
H a l i f a x broached o n a number o f key i s s u e s . He b r o u g h t up t h e 
f u t u r e p rob lem o f U . S . a i d to B r i t a i n a t the end o f the war and 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h B r i t a i n w o u l d need to overcome to r e g a i n 
(1^9) F .O . to W a s h i n g t o n , May 2 5 , 1 9 ^ , U M 7 2 / 1 2 / 7 1 . 
(150) See D r a f t Memo by D a l t o n , c i r c u l a t e d June 2 8 , 1 9 ^ , and 
D r a f t T e l e , to Wash, by D a l t o n wh ich was never s e n t , 
da t ed J u l y 26 , 1 9 ^ , UE23V5 /71 . 
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her economic h e a l t h . He ment ioned the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a 2 -
d o l l a r l o a n to t ake o v e r the j o b o f Lend-Lease . I n a d d i t i o n he 
sugges ted t h a t perhaps the o n l y way t o persuade Morgenthau and 
C r o w l e y t o take a r e a sonab l e l i n e on the s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s / 
r e s e r v e p o s i t i o n , was f o r Anderson t o engage them i n p e r s o n a l 
t a l k s . I n f a c t t h i s was t he b e g i n n i n g o f a s e r i e s o f even t s 
w h i c h l e d t o t he d i s c u s s i o n o f t he problems o f Lend-Lease I I and 
Lend Lease I I I , ( i . e . the p e r i o d s a f t e r V.fci .-Day and V . J . - D a y 
r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , f i r s t by Morgenthau and A n d e r s o n , and l a t e r by 
the two l e a d e r s a t t he Second Quebec C o n f e r e n c e . The B r i t i s h 
I n i t i a l r e a c t i o n , however , though r e c e p t i v e to S t e t t i n i u s ' 
o v e r t u r e s , was c a u t i o u s . The C h a n c e l l o r p o i n t e d o u t to H a l i f a x 
t h a t the U . K . wou ld p r o b a b l y need more no t l e s s Lend-Lease I n 
Stage I I , and t h a t he was no t keen o n the Idea o f a l o a n . 
"Our c a p a c i t y to repay the U n i t e d S t a t e s a f t e r the 
war i n a d d i t i o n t o our many o t h e r e x i s t i n g c r e d i t o r s , 
w i l l be s u b j e c t to many q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
o f t i m e and manner we s h a l l n o t u n d e r t a k e any 
o b l i g a t i o n w h i c h we do n o t I n t e n d to h o n o u r . " (152) 
By June , the p o s t Lend-Lease I s tage was i n c r e a s i n g l y 
becoming o f c o n c e r n . The m i l i t a r y a p p r o p r i a t i o n s o f Lend-Lease 
had been s t a b l e f o r some t ime and the m o r a t o r i u m o n f u r t h e r 
r e d u c t i o n s o f c i v i l i a n goods r e c e i v e d t h r o u g h F . E . A , , p romised 
by Crowley and S t e t t l n i u s some weeks p r e v i o u s l y , had t e m p o r a r i l y 
s t a b i l i s e d the p o s i t i o n . The B r i t i s h , t h o u g h , knew t h i s would 
n o t c a r r y ove r i n t o Leud-Lease I I , i . e . a f t e r V . E . I n f a c t , the 
F . E . A . were s t i l l p r e s s i n g f o r f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n s , though by 
(151) See Wash ing ton to F.O. May 27 and 30 , 1 9 ^ j UM306 and 
Ul+888/12/71 . 
(152) C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer t o H a l i f a x , June 6 , 
U5020/12 /71 . 
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even more d e v i o u s means t h e n u s u a l . One p r o p o s a l f o r example 
was to pu t up the minimum l i m i t f o r r e q u i s i t i o n s f r o m #1 ,000 -
20 ,000 . The B r i t i s h , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h the n o v e l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o f the d r a f t s u p e r c e s s i o n agreement i n m i n d , were b e g i n n i n g to 
d e s p a i r o f any f o r m a l a l l e v i a t i o n s o f the W h i t e Paper . A f t e r 
the ' C r o w l e y L i s t ' o f e a r l y '\9kki t hey had c o n s i d e r e d v o l u n t a r i l y 
r emov ing a number o f a r t i c l e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y m a n u f a c t u r e d goods , 
f r o m Lead-Lease , t o g i v e a f r e e r hand to B r i t i s h e x p o r t e r s . 
B u t t h i s was now r e j e c t e d . There seemed l i t t l e p o i n t . F i r s t o f 
a l l i t was j udged u n l i k e l y t h a t such a c t i o n would make F . 3 . A . 
more amenable to the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n . S e c o n d l y , a c c o r d i n g t o 
the r e c e n t t a l k s , t h e r e would s t i l l be a p o s s i b l e s i x months 
r e s t r i c t i o n o n such goods. T h i r d l y , t he B r i t i s h d i d no t t h i n k 
t h e y c o u l d a f f o r d such measures. Thus t h e y g r a d u a l l y began to 
b e l i e v e the b e s t p o l i c y wou ld be to s tand o n the W h i t e Paper as 
i t was. There was now l i t t l e r e a s o n o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , as f a r as 
t h e y c o u l d see, f o r s eve re r r e s t r i c t i o n s and the de f a c t o p o s i t i o n 
seemed d e f e n s i b l e . The p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h i c h the 
F . E . A , had pu t f o r w a r d f o r the cu t s had o n the whole proved 
u n f o u n d e d . There had been l i t t l e C o n g r e s s i o n a l o r p u b l i c 
c r i t i c i s m and the B r i t i s h g o l d and d o l l a r h o l d i n g s had never 
become a s e r i o u s p u b l i c i s s u e , and i n any case , w i t h the June 6 
l a n d i n g s , B r i t i s h r e c e i p t s o f d o l l a r s r a p i d l y d e c l i n e d . D u r i n g 
t he h e a r i n g s f o r the F i f t h Lend-Lease A p p r o p r i a t i o n s t h e r e was 
l i t t l e c o n t r o v e r s y and i n f a c t the a c t u a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n s exceeded 
by $1,500m the c u r r e n t r e q u i r e m e n t e s t i m a t e s f o r the coming y e a r . 
The problems now g a i n i n g p r i o r i t y I n B r i t i s h eyes were those 
connec ted w i t h the p e r i o d a f t e r V . E . - d a y , and a t the end o f the 
war . The s u p p l y o f p u r e l y m i l i t a r y m a t e r i a l s was no t much I n 
d o u b t , b u t the s u p p l y o f c i v i l i a n goods f o r t he coming months was. 
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Throughou t the l a s t e i g h t e e n months t he F . E . A . a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
a i d e d and a b e t t e d by T r e a s u r y o f f i c i a l s , had caused the U . K . much 
t r o u b l e and had e f f e c t i v e l y reduced Lend-Lease s u p p l i e s and 
d e l a y e d d e l i v e r i e s by t h e i r q u i b b l i n g o b s t r u c t i o n i s m . The B r i t i s h 
now b e l i e v e d the b e s t course o f a c t i o n would be a h i g h l e v e l 
agreement , p r e f e r a b l y r e s u l t i n g i n a d e t a i l e d p r o t o c o l o f B r i t i s h 
s u p p l y needs, t h a t would c i r c u m v e n t d i s a f f e c t e d bureaucra t s and 
perhaps even Crowley and Morgen thau . The r e q u i r e m e n t s were t o be 
r e s t r i c t e d to t h r e e main c a t e g o r i e s , s h i p p i n g , raw m a t e r i a l s and 
p e t r o l e u m . The most c o n t r o v e r s i a l c a t e g o r y o f Lend-Lease 
f a b r i c a t e d n o n - m u n i t i o n s , was h o p e f u l l y to be e n t i r e l y d i spensed 
w i t h . To ach ieve t h i s , i t was hoped to ge t an agreement f r o m 
R o o s e v e l t h i m s e l f . So f a r as the end o f h o s t i l i t i e s was c o n c e r n e d , 
a l t h o u g h t h e r e was c o n f u s i o n on the B r i t i s h s i d e l a t e r , a t t h i s 
t i m e i t appeared c l e a r f r o m Crowley and Cox t h a t Lend-Lease wou ld 
t e r m i n a t e as h o s t i l i t i e s d i d . However , t h e r e was a p r o v i s i o n 
under t he M u t u a l A i d Agreement t h a t Lend-Lease s u p p l i e s c o u l d 
c o n t i n u e f o r t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r the end o f h o s t i l i t i e s o n a cash 
o r c r e d i t b a s i s , commonly r e f e r r e d t o as a ' 3 ( c ) A g r e e m e n t ' . 
The B r i t i s h t h e r e f o r e began to c o n s i d e r such an ar rangement h o p i n g 
f o r v e r y l i b e r a l c r e d i t t e rms , as such an agreement would a l s o be 
b e n e f i c i a l to the U . S . by a l l o w i n g U . S . i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y a 
c o n t i n u a t i o n o f i t s w a r - t i m e m a r k e t s . ^ 5 3 ) 
( 1 5 3 ) For above see memorandum f r o m T . W . C h i l d s to the M i n i s t e r , 
June 1 0 , 1 9 ^ i U 5 8 8 2 / 1 2 / 7 1 and supplement to the Memo, 
U E 3 1 / 5 / 7 1 . 
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S t i l l y to r e t u r n to t h e s u p e r c e s s i o n t a l k s , By l a t e June 
D a l t o n was v e r y w o r r i e d ove r the s i t u a t i o n and h e l p f o r B r i t i s h 
p o s t - w a r r e c o n v e r s i o n here seemed most d u b i o u s . D a l t o n f e l t 
unab l e t o accep t the terms o f the new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the 
agreement w i t h o u t two a s su rances . 
" ( 1 ) An acknowledgement t h a t o b l i g a t i o n to secure 
agreement o f t he Combined E x p o r t s Committee would 
n o t i n v o l v e sudden o r a r b i t r a r y su spens ion o f e x i s t i n g 
ar rangements f o r c i v i l i a n p r o d u c t i o n o r o f e x p o r t 
l i c e n c e s a l r e a d y g r a n t e d . 
( i l ) Ar rangements to secure t h a t the o b l i g a t i o n to 
o b t a i n consent to the e x p o r t o f goods l i k e to those 
i m p o r t e d o n m i l i t a r y programmes shou ld n o t become 
o p e r a t i v e i n r e s p e c t o f any p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s o f goods 
u n t i l the a t t e n t i o n o f the r e c e i v i n g c o u n t r y had been 
c a l l e d to t h a t c l a s s o f good and t h e r e had been 
r ea sonab le o p p o r t u n i t y f o r d i s c u s s i o n by the Combined 
Commi t t ee . " (15*0 
A l t h o u g h t h e r e had been some i n d i c a t i o n t h a t p o i n t ( i ) c o u l d 
be ' b r o a d l y m e t ' , t h e r e was l i t t l e hope o n ( i i ) , and w i t h the 
b u r d e n t h i s would p l a c e on B r i t i s h e x p o r t f r e e d o m and the u n i l a t e r a l 
n a t u r e o f i t , due t o t h e n o v e l U . S . i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e f e r r e d t o 
above , the p r o p o s a l s seemed u n a c c e p t a b l e . The m i s s i o n i n Wash ing ton 
however , d o l e f u l l y recommended acceptance i n the hope t h a t some 
a m e l i o r a t i o n o f the c o n d i t i o n s m i g h t be a c h i e v e d i n the p r a c t i c e 
o f the agreement . B u t , D a l t o n d i d no t want a n y t h i n g to do w i t h 
t h i s . F i r s t o f a l l t h e r e were r e c e n t i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t the 
Amer icans were r e v e r t i n g t o the • L a n d l a 1 o r m a r g i n a l t h e o r y , w h i c h 
as N . B . R o n a l d c r u d e l y expressed i t , m e a n t J -
" . . . t hey b l e e d us as near as p o s s i b l e w h i t e , and j u s t 
c o n t r i b u t e enough to p r e v e n t ou r pa s s ing o u t o f 
e x i s t e n c e . " (155) 
and h a r d l y added s u p p o r t t o hopes t n a t the p r a c t i c e would 
a m e l i o r a t e the agreement . T h i s c o u l d d r a m a t i c a l l y a f f e c t B r i t a i n ' s 
(15*0 D r a f t : Memo by P r e s i d e n t o f the Board o f T r a d e , War C a b i n e t , 
Lo rd P r e s i d e n t ' s Commi t t ee , ' S u p e r c e s s i o n o f Lend-Lease 
"White Paper , c i r c u l a t e d June 2 8 , 1 < M , U5853/12 /71 . 
(155) Ronald to C a m p b e l l , J anuary 2U-, 19**S U1 ^ 5 / 1 2 / 7 1 . 
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r e c o v e r y p o t e n t i a l i n Lead-Lease I I and D a l t o n wished to a v o i d 
t h i s i f p o s s i b l e . S e c o n d l y , i n v i e w o f S t e t t i n i u s 1 r e c e n t 
c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h H a l i f a x , D a l t o n h e l d hopes t h a t h i g h l e v e l t a l k s 
w i t h t h e S t a t e Depa r tmen t , and perhaps K o o s e v e l t , c o u l d r e s u l t i n 
a more b e n e f i c i a l ou tcome. C o n s e q u e n t l y , D a l t o n p r e f e r r e d t o s t and 
o n the 19A1 Whi te Paper d e s p i t e p o s s i b l e t h r e a t s , f r o m the U . S . , to 
B r i t a i n ' s e s s e n t i a l e x p o r t s to E a s t e r n Hemisphere c o u n t r i e s . The 
dangers o f p r e j u d i c i n g p o s s i b l e f u t u r e h i g h l e v e l t a l k s and the 
u n a c c e p t a b l l i t y o f the c o n d i t i o n s as they s t o o d , o v e r - r o d e the 
app rehens ions ove r n o t s i g n i n g . T h i r d l y , i f the document was 
s i g n e d i t c o u l d v e r y e a s i l y r e s u l t i n s eve re r r e s t r i c t i o n s b e i n g 
Imposed on B r i t i s h e x p o r t s t h a n p r e v i o u s l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n v i e w 
o f the r e v i v a l o f the m a r g i n a l t h e o r y . T h i s , i t was f e a r e d , 
would r e l e a s e a b a c k l a s h f r o m B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i a l i s t s w h i c h i f 
r e c i p r o c a t e d by U . S . p r o d u c e r s , c o u l d r e s u l t I n a v e r y tense 
s i t u a t i o n , and one t h a t shou ld be a v o i d e d i f p o s s i b l e . 
" I f t h i s course i s a d o p t e d , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f e x p o r t 
p o l i c y i s l i k e l y to be i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t d u r i n g the 
i n t e r v a l . I ask my c o l l e a g u e s to agree t h a t I shou ld 
c o n t i n u e to p e r m i t s u p p l i e s o f e s s e n t i a l goods made o f 
sca rce m a t e r i a l s t o E a s t e r n Hemisphere d e s t i n a t i o n s 
w i t h o u t s e e k i n g Amer i can a u t h o r i t y , and t o r e s i s t any 
A m e r i c a n a t t e m p t s o n the o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l to f o r c e us 
t o seek t h e i r a p p r o v a l . " (156) 
By J u l y 6 , D a l t o n had r e a l l y a p p l i e d h i m s e l f to the problems 
c o n f r o n t i n g the B r i t i s h t r a d e p o s i t i o n and had d r a f t e d two l e n g t h y 
t e l e g r a m s f o r W a s h i n g t o n . I n them he s t r o n g l y d i s a g r e e d w i t h t h e , 
a l b e i t r e l u c t a n t , recommendat ions f o r the accep tance o f the U . S . 
p o s i t i o n . The two t e l e g r a m s were i n f a c t never s e n t , i n s t e a d the 
L o r d P r e s i d e n t ' s Commi t t ee , on J u l y 7 , d ec ided to send R i c h a r d Law 
(156) D a l t o n , June 28 , Memo. 1 9 ^ - U5853/12/71. 
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over t o the U . S . to s o r t the m a t t e r o u t w i t h S t e t t i n i u s and 
HuLL*, and onLy a s h o r t teLegram was d i s p a t c h e d s i m p l y e x p l a i n i n g 
t o t he B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s i n Wash ing ton t h a t under t he p r e s e n t 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s s i g n a t u r e was I m p o s s i b l e . D e s p i t e t he f a c t t h a t 
t he two l e n g t h y t e l e g r a m s were never s e n t , t hey a re v e r y 
i m p o r t a n t i n d i c a t i o n s o f the mood o f the m i n i s t e r s d i r e c t l y 
connec ted and bes t i n f o r m e d on the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d . F o r , a l t h o u g h 
the t e l e g r a m s were d r a f t e d under the a u t h o r i t y o f D a l t o n , he a l s o 
c o n s u l t e d and c o l l a b o r a t e d w i t h A n d e r s o n , Law and O l i v e r L y t t e l t o n . 
( 1 5 7 ) 
The second pa rag raph o f one t e l e g r a m I s so s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i t 
must be quo ted i n f u l l . 
rt I t has become c l e a r t h a t the r e a l i s sues go f a r deeper 
t h a n the a p p a r e n t l y l i m i t e d and t e c h n i c a l q u e s t i o n s o n 
wh ich the n e g o t i a t o r s have been e n c o u n t e r i n g d i f f i c u l t y . 
F o r e i g n t r a d e i s to us a v i t a l n e c e s s i t y . I n 1 9 ^ 3 , the 
volume o f our e x p o r t s e x c l u d i n g m u n i t i o n s , was o n l y 
abou t 25 per cen t o f 1937 . 1^ c o n t r o l l i n g e x p o r t s f o r 
war purposes , we have n o t heeded long t e rm consequences, 
such as the d i f f i c u l t y o f r e g a i n i n g marke ts w h i c h have 
been l o s t . We have u n s p a r i n g l y s a c r i f i c e d ou r overseas 
a s se t s to the e x t e n t o f £ 1 , 0 0 0 m i l l i o n s , and a t the same 
t i m e have been b u i l d i n g up u n d i s c h a r g e d ove r seas l i a b i l i t i e s 
w h i c h a l r e a d y amount t o £ 2 , 5 0 0 m i l l i o n s and w h i c h a r e s t i l l 
i n c r e a s i n g a t a r a t e o f £ 1 , 7 5 0 m i l l i o n s a y e a r . Our 
f i n a n c i a l burdens are r e l a t i v e l y h e a v i e r t h a n those o f any 
o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , f a r h e a v i e r , f o r example , t han F r a n c e . 
There I s o n l y one way by w h i c h we can reduce the r a t e o f 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f our p o s i t i o n and m a i n t a i n ou r war e f f o r t , 
namely by e x p o r t i n g . We must secure accep tance o f the f a c t 
t h a t we have an i r r e s i s t i b l e case f o r f r eedom to e x p o r t 
wherever and whenever we can do so w i t h o u t d e t r a c t i n g f r o m 
the war e f f o r t . We do n o t I g n o r e the I n e v i t a b l e e f f e c t o f 
Lend-Lease o n ou r p r e s e n t f r e e d o m o f a c t i o n . I n o r d e r t o 
m i n i m i s e t he p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t i n t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n , we a r e ready under the new a r rangements t o pay i n 
f u l l f o r any goods e x p o r t e d l i k e to those o b t a i n e d o n Lend-
Lease o r any raw m a t e r i a l s , l i k e to Lend-Lease raw m a t e r i a l s , 
c o n t a i n e d i n ou r e x p o r t s . " 0 58 ) 
( 1 5 7 ) The l a t t e r was M i n i s t e r o f (War) P r o d u c t i o n , March 1 2 , 1 9 ^ 2 - ^ 5 . 
( 1 5 8 ) D r a f t o f D a l t o n ' s l e t t e r to Wash ing ton , J u l y 6 , 19M*, 
U E 2 3 V 5 / 7 1 . 
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D a l t o n I n s i s t e d t h a t the economy c o u l d n o t t o l e r a t e such 
r e s t r i c t i o n s , no t o n l y on the grounds o f economic r e c k o n i n g e i t h e r 
The s i t u a t i o n was r a p i d l y d e v e l o p i n g i n t o an u l t i m a t e c h a l l e n g e 
t o t he U . S . - U . K . a l l i a n c e , c e r t a i n l y i n terras o f p o s t - w a r d e v e l o p -
ments . The p re s su re and a c c u s a t i o n s f r o m i n d u s t r i a l l e a d e r s i n 
B r i t a i n , was now h a v i n g p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s w h i c h c o u l d n o t be 
i g n o r e d . A c c u s a t i o n s were now b e i n g made t h a t the Lend-Lease 
r e s t r i c t i o n s were b e i n g m a i n t a i n e d , no l o n g e r i n the b e s t i n t e r e s t 
o f the two c o u n t r i e s use o f j o i n t r e s o u r c e s , b u t f o r the i n t e r e s t s 
o f U . S . i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . T h i s agreement , D a l t o n c l a i m e d , would be 
i m p o s s i b l e t o d e f e n d i n P a r l i a m e n t . ^ ^ The o p e r a t i o n o f t he 
agreement would depend upon the w o r k i n g s o f the C . E . C . w h i c h would 
c o n s i d e r b road e s t i m a t e s and would have d i s c r e t i o r ^ a r y a u t h o r i t y 
ove r e x p o r t a b l e goods i n the f o l l o w i n g c a t e g o r i e s , 
i ) A c t u a l Lend-Lease goods, 
i i ) L i k e goods r e c e i v e d i n l a s t s i x months, 
i l l ) P r o d u c t s made o f Lend-Lease goods or l i k e goods w h i c h 
governments o f e i t h e r c o u n t r y have c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n t o 
as the s u b j e c t o f r ea sonab le c o m p l a i n t . 
How these c a t e g o r i e s were d e a l t w i t h and p o l i t i c a l r e a c t i o n 
t h e r e t o would depend upon the degree o f c o o p e r a t i o n shown by the 
U . S . , t he p r a c t i c a l problems o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , aiid what l i m i t was 
p l a c e d on i n r o a d s i n t o B r i t i s h s o v e r e i g n c o n t r o l o v e r her own 
e x p o r t s . B u t , 
" I t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a q u e s t i o n o f c o n f i d e n c e and our 
c o n f i d e n c e has been shaken by the change o f a tmosphere 
i n W a s h i n g t o n . " ( 1 6 0 ) 
( 1 5 9 ) See I b i d . 
( 1 6 0 ) D a l t o n Supplementa ry Note o n S u p e r c e s s i o n t a l k s 
s u b m i t t e d to L o r d P r e s i d e n t s Commit tee , U E 3 8 1 / 5 / 7 1 . 
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The B r i t i s h had proposed a compromise o v e r t he p a r t i c u l a r l y 
d i f f i c u l t I s sue o f m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s , l a r g e l y based on the admin -
i s t r a t i v e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d . I t had been sugges ted to the 
Amer icans t h a t such d i f f i c u l t i e s m i g h t make i t i m p o s s i b l e to adhere 
too s t r i c t l y t o the agreement . B u t , even t h i s had been r e j e c t e d 
by t he U . S . as e v a s i v e ^ 1 ^ . An a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h i s was to a l l o w 
the document to become e f f e c t i v e i n s t a g e s , t h u s e n a b l i n g the U . K . 
to see i f t i le m a r g i n a l p r i n c i p l e was a g a i n to be a p p l i e d . The 
second a l t e r n a t i v e , and the one D a l t o n f a v o u r e d , was to suspend the 
s u p e r c e s s l o n t a l k s u n t i l w i d e r n e g o t i a t i o n s o n Lend-Lease I I had 
t a k e n p l a c e . I t was hoped t h a t w i t h the a s s i s t a n c e o f H u l l and 
S t e t t l n i u s , B r i t a i n m i g h t t h e n be i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n . ^ 
R i c h a r d Law, who had been g i v e n the t a sk o f s o r t i n g the 
s u p e r c e s s i o n t a l k s o u t , .now engaged the U . S . I n c o n v e r s a t i o n s o n 
t he o u t s t a n d i n g p r o b l e m s . I n f a c t , t he U . S . r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s had 
suspended the t a l k s t e m p o r a r i l y u n t i l Law 's a r r i v a l . S t e t t i n i u s , 
o n mee t ing Law, suggested an exchange o f views s h o u l d be h e l d 
between the two o f them, Acheson and T a f t . ^ 1 ^ ^ T h i s was 
somewhat e n c o u r a g i n g as the S t a t e Depar tment were known t o be more 
s y m p a t h e t i c to the U . K . ! s p r e d i c a m e n t . For Law, i n f a c t , shared 
D a l t o n ' s s t r o n g v i ews and was b a d l y i n need o f a l l i e s w i t h i n t he 
U . S . A d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o ach ieve h i s p u r p o s e , w h i c h was t o 
i n d e f i n i t e l y pos tpone agreement . The s h i f t to the m a r g i n a l t h e o r y 
C161) See I b i d . 
(162) See T e l e . B US /23I+/5/71 , K e f . quo ted i n f u l l aoove . 
(163) Acheson and T a f t - p resumably C . P . T a f t , D i r e c t o r o f 
Economic A f f a i r s i n the S t a t e Depar tment I n 19M+. 
See Campbel l t o Law, J u l y 8,1 9 ^ , UE152/5/71 • 
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was endange r ing 3 r l t i s h hopes f o r Lend-Lease I I and t h i s had t o 
be a v o i d e d i f p o s s i b l e . 
The encouragement f r o m t h e S t a t e Depa r tmen t , and the f e e l i n g 
o f f u t i l i t y c o n c e r n i n g the s u p e r c e s s i o n t a l k s f u r t h e r emphasised 
the i n c l i n a t i o n f o r h i g h - l e v e l t a l k s on Lend-Lease I I . T h i s was 
now o f u n i v e r s a l c o n c e r n t o a l l B r i t i s h Depar tments concerned w i t h 
economic i s s u e s . By June 26 th , the Raw M a t e r i a l s Depar tment o f 
the M i n i s t r y o f S u p p l y ^ 1 ^ ^ad p repa red a l e n g t h y no te o n the 
I s sue o f raw m a t e r i a l s and Lend-Lease . 
" . . . we u rge t h a t the U.S . Government s h o u l d n o t be 
pressed t o s u p p l y raw m a t e r i a l s to U . K . i n Stage I I 
o n Lend-Lease t e r m s . . . . " 
The e s t i m a t e d ne t cos t was #60m a n d i -
" . . . T h i s r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l s a v i n g i n d o l l a r s would 
n o t be adequate compensa t ion f o r the d i s a b i l i t i e s 
wh ich i t would c a r r y w i t h i t . " (166) 
The danger o f U . S . h a m s t r i n g i n g B r i t i s h e x p o r t e x p a n s i o n 
was now uppermost i n most B r i t i s h m i n d s . I n t he o p i n i o n o f t h e 
M i n i s t e r o f Supp ly i t would be I n Stage I I t h a t the U . K . wou ld have 
t o e s t a b l i s h the base f o r i t s p o s t - w a r e x p o r t d r i v e . And even i f 
r e s t r i c t i o n s were o n l y o f a s e l e c t i v e n a t u r e , w i t h r e c e n t 
(16W) See Law t o W a s h i n g t o n , J u l y 8 , U 5 3 5 3 / 1 2 / 7 K 
(165) M i n i s t e r o f S u p p l y , S i r A . Duncan, Feb rua ry ^,19^-2-^5. 
(166) Raw M a t e r i a l s , S u p p l i e s f r o m U . S . A . i n Stage I I . Note by 
the Raw M a t e r i a l s Depar tment o f the M i n i s t r y o f S u p p l y , 
d a t e d June 26, c i r c u l a t e d J u l y 1 1 , 1 9 ^ , U E 2 W 5 / 7 1 . 
00 .3B Lend-Lease raw m a t e r i a l s had been sugges ted i n 
p r e l i m i n a r y p r o p o s a l s , June 26 , UE82 /5 /71. 
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developments i n m i n d , t h i s c o u l d s t i l l be v e r y damaging . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , r e c i p r o c a l Lend-Lease was i n s u f f i c i e n t , and anyway 
too p o l i t i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e to use as c o u n t e r - a c t i n g b a r g a i n i n g 
p r e s s u r e . 
"As a Supp ly Depar tment we must keep c o n s t a n t l y i n our 
minds the f a c t t h a t we cannot a f f o r d i n n e g o t i a t i o n s 
w i t h the U . S . a u t h o r i t i e s t o m a i n t a i n an a t t i t u d e w h i c h 
j e a p o r d l s e s o u r s u p p l i e s , i f d i s c u s s i o n s a re on the 
b r i n k o f an impasse , we must draw back l e s t the f l o w o f 
raw m a t e r i a l s t o the U . K . f r o m U . S . A . be c u t o f f and the 
home and e x p o r t t r a d e s t a r v e d o f s u p p l i e s . I n the l a s t 
r e s o r t , the U . S . A . i s p a y i n g the p i p e r and we a re i n no 
p o s i t i o n t o c a l l tne t u n e . " (167) 
The t a l k s had i n f a c t reached an impasse and the n e g o t i a t i o n 
o f s u p p l i e s i n Lend-Lease I I was now the a l t e r n a t i v e to be 
c o n c e n t r a t e d upon , b u t even here t h e r e were g r e a t d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
One p a r t i c u l a r c o m p l i c a t i o n , un ique t o B r i t a i n , was the v a s t 
a c c u m u l a t i o n o f d e b t s t o the S t e r l i n g A r e a . The reasons f o r 
w i s h i n g to m a i n t a i n t h e S t e r l i n g Area i n v i o l a t e f r o m d e f a u l t i n g 
o r s i m i l a r a c t i o n has been e x p l a i n e d e l s e w h e r e . However, the 
p o s i t i o n a t t h i s t i m e was so c r u c i a l t h a t t h e r e was some t a l k o f 
a l l o w i n g the U . S . t o ge t a f o o t h o l d i n the S t e r l i n g A r e a , by 
p e r s u a d i n g h e r t o take over some o f the d e b t s . Such p r o p o s a l s 
were soon d i s c a r d e d t h o u g h , and n o t renewed. ^ ^ 8 ) 
C o n s i d e r a b l e i m p o r t a n c e was a t t a c h e d to t he adverse e f f e c t 
t h e S t e r l i n g Ba lances c o u l d have o n B r i t a i n ' s a l r e a d y weakened 
t r a d i n g p o s i t i o n . I t was e s t i m a t e d t h a t i f p o o l i n g o f r e s o u r c e s 
was n o t p r a c t i c e d i n more d e p t h , and i f Lend-Lease t e r m i n a t e d w i t h 
the end. o f h o s t i l i t i e s U . K . s t e r l i n g d e b t s would t o p #18B so t h a t : -
(167) I b i d . 
(168) See ' F i r s t O u t l i n e o f Stage I I Case f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n to 
t he A m e r i c a n s , June 2 6 , 1 9 ^ , UK82 /5 /71 . 
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" . . . i n a d d i t i o n t o the e x p o r t s needed to cover our 
c u r r e n t I m p o r t s , we s h a l l have t o e x p o r t a g r e a t d e a l 
more t o enable the overseas h o l d e r s o f s t e r l i n g ba lances 
a r i s i n g o u t o f t he war by degrees to c o n v e r t t h e s t e r l i n g 
i n t o goods i n accordance w i t h ou r c a p a c i t i e s and t h e i r 
r e q u i r e m e n t s . I t would be m i s l e a d i n g t o a t t e m p t to 
t r a n s l a t e t h i s i n t o f i g u r e s - b u t to i l l u s t r a t e the 
magni tude o f the p r o b l e m , i f the ba lances amounted to 
18 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s t o c o n v e r t \% o f the t o t a l goods i n a 
yea r would mean r a i s i n g the 1938 volume o f o u r e x p o r t s 
by ano the r 5#." (1 69) 
So, the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d were b r o a d e n i n g o u t . I t was no 
l o n g e r a m a t t e r f o r t e c h n i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s . As D a l t o n p o i n t e d o u t , 
the s u p e r c e s s i o n t a l k s had uncovered a new t r e n d I n Amer i can 
t h i n k i n g wh ich was endange r ing v i t a l B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . The 
p o s i t i o n o f the s u p e r c e s s i o n t a l k s now looked h o p e l e s s , even more 
so , as i t , per se , was becoming l e s s o f a p r i o r i t y i s s u e . On 
L a w ' s a r r i v a l i n W a s h i n g t o n , he d i s c u s s e d t h e p o s i t i o n w i t h Keynes 
Eady, R o n a l d , Opie and B r a n d . ^ 7 ° ^ Keynes , Eady and Brand 
b e l i e v e d t h a t s i g n a t u r e o f t he agreement would o n l y encourage 
A m e r i c a n t endenc ie s toward the m a r g i n a l t h e o r y . The c o n d i t i o n s 
I n Wash ing ton had changed ove r the p r e v i o u s t w e l v e months and 
s i g n a t u r e was now most u n d e s i r a b l e . The p rob lem had been v iewed 
i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t f r o m t w e l v e months ago so t h a t as B r i t a i n ' s 
economic ma la i s e became more f u l l y u n d e r s t o o d , r e l u c t a n c e to s i g n 
i n c r e a s e d . I t now seemed c l e a r t h a t c l e a r - c u t s tages such as 
Lend-Lease and l i m i t e d B r i t i s h e x p o r t s f o l l o w e d by no Lend-Lease 
and an e x p o r t d r i v e , was u n r e a l i s t i c . There had t o be an o v e r l a p , 
and t h i s was now the adop ted p o l i c y o f the B r i t i s h , wh ich they 
hoped the Amer icans c o u l d be persuaded to a c c e p t . 
(169) D r a f t o f U . K . r e q u i r e m e n t s f o l l o w i n g end o f European 
H o s t i l i t i e s and t h e r e a f t e r , J u l y 18, 19^-+, UE171/5 /71. 
(170) Brand had t a k e n over f r o m P h i l l i p s as the B r i t i s h T r e a s u r y 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Wash ing ton 19^4-^-6, he had p r e v i o u s l y bee 
a member o f the B r i t i s h Food M i s s i o n i n U . S . A . 19^1-^+. 
(171) See Wash ing ton , to F .O . J u l y , 17, 1 9 ^ , U E 3 1 7 / 5 / 7 L 
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I n Law ' s o p i n i o n such p e r s u a s i o n would n o t be as d i f f i c u l t as 
many t h o u g h t , p r o v i d i n g H u l l a;id R o o s e v e l t c o u l d be won o v e r . 
On J u l y 19> Law met w i t h S t e t t i n i u s , who c o n f i r m e d rumours 
t h a t had been c i r c u l a t i n g o n the 1 7 t h , t h a t the U . S . was now 
p r e p a r e d t o postpone the c o n c l u s i o n o f the s u p e r c e s s i o n t a l k s u n t i l 
a f t e r the November e l e c t i o n s . D u r i n g the same c o n v e r s a t i o n 
S t e t t i n i u s drew Law i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the i s s u e s o f e x p o r t 
c o n t r o l s , Lend-Lease and the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a U . S . d o l l a r l o a n to 
(1 72) 
the U . K . a t \ .2% I n t e r e s t . ' However, Eden was uneasy a t such 
p r e c i p i t o u s deve lopments and c a u t i o n e d Law t o r e s t r i c t h i m s e l f t o 
h i s b r i e f , the r e l a x a t i o n o f e x p o r t c o n t r o l s . The U . K . wanted 
i t s case f o r Lend-Lease I I f u l l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d and d e t a i l e d b e f o r e 
t a l k s w i t h the U . S . were i n i t i a t e d . By A u g u s t , i n f a c t , by 
m u t u a l agreement , I t was f i n a l l y d e c i d e d to s h e l v e t he s u p e r c e s s i o n 
p r o p o s a l s . On Augus t 2 , a t a mee t ing w i t h the F . E . A . , Law 
s t a t e d t h a t J -
" . . . d i f f e r e n t reasons had moved the U n i t e d S t a t e s and 
the U n i t e d Kingdom Governments to suspend n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
They f e l t t h a t "The weather would be too h o t " u n t i l 
November to p u b l i s h a n y t h i n g new on Lend-Lease whereas 
we f e l t t h a t , welcome as much o f the new documents had 
been , we had not t he c o n f i d e n c e t h a t t hey wou ld secure 
us the r i g h t answers and we wished t h e r e f o r e to have the 
whole m a t t e r cons ide red i n a w i d e r c o n t e x t . " ( 1 7 3 ) 
T h i s was i n f a c t v e r y much the end o f s p e c i f i c a t t e m p t s t o 
have the Whi te Paper superseded. The B r i t i s h a im now was to 
o r g a n i s e h i g h l e v e l t a l k s on Lend-Lease I I and B r i t a i n ' s e x p o r t 
t r a d e , and p rog re s s on these l i n e s was soon f o r t h c o m i n g . I n the 
l a t e Summer, Morgenthau v i s i t e d England and d i s c u s s e d economic 
( 1 7 2 ) See Wash ing ton to F .O . , J u l y 1 9 , 1 9 ^ , UE362/5/7I. 
( 1 7 3 ) See Annex " P o i n t s o f I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the Quebec 
C o n v e r s a t i o n R e l a t i n g to E x p o r t s " , Note by M r . H e l m o r e , 
' H i s t o r i c a l ' September 3 0 , 1 9 ^ , Ual 55V5/71. 
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m a t t e r s w i t h C h u r c h i l l . The P .M. a l l e g e d t h a t Morgenthau had 
ac t ed i n a manner u n f r i e n d l y t o the U . K . , w h i c h was s i m p l y b a n k r u p t . 
" I (Morgen thau) s a i d t h a t I w a s n ' t u n f r i e n d l y b u t I d i d n ' t 
l i k e t h e i r p l a y i n g one p e r s o n a g a i n s t the o t h e r , when they 
had a t empora ry advantage ove r u s . I s a i d t h a t I had been 
m e r e l y t r y i n g to c a r r y o u t the P r e s i d e n t ' s d e c i s i o n g i v e n 
t o me i n January "i 9^3 t o keep the B r i t i s h b a l a n c e s down t o 
a b i l l i o n d o l l a r s . " (17*+) 
Morgen thau went on to suggest t h a t perhaps C h u r c h i l l and 
R o o s e v e l t shou ld b o t h a p p o i n t commit tees to l o o k i n t o the m a t t e r s 
o f c o n c e r n w i t h perhaps h i m s e l f as the head o f t he U . S . Commi t t ee . 
C h u r c h i l l r e c e i v e d t h i s f a v o u r a b l y , b u t o t h e r s , n o t a b l y Keynes , 
Eady and B r a n d , were somewhat d i s t u r b e d by M o r g e n t h a u ' s s u g g e s t i o n s 
and h i s l a t e r t a l k s w i t h A n d e r s o n . These d i s s e n t i e n t s b e l i e v e d 
t h a t d e a l i n g s s h o u l d be w i t h the F , K . A . , the S t a t e and War 
Depar tmen t s and R o o s e v e l t , n o t w i t h Morgen thau . Morgen thau was 
poach ing on o t h e r p e o p l e ' s t e r r i t o r y . 1 On Augus t 11, 
Morgenthau accompanied by Whi t e and M . C . T a y l o r , had f u r t h e r 
d i s c u s s i o n s on economic p o l i c i e s w i t h Ander son , Waley and S i r 
R i c h a r d H o p k i n s . Anderson emphasised B r i t a i n ' s f i n a n c i a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s wh ich had deve loped as a d i r e c t r e s u l t o f he r war 
e f f o r t . By the end o f 19^5) A n d e r s o n e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e U . K . ' s 
a ccumula t ed deb t would amount to abou t £3)650m, n e v e r t h e l e s s , 
Ande r son s a i d to Morgenthau t h a t B r i t a i n was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t ; -
(17*0 Blum, O p . C i t . p . 308 . 
(175) See Keynes , Kady and Brand to H o p k i n s , 
Augus t ky 19M*-, UK781/5 /71 . 
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( 1 ) " We s h o u l d no t emerge f r o m the war as a p p l i c a n t s 
f o r Poor R e l i e f ; 
( 2 ) There wou ld be no r e p u d i a t i o n o f ou r l i a b i l i t i e s . 
There m i g h t be a d j u s t m e n t s and c o u n t e r - c l a i m s and 
we m i g h t need t o ana lyse the l i a b i l i t i e s t o sepa ra te 
those r e s u l t i n g f r o m t r a d e f r o m those r e s u l t i n g f r o m 
s t e r i l e war e x p e n d i t u r e , b u t t h e r e wou ld be no 
r e p u d i a t i o n . " (176) 
Ander son added t h a t the way o u t o f the U . K . ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s 
depended upon a s u c c e s s f u l r e v i v a l o f the c o u n t r y ' s e x p o r t t r a d e 
w i t h adequate g o l d and d o l l a r r e s e r v e s to f a c i l i t a t e such a p o l i c y , 
an o b v i o u s h i n t t o t h e Americans t o r e l a x Lend-Lease r e s t r i c t i o n s 
o n B r i t a i n ' s e x p o r t c a p a c i t y . 
" ( 1 ) to a f f o r d us a w o r k i n g b a l a n c e 
( 2 ) to s u s t a i n the f u r t h e r l i a b i l i t i e s w h i c h we s h o u l d 
be bound t o i n c u r i n the T r a n s i t i o n P e r i o d a f t e r t he 
end o f t he Japanese War, and 
(3) t o meet the l e g i t i m a t e c l a i m s o f o t h e r c o u n t r i e s i n 
the s t e r l i n g a r e a . " (177) 
Ander son proposed a t w o - f o l d s o l u t i o n , f i r s t o f a l l an 
i n c r e a s e i n e x p o r t s f r o m the p r e s e n t 3°# o f p r e -war l e v e l to 
150#, and s e c o n d l y , adequate s u p p l i e s under Lend-Lease I I . 
M o r g e n t h a u ' s response was less t h a n f o r t h c o m i n g . He t o l d 
Anderson t h a t C h u r c h i l l ! s v i ew had oeen t h a t economic i s s u e s 
shou ld n o t be d i s c u s s e d a t the h e i g h t o f the European War and 
c o u l d be d e f e r r e d u n t i l a f t e r the November P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . 
Anderson p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t n e r e was conce rn among B r i t i s h d e p a r t -
ments t h a t U . S . o f f i c i a l s under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s m i g h t make 
commitments to Congress w i t h o u t f u l l y c o n s i d e r i n g the B r i t i s h 
p o s i t i o n . Morgenthau i n f a c t sugges ted t h a t what was needed w a s ; -
" . . . a new name and a f r e s h a p p r o a c h . " (178) 
(176) See Note o f a M e e t i n g , Augus t 11, 1 9 ^ , UE765 /5/71 . 
(177) I b i d . 
(178) I b i d . 
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r a t h e r t h a n m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f Lend-Lease , b u t n o t h i n g c o n c r e t e 
emerged f r o m che m e e t i n g . As u s u a l , Morgenthau was push ing f o r 
the e x p a n s i o n o f i n f l u e n c e o f h i s own d e p a r t m e n t . He wanted the 
a u t h o r i t y f o r d e a l i n g w i t h the e x t a n t economic prob lems t o be 
v e s t e d i n the T r e a s u r y Depar tments o f the two c o u n t r i e s . 
Ande r son s i m p l y p o i n t e d o u t t h a t such a course o f a c t i o n would 
depend upon Prime M i n i s t e r i a l d i r e c t i o n and a t t h i s w i t h some 
consensus t h a t a w i d e r more g e n e r a l approach to the U . K . ' s p rob lems 
(1 79) 
was r e q u i r e d , the c o n v e r s a t i o n was c o n c l u d e d . ' 7 
A c c o r d i n g to B l u m , Morgen thau , o n h i s r e t u r n t o Wash ing ton , 
was more s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y d i s p o s e d t o w a r d t he U . K . ' s economic 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , b u t he s t i l l b e l i e v e d i t was h i s j o b to keep L e n d -
Lease I I t o the U . K . , t o a r e a s o n a b l e l e v e l . I n England he had 
a l s o d i s c u s s e d h i s v iews o n Germany, i n f a c t , the main r e a s o n f o r 
h i s European t r i p . He had been p l e a s e d w i t h the B r i t i s h r e sponse , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i i d e n ' s , and as we s h a l l see, had hopes o f B r i t i s h 
s u p p o r t f o r h i s p l a n s . S t i l l , o n t he economic i s s u e s , t h e r e was 
s t i l l a s t r o n g f e e l i n g i n the U .S . t h a t the U . K . was o v e r - s t a t i n g 
her case . For example , on August 9 , the U . S . O f f i c e o f War 
I n f o r m a t i o n appeared t o d i s r e g a r d the e x t e r n a l f i n a n c i a l a spec t 
o f B r i t a i n ' s problems and s i m p l y quo ted the s i z e o f the r e s p e c t i v e 
n a t i o n a l d e b t s o f the U .S . and the U . K . , w h i c h s tood a t 375,O00B 
and 3300,000B. 
"The t h i n g t h a t w o r r i e s U . S . a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n i t s 
d i s c u s s i o n s about f u r t h e r a i d f o r the B r i t i s h , i s how 
w i l l t hey be a b l e to make Congress u n d e r s t a n d . There i s 
a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r a b l e f e e l i n g o n the h i l l t h a t the B r i t i s h 
may come o u t o f t h i s war s t r o n g e r f i s c a l l y t h a n o u r s e l v e s . 
A l s o , i f we g r a n t such a i d to the U n i t e d Kingdom, w i l l n o t 
R u s s i a , F r ance , B e l g i u m , H o l l a n d and so on ad i n f i n i t u m 
expec t the same s o r t o f t r e a t m e n t ? They ask . And i f we 
d o n ' t g i v e i t to them w i l l n o t the p o l i c y o f p l a y i n g 
f a v o u r i t e s w i n us enemies?" (l8o) 
(179) See I b i d . 
(180) U . S . O f f i c e o f War I n f o r m a t i o n , August 9 , 19*+*+, Ar i3 l37/3i+A5. 
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T h i s t y p e o f s u s p i c i o n was s t i l l p r e v a l e n t i n t h e F . & . A . 
and was m a n i f e s t i n t h e i r c o n t i n u i n g o b s t r u c t i o n i s m . ^ ^ 1 ^ 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t was t h o u g h t i m p r u d e n t b y some o f t h e B r i t i s h 
t o p u t a l l t h e i r eggs i n one b a s k e t , i . e . t h e U . S . T r e a s u r y as 
M o r g e n t h a u seemed t o be s u g g e s t i n g . F i r s t o f a l l , Decause o f 
p a s t e x p e r i e n c e w i t h t h e T r e a s u r y , s e c o n d l y b e c a u s e some o f t h e 
B r i t i s h a i m s c o u l d o n l y be r e a l i s e d t h r o u g h t h e e x e r c i s e o f 
a u t h o r i t y b y t h e F . E . A . and t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t , and t h i r d l y 
b e c a u s e i n t h e c o m i n g t a l k s a t Quebec w h i c h R o o s e v e l t and 
C h u r c h i l l had a g r e e d o n , i t was s e e n as " a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y " t o 
c a r r y H u l l ' s g o o d w i l l w h i c h w o u l d n o t be f o r t h c o m i n g i f 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e d e a l s o n f o r e i g n e c o n o m i c p o l i c y w e r e made s o l e l y 
(182) 
t h r o u g h M o r g e n t h a u . ; A t t h i s t i m e B r i t a i n was f o r t u n a t e l y 
b e f r i e n d e d b y H a r r y H o p k i n s , who had i n i t i a l l y b e e n much i n v o l v e d 
i n L e a d - L e a s e , and i t had b e e n t o h i m t h a t C h u r c h i l l h a d h a n d e d 
t h e memo o n B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s a t t h e C a i r o C o n f e r e n c e . I n f a c t 
o n a number o f s e n s i t i v e i s s u e s , W . 3 . C . h a d a p p r o a c h e d F . D . H . v i a 
H o p k i n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y o n t h e s e n s i t i v e s u b j e c t o f t h e e x c h a n g e o f 
i n f o r m a t i o n o n n u c l e a r e n e r g y . ^ ^ 3 ) H o w e v e r , H o p k i n s h a d l o s t 
much s y m p a t h y f o r B r i t a i n b e c a u s e o f t h e i r p r e v a r i c a t i o n s o v e r 
t h e o p e n i n g o f t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t . S t i l l , o n t h i s i s s u e h e 
e n t e r e d t h e c o n t r o v e r s y o n J u l y 2 5 t h , b y a s k i n g t o speak t o Carapbe 
(181) See e s p e c i a l l y B o a r d o f T r a d e t o H e l m o r e i n W a s h i n g t o n , 
A u g u s t 1 3 , l9Mf, U E 7 1 V 5 / 7 1 . 
(182) See B r a n d t o F . O . , A u g u s t 15, 1 9 ^ , UE757 /5/71 . 
(183) See P i e r r e , p.*+3, ' N u c l e a r P o l i t i c s 1939-1970,' OUP 
L o n d o n , 1972, a n d G o w i n g , M . ' B r i t a i n and A t o m i c E n e r g y * , 
M a c m i l l a n , L o n d o n 1965. 
(18^) See M o r a n , O p . C i t . p .131> and B r y a n t , O p . C i t . c h . 1 ^ . 
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He s a i d t h a t a s t r o n g U . K . was r e q u i r e d b y t h e U . S . and i n v i e w 
o f t h i s and t h e p o l i t i c a l d e l i c a c i e s o f a n e l e c t i o n y e a r , he was 
g o i n g t o a p p l y h i m s e l f t o t h e a l l e v i a t i o n o f B r i t a i n ' s e c o n o m i c 
d i f f i c u l t i e s / 1 8 ^ On A u g u s t i W t h H o p k i n s f o l l o w e d t h i s u p i n 
t a l k s w i t h H a l i f a x , and e x p r e s s e d v i e w s v e r y much i n l i n e w i t h 
B r i t i s h o p i n i o n . He s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t s h o u l d i s s u e 
o r d e r s t o f r e e z e t h e n a t u r e o f L e n d - L e a s e i n i t s p r e s e n t f o r m , 
c o m b i n e d w i t h a P . M . / P r e s i d e n t i a l a c c o r d t o c o n t i n u e u n d e r s u c h 
c o n d i t i o n s u n t i l a d a t e d e c i d e d b e t w e e n t h e m . A f u r t h e r a g r e e m e n t 
s h o u l d a l s o be r e a c h e d , he t h o u g h t , t o e s t a b l i s h a c o m m i t t e e o f 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n f o r t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l a s p e c t s o f 
L e n d - L e a s e , S u c h a c o m m i t t e e c o u l d b e g i n i t s w o r k i m m e d i a t e l y 
a f t e r t h e November e l e c t i o n s . 
On A u g u s t 19 , M o r g e n t h a u r e p o r t e d o n h i s t a l k s i n E n g l a n d 
w i t h C h u r c h i l l and A n d e r s o n t o R o o s e v e l t , M o r g e n t h a u r e p o r t e d o n 
t h e c l a i m s t h a t t h e B r i t i s h w e r e b r o k e a n d o n t h e s i t u a t i o n o f 
B r i t i s h r e s e r v e s , he recommended t h a t c o m m i t t e e s o n b o t h s i d e s 
s h o u l d be s e t up t o l o o k i n t o t h e p r o b l e m s e s p e c i a l l y as he 
c o n s i d e r e d t h e r e was a g r e a t need f o r s u b s t a n t i a l f i g u r e s f r o m 
t h e B r i t i s h . H i s s u g g e s t i o n s w e r e f a v o u r a o l y r e c e i v e d b y 
R o o s e v e l t , t h o u g h no a c t i o n was t a k e n f o r some d a y s . 
" D u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n , t h e P r e s i d e n t 
k e p t c o m i n g b a c k t o E n g l a n d ' s b e i n g b r o k e . He s a i d , 
" T h i s i s v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g . I h a d no i d e a t h a t E n g l a n d 
was b r o k e . I w i l l go o v e r t h e r e and make a c o u p l e o f 
speeches a n d t a k e o v e r t h e B r i t i s h E m p i r e . " (186) 
(185) See W a s h i n g t o n t o F . O . J u l y 25 , 19M*, C a m p b e l l t o 
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , UJam-7^/5/71 . 
(186) See 31um, O p . C i t . p . 3 0 9 , a l s o 308-310. 
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M o r g e n t h a u s u b s e q u e n t l y saw H o p k i n s who a g r e e d t h a t any 
a r r a n g e m e n t s w o u l d h a v e t o a w a i t a c o m p l e t e r e v i e w o f t h e 
p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s . On t h a t same d a y H o p k i n s r e p o r t e d t o 
H a l i f a x i n t e r i m d e c i s i o n s t a k e n b y t h e U . S . G o v e r n m e n t . 
1 . The U . S . C h i e f s o f S t a f f had n o t c o n c l u d e d t h e i r p l a n s o n t h e 
J a p a n e s e War , so A n g l o - U . 3 . r e q u i r e m e n t e s t i m a t e s w o u l d 
h a v e t o be t e m p o r a r i l y s h e l v e d , 
2 . On t h e L e n d - L e a s e n e g o t i a t i o n s R o o s e v e l t had o r d e r e d L e n d -
L e a s e t o c o n t i n u e o n p r e s e n t l i n e s f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g a n d 
t h a t a l l o t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s s h o u l d be s u s p e n d e d . 
3 . A new b r o a d a p p r o a c h o n L e a d - L e a s e s h o u l d be d i s c u s s e d and 
hammered o u t b y F . D . R , and W . S . C . a t t h e i r f o r t h c o m i n g 
m e e t i n g . (187) 
On A u g u s t 21*, p r e p a r a t o r y s t e p s f o r t h e W . S . C . / F . D . R . 
M e e t i n g b e g a n . R o b e r t B r a n d p r e s e n t e d a r e p o r t f r o m A n d e r s o n 
o n B r i t a i n ' s e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n t o M o r g e n t h a u . He a r g u e d f o r 
p a r t i a l d e m o b i l i s a t i o n o f B r i t i s h war p r o d u c t i o n a n d a r e t u r n t o 
e x p o r t p r o d u c t i o n o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e p a p e r . B u t , h e added t h a t 
B r i t a i n w o u l d s t i l l r e q u i r e L e n d - L e a s e f o o d , o i l a n d s h i p p i n g a t 
l e a s t , and p e r h a p s m o r e , t h o u g h d e t a i l i n g s u c h i t e m s w o u l d Qe 
d i f f i c u l t u n t i l a f t e r t h e t o p l e v e l m e e t i n g i n Quebec and 
d e c i s i o n s o n t h e F a r E a s t War w e r e k n o w n . M o r g e n t h a u ' s r e p l y was 
c a u t i o u s . He s a i d he was e a g e r t o h e l p b u t o n l y u n d e r c e r t a i n 
c o n d i t i o n s . He o b v i o u s l y w a n t e d t o a v o i d t h e s i t u a t i o n o f 1 9^3~** 
when E n g l a n d h a d f o u n d a n a l l y i n t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t t o a r g u e 
(187) See H a l i f a x t o P . M . and C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e E x c h e q u e r , 
' P e r s o n a l 1 , A u g u s t 2 0 , 19M*, UE823 /5 /71 . 
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t h e i r c a se f o r l a r g e r r e s e r v e s . To a v o i d t h i s , M o r g e u t h a u 
w a n t e d t o c e n t r a l i s e c o n t r o l o v e r L e u d - L e a s e i s s u e s and t h u s 
i n d i r e c t l y B r i t a i n ' s r e s e r v e p o s i t i o n i n t r i e h a n d s o f t h e 
T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t . T h i s was t o be d o n e by t h e means o f a n 
i n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l e x e c u t i v e c o m m i t t e e w h i c h h e was t o c h a i r . 
T h i s was t h e f i r s t c o n d i t i o n and s o m e t h i n g w h i c h h a d a l r e a d y b e e n 
d i s c u s s e d w i t h A n d e r s o n i n A u g u s t . The s e c o n d c o n d i t i o n was a n 
a d e q u a t e s u p p l y o f s t a t i s t i c s f r o m t h e U . K . B r a n d I n d i c a t e d 
p r o v i s i o n a l a s s e n t t o t h e U . S . c o n d i t i o n s and a c c e p t e d t h e 
d e s i r a b i l i t y o f u r g i n g W . 3 . C . t o a p p o i n t a B r i t i s h e q u i v a l e n t t o 
(188) 
M o r g e n t h a u ' s i n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l c o m m i t t e e . P r e p a r a t i o n s 
f o r t h e c o m i n g m e e t i n g c o n t i n u e d a p a c e , t h o u g h b o t h s i d e s w e r e 
now r e s e r v i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n s u n t i l t h e m e e t i n g a t Quebec . The 
i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e c o m i n g Quebec m e e t i n g was i n d i c a t e d o n 
S e p t e m b e r 9 t h , 1 9 ^ , when R o o s e v e l t i s s u e d t i e f o l l o w i n g d i r e c t i v e 
t o d e p a r t m e n t s c o n c e r n e d w i t h L e n d - L e a s e . I n f a c t , i t was much 
i n l i n e w i t h H o p k i n s 1 s u g g e s t i o n s t o t h e B r i t i s h i n A u g u s t . 
" I t I s my w i s h t h a t no D e p a r t m e n t . . . t a k e u n i l a t e r a l 
a c t i o n i n r e g a r d t o a n y m a t t e r s t h a t c o n c e r n L e n d -
L e a s e , b e c a u s e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n o f a n y s u c h a c t i o n a r e 
b o u n d t o a f f e c t o t h e r D e p a r t m e n t s . . . a n d , i n d e e d , o u r 
w h o l e n a t i o n a l p o l i c y . I am p a r t i c u l a r l y a n x i o u s t h a t 
a n y I n s t r u c t i o n s w h i c h may h a v e b e e n i s s u e d , o r a r e a b o u t 
t o be i s s u e d r e g a r d i n g L e n d - L e a s e . . . t o o u r a l l i e s a f t e r 
t h e c o l l a p s e o f G e r m a n y , be i m m e d i a t e l y c a n c e l l e d and 
w i t h d r a w n . " (189) 
(188) See B l u m , pp 309-310, O p . C i t . 
(189) Q u o t e d i n B l u m , O p . C i t . p . 3 1 1 . 
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O v e r t h i r t y y e a r s a f t e r t h e S e c o n d Quebec C o n f e r e n c e ( Q I I ) 
much, r e m a i n s t o c a u s e p u z z l e m e n t o v e r t h e d e c i s i o n s made and t h e 
members o f t h e d e l e g a t i o n . On t h e w h o l e , A m e r i c a n p o l i c y a p p e a r s 
c o n f u s e d and d i s j o i n t e d . A n I m p o r t a n t a b s e n c e f r o m A m e r i c a n 
c o u n s e l l i n g a t t h i s t i m e was t h a t o f H a r r y H o p k i n s who had b e e n 
i l l f o r a number o f m o n t h s and who h a d l o s t c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e . 
He d i d c o r r e s p o n d w i t h C h u r c h i l l i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r t o t h e 
C o n f e r e n c e , b u t d i d n o t a t t e n d a t Q u e b e c , a p p a r e n t l y f o r h e a l t h 
r e a s o n s , t h o u g h h i s b i o g r a p h e r , S h e r w o o d , p o i n t s o u t t h i s h a d 
n e v e r p r e v e n t e d h i m b e f o r e a n d c o n j e c t u r e s t h a t h i s a b s e n c e was 
due more t o f e e l i n g s o f t e m p o r a r y p o l i t i c a l i m p o t e n c e . ^ 
The o t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t a b s e n c e was t h a t o f H u l l , o r a n y s e n i o r member 
o f h i s D e p a r t m e n t . F i n a l l y , as we s h a l l s e e , t h e m a i n m o v i n g f o r c e 
i n t h e f o r e i g n e c o n o m i c i s s u e s was t h a t o f M o r g e n t h a u and W h i t e . 
F i r s t o f a l l t h e r e w e r e f i v e m a i n i s s u e s a t t h e C o n f e r e n c e , 
t h o u g h t h e p o l i t i c s o f some do n o t c o n c e r n us h e r e . 
1 . F a r K a s t S t r a t e g y and t h e l e v e l o f B r i t i s h war 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n L e a d - L e a s e I I . 
2 . German o c c u p a t i o n z o n e s . 
3 . S t r a t e g y i n E u r o p e , N o r t h e r n s p e a r h e a d v e r s u s 
b r o a d a d v a n c e . 
P r i n c i p l e s t o g o v e r n f u t u r e L e n d - L e a s e . 
5, The M o r g e n t h a u P l a n . 
The r o l e s o f M o r g e n t h a u and R o o s e v e l t i n t h e Quebec t a l k s 
a r e r a t h e r p r o b l e m a t i c t o e x p l a i n . F i r s t o f a l l , as has become 
c l e a r t h r o u g h o u t t h i s a c c o u n t , t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n f l i c t 
b e t w e e n t h e S t a t e and T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t s , and H u l l I n p a r t i c u l a r 
(190) See S h e r w o o d , O p . C i t . p . 8 1 3 . 
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h a d g r o u n d s f o r c o m p l a i n t as he was o f t e n i l l - i n f o r m e d o f h i g h 
l e v e l m e e t i n g s w i t h f o r e i g n l e a d e r s / 1 ^ 1 ^ T h i s r a n k l e d H u l l e v e n 
more as M o r g e n t h a u became more p r o m i n e n t i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s p h e r e . B e f o r e g o i n g t o Queoec , R o o s e v e l t a s s u r e d H u l l t h a t 
t h e r e w o u l d be no p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s r a i s e d a t t h e m e e t i n g and t h a t 
(1 9 2 ) 
i t w o u l d be p u r e l y m i l i t a r y i n n a t u r e . J T h i s i n i t s e l f a p p e a r s 
odd i f one k e e p s i n m i n d t h e p r e p a r a t o r y s t e p s w h i c h h a d b e e n 
t a k e n t o d i s c u s s L e n d - L e a s e i s s u e s . H o o s e v e l t and many o t h e r 
p e o p l e i n h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n knew t h a t t h e s e i s s u e s w o u l d be 
d i s c u s s e d , and subsumed u n d e r t h i s B r i t a i n ' s r e s e r v e p o s i t i o n and 
e x p o r t p o l i c y . B l u m r e c o r d s t h a t M o r g e n t h a u was s u r p r i s e d by h i s 
c a l l t o Quebec , t h o u g h , as we have s e e n , M o r g e n t h a u o v e r t h e 
p r e v i o u s m o n t h s h a d g r a d u a l l y a c q u i r e d a d o m i n a n t p o s i t i o n o n t h e 
U . S . s i d e i n s u c h n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n v i e w o f t h i s , and t h e g e n e r a l 
k n o w l e d g e t h a t L e n d - L e a s e I I was t o be d i s c u s s e d , ( a ) i t seems 
s u r p r i s i n g t h a t M o r g e n t h a u was s u r p r i s e d ; ( b ) t h a t R o o s e v e l t 
s h o u l d f i r s t t e l l H u l l t h a t no p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s w e r e t o be 
d i s c u s s e d and t h e n s u b s e q u e n t l y o n l y c a l l f o r M o r g e n t h a u ; 
( c ) t h a t M o r g e n t h a u ' s p l a n f o r German p a c i f i c a t i o n s h o u l d become 
s u c h a n i s s u e a t Quebec w i t h o u t some t a c i t a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t t h a t he 
w o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e t a l k s . 
On t h e B r i t i s h s i d e , L o r d C h e r w e l l was d e s i g n a t e d t o be i n 
c h a r g e o f t h e L e n d - L e a s e d i s c u s s i o n s . He was somewhat p r o -
A m e r i c a n i n h i s o u t l o o k and r e g a r d e d c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h t h e U . S . 
as e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e U . K . i n t h e p o s t - w a r p e r i o d . F u r t h e r m o r e , 
he was I n t e n s e l y s c e p t i c a l o f e v e n p a r t i a l a l t e r n a t i v e s s u c h as 
(191) See L e a h y and H u l l , O p . C i t . 
(192) See J . F . B y r n e s , ' S p e a k i n g F r a n k l y ' , H e i n e m a n L t d . , 
L o n d o n and T o r o n t o , 19^7) p . 1 8 3 . 
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t h e m a i n t a i n a n c e , as a l a s t r e s o r t , o f a t r a d i n g a r e a b a s e d o n 
s t e r l i n g . He was a l s o r a b i d l y . a n t i - G e r m a n . ^ 1 ^3 ) A g a i n s t t h i s 
b a c k c l o t h t h e c o n f e r e n c e a t Quebec b e g a n o n S e p t e m b e r 10, 19Mf. 
M o s t o f t h e p r e l i m i n a r y t a l k s w e r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e s t r a t e g i c 
p r o b l e m s o f t h e F a r E a s t b u t o n t h e e v e n i n g o f t h e 13th, w i t h 
M o r g e n t h a u ' s a r r i v a l a t Quebec , h i s p l a n f o r German p a c i f i c a t i o n 
was p r e s e n t e d t o W . S . C . The p r o p o s a l s had p r e v i o u s l y b e e n 
c o n s i d e r e d b r i e f l y i n L o n d o n , and M o r g e n t h a u h a d b e e n p a r t i c u l a r l y 
e n c o u r a g e d b y h i s a s s e s s m e n t o f E d e n ' s r e a c t i o n s t o t h e p l a n . 
I n f a c t , Eden had s i m p l y b e e n n o n - c o m m i t t a l , as he r e g a r d e d much 
o f t h e p l a n t o be o u t s i d e h i s a u t h o r i t y . T h i s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
was t o c a u s e a b i t t e r r e a c t i o n f r o m M o r g e n t h a u when E d e n r e a c t e d 
v i o l e n t l y a g a i n s t W . S . C . ' s a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e M o r g e n t h a u P l a n 
d u r i n g t h e l a t t e r s t a g e s o f t h e c o n f e r e n c e . 7 i n f a c t , 
C h u r c h i l l ' s o w n r e a c t i o n o n t h e 13th was u n f a v o u r a b l e n o t o n l y 
b e c a u s e o f p e r s o n a l r e s e r v a t i o n s b u t a l s o b e c a u s e t h e i s s u e s 
i n v o l v e d i n L e a d - L e a s e I I , were t o h i m o f a h i g h e r p r i o r i t y . 
S o , e v e n a t t h i s e a r l y s t a g e , t h e two i s s u e s , German p a c i f i c a t i o n 
p l a n s and L e n d - L e a s e I I , b y j u x t a p o s i t i o n , seemed t o be i n 
c o n t e s t w i t h each o t h e r . H a r r y W h i t e r e c o r d e d : -
" . . . C h u r c h i l l seemed t o be i n t e r e s t e d s o l e l y i n t h e 
L e n d - L e a s e a r r a n g e m e n t s , w h e r e a s t h e P r e s i d e n t was 
t h i n k i n g o f p o l i c y t o w a r d Germany and was n o t v e r y 
i n t e r e s t e d i n L e n d - L e a s e a r r a n g e m e n t s . " (195) 
(193) See B i r k e n h e a d , O p . C i t . pp . 265 and 267. 
(19^) See W h e e l e r - B e n n e t , O p . C i t . p p . 1 8 2 - 3 . 
(195) H . D . W h i t e , Memo f o r t h e S e c r e t a r y ' s F i l e s , 
S e p t e m b e r 25 , 19M*, M e e t i n g i n H u l l ' s O f f i c e , 
S e p t e m b e r 20 , 19^> Y a l t a P a p e r s , p . 1 3 3 . 
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T h i s w a s , i n f a c t , t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a n i n e x t r i c a b l e L i n k 
b e t w e e n t h e M o r g e n t h a u P l a n and t h e L e n d - L e a s e I I p r o v i s i o n s . 
A number o f w r i t e r s h a v e d i s c u s s e d t h i s p r o b l e m . Some l i k e 
E . F . P e n r o s e h a v e d i s m i s s e d t h e b a r g a i n i n g l i n k b e t w e e n t h e two 
i s s u e s . P e n r o s e , f o r e x a m p l e , d o e s t h i s o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t 
M o r g e n t h a u was i i o t t h e t y p e o f man t o w i t h o l d a i d t o t h e U . K . i n 
a n a t t e m p t t o g a i n B r i t i s h a d h e r e n c e t o A m e r i c a n p o l i c i e s . ' J 
O t h e r s h a v e p o i n t e d t o t h e o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t i n g t h a t 
t h e r e w e r e two s e p a r a t e , d i s t i n c t and u n c o n n e c t e d a g r e e m e n t s . 
B u t , i t w i l l become c l e a r , t h a t t h e two a g r e e m e n t s w e r e n e g o t i a t e d 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y and t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s a r e f a i r l y o b v i o u s . F u r t h e r -
m o r e , M o r g e n t h a u who h a d p r e v i o u s l y m a i n t a i n e d a h a r s h l i n e o n 
L e n d - L e a s e I I was n a r d l y l i k e l y t o r e v e r s e h i s a t t i t u d e o v e r n i g h t 
and s u p p o r t a g e n e r o u s L e n d - L e a s e I I p o l i c y , w h i c h was p r o p o s e d 
a t Q u e b e c , w i t h o u t a n a d e q u a t e q u i d p r o q u o . D e s p i t e t h e k n o w l e d g e 
t h a t t h e ' g e n e r o s i t y ' a t Quebec w o u l d n o t r a d i c a l l y a l t e r 
B r i t a i n ' s e c o n o m i c b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r , t h e mos t i n f l u e n t i a l f a c t o r 
i n M o r g e n t h a u ' s d e c i s i o n s a t Quebec was B r i t a i n ' s a c c e p t a n c e o f 
t h e M o r g e n t h a u P l a n . O f c o u r s e t h e U . S . h a d n e v e r w a n t e d t o 
d e s t r o y t h e U . K . e c o n o m y , w h a t t h e y d i d w a n t was t o b r e a k i n t o 
B r i t i s h e c o n o m i c p r e s e r v e s w h i l e s t i l l m a i n t a i n i n g B r i t a i n as a 
.good c r e d i t r i s k . I f a b y - p r o d u c t o f t h i s was a d i m i n u t i o n i n 
U . K . ' s e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h , t h e n t h i s was p e r h a p s i n e v i t a b l e . ^ ^ 6 ) 
A t Quebec , C h u r c h i l l and F . D . R , d e l e g a t e d t h e m a t t e r s o f 
L e n d - L e a s e and t h e M o r g e u t h a u P l a n t o C h e r w e l l , M o r g e n t h a u a n d 
(1 9 7 ) 
W h i t e . 7 On t h e 1 ^ t h b o t h i s s u e s w e r e d i s c u s s e d a n d a g r e e m e n t 
(196) See B l u m , O p . C i t . p . 3 1 0 . 
(197) See B l u m , O p . C i t . p . 3 1 ^ . 
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r e a c h e d o n L e n d - L e a s e I I , w i t h o n L y a s l i g h t amendment o n t h e 
15th, and i t was s u b s e q u e n t l y s i g n e d o n t h e 16th . 
1. A f i g u r e o f #3iB f o r m u n i t i o n s was a g r e e d o n . C h u r c h i l l 
h a d p r o p o s e d p r o p o r t i o n a l f i g u r e s t o w h i c h F . D . R . a s s e n t e d 
b u t M o r g e n t h a u had o b j e c t e d a n d a c t u a l f i g u r e s w e r e 
s u b s t i t u t e d . 
2. A f i g u r e o f # 3 B f o r n o n - m i l i t a r y I t e m s was a g r e e d o n and 
e m p h a s i s e d b y C h u r c h i l l ' s p r o m p t i n g s . 
3 . " T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i f t h e U n i t e d 
K i n g d o m was o n c e more t o pay i t s way i t was e s s e n t i a l t h a t 
t h e e x p o r t t r a d e , w h i c h h a d s h r u n k t o a v e r y s m a l l f r a c t i o n , 
s h o u l d be r e - e s t a b l i s h e d n a t u r a l l y no a r t i c l e s o b t a i . n e d o n 
L e n d - L e a s e o r I d e n t i c a l t h e r e t o w o u l d be e x p o r t e d o r s o l d ; 
b u t I t was e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d n o t 
a t t a c h any c o n d i t i o n s t o s u p p l i e s d e l i v e r e d t o B r i t a i n o n 
L e n d - L e a s e w h i c h w o u l d j e o p a r d i s e t h e r e c o v e r y o f h e r e x p o r t 
t r a d e . The P r e s i d e n t t h o u g h t t h i s w o u l d oe p r o p e r . . 
^ . C h u r c h i l l p r o p o s e d a j o i n t c o m m i t t e e t o s o r t o u t t h e 
d e t a i l s . (198) 
Now, a l t h o u g h a f o r m a l c o n n e c t i o n r e l a t i n g t h e t w o ' s e p a r a t e 
a g r e e m e n t s o n a q u i d p r o quo b a s i s was n o t r e c o r d e d , n o r has i t 
b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d f u l l y b y h i s t o r i a n s , t h e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e 
i m p l i e s s u c h a l i n k v e r y f o r c e f u l l y . F i r s t o f a l l we h a v e 
W h i t e ' s memorandum q u o t e d above w h e r e i t was c l e a r l y s u g g e s t e d 
t h a t C h u r c h i l l a n d R o o s e v e l t h a d d i f f e r e n t I n t e r e s t s a n d p r i o r l t i 
and a p p e a r e d r e l u c t a n t t o d i s c u s s t h e m w i t h each o t h e r . A f e w 
d a y s l a t e r a g r e e m e n t s w e r e r e a c h e d i n w h i c h i m p o r t a n t c o n c e s s i o n s 
were c e d e d , o r s t r o n g l y h e l d v i e w s a l t e r e d , r e s u l t i n g i n 
s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n c l u s i o n s f o r b o t h s i d e s ' p r i o r i t y i n t e r e s t s . 
(198) P . M . t o D e p u t y P . M . , C h a n c e l l o r o f E x c h e q u e r and War 
C a b i n e t , S e p t e m b e r 15, 1 9 ^ , UE 122V5/71 - t h i s r e c o r d 
was a memorandum d r a w n up b y C h e r w e l l , as was a p p a r e n t l y 
t h e r e c o r d o f d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e M o r g e n t h a u P l a n b y t h e 
s u b - c o m m i t t e e o f C h e r w e l l , W h i t e and M o r g e n t h a u - See 
B l u m , O p . C i t . p . 3 1 3 . 
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F u r t h e r m o r e , b o t h I s s u e s w e r e r e s o l v e d by t h e same p e o p l e , 
n a m e l y C h e r w e l l a n d M o r g e n t h a u ; and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , a p o i n t some 
h i s t o r i a n s h a v e i g n o r e d , o r e v e n s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e y w e r e 
d i s c u s s e d s e p a r a t e l y w i t h t h e L e i i d - L e a s e I I f o l l o w i n g t h e 
M o r g e n t h a u p a c i f i c a t i o n p l a n as i f t h e y w e r e b o t h i s o l a t e d . T h i s 
was o b v i o u s l y n o t t h e c a s e . The memo o n L e n d - L e a s e I I , i n i t i a l l e d 
o n t h e 15th , was f o l l o w e d b y t h e I n i t i a l l i n g o f C h e r w e l l ' s r e p o r t 
( 1 9 9 ) 
o n t h e t a l k s c o n c e r n i n g t h e M o r g e n t h a u P l a n . " T h e n , a f t e r 
f u r t h e r t a l k s o n t h e 1 ? t h , t h e Quebec Memorandum e m b o d y i n g t h e 
M o r g e n t h a u P l a n was f i n a l i s e d / 2 0 0 ^ S e c o n d l y , as we h a v e s e e n , 
M o r g e n t h a u was a w a r e o f t h e s e r i o u s p r o b l e m s c o n f r o n t i n g B r i t a i n ' s 
economy and knew t h a t s u c h c o n c e s s i o n s as h a d b e a n made i n L e n d -
L e a s e I I , w o u l d n o t s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t h e r b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . 
I n a n y case i t l o o k e d as i f t h e T r e a s u r y was t o h a v e a u t h o r i t y 
o v e r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e a g r e e m e n t w h i c h w o u l d s a f e g u a r d a g a i n s t 
any u n t o w a r d d e v e l o p m e n t s . And f i n a l l y o f c o u r s e t h e U . K . h a d 
g i v e n M o r g e n t h a u w h a t h e r e g a r d e d as a n i n v a l u a b l e q u i d p r o q u o , 
a c c e p t a n c e o f h i s p l a n s f o r t h e p a c i f i c a t i o n o f G e r m a n y . 
C199) See b l u m , G p . C i t . p p . 3 1 2 - 1 3 . I n f a c t t h e a c c o u n t o f t h e 
t i m i n g i s n o t e x a c t , b u t t h e s i m u l t a n e i t y o f t h e 
d i s c u s s i o n s i s c l e a r . 
(200) P r o v i s i o n s w e r e b a s i c a l l y (1) I n d u s t r i a l r e p a r a t i o n s , 
(2) Sa s r and R h u h r i n d u s t r i a l f a c i l i t i e s t o be d i s m a n t l e d , 
(3) R e c o m m e n d a t i o n f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o f t h e S a a r 
and R h u h r a r e a s , (h) C o n v e r t Germany t o a p a s t o r a l s o c i e t y . 
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B a c k i n t h e U . S . C o r d e l l H u l L was o n l y i n f o r m e d o f t h e 
A n g l o - U . S . a c c o r d s a f t e r t h e e v e n t . On S e p t e m b e r 15 5 i n w o r d s 
w h i c h a g a i n s u g g e s t a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e two i s s u e s , H u l l was 
i n f o r m e d o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s . 
" M o r g e n t h a u h a d p r e s e n t e d a t Quebec i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h 
h i s p l a n f o r G e r m a n y , a p r o p o s a l o f c r e d i t s t o B r i t a i n 
t o t a l l i n g s i x and a h a l f b i l l i o n d o l l a r s . " (201) 
H u l l r e c o r d s t h a t t h i s a n g e r e d h i m as much as a n y t h i n g i n 
(202) 
h i s c a r e e r . He t u r n e d a t one s t a g e , t o S t e t t i n i u s and s a i d ; -
" I n C h r i s t ' s name w h a t has h a p p e n e d t o t h e man?" (203) 
H u l l , u n d e r s t a n d a b l y , was f u r i o u s . E v e n I n t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l 
Memo, t h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f t h e #6£B c r e d i t s a n d t h e M o r g e n t h a u 
P l a n seemed t o I n d i c a t e i t was a p a c k a g e d e a l . H u l l , o n t h e o t h e r 
h a n d , h a d w a n t e d t o t r a d e L e n d - L e a s e c o n c e s s i o n s f o r t h e d i s m a n t l i n g 
o f t h e B r i t i s h t r a d e r e s t r i c t i o n s o r c o n c r e t e and u n e q u i v o c a l 
p l e d g e s t o do s o . 
" H u l l c o m p l a i n e d a b o u t t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s f a i l u r e t o 
c o n s u l t t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t and t o demand B r i t i s h 
c o n c e s s i o n s f o r p o s t - w a r c o m m e r c i a l p o l i c y I n r e t u r n 
f o r A m e r i c a n a i d . R o o s e v e l t , h e s a i d , had g i v e n away 
t h e b a i t . " (20V) 
T h i s may h a v e b e e n t r u e so f a r as H u l l was c o n c e r n e d , b u t 
M o r g e n t h a u h a d u s e d t h a t same b a i t t o c a t c h a d i f f e r e n t f i s h . 
T h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n as some h i s t o r i a n s h a v e s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e 
q u e s t i o n o f B r i t i s h e c o n o m i c r e s t r i c t i o n s was o v e r l o o k e d by t h e U . S . 
(201) P r e s i d e n t i a l Memo t o H u l l , S e p t e m b e r 15 9 19^^* s u b s t a n c e 
q u o t e d I n H u l l , O p . C i t . pp.1613- 1*-, V o l . I I . 
(202) I b i d . 
(203) Q u o t e d as E d i t o r i a l Comment i n C a d o g a n , O p . C i t . p . 6 6 6 . 
(20^-) B l u m , O p . C i t . p.31 ^ . 
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On t h e eve o f t h e Quebec m e e t i n g , H o p k i n s w r o t e t o K o o s e v e l t . 1 
" I t h i n k i t i s i m p o r t a n t i n Quebec t h a t y o u t e l l t h e 
P r i m e M i n i s t e r how s t r o n g l y y o u f e e l a b o u t k n o c k i n g down 
some o f t h e t r a d e b a r r i e r s t o g e t somewhere i n t e r m s o f 
w o r l d t r a d e . I h a v e a f e e l i n g t h a t t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r 
t h i n k s t h a t t h i s i s a p e t h o b b y o f S e c r e t a r y H u l l ' s and 
t h a t y o u may n o t t h i n k i t o f g r e a t I m p o r t a n c e . I t h i n k i t 
i s e s s e n t i a l t o o u r f u t u r e b a r g a i n i n g w i t h G r e a t B r i t a i n 
t h a t y o u d i s a b u s e t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s m i n d o f t h i s . 
I r a t h e r t h i n k t h a t he t h i n k s t h e g e n i u s o f t h i s p rogramme 
i n A m e r i c a l i e s w i t h S e c r e t a r y H u l l , w h i l e t h e t r u t h o f t h e 
m a t t e r I s t h a t i t i s a p rogramme t h a t , f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g , 
ha s b e e n pushed b y y o u . 1 1 (205; 
H o o s e v e l t , o b v i o u s l y , mus t h a v e had t h e p r o b l e m o f b a r g a i n i n g 
w i t h B r i t a i n t o m o d i f y h e r r e s t r i c t i o n i s t e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s I n 
m i n d when he a t t e n d e d t h e c o n f e r e n c e . I t seems h i g h l y u n l i k e l y 
t h a t he w o u l d t h r o w away s u c h a r i c h b a r g a i n i n g a s s e t as L e n d -
L e a s e I I , w i t h o u t some t a n g i b l e r e t u r n , E v e n B r i t i s h a c c e p t a n c e 
o f t h e M o r g e n t h a u P l a n , seems a p a l t r y q u i d p r o quo w h e n 
c o m p a r e d w i t h o t h e r i m p o r t a n t s t e p s t a k e n a t Q u e b e c , i n p a r t i c u l a r 
t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f o c c u p a t i o n zones i n G e r m a n y . F o r n e r e , t h e 
B r i t i s h h a d a n u n d o u b t e d t r i u m p h . On t h e one h a n d B r i t a i n a g r e e d 
t o a p o l i c y o f h a r s h t r e a t m e n t o f p o s t - w a r G e r m a n y , b u t o n t h e 
o t h e r h a n d g a i n e d t h e n o r t h e r n , h i g h l y d e v e l o p e d and i n d u s t r i a l i s e d 
o c c u p a t i o n z o n e . T h u s B r i t a i n w o u l d oe i n a p o s i t i o n t o u n i l a t e r a l l y 
a m e l i o r a t e h a r s h o c c u p a t i o n measu re s as a l a s t r e s o r t . 
F i n a l l y , o n t h e Quebec C o n f e r e n c e , we come u p o n t h e u n u s u a l 
c a se o f C h u r c h i l l r a p i d l y c h a n g i n g h i s m i n d f r o m s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n 
t o t h e M o r g e n t h a u P l a n t o a c c e p t i n g i t . A c c o r d i n g t o M o r a n ^ ^ ^ 
i t was C h e r w e l l who p e r s u a d e d W . S . C . t o a c c e p t t h e M o r g e n t h a u P l a n . 
(205) W h i t e House P a p e r s o f H . L . H o p k i n s , V o l . I I , J a n u a r y 19"+2-
J u l y 19!+5> R . E . S h e r w o o d , E y r e and S p o t t i s w o o d , 
L o n d o n 19^9, p . 8 0 9 . 
(206) A l s o H u l l , o u t t h i s must h a v e b e e n f r o m a s e c o n d h a n d a c c o u n t , 
see H u l l , O p . C i t . p . 1615 . 
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" . . . he was won o v s r b y t h e P r o f . , and i n t h e e n d , 
a c c o r d i n g t o M o r g e n t h a u , t h e p l a n was d r a f t e d e n t i r e l y 
b y M r . C h u r c h i l l . " (207; 
The q u e s t i o n o f r e a l s u b s t a n c e i s how was C h u r c h i l l won o v e r ? 
M o r g e n t h a u h a d s u g g e s t e d t h a t a d e - I n d u s t r i a l i s e d Germany w o u l d 
p r e s e n t B r i t a i n w i t h g r e a t e x p o r t o p p o r t u n i t i e s , b u t t h i s does n o t 
seem t o h a v e b e e n c o n s i d e r e d as a r e a l i s t i c f a c t o r o n t h e B r i t i s h 
s i d e . C h u r c h i l l ' s i n t i m a t i o n o f t h e m o t i v a t i o n s b e h i n d t h e a g r e e -
m e n t s was as f o l l o w s 
" A t f i r s t I v i o l e n t l y o p p o s e d t h i s i d e a ( i . e . t h e 
M o r g e n t h a u P l a n ) , b u t t h e P r e s i d e n t , w i t h M r . M o r g e n t h a u 
- f r o m whom we had so much t o a sk - was so i n s i s t e n t 
t h a t i n t h e end we a g r e e d t o c o n s i d e r i t . " (208) 
T h e r e mus t h a v e b e e n two o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n C h u r c h i l l ' s 
m i n d . F i r s t o f a l l , as p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d , B r i t a i n w o u l d be i n 
de f a c t o c o n t r o l o f t h e m a i n German i n d u s t r i a l r e g i o n , and c o u l d 
t h u s a m e l i o r a t e p a c i f i c a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s u n i l a t e r a l l y I f need b e . 
S e c o n d l y , t h e M o r g e n t h a u P l a n was somewhat t e n t a t i v e , w h e r e a s 
L e n d - L e a s e I I was more i m m e d i a t e , more c o n c r e t e , a n d t o B r i t a i n , 
more v i t a l / 2 0 9 ^ 
(207) M o r a n , O p . C i t . p . 1 7 9 . 
(208) C h u r c h i l l , ' T r i u m p h and T r a g e d y , p p . 1 3 8 - 1 3 9 . 
(209) I n f a c t t h e M o r g e n t h a u P l a n was t o be s h o r t l i v e d . On 
t h e 15th, Eden a r r i v e d i n Quebec , and much t o M o r g e n t h a u ' s 
a l l e g e d s u r p r i s e and W . S . C . ' s d i s c o m f o r t , h e s t r o n g l y 
o p p o s e d B r i t a i n ' s a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e p l a n . He was l a t e r 
b a c k e d b y a m a j o r i t y o f t h e C a b i n e t a n d t h e p l a n was n e v e r 
a c c e p t e d b y t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t . L i k e w i s e i n t h e U . S . 
w i t h the c o m b i n e d o p p o s i t i o n o f H u l l , H o p k i n s , S t i m s o n and 
M c C l o y , b y O c t o b e r t h e M o r g e n t h a u P l a n h a d b e e n l a i d t o o n e 
s i d e and t h a t was w h e r e i t r e m a i n e d . 
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S o , t h e Q . i l A g r e e m e n t a p p e a r e d i n i t i a l l y mos t f a v o u r a b l e 
t o B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . The U . S . had a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s 
o f t h e B r i t i s h e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n , a n d had t a k e n a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
r e m e d i a l d e c i s i o n s . T h e y had n o t b e e n p r e p a r e d t o s i g n a d e t a i l e d 
p r o t o c o l , as some B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y S i n c l a i r , h a d 
a d v o c a t e d , b u t o n t h e w h o l e t h e B r i t i s h w e r e p l e a s e d w i t h t h e 
r e s u l t s . ^ 1 0 ) ^ h e r e y e r e s t i l l w o r r i e s o v e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e t a i l s , 
d e f i n i t i o n s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y r e g a r d i n g C h u r c h i l l 1 s 
s t a t e m e n t t h a t ; -
" . . . no a r t i c l e s o b t a i n e d o n L e n d - L e a s e o r i d e n t i c a l 
t h e r e t o w o u l d be e x p o r t e d o r s o l d f o r p r o f i t . " ( 2 1 1 ) 
when i t was t he B r i t i s h , a i m t h a t a r t i c l e s i d e n t i c a l t o t h o s e 
r e c e i v e d u n d e r m i l i t a r y L e n d - L e a s e s h o u l d be a v a i l a b l e f o r e x p o r t . 
Y e t , d e s p i t e t h i s , t h e s e w e r e i n e f f e c t e i t h e r t h e o l d p r o b l e m s 
o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n e n c o u n t e r e d o v e r t h e l a s t two y e a r s w i t h t h e 
F . E . A , o r r a t h e r i n s i g n i f i c a n t . I t was n o t t h e d e t a i l s o r t h e 
p r o v i s i o n s , so much b u t a s h i f t away f r o m t h e ' s p i r i t ' o f Quebec 
b y t h e A m e r i c a n s w h i c h was t o d i s a p p o i n t B r i t i s h h o p e s . T h i s was 
l a r g e l y due to p r e s s u r e s f r o m t h e m i l i t a r y s i d e a n d v i e w s and 
o p i n i o n s , w h i c h l a t e r became f e l t , b u t w e r e submerged o r w e n t 
u n e x p r e s s e d a t Quebec , i n o r d e r t o p u r s u e o t h e r p r i o r i t i e s . 
M o r g e n t h a u i n p a r t i c u l a r was raisunderstood by t h e B r i t i s h . He 
seemed p r e p a r e d t o a g r e e w i t h t h e B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n o n L e n d - L e a s e 
a t Q u e b e c , f o r a p r i c e o f c o u r s e , b u t h i s a t t i t u d e o n r e t u r n i n g 
t o t h e U . S . e v i n c e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e o f t h e 
( 2 1 0 ) See WP( 1+5)2^, J a n u a r y 2*+, 19^5- R e p o r t by L o r d K e y n e s 
o n The W a s h i n g t o n N e g o t i a t i o n s : p r o t o c o l i d e a was 
d r o p p e d l a r g e l y b e c a u s e o f o p p o s i t i o n f r o m U . S . War and 
Navy D e p a r t m e n t s . 
( 2 1 1 ) P . M . t o D e p u t y P . M . e t a l , S e p t e m b e r 1 5 , 191*-1*, p a r a A , 
U E 1 2 2 V 5 / 7 1 > see a l s o B r a n d t o S e l f , S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , 
Uiii 5 5 ^ / 5 / 7 1 . 
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p r o p o n e n t s o f t h e ' m a r g i n a l t h e o r y ' , a r e v i v a l o f w h i c h seemed 
more t h a n p o s s i b l e t o t h e B r i t i s h due t o t h e i n s i s t e n c e o f 
M o r g e n t h a u o n t h e u se o f a b s o l u t e r a t h e r t h a n p r o p o r t i o n a l f i g u r e s 
a t Q u e b e c . On S e p t e m b e r 20, M o r g e n t h a u d e s c r i b e d how h e w o u l d 
l i k e t o see t h e s i t u a t i o n p r o c e e d . 
" T h e way I w o u l d l i k e t o p r o c e e d w o u l d be t o s o r t o f 
p u t them ( i . e . t h e B r i t i s h ) o n t h e w i t n e s s s t a n d and 
a s k them how much t h e y w a n t e d , and why t h e y w a n t e d i t 
a n d t h e n s t a r t i n w i t h w h a t e v e r was a g r e e d o n a t Quebec 
as t o w h a t t h e y w o u l d c o n t r i b u t e i n t h e P a c i f i c . " (212) 
T h e n i n r e p l y t o M c C l o y , he a d d e d t h a t L e n d - L e a s e I I t o t h e 
U . K . s h o u l d oe j u s t i f i e d i n t e r m s o f B r i t a i n ' s war e f f o r t a g a i n s t 
J a p a n . T h i s was a n o t h e r i s s u e w h i c h was t o be t r o u b l e s o m e . 
A l r e a d y o n S e p t e m o e r 16, Weeks had c o m p l a i n e d t o S i n c l a i r r e g a r d i n g 
W h i t e ' s s t r o n g o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e u s e o f p r o p o r t i o n a l f i g u r e s , ^2>) 
and o n t h e 19th, A n d e r s o n w r o t e t o C h e r w e l l i -
" . . . W h i t e ' s a p p r o a c h w o u l d a p p a r e n t l y l e a v e r o o m f o r 
t h e r e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e " m a r g i n a l " d o c t r i n e o f L e i i d -
L e a s e i n a f o r m w h i c h w o u l d be q u i t e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
t h e s p i r i t o f t h e Quebec A g r e e m e n t . " (21^) 
(212) See B l u m , p .31*+. 
(213) 3ee Weeks t o S i n c l a i r , M i n i s t r y o f P r o d u c t i o n , 
S e p t e m b e r 16, 19M*, US1 230 /5 /71 . 
(21*0 C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e E x c h e q u e r t o C h e r w e l l , S e p t e m b e r 19, 
19U-I+, UE1230 /5 / 70 . S n o r t l y a f t e r t h i s t h e r e a p p e a r s t o 
h a v e b e e n some t r o u b l e o v e r C h e r w e l l 1 s p o s i t i o n . 
A p p a r e n t l y A n d e r s o n h i n t e d t h a t C h e r w e l l was r u s h i n g t h e 
L e n d - L e a s e I I t a l k s , o f w h i c h h e was i n c h a r g e , and t h a t 
h e s h o u l d w a i t f o r K e y n e s , o n h i s way t o W a s h i n g t o n , t o 
g e t h i s a d v i c e . C h e r w e l l r e p l i e d b y a s k i n g t h e P . M . t o 
r e l i e v e h i m o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e t a l k s u n d e r s u c h 
c o n d i t i o n s . A n d e r s o n r e p l i e d by s a y i n g t h a t C h e r w e l l 
had m i s u n d e r s t o o d h i m , and t h a t i f he c o u l d r e a c h a g r e e -
ment o n t h e b a s i s o f $33 m u n i t i o n s and 03^ - f o r c i v i l i a n 
s u p p l i e s w i t h no r e s t r i c t i o n s o n U . K . e x p o r t r e c o v e r y , 
t h e n he was t o do s o . See W a s h i n g t o n t o F . O . and r e o l y 
S e p t e m b e r 22 , U E 1 3 ^ 6 / 5 / 7 1 . 
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H o w e v e r , o n t n e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e A t l a n t i c t h e A m e r i c a n s 
b e g a n t o v a c i l l a t e o v e r t n e p o s i t i o n a d o p t e d a t Q u e b e c . As we 
h a v e s e e n , t h e Quebec C o n f e r e n c e o n t h e A m e r i c a n s i d e was a 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s h a m b l e s . I n e a r l y S e p t e r a o e r , 
H u l l f u r i o u s a t t h e ' b a i t ' o e i n g g i v e n away a t Q u e b e c , s t i l l 
p r e s s e d R o o s e v e l t t o p r e s s f o r u n e q u i v o c a l a c c e p t a n c e o f A m e r i c a n 
t r a d e p r i n c i p l e s b y t h e B r i t i s h as a p a r t i a l and i n f a c t a n 
a d d i t i o n a l q u i d p r o quo f o r L e n d - L e a s e I I . F o r a w h i l e K o o s e v e l t 
became e v e n more e n t h u s i a s t i c o n t h i s t h a n H u l l , w h o , o n s e c o n d 
t h o u g h t s , a l o n g w i t h S t i r a s o n , b e l i e v e d t h j . s was g o i n g t o o f a r , and 
w o u l d c a u s e d i f f i c u l t p o l i t i c a l r e p e r c u s s i o n s . ^ ^ L a t e r i n 
S e p t e m b e r , w i t h t n e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f Quebec c l e a r e r i n h i s m i n d , 
H u l l was more c a u t i o u s and more f e a r f u l o f B r i t i s h r e a c t i o n s . 
A l t h o u g h h i s m a i n a i m was t o c r e a t e a l i b e r a l w o r l d c o m m e r c i a l 
s y s t e m f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f A m e r i c a n e n t e r p r i s e , t h i s c o u l d n o t oe 
r e a l i s e d i f B r i t a i n was pushed t o o f a r and r e f u s e d t o c o o p e r a t e . 
" T h e B r i t i s h , H u l l a d v i s e d c o u l d u l t i m a t e l y 
s o l v e t h e i r p r o b l e m s o n l y " b y t h e a d o p t i o n . . . o f 
a l i b e r a l c o m m e r c i a l p o l i c y . . . " B u t t h e i n t e r n a l 
p r e s s u r e s o n them n o t t o d o so w o u l d be s t r o n g and 
w e r e I n c r e a s i n g , and i t was now v i t a l t h a t t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s r e l i e v e as much as p o s s i o l e t h e s n o r t - t e r m 
B r i t i s h p r o b l e m s t h e war c r e a t e d t o p e r m i t them t o 
c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t r a u e p r o g r a m m e . T h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d now p e r m i t B r i t a i n t o e x p o r t more 
t o s t r e n g t h e n i t s r e s e r v e p o s i t i o n , b u t n o t u n d e r 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h " w i l l s t i r up t h e r e s e n t m e n t o f o u r 
e x p o r t m a n u f a c t u r e r s and t r a d e r s . " (216) 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y o t h e r g r o u p s and i n d i v i d u a l s w e r e b e g i n n i n g t o 
b r i n g p r e s s u r e t o b e a r t o u n d e r m i n e Quebec . One o f t h e b a s i c 
(215) F h ( 1 9 M t ) I I I 6 3 - 6 5 , a n d K o l k o , O p . C l t . p p . 2 9 0 - 2 9 1 . 
(216) F h ( 1 9 M f ) I I I 53 -55 ) q u o t e d f r o m K o l k o , O p . C i t . p . 2 8 9 . 
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problems was t h a t the U.S. s t i l l h e l d a narrow view o f Leiid-Lease 
as a weapon f o r v i c t o r y . The B r i t i s h saw i t as a necessary a i d 
to b e g i n t he r e - c o n v e r s i o n o f t h e i r economy to e x p o r t p r o d u c t i o n . 
I n f a c t , i n the b e g i n n i n g , C h e r w e l l and Morgenthau's t a l k s on the 
d e t a i l s o f Lend-Lease I I d i d get o f f t o a good s t a r t . C h e r w e l l 
y e t a g a i n s p e l t o u t the economic problems o f B r i t a i n t o 
Morgenthau, who appeared t o be a t t e n t i v e and si m p l y i n s i s t e d a t 
t h i s stage t h a t more s t a t i s t i c a l d e t a i l would have t o be f o r t h -
coming. D e s p i t e C h e r w e l l ' s r e t i c e n c e on t h i s , Morgenthau remained 
amiable and had no o b j e c t i o n s to Keynes a s s i s t i n g i n the 
n e g o t i a t i o n s , though White subs e q u e n t l y o b j e c t e d t o Morgenthau on 
(217) 
t h i s . On October 6 , Morgenthau i n s i s t e d , t o h i s own pe o p l e , 
t h a t the ' s p i r i t o f Quebec 1 should p r e v a i l , though as suggested 
above, t h e r e was some d i v e r g e n c e on what t h i s meant on the B r i t i s h 
and American s i d e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . For example, Morgenthau 
c o n t i n u e d by saying t h a t he no loxiger thought t h a t B r i t i s h reserve: 
l e v e l s were a u s e f u l y a r d s t i c k f o r t he assessment o f her needs 
and t h a t new f i g u r e s and a new b a s i c a n a l y s i s was r e q u i r e d . I t 
would be r e q u i r e d f o r economic p l a n n i n g which would a l l o w B r i t a i n 
t o g r a d u a l l y meet her commitments. A t t h i s stage b o t h t he 
Tr e a s u r y and S t a t e Departments f a v o u r e d some concessions to the 
U.K. though they were f r e q u e n t l y a t cross purposes as to where 
the concessions should come fr o m . On the economic s i d e o f the 
U.S. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Crowley was perhaps the most i n f l e x i b l e , as 
Keynes commented:-
"... h i s ear b e i n g so near the ground t h a t he was o u t 
o f range o f persons speaking from an e r e c t p o s i t i o n . " 
( 2 1 8 ) 
(217) See Blum, p . 3 1 6 , Op.Cit. 
( 2 1 8 ) See W?(^5)2^, January 19 , 19^5. 
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From t h i s American a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n f u s i o n , the c l e a r e s t 
v o i c e and i n the end the most i n f l u e n t i a l , came from the Army, 
Navy and War Departments. The s e r v i c e departments o f course had 
^ r e a t i n f l u e n c e over war m a t e r i a l Lend-Lease and u n f o r t u n a t e l y 
f o r the B r i t i s h , the American Far East commanders, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
A d m i r a l K i n g , were not e n t h u s i a s t i c about B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n the Far East War. They knew i n any case t h a t a p a r t f r o m the 
Burma Campaign t o which they were a l r e a d y committed, t h e r e would 
be l i t t l e the B r i t i s h c o u l d c o n t r i b u t e but much t h a t t h e y c o u l d 
c l a i m i f n o m i n a l l y e q u a l c o - b e l l i g e r e n t s i n t h e Far East. On 
October 1 9 t h the m i l i t a r y caucus o f the Lend-Lease Committee met 
and Under S e c r e t a r y P a t t e r s o n s a i d t h a t he wanted Lend-Lease I I 
to be r e s t r i c t e d to war a r t i c l e s which were to be used i n the 
war zones. General S o m e r v e l l i n a s i m i l a r v e i n wanted t i g h t 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on the use o f Lend-Lease s h i p p i n g . On October 2 ^ t h ; -
"The B r i t i s h r e q u e s t s were considered a t a c l o s e d meeting 
o f the J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f ... I t was the unanimous 
o p i n i o n o f the J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f t h a t t h e y were n o t 
J u s t i f i e d a t t h a t time i n recommending Lend-Lease 
d e l i v e r i e s t o anybody except f o r m a t e r i a l t h a t would 
a c t u a l l y be used i n war." ( 219) 
S i m u l t a n e o u s l y B r i t i s h s u p p o r t f o r the Morgenthau P l a n began 
to v i s i b l y recede. Blum r e c o r d s t h a t on the 1 8 t h , Morgenthau 
a d m i t t e d t o White t h a t h i s p l a n f o r Germany was s t i l l a f a c t o r 
i n h i s approach t o Lend-Lease I I , t h e n by i m p l i c a t i o n , c o n t r a d i c t e d 
t h i s by saying t h a t B r i t a i n ' s w i t h d r a w a l o f s u p p o r t f o r h i s p l a n , 
and o t h e r economic d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h the B r i t i s h , f o r example over 
A r g e n t i n a , d i d not a f f e c t h i s s u p p o r t o f Lend-Lease I I a i d t o 
B r i t a i n . I n f a c t , as we s h a l l see, Morgenthau d i d press f o r Lend-
(219) Leahy, Op.Cit. p.320-321 . 
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Lease I I concessions f o r the B r i t i s h , though t h e r e i s L i t t l e 
evidence o f t h i s b e i n g clone e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y Anglo-American t a l k s were y e t a g a i n r u n n i n g 
i n t o t r o u b l e . The U.S. r e f u s e d Keynes 1 r e q u e s t f o r the r e -
i n t r o d u c t i o n o f c i v i l i a n tobacco s u p p l i e s , whereas the B r i t i s h 
were hedging over an American r e q u e s t to u n d e r w r i t e the e x t e n s i o n 
o f r e c i p r o c a l Lend-Lease by A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand to cover 
U.S. meat procurements i n the Far East. F u r t h e r m o r e , a s e r i o u s 
d i f f e r e n c e o f o p i n i o n was d e v e l o p i n g between the B r i t i s h and the 
F. E. A. who: -
took a d i f f e r e n t view. I t h e l d t h a t the White Paper 
remained i n f o r c e u n t i l V.E.-day and t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n s 
should c o n t i n u e t i l l t hen to be made to i t f o r 'waivers' f o r 
e x p o r t s o f goods a f f e c t e d by i t s terms. I t a f f i r m e d once 
more t h a t d e c i s i o n s and recommendations o f combined b o a r d s , 
and committees d i d not per se c o n s t i t u t e waivers o f White 
Paper r e q u i r e m e n t s . 1 1 (220) 
Blum has argued t h a t c o n d i t i o n s had so changed t h a t t h e r e was 
an Anglo-American consensus t h a t the assumptions o f Q . I I were now 
based on i n a c c u r a t e p r o p o s i t i o n s . I can f i x i d l i t t l e evidence t o 
s u p p o r t t h i s c o - i t e . i t i o n . I n f a c t , the main c h a l l e n g e to the 
assumptions o f Quebec d i d not come u n t i l December 16 , w i t h 
ftunstedt's o f f e n s i v e i n the Ardennes. I t was o n l y t hen t h a t the 
f e a r grew t h a t German Defeat was perhaps not j u s t round the c o r n e r 
The B r i t i s h wanted the e x p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s r e l a x e d a t the end o f 
1 9 ^ , b u t the U.S. demurred somewhat and i n s i s t e d t h a t they were 
o n l y to be r e l a x e d on V.E.-day. D e s p i t e these growing d i f f i c u l t i e 
Keynes remained o p t i m i s t i c , and t o l d D a l t o n on November 1 1 y t h a t 
the p r o s p e c t s f o r B r i t i s h freedom to e x p o r t looked p r o m i s i n g . 
(220) Hargreaves and Gowing, Op.Cit. p . l 6 W , 
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On the 1 7 t h , however, i n a t h i r d r e - d r a f t o f a p o s s i b l e Anglo-
U.S, agreement, the U.S. appeared more concerned w i t h t h e i r own 
e x p o r t markets t h a n the U.K.'s. 
" D) The U n i t e d Kingdom agrees t h a t the s t e r l i n g area 
d o l l a r p o o l a;id Empire i m p o r t c o n t r o l s should be 
a d m i n i s t e r e d w i t h a view to i n c r e a s i n g the freedom o f 
i m p o r t e r s ' c h o i c e s , w i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e t o r e d u c i n g 
wartime o b s t a c l e s to the access o f U n i t e d S t a t e s e x p o r t e r s 
t o t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l e x p o r t markets. The U n i t e d Kingdom 
w i l l undertake a l l steps w i t h i n i t s power to a c h i e v e these 
o b j e c t i v e s , and w i l l endeavour to assure the p r o v i s i o n o f 
d o l l a r exchange f o r cases m u t u a l l y agreed to be p a r t i c u l a r l y 
troublesome." ( 2 2 1 ) 
A t t h i s time Roosevelt began t o become even more uneasy about 
the B r i t i s h and p a r t i c u l a r l y C h u r c h i l l and the ' s p i r i t o f Quebec 1. 
Roose v e l t was d i s t u r b e d by C h u r c h i l l ' s a t t i t u d e toward Russia and 
her p o s s i b l e p e n e t r a t i o n i n t o c e n t r a l Europe, h i s views on the 
B r i t i s h Kmpire and h i s benevolence toward European r o y a l t y . Mot 
o n l y R o o s e v e l t , b u t a number o f o t h e r l e a d i n g members o f the 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n b e l i e v e d t h a t B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y o f ' p e r i p h e r a l 
o p e r a t i o n s ' i n the M e d i t e r r a n e a n had been based on p o l i t i c a l r a t h e r 
t h a n s t r a t e g i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n was 
to keep the Russians as f a r east as p o s s i b l e . These b e l i e f s , a l o n g 
w i t h the i n n a t e problems o f the economic o u t l o o k , began t o 
i n f l u e n c e Roosevelt's o u t l o o k . He was a l s o under p r e s s u r e , as we 
have seen from h i s J o i n t C h i e f s , and as o f t e n w i t h R o o s e v e l t , 
p r e s e n t pressures began to a l t e r past d e c i s i o n s . 
"... when i t came to Lend-Lease, Roosevelt a c t e d as 
though he had never heard o f the Quebec agreements." ( 2 2 2 ) 
( 2 2 1 ) Annex A. B. T h i r d D r a f t U E 2 5 6 0 / 5 / 7 1 , November 1 7 , 1 9 ^ . 
( 2 2 2 ) Blum, Op.Clt. p.320. 
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i w e n Morgenthau was somewhat d i s t u r b e d oy the r e v e r s a l o f 
HooseveLt's views. He t r i e d to i n f l u e n c e him v i a Leahy, perhaps 
n o t the best choice as a m e d i a t o r , and a d e l e g a t i o n o f Acheson, 
C u r r i e , White, and m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s , though u n f o r t u n a t e l y to no 
a v a i l , Leahy t o l d Morgenthau on E^ovember 18, 
1 1... the P r e s i d e n t s a i d he never promised them ( i . e . the 
3 r i t i s h ) a n y t h i n g a t Quebec and t h a t we should handle t h i s 
j u s t the same as any o t h e r Lend-Lease O p e r a t i o n . " (223) 
On the same day Leahy gave an o r a l r e p o r t on Lend-Lease to 
Roosevelt and on November 2 2 , the U . S . had produced a m o d i f i e d 
v e r s i o n o f p r o p o s a l s f o r Lend-Lease I I . I n i t the m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s 
were much the same as envisaged a t Quebec, but w i t h r e g a r d t o 
c i v i l i a n a r t i c l e s i t was recomnended t h a t t h e r e should be no 
a l t e r a t i o n i n B r i t i s h e x p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s u n t i l V . i j.-day. 
Keynes o b j e c t e d v e r y s t r o n g l y to t h i s and p o i n t e d o u t the new 
commitments the U . S . wanted the U . K . to undertake i n the Ear East 
i n r e g a r d t o meat a p p r o p r i a t i o n s . Morgenthau was somewhat w o r r i e d 
by t h i s r e a c t i o n and i n a l e t t e r t o Roosevelt d a t e d November 2?> 
he proposed a more f l e x i b l e arrangement. He put f o r w a r d f i g u r e s 
o f # 2 .7B and #2.8B f o r war and c i v i l i a n s u p p l i e s r e s p e c t i v e l y , 
which would be s u p p l i e d s u b j e c t to war c o n d i t i o n s b u t w i t h no 
o f f i c i a l a l t e r a t i o n o f the B r i t i s h e x p o r t p o s i t i o n . However, a t 
the l a s t Combined Committee Meeting on Lend-Lease o n November 2 2 , 
Crowley d i d say t h a t the F.hi.A. ( o f a l l i n s t i t u t i o n s 11) would h e l p 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y to a l l e v i a t e B r i t a i n ' s e x p o r t d i f f i c u l t i e s between 
January 19^5 and V.E.-day. ( 2 2 ^ 
(223) I b i d . 
( 2 2 1 * ) See CCLL, November 2 2 , 19M+, U E 2 5 6 1/5 / 7 1, a l s o Hargreaves 
and Gowing, Op.Cit. p.16^ . 
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The p r e s s u r e s I n London had been growing c o n s i d e r a b l y t o impress 
upon the U.S. the domestic d i f f i c u l t i e s 3 r i t a i n would f a c e i f 
a l l e v i a t o r y economic measures were n o t taken, and i t was t h o u g h t 
I m p o s s i b l e to d e l a y a statement on t h e economic Issues l a t e r t h a n 
November 2 9 . J' So w i t h the statement from Crowley i n mind 
the B r i t i s h and Americans were a t l a s t a b l e to agree t o a 
simultaneous statement on Lend-Lease. I t was d i f f i c u l t t o judge 
j u s t how u s e f u l Crowley's promise would be e s p e c i a l l y as one o f 
the main B r i t i s h aims had been t o secure a h i g h l e v e l d e c i s i o n 
f r o m the U.S. to p r e v e n t f u r t h e r o b s t r u c t i o n i s m from the F.E.A. 
b u r e a u c r a t s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , on November 3 0 t h , K o o s e v e l t and 
C h u r c h i l l s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i s s u e d s t a t e m e n t s . C h u r c h i l l i n the 
House o f Commons s a i d t h a t f r o m January 1 s t , 19^+5:-
"... we s h a l l no longer r e c e i v e shipments to t h i s c o u n t r y , 
under Lend-Lease, o f any manufactured a r t i c l e s f o r 
c i v i l i a n use which e n t e r i n t o e x p o r t t r a d e ? nor o f many 
raw and s e m i - f a b r i c a t e d m a t e r i a l s such as i r o n or s t e e l 
and some n o n - f e r r o u s m e t a l s . Consequently, I n accordance 
w i t h the White Paper o f September, 19^1, we s h a l l t h e n be 
f r e e to e x p o r t a wide range o f goods made from those 
m a t e r i a l s .., 
... Nor, i n g e n e r a l , s h a l l we r e c e i v e i n t h i s c o u n t r y 
under Lend-Lease, f i n i s h e d a r t i c l e s i d e n t i c a l w i t h those 
which we s h a l l e x p o r t . Such a r t i c l e s w i l l be p a i d f o r by 
us. Where we c o n t i n u e to r e c e i v e any raw m a t e r i a l s , the 
q u a n t i t i e s s u p p l i e d under Lend-Lease are l i m i t e d to our 
domestic consumption, f o r the manufacture o f m u n i t i o n s and 
the m a i ntainance o f our e s s e n t i a l war time economy. We 
s h a l l pay cash f o r any a d d i t i o n a l s u p p l i e s which we might 
wish t o take f r o m U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r e x p o r t purposes." ( 226) 
There appeared some d i v i s i o n s o f o p i n i o n as to e x a c t l y what 
was agreed t o , l a r g e l y because o f Crowley's u n o f f i c i a l pledge o f 
h e l p . I n e f f e c t t he White Paper r e s t r i c t i o n s had been m a i n t a i n e d , 
(225) See P r e s i d e n t o f the Board o f Trade, C h a n c e l l o r o f the 
Exchequer, M i n i s t e r o f Food and F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y to 
Keynes, November 16 , 19M*. U E 2 1 8 6 / 5 / 7 1 . 
(226) Hansard, November 3 0 , 191+U, W.S.C. Col . 72 . 
332 
w i t h o n l y assurances from the U.S. o f a more l i b e r a l a d m i n i s t r -
a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o a l l e v i a t e tne p o s i t i o n f r o m tne American 
s i d e , B r i t a i n was to r e c e i v e a f u r t h e r # 5 « 5 S under Lend-Lease, 
b u t the U.S. had i n s i s t e d on f o r m i n g a committee to compare 
B r i t a i n ' s Lend-Lease i m p o r t s w i t h h er e x p o r t s . T h i s was 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n Hay 19^5 and t h e r e f o l l o w e d a p e r i o d o f w r a n g l i n g 
over i t s o p e r a t i o n s , but the war ended oe f o r e i t was a o l e t o 
conclude i t s f i r s t r e p o r t . The B r i t i s h e x p o r t p o s i t i o n was o n l y 
r e l i e v e d by B r i t a i n h e r s e l f , who e l i m i n a t e d most o f the 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l s u p p l i e s from Lend-Lease. The main outcome, the 
g r e a t e s t s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the two ye a r s o f w r a n g l i n g w i t h the U.S. 
over the e x p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s was t h a t i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s i t 
was n ot j u s t the lower echelons o f the F.a.A, and Morgenthau's 
minions a t the Tre a s u r y who r e f u s e d t o h e l p . For i n the end the 
hope t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l r e l a x a t i o n s would be f o r t h c o m i n g i f o n l y 
R o o s e v e l t would take d e c i s i o n s , i f o n l y the U.S. could be f u l l y 
i n f o r m e d o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d , proved g r o u j i d l e s s . 
R o o s e v e l t v a c i l l a t e d a c c o r d i n g to p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s b r o u g h t to 
Dear, and i n any case a l l American m i n i s t e r s concerned wanted 
concessions o f one form o r another from the B r i t i s h i n r e t u r n 
f o r e x p o r t c o n t r o l r e l a x a t i o n , which t he B r i t i s h f e l t unable t o 
concede. The apparent changes o f p o l i c y and o c c a s i o n a l l y 
c o n f u s i o n on the U.S. was not caused by the q u e s t i o n o f to r e l a x 
or n ot to r e l a x t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s , b u t by c o n t r o v e r s y over what 
should be e x t r a c t e d from the B r i t i s h i n r e t u r n . And so, i n the 
end, t he B r i t i s h had to take u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n to a v o i d the e x p o r t 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . B u t , t h i s meant t h a t the new e x p o r t d r i v e as i t 
stood would have to b e , s o l e l y generated by B r i t i s h r e s o u r c e s . 
A s i t u a t i o n which, as we s h a l l see, was h i g h l y d i s t u r b i n g f o r 
the B r i t i s h . The B r i t i s h economy by 1 9*+5 w a s so run-down, 
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d i s j o i n t e d and exhausted t h a t i t was obvious t h a t a 'home-grown 
r e c o v e r y 1 was u n r e a l i s t i c . Some form o f f u r t h e r h e l p was 
necessary. 
I t was hoped t h a t Lend-Lease would a l l e v i a t e some o f the 
problems f a c i n g the U.K., b u t i t was f a i r l y c l e a r by 19*+5 t h a t i t 
c o u l d not be r e l i e d on as an o v e r a l l s o l u t i o n as some had 
o r i g i n a l l y hoped. I n h i s a u t o b i o g r a p h y , Roubins wrote t h a t the 
sharp c u t - o f f o f Lend-Lease i n August d i d not come as a s u r p r i s e 
to those f a m i l i a r w i t h tne s i t u a t i o n I n Washington. 
The f i r s t major cut-back i n Lend-Lease came w i t h the end o f 
the war i n Europe. A f t e r t h i s , p r e s s u r e t o reduce Leiid-Lease 
f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y from the U.S. s e r v i c e departments. 
A d m i r a l Leahy was a s t r o n g i n f l u e n c e on t h i s l i n e o f p r e s s u r e . 
He had r a p i d l y gained the con f i d e n c e o f the new P r e s i d e n t , sometimes 
to the annoyance o f o t h e r members o f the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . For 
example, on J u l y 2 , a t a meeting c h a i r e d by Fred V i n s o n , Leahy 
v e n t u r e d to advise the meeting t h a t no f u r t h e r Lend-Lease should 
be s u p p l i e d t o i u r ^ p e except f o r the p r o s e c u t i o n o f the war a g a i n s t 
Japan. Vinson was annoyed a t Leahy presuming to g i v e a d v i c e on 
such t o p i c s . S i m i l a r views were b e i n g expressed though by the 
F.E.A. and some members o f the T r e a s u r y Department. Truman 
h i m s e l f was e v e n t u a l l y convinced and on the eve o f h i s d e p a r t u r e 
f o r Potsdam on J u l y 5j i s s u e d the f o l l o w i n g o r d e r t o the C h i e f s o f 
S t a f f . 
" A pproval o f the i s s u e o f a l l i e d governments o f Lend-
Lease m u n i t i o n s o f war and m i l i t a r y and n a v a l equipment 
w i l l oe l i m i t e d t o t h a t which i s to be used i n the war 
a g a i n s t Japan, and i t w i l l n o t be used f o r any o t h e r purpose." 
(227) 
(227) Leahy, p.M*0, Op.Cit. 
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T h i s , Leahy r e c o r d s , was to prove one o f the most troublesome 
i s s u e s o f the m i l i t a r y s t a f f meetings a t Potsdam. But the U.S. 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s r e f u s e d to compromise the l i t e r a l meaning o f the 
o r d e r , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t t h e y knew the P r e s i d e n t was c o n s i d e r -
i n g m o d i f y i n g i t . They declaimed any a b i l i t y t o commit Lend-Lease 
f o r c i v i l i a n purposes. I n f a c t a s l i g h t amendment was soon made 
by Truman a f t e r s u g g e s t i o n s and d r a f t i n g s by Stimson, McCloy and 
C l a y t o n . On J u l y 23, Truman approved the use o f Lend-Lease by the 
o c c u p a t i o n f o r c e s i n Europe. 
At Potsdam the B r i t i s h on the whole were unable to make much 
pro g r e s s on the i s s u e o f economic a s s i s t a n c e . C h u r c h i l l had 
b r o u g h t Lend-Lease I I to Truman's n o t i c e as e a r l y as May 23 ,19^5) 
b u t had r e c e i v e d no s u b s t a n t i a l r e p l y . The Americans had r e a l i s e d 
t h a t Lend-Lease would oe an u n a v o i d a b l e t o p i c a t Potsdam so a 
number o f b r i e f s were prepared f o r the P r e s i d e n t . The S e c r e t a r y 
of S t a t e , Jimmy Byrnes, h i m s e l f , s u b m i t t e d an i m p o r t a n t memorandum 
on t h i s to Truman a t Babelsberg. I n accordance w i t h Byrnes' 
a d v i c e , Truman wrote to C h u r c h i l l . He s a i d t h a t Lend-Lease would 
be s u p p l i e d on the terms agreed d u r i n g the Autumn, i . e . b o t h 
m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n s u p p l i e s f o r the e f f e c t i v e p r o s e c u t i o n o f the 
war a g a i n s t Japan. The a c t u a l q u a n t i t i e s , as agreed, must be 
(229) 
s u b j e c t t o the changing s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n . 7 I n f a c t , 
n e i t h e r Truman nor h i s C h i e f s o f S t a f f were d e s i r o u s o f a major 
r o l e f o r the U.K. i n the Far i i i a s t , and t h i s o f course would mean 
a g r e a t r e d u c t i o n i n Lend-Lease s u p p l i e s . Truman, j u s t t o c a u t i o n 
the B r i t i s h , a l s o n o t e d i n h i s l e t t e r the i n c r e a s e i n the U.K. 
(228) See F.H. 19^5, V o l . I I , Potsdam Papers, p.1177> 'Lend-
Leasei Meed f o r Anglo-American F i n a n c i a l D i s c u s s i o n s ' , 
and an a t t a c h e d d r a f t r e p l y to P.M., See Truman to W.3.C. 
J u l y 17, 19^5, l'oid, p . n 8 l - 2 . 
(229) I b i d . 
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g o l d and d o l l a r r e s e r v e s . C h u r c n i l l r e p l i e d on J u l y 2 ^ t n , w i t h 
a t o u c h o f n i c e sarcasm. He was pleased to hear, he s a i d , t h a t 
t he Autumn agreement s t i l l s tood. S u p p l i e s o f armaments had been 
v i r t u a l l y choked o f f by the s t r i c t a p p l i c a t i o n o f the r e q u i r e m e n t 
t h a t Lend-Lease a r t i c l e s were t o be used i n the war a g a i n s t the 
Japanese. C h u r c h i l l asked Truman to take a p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t t o 
r e l i e v e B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n . He concluded w i t h a s u g g e s t i o n t h a t 
economic and f i n a n c i a l t a l k s should be under-taken i n Washington 
i n September. There f o l l o w e d a number o f f u r t h e r exchanges between 
Truman and C h u r c h i l l and l a t e r w i t h A t l e e , b u t d e s p i t e Truman's 
d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t he i n t e n d e d t o i n t e r p r e t the p r e s e n t agreement 
l i b e r a l l y and t h a t he Intend e d t o r e s t r u c t u r e t he Lend-Lease 
renewal a c t , b u r e a u c r a t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e c o n t i n u e d and the Lend-Lease 
supply l i n e s u f f e r e d consequently. t 2 3 0 ) T h e s u ( ^ ^ e n e n £ j t 0 t h e 
Japanese war made such n e g o t i a t i o n s f r u i t l e s s . The q u e s t i o n i n 
mid-August was, would the Americans g i v e any s h o r t - t e r m a s s i s t a n c e 
v i a c i v i l i a n Lend-Lease I n view o f the premature end t o the war 
and the r e l a t i v e l a c k o f advancement i n r e - c o n v e r t i n g the B r i t i s h 
economy back to a peace-time b a s i s ? The v i c t o r y d i d come as a 
s u r p r i s e to most Americans as w e l l as the B r i t i s h . For example, 
as l a t e as J u l y 19, the Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f s e t November 15, 
19^6, as V.-J. D a y . ( 2 ^ 1 ^ 
F o r t u n a t e l y f o r the 3 r l t i s h , C l a y t o n was i n London d u r i n g 
August, o f f i c i a l l y on U.N.K.R.A. b u s i n e s s , and u n o f f i c i a l l y t o 
o r g a n i s e the renewal o f Anglo-U.S. economic and f i n a n c i a l t a l k s . 
On August 17, Wlnant r e p o r t e d t o the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e on a 
meeting between B r i t i s h and American o f f i c i a l s headed by Keynes and 
(230) See Truman to W.3.C., J u l y 2 5,p . 1 l 8 3 , W.3.C. to Truman, 
J u l y 25) Truman to W.S.C. J u l y 29 , Truman's d i r e c t i v e t o 
J.C.S. J u l y 2 9 , A t l e e t o Truman, J u l y 3 1 , pp.1183-1187, 
I b i d . 
(231) See Winant t o 3.3.August 16, 19^5, F.R.19I+5, "VOL. V I I . p. 93 . 
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C l a y t o n r e s p e c t i v e l y . D e s p i t e d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n , i t was 
o b v i o u s to Winant t h a t the B r i t i s h wanted a q u i c k concordat on 
Lend-Lease f o l l o w e d by a f i n a n c i a l agreement which would n o t 
i n c l u d e major t r a d e concessions. T h i s was a l i n e t he U.S. r e s i s t e d 
s t r o n g l y . C l a y t o n was determined t h a t the t a l k s s h o u l d be 
comprehensive and p a r t o f a coherent whole. ^ 2-^2'> S t i l l t h i s i s 
to a n t i c i p a t e somewhat. The p o i n t was t h a t a e s p i t e the l a c k o f 
f r i c t i o n i n the e a r l y stages o f the d i s c u s s i o n s on tne t e r m i n a t i o n 
o f Lend-Lease t h i s was soon to be a l t e r e d by Truman's a b r u p t c u t -
o f f o f L e a d - L e a s e / 2 - ^ ) 
T h i s a b r u p t t e r m i n a t i o n caused g r e a t concern i n the U.K., 
b u t the main p o i n t seems to have been o v e r l o o k e d by many w r i t e r s . 
I t was not t h a t the B r i t i s h were unaware t h a t Lend-Lease would 
t e r m i n a t e w i t h the c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s t h a t caused the 
c o n s t e r n a t i o n . I t was the premature ending o f the h o s t i l i t i e s . 
B r i t a i n ' s r e c o n v e r s i o n programme had been p r o j e c t e d w e l l i n t o 
19^6) a i d e d by Lend-Lease, f o r t h a t was the time i t was expected 
to take t o f i n a l l y d e f e a t Japan, The sudden end to the war, and 
conseq u e n t l y Lend-Lease, l e f t her h i g h and d r y i n terms o f plans 
and p r o v i s i o n s f o r her economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . A second p o i n t 
on t h i s i s the argument by some t h a t Truman d i d not f u l l y r e a l i s e 
what he was d o i n g . T h i s i s u n a c c e p t a b l e . He had a l r e a d y gone 
t h r o u g h t h i s once b e f o r e i n May w i t h Russia. The evidence, even 
on t h a t o c c a s i o n , c l e a r l y suggests he knew what ne was d o i n g . 
(232) See Winant t o 3.S. I b i d , pp.9 9 - 1 0 1 . 
(233) See F.h. I b i d . White House Conference, August 17, Byrnes, 
Vinson, Crowley, Leahy, Snyder and Truman, d e c i s i o n to 
t e r m i n a t e Lend-Lease taken. Brown, C h i e f o f S t a t e Dept. 
D i v i s i o n on Commercial P o l i c y to Hawkins i n London, 
August 19 , 19^5 , P-1Q5) I b i d . , Byrnes to C l a y t o n , August 2 0 , 
r e f e r s to an amendment suggested by C l a y t o n t h a t c o u n t r i e s 
w i t h o u t 3c agreements, e.g. U.K., may o b t a i n goods f o r 
payment "on terras t o be m u t u a l l y agreed on." : Crowley 
c i r c u l a r t o U.S. d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s , August 20,19 L +5 ) on 
Lend-Lease, I b i d , pp . 1 0 7 - 8 . 
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The o n l y mistake was male by a d m i n i s t r a t o r s who t u r n e d back 
shipments f o r Russia i n mid-ocean. ^ 2 j , 10 S q a s ^ a r a s t t i e 
August 21 , announcement o f Lend-Lease t e r m i n a t i o n i s concerned, 
t h e r e can be L i t t l e doubt a f t e r the experiences o f A p r i l t h a t 
Truman was aware o f the l i k e l y consequences and r e a c t i o n s . ^ 3 5 ) 
i i a r r o d t r i e s to a p o l o g i s e f o r Truman's a c t i o n s by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t 
b o t h C l a y t o n and Acheson were absent f r o m Washington when the 
d e c i s i o n was made. Harrod r e f e r s t o C l a y t o n e x p r e s s i n g annoyance 
over the phone, b u t one suspects t h i s was more over the a b r u p t 
method o f t e r m i n a t i o n and the f a c t t h a t the U.S. E x e c u t i v e had 
o v e r l o o k e d the f a c t t h a t the U.K. had no 3C> agreement to a l l o w 
her t o r e c e i v e f u r t h e r d e l i v e r i e s t h an to the substance o f the 
d e c i s i o n i t s e l f . What Harroa does n o t p o i n t o u t , nor Gardner, 
was t h a t both Acheson's and C l a y t o n ' s s u p e r i o r s were a t the meeting 
which decided to t e r m i n a t e Lend-Lease, i . e . Byrnes and Vinson. 
I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s , p r essure had been b u i l d i n g up f o r some time 
to c u t down Lena-Lease, as we have a l r e a d y seen. Even Stimson, 
who was convinced the U.S. would have to h e l p r e h a b i l i t a t e t he 
U.K. economy, d i d not b e l i e v e Lend-Lease was the way t o do i t . ^ ^ ^ 
Other members o f the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h e l d s i m i l a r views though f o r 
d i f f e r e n t reasons. Even C l a y t o n , as we s h a l l see, on a number o f 
occasions i n s i s t e d t h a t American a s s i s t a n c e must be complemented 
(23^) For evidence o f Truman's awareness i n May see Grew Papers;-
Memo o f telephone c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Crowley May 11* and 
o t h e r r e f e r e n c e s g i v e n i n ' O r i g i n s o f the Cold War', 
B . J . B e r n s t e i n , i n "20th Century America, Recent I n t e r p r e t -
a t i o n s " , E d i t e d by B e r n s t e i n and Matusow, H a r c o u r t , Brace, 
J o v a n o v i c h , N.Y.1972, p.362 , f 0 0 t n o t e s . 
(235) N.B. Wheeler-Bennett, Op.Cit. p . 5 6 1 , confuses the May 11, 
t e r m i n a t i o n o f Lend-lease to Russia, who w i t h the s u r r e n d e r 
o f Germany ceased to be a c o - b e l l i g e r e n t , w i t h the August 
21, t e r m i n a t i o n which a f f e c t e d B r i t a i n most. 
(236) Stimson, Op.Cit. p .3^5) October 13, 19^S d i a r y e n t r y . 
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with, concessions from the B r i t i s h and o b v i o u s l y the c o n t i n u a t i o n 
o f Lend-Lease would make t h i s More d i f f i c u l t t o n e g o t i a t e . 
F i n a l l y we come to the t n l r d p o i n t , T h i s i s the idea t h a t 
the U.S. could not riave c o n t i n u e d Lend-Lease even i f i t had ueen 
i n her p o l i c y i n t e r e s t s t o do so. 
"The American Government made two major e x c e p t i o n s to 
the p o l i c y o f s h u t t i n g o f f Lend-Lease w i t h V-J day. 
The economy o f China was as c h a o t i c as was her p o l i t i c a l 
a L i d m i l i t a r y c o n d i t i o n . To expect repayment f o r any 
American a i d p r o v i d e d t o the Chinese Government was, 
under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , an a b s u r d i t y ; y e t not to h e l p 
Chiang Kai-shek would open the path t o the Communists i n 
the i f o r t h and would h i n u e r the disarmament and r e p a t r i a t i o n 
o f Japanese t r o o p s l o c a t e d i n China. Consequently, the 
American Government decided to co n t i n u e Lend-Lease a i d t o 
China, and i n f a c t the t o t a l v a l u e o f s u p p l i e s and s e r v i c e s 
p r o v i d e d t o the Chinese a f t e r V-J day was almost equal t o 
a l l Lend-Lease d e l i v e r i e s made d u r i n g the war. I t was not 
u n t i l 3 ° June 19^6 t h a t Lend-Lease t o China was stopped and 
a ' p i p e - l i n e 1 c r e d i t s u b s t i t u t e d t o f i n a n c e s t i l l f u r t h e r 
d e l i v e r i e s . " (237) 
So much f o r the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n t i n u i n g Lend-Lease. 
I n f a c t the Americans d i d not want to s e t t l e i n the c o n t e x t o f 
Lend-Lease. C h u r c h i l l was r i g h t when he complained i n P a r l i a m e n t 
over the s w i f t a x i n g o f Lend-Lease, t h i s was n o t as he was su r e , 
to be the l a s t word f r o m the Americans. Indeed i t was n o t , 
A new urgency was g i v e n to the t a l k s t h a t nad oeen proposed f o r 
September and i t i s to these n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t we must look t o 
see what the American p o l i c i e s and i n t e n t i o n s r e a l l y were. 
(237) 'Survey o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 1939-l*-o> America, B r i t a i n 
and Russia - T h e i r C o o p e r a t i o n and C o n f l i c t 19^1-^6", 
W.H.HcWeill, H.I.I.A. U.U.P. 1953, London, p.675. 
(23B) See Hansard, August 19^5* 
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CHAPTER 6 
'THE INTEREST AND THE SENTIMENT' 
" P o l i t i c i a n s n e i t h e r love nor hate. 
I n t e r e s t , not sentiment, governs 
them." 
Lord C h e s t e r f i e l d . 
The year 19M* witnessed developments that were r e c e i v e d with 
a mixture of anxiety and r e l i e f i n the U«K. B r i t a i n ' s lone stand 
between June 22 ^^h0 to June 22 19*M, was now bearing f r u i t i n the 
f i e l d of war against the A x i s . By the c l o s i n g months of 19^+, 
d e s p i t e Runstedt's tour de force i n the Ardennes, v i c t o r y now 
seemed assured. Memories of the d i s a s t e r s i n Singapore, Dunkirk 
and C r e t e ; the l o s s of naval p r e s t i g e with the s i n k i n g of 
'Repulse 1 and 'The P r i n c e of V a l e s 1 were beginning to fade i n the 
fa c e of more immediate successes i n the a i r and i n Western France. 
B r i t a i n 1 3 sovereignty had been maintained I n t a c t . At the same 
time the;:e was a c l e a r r e a l i s a t i o n that B r i t a i n ' s power v i a - a - v i s 
her two great a l l i e s , had diminished g r e a t l y during the war. i*'or 
the f i r s t time, i n 1 9 ^ , the U.S. had more men i n the f i e l d than 
the combined f o r c e s of the B r i t i s h Empire. Secondly, B r i t a i n was 
now a c u t e l y aware of her economic weakness and the problems she 
would have to overcome to regenerate p r o s p e r i t y and s t a b i l i t y . 
The unavoidable concommitant of B r i t a i n ' s success i n war 
was massive expenditure on arms and s u p p l i e s . The B r i t i s h 
d e s p e r a t e l y hoped that they would be able to solve t h e i r enormous 
economic problems with the f i n a n c i a l and commercial a s s i s t a n c e of 
the U.S., though t h i s hope was being placed i n an i n c r e a s i n g l y 
p r e c a r i o u s p o s i t i o n by the development of f r i c t i o n between the 
two c o u n t r i e s . I t would be a sad iron y Indeed i f success i n one 
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f i e l d of endeavour, that o f war, was to be accompanied by a 
f a i l i n g i n a no l e s s important sphere, that of economics. 
As we have already seen, there had been continuous d i f f e r e n c e s 
between the two c o u n t r i e s over the war-time commercial and 
monetary problems, as w e l l as over-planning f o r the post war period. 
I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s , there were other more s p e c i f i c problems, one 
of which has been considered b r i e f l y , the i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade of 
c e r e a l s . There were a number of other s p e c i f i c i s s u e s , which 
although too s p e c i f i c i n nature to be included i n d e t a i l i n a 
t h e s i s of t h i s nature, do r e q u i r e a mention. They r e f l e c t i n a 
s p e c i f i c and concrete way the d i f f e r e n c e s between the two 
c o u n t r i e s 1 economic and commercial p o l i c i e s , and are p a r t i c u l a r l y 
important to bear i n mind when the f i n a l phases of the post-war 
planning are considered. 
F i r s t of a l l , i t should be remembered that these d i f f e r e n c e s 
i n 19M* occurred against the backcloth of impasse i n the commercial 
t a l k s and divergent views on s t r a t e g y between the U.S. and the U.K. 
for the European w a r . ^ One of the most p e r s i s t e n t thorns i n 
Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s was B r i t a i n ' s c l o s e t i e s with Argentina 
and her dependence upon meat s u p p l i e s therefrom. The U.S. 
resented t h i s B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e i n L a t i n America, which they 
regarded as a preserve for American diplomacy and commercial and 
investment o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Indeed by the U.S. had taken 
over most of B r i t a i n ' s former trade with L a t i n America which had 
c o n s i s t e d of of t o t a l pre-war world exports to that area. 
An export market B r i t a i n was never to recover*, i n 19^8 i t only 
had 8j£ of the market. Despite t h i s usurpation of B r i t a i n ' s 
(1) See Bryant 'Triumph i n the West't and Lowensteln et a l , 
Op.Cit. Docs. 399, UOO, f o r the disagreements over ' A n v i l 1 
June-July 1 9 ^ . 
commercial r o l e i n Latin-America and U.K. r e l i a n c e on A r g e n t i n i a n 
beef, the U.S. continuously pressed B r i t a i n to adopt a more 
aggressive a t t i t u d e toward t h i s pro-Axis country. There was 
p o l i t i c a l sense i n t h i s , but at the same time, many people i n the 
U.K. b e l i e v e d that i t was not purely c o i n c i d e n t a l t h a t any break 
with Argentina would make the U.K. more dependent upon U.S. 
a g r i c u l t u r a l s u rpluses and open Argentina up for U.S. commercial 
penetration. 
I n e a r l y 19M* two things occurred i n r a p i d s u c c e s s i o n . 
On January 26 , Argentina f i n a l l y broke diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with 
the A x i s countries and i n February, Peron over-threw the 
government and General F a r r e l l was i n s t a l l e d as the 'puppet' 
P r e s i d e n t . C o r d e l l H u l l , i n p a r t i c u l a r , took a very dim view of 
Peron and the p o l i t i c a l climate i n Argentina. Intense pressures 
were exerted on B r i t a i n to provide a united f r o n t against the new 
regime. At f i r s t these were r e s i s t e d or compromises made by the 
B r i t i s h to t r y to safeguard the pending renewal of long term beef 
c o n t r a c t s . H u l l was determined to exert diplomatic pressure on 
Argentina v i a the U.K., thus i n order to weaken B r i t a i n ' s l i n k s 
with Argentina, and p a r t l y because of economic dogma, H u l l 
persuaded Roosevelt to express strong opposition to the renewal 
of long term meat c o n t r a c t s to C h u r c h i l l a t Quebec. I n the face 
of such strong pressure, the B r i t i s h became f e a r f u l of endangering 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of f u t u r e American f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e and on 
October 13, C h u r c h i l l ordered that no more long term c o n t r a c t s 
were to be concluded f o r the time being. 
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A second area of severe and p e r s i s t e n t c o n f l i c t concerned 
MlddLe E a s t o i l s u p p l i e s . T h i s was an area of pre-war domination 
by the U.K. During the war, however, the U.S. became increasingly-
concerned with the r a p i d d e p l e t i o n of her domestic r e s e r v e s . I n 
J u l y 19^3» Harold I c k e s was appointed head of The Petroleum 
Reserves Corporation, and he deployed h i s t a l e n t s to expand 
American i n t e r e s t and c o n t r o l of f o r e i g n o i l r e s e r v e s . At the 
Teheran Conference, General Hurley had s u c c e s s f u l l y engineered the 
'Three Power D e c l a r a t i o n on I r a n ] which he saw as a step toward 
(2) 
loosening B r i t a i n ' s monopoly r i g h t s over P e r s i a n O i l . ' Hurley 
was one of many Americans who resented B r i t a i n ' s Middle Bast 
i n f l u e n c e and t h i s p a r t l y accounts for the v i t r i o l i c r e a c t i o n of 
the U.S. i n the following year over Saudi Arabia. T h i s was one 
area where the U.S. d i d have major o i l concessions and they 
objected to what they perceived as the attempt by the B r i t i s h 
to b o l s t e r t h e i r p o l i t i c a l I n f l u e n c e i n that country. 
(3 ) See Engl e r , Op.Cit. See Kolko pp 29**-311. There were two 
u n s u c c e s s f u l attempts to reach agreement on o i l as an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l commodity, J u l y 25-August 3 , 19M*. F.R .19M*, 
3 , p.119 f f . - Jan. 19 , 19^-5 F.D.R. withdrew agreement. 
See a l s o A.J.P.Taylor, 'Beaverbrook pp.556-57- C o n f l i c t 
over M.E. O i l was to occur a f t e r the war as w e l l . 
For the Mossadegh, 1951, I r a n i a n C r i s i s , see Engler pp 2 0 2 - 7 . 
For another c r i s i s l e s s w e l l known and documented, see N.Y. 
Times, Dec.20,19^-9, Dec.21,19^9, D a i l y Telegraph, Dec.23,19^9, 
D a i l y Worker, Dec.23,19^9, F i n a n c i a l Times, Dec.2^,19^9, 
Manchester Guardian, Dec.29>19^9> News C h r o n i c l e , Jan . 7 i 1 9 5 0 , 
N.Y.Times, Feb.1 ,1950 and Feb. 2 , D a l l y Telegraph, Feb.6, 
1950, Scotsman, Feb.7,1950 , F i n a n c i a l Times, Feb.0 ,1950. 
Evening Standard, Feb.9,1950, N.Y,Times, Feb.13,1951. 
B a s i c a l l y B r i t a i n attempted to reduce her purchases of d o l l a r 
o i l by buying S t e r l i n g Area o i l and asking Commonwealth and 
Empire to do l i k e w i s e . Also U . S . o i l companies working i n U.K. 
would have t h e i r d o l l a r expenditures t i g h t l y c o n t r o l l e d . The 
American r e a c t i o n v a r i e d from Tom Connally's denouncement of 
i t as an a c t of economic war, and suggestions that Marshall 
Aid should be axed, to the 'Washington Post' simply c r i t i c i s i n g 
the U.K. f o r not consult i n g the U.S. before taking the a c t i o n . 
The problem was resolved i n 1951 by U.S. companies agreeing to 
reduce the d o l l a r content of t h e i r o i l from 75% to the B r i t i s h 
Companies' l e v e l of 30£ . 
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tfhe t h i r d area was that of c i v i l a v i a t i o n . During the war 
there had been an informal agreement that the U.K. would 
ooncentrate on the development of f i g h t e r planes and the U.S. on 
bombers. ' Obviously i n a f r e e f o r a l l post-war competition i n 
c i v i l a v i a t i o n , the U.S. was going to be i n a f a r b e t t e r p o s i t i o n 
than the U.K. i n terms of the technology requirements for l a r g e 
c i v i l a i r c r a f t . Despite t h i s , the U.S. s t i l l wished to g a i n 
landing r i g h t s and bases throughout the B r i t i s h Empire and g a i n 
access to the a v i a t i o n markets there. During l a t e 19M* and e a r l y 
19^5j extensive t a l k s were conducted between the U.S. and the U.K. 
Beaverbrook who a l s o negotiated with I c k e s on the o i l i s s u e , wa3 
now negotiating with A.A.Berle on the a v i a t i o n one. F o r t u n a t e l y 
fo r the U.K., Beaverbrook was most s k i l l e d i n these types of t a l k s 
and was l i t t l e disposed to giving any ground to I n c r e a s e the 
American advantage i n t h i s f i e l d . The B r i t i s h knew f u l l w e l l that 
the expansion of Juan Trlppe's Pan Am. i n the t h i r t i e s i n South 
America had not been achieved on grounds of normal competitive 
f r e e e n t e r p r i s e c r i t e r i a . Non-commercial, i . e . government backing, 
had been r e s p o n s i b l e , or at l e a s t aided Pan Am, to e s t a b l i s h i t s 
v i r t u a l monopoly of i n t e r - n a t i o n s e r v i c e s . Yet here, a few y e a r s 
l a t e r , B e r l e was demanding concessions from the B r i t i s h based on 
the argument of f r e e non-discriminatory non-subsidised competition. 
T h i s , i n i t s e l f , as a p r i n c i p l e , was not o b j e c t i o n a b l e , but i n 
i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i t would su r e l y contravene another Informal agree-
ment that n e i t h e r the U.S. nor the U.K. was to take commercial 
advantage of the other country's circumstances brought about by war 
(if) See W.8.C. to F.D.R., Nov.2 8 , 1 9 ^ . F.B. of U.S. Dip.Papers, 
1 9 ^ , V o l , I I , p.590. 
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T h i s i s e x a c t l y what the Americans seemed determined to do even 
by going to the lengths of s e c r e t l y negotiating with E i r e landing 
r i g h t s i n the E a s t e r n A t l a n t i c . w ' 
By l a t e 19M+, the p o s i t i o n on commercial t a l k s with the U.S. 
was being r e a s s e s s e d by the B r i t i s h . Already, e a r l i e r i n the year, 
Anderson had questioned some of the premises and Judgements on 
which the d e c i s i o n to abandon t a l k s with the U.S. had been taken. 
By the end of the year the main s t r a t e g i c c r i s i s of the war, as 
f a r as Anglo-American f o r c e s were concerned, was over. There 
were now l e s s s u b s t a n t i a l grounds on which to r e s i s t American 
pressures for renewal. Simultaneously i t appeared that a more 
sympathetic a t t i t u d e was d i s c e r n i b l e , c e r t a i n l y from some members 
of the S t a t e Department. The r e c u r r e n t problem dealing with the 
U.S. of a lack of consistency through the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s t i l l 
remained though, to complicate B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s and assessments. 
For example, i n the Summer/Autumn of 1 9 ^ j there were strong 
disagreements between Acheson and Morgenthau over whether the U.S. 
should pay a higher percentage of the European r e l i e f b i l l while 
s t i l l l e a v i ng the U.K. with the same amount of p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e 
i n the l i b e r a t e d c o u n t r i e s . Morgenthau opposed t h i s on the 
grounds that the U.S. was already i n e f f e c t footing most of 
B r i t a i n ' s r e l i e f expenditure v i a Lend-Lease. He was a l s o 
r e l u c t a n t to see B r i t a i n i n c r e a s e or even r e t a i n the amount of 
i n f l u e n c e she had exerted i n I t a l y , r e s u l t i n g i n what he considered 
to be an o b j e c t i o n a b l y r i g h t i s t and r e a c t i o n a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
(5) See Lowenstein, Ed. Op.Cit., Docs. h?B, 509, **68, W70, 507, 
516, Nov.19M+-March 19^5* a l s o A.J.P.Taylor 'Beaverbrook 1, 
PP 556-557. See a l s o Gardner, L.."C. Economic Aspects of 
New Deal Diplomacy, Beacon P r e s s , Boston 19^^, p.62. 
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While Morgenthau*s s t i n g i n e s s won out here, though obviously 
p o l i t i c a l l y motivated, he was to l o s e out a few months l a t e r i n 
January 19^5 with h i s proposal to o f f e r immediately the U.S.S.R, 
01GB i n post war c r e d i t s , a proposal that was quashed by the 
S t a t e Department. So, although there were encouraging signs from 
some members of the S t a t e Department, these were obviously 
q u a l i f i e d by the known d i s p o s i t i o n s of other members of the U.S. 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the d i f f e r e n c e s that e x i s t e d t h e r e i n . 
On December kt Hagowan reported to L l e s c h l n g on views 
expressed by Leo Pasvolsky i n a recent conversation. Pasvolsky 
had i n d i c a t e d that he thought i t had been a mistake to consider 
the establishment of a m u l t i l a t e r a l trade convention i n a r a t h e r 
i d e a l i s t i c f a s h i o n and that a f u r t h e r mistake had been not to 
place primary emphasis on agreement for the t r a n s i t i o n p r o v i s i o n s , 
which he now considered e s s e n t i a l . ^ T h i s was very p a l a t a b l e 
news for the B r i t i s h and welcomed as a p o s s i b l e opening. B r i t a i n 
h e r s e l f was desirous of a s o l u t i o n to the commercial problems and 
was a l s o being pressed by parts of the Empire, and Canada i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , f o r an economic modus v l v e n d l with the U.S. These 
were very important c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and a f t e r a l l things were 
not uniformly gloomy, the B r e t t o n Woods Conference had been 
concluded with, prima f a c i e , s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t s * Now, perhaps, 
was the time to r o l l the d i c e on complementary economic i s s u e s . 
Secondly, the B r i t i s h now believed they had proposals which would 
be more acceptable to the U.S. on a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y , which had 
been the cause of deadlock i n 19^3• I t was true that t h i s had 
acted as a f o c a l point f o r opposing the t a l k s f o r p r e f e r e n t i a l l s t s , 
(6) See Magowan to L i e s c h i n g , *f/l2/M*, UE79 / 79 /53 . 
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i m p e r i a l i s t s , s o c i a l i s t s and anti-Americans. Nevertheless, the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of s o l v i n g the a g r i c u l t u r a l deadlock led to some 
optimism and hopes f o r resuming the t a l k s on a s a t i s f a c t o r y b a s i s . 
Consequently, toward the end of a f t e r p r e l i m i n a r y moves i n 
the Summer, Harry Hawkins led a small band of negotiators to the 
American Embassy i n London to renew commercial t a l k s with the 
B r i t i s h on an informal l e v e l . 
The i n i t i a l impressions gained from Hawkins by the B r i t i s h 
(J) 
were hopeful and o p t i m i s t i c . ' ' Hawkins i n d i c a t e d that there 
were great pressures i n the U.S. for a s u c c e s s f u l commercial 
convention on a world or r e g i o n a l b a s i s . Even the bankers who 
had opposed the I.M.F. now saw such a convention as a means of 
making the I.M.F. workable. Hawkins f u r t h e r added that he wasi-
"... recommending the United S t a t e s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n to 
propose l e g i s l a t i o n to Congress i n February ... for 
powers to reduce the American t a r i f f , drawn on such a 
wide s c a l e and i n such general terms that under i t the 
Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n would i n f a c t be able to Implement any 
m u l t i l a t e r a l Convention of the kind which had been under 
d i s c u s s i o n . n (8 ) 
I n r e t r o s p e c t i t i s p o s s i b l e to see that statements such 
as t h i s were to r a i s e f a l s e hopes among the B r i t i s h . We s h a l l 
soon see the lack of enthusiasm for a c r o s s the board t a r i f f 
r e ductions among the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and s l i g h t l y l a t e r from the 
new P r e s i d e n t . I t i s conceivable that Hawkins d i d not f u l l y 
understand the s i t u a t i o n , i . e . the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the d i f f e r e n c e 
between a 50£ a c r o s s the board r e d u c t i o n and the 50% r e d u c t i o n 
which was l a t e r i n the year made p o s s i b l e under R.T.A.A. l e g i s l a t i o n . 
(7) The main negotiators i n these t a l k s were i ULS«— Hawkins, 
Penrose and Lloyd S t e e r e i U.K. Bobbins, Kady, L l e s c h i n g . 
(8 ) Conversation with Bobbins and Marcus Flemming, dated 
1,1.^-5, from convers a t i o n of preceding F r i d a y , 
U E 2 2 V 1 1 3 / 5 3 . 
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Keynes had expressed doubts about h i s commercial understanding 
during the abortive supplementary trade agreement t a l k s e a r l i e r 
i n the war; a l s o he was to change s t r a n g e l y to obdurate dogmatism 
l a t e r i n the year on commercial t a l k s . However, t h i s remains 
r a t h e r s p e c u l a t i v e , the main reason f o r the d i f f e r e n c e between 
B r i t i s h perceptions of American I n t e n t i o n s and what was e v e n t u a l l y 
to come about i n the Summer wa3 the r e a l i s a t i o n that America d i d 
not need to concede ! a n across the board r e d u c t i o n p o l i c y 1 to 
the U.K. i n order to gain the concessions she needed from B r i t a i n . 
The move toward t h i s p o s i t i o n which had al r e a d y begun i n the U.S. 
by January 19*+5» bad not been communicated to Hawkins, and t h i s 
accounts f o r the proposals he made. 
Even a t t h i s time, however, the B r i t i s h d i d evince some 
cau t i o n f o r they were not f u l l y sure o f Hawkins 1 a u t h o r i t y , nor 
of h i s knowledge of American p o l i c y . I t was not known, for 
example, i f Roosevelt was aware of the renewal of informal t a l k s . 
S t i l l , the B r i t i s h grappled with the v e r b a l o u t l i n e of the 
American d r a f t of an I.T.O, which Hawkins had given and r a i s e d 
some o b j e c t i o n s to i t on January 3» at the f i f t h meeting of the 
t a l k s . The B r i t i s h were apparently to reduce t a r i f f s and 
preferences, e v e n t u a l l y a b o l i s h i n g the l a t t e r , and a b o l i s h a l l 
but a few q u a n t i t a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n they were 
concerned over the u n c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s for the p r o t e c t i o n of 
i n f a n t i n d u s t r i e s which could have d i r e e f f e c t s on the emerging 
Empire i n d u s t r i e s . I n r e t u r n , the Americans were simply to 
commit themselves to lowering t a r i f f s and not to impose quotas. 
C e r t a i n escape c l a u s e s were a l s o o f f e r e d to the B r i t i s h as 
a m e l l o r a t i v e s . B r i t i s h r e a c t i o n to these proposals and t h e i r 
counter suggestions immediately caused some worry. On the 
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f o l l o w i n g day, Winant cabled the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e i n Washington 
that the B r i t i s h appeared to have moved away from t h e i r p o s i t i o n 
i n the Washington t a l k s and that t h i s wasi-
"... l i k e l y to create s e r i o u s o b s t a c l e s ..." (9 ) 
I n f a c t Washington was not much perturbed by t h i s , nor did they 
consider i t a s i g n i f i c a n t s h i f t from the Washington T a l k s . ^ 1 0 ^ 
Nevertheless, other problems were soon to a r i s e . 
On January 8 , at the 7th meeting, the B r i t i s h questioned the 
p r o p r i e t y of introducing a clause on exchange r e s t r i c t i o n s , an 
area which they thought had been f u l l y covered by Bretton Woods. 
Not only was the p r o p r i e t y i n question, but American motives. 
A r t i c l e X X ( i ) only provided for a f i v e year t r a n s i t i o n period 
during which exchange r e s t r i c t i o n s could be maintained, whereas 
A r t i c l e XIV ( 2 ) of B r e t t o n Woods was more f l e x i b l e and allowed 
r e s t r i c t i o n s to be maintained beyond t h i s time under c e r t a i n 
circumstances. The Americans were f u r t h e r p l a c i n g i n question the 
p o s s i b i l i t y , under X1X (2) of B r e t t o n Woods, of continuing s t e r l i n g 
arrangements to allow f u r t h e r accumulation of s t e r l i n g balances 
for Import purposes by A r t i c l e X X ( 2 ) . ^ ^ These f a c t o r s were 
not only d i s t u r b i n g i n themselves, but a l s o , i n the way that they 
r e f l e c t e d an o b j e c t i o n a b l e U.S.view on the t r a n s i t i o n period. 
These o b j e c t i o n s were i n turn d i s t u r b i n g to Hawkins who r e a l i s e d 
that the B r i t i s h s t i l l meant to u t i l i s e the s t e r l i n g arrangements 
to a i d t h e i r economic recovery i f I t was deemed necessary. 
A p o l i c y the Americans strongly wished to prevent, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the p o s s i b l e f u r t h e r growth of s t e r l i n g balances. B r i t a i n had 
(9) Winant to S.S. January ^ ,19^5? F.R.19^5, V o l . V I I , pp.1-3* 
(10) See S t a t e Dept. I n s t r u c t i o n Jan.1 9 t h , 1 9 ^ 5 , footnote 12, p.3, 
I b i d . 
(11) See Resume of 7 th meeting, Hawkins/Llesching T a l k s , 
January 8 ,19^5 , UE113-115 /113 /53-
3^9 
managed to r e t a i n sovereign c o n t r o l over these balances a t 
Bret t o n Woods, with American acquiescence and although she was 
prepared to have f u r t h e r t a l k s on monetary d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , they 
were not to be i n the context of the I.M.F. or the I . T . O , ^ 2 ^ 
The optimism of the preliminary overtures i n the t a l k s was already 
being undermined; but i t i s perhaps f a i r to say t h a t the 
dissonant chords were struck f i r s t by the U.S. Despite a c e r t a i n 
dubiety concerning the e f f i c i e n c y of communications between 
Hawkins' group and developments i n the U.S., the motivation 
behind some of the more ob j e c t i o n a b l e points i n the U.S. d r a f t 
I.T.O. may be traced to p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and s h i f t s i n 
Washington. United Kingdom r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n Washington were 
not kept informed of the developments i n the Hawkins-Liescning 
t a l k s and so i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to compare t h e i r views of 
commercial p o l i c i e s the U.S. might support, unbiased by the t a l k s 
i n London. F i r s t of a l l , one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t developments 
was the appointment of William L. Clayton, i n December 1 9 M t , as 
A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e i n charge of economic a f f a i r s . 
The President had promised a post-war target of 6 0 m i l l i o n j o b s ; 
I t was Clayton's job to f u r t h e r t h i s goal i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
economic sphere. 
( 1 2 ) See 8th meeting Jan . 1 1 t h , U E 2 7 8 / 1 1 3 / 5 3 . 
( 1 3 ) See Coulson to Ronald and H a l l - P a t c h , January 9 , 1 9 ^ 5 , 
UE155 /113/53* W.L.Clayton A s s i s . S . S . 19^l+-0ctober 1 9 ^ 7 -
P r e v i o u s l y i n F e d e r a l Loan Agency, Senior r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
at 'Hot Springs Conference 1. He held s i m i l a r views to 
H u l l , favoured vigorous l a i s s e z - f a i r e , and b e l i e v e d i n 
the need for U.S. to expand economically on i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
b a s i s , by p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s , i f necessary. See Speech 
on Econ. Requirements of the Peace, before House Ways and 
Means Cmte. A p r i l , 1 8 , 19^5- DOSB, A p r i l 12, 19^5 , PP 7 5 2 - 7 , 
and Se l e c t e d Papers of W i l l Clayton, Ed. F.J.Dobney, 
John Hopkins P r e s s , Baltimore and London, 1 9 7 1 , P*84, 
Secondly, despite the f a c t t h a t the State Department i n 
Washington now favoured a concentration on the t r a n s i t i o n a l 
problems and had moved away from t h e i r o l d l i n e of approach, 
they were also u r g i n g a renewal of the f u l l spectrum of A r t i c l e 
V I I t a l k s . This again was avoiding the s p e c i f i c s u b s t a n t i a l 
problems emerging i n London from the d r a f t I.T.O. Thus Eady 
could hold most encouraging t a l k s w i t h Harry Hopkins on the 
general nature o f economic problems and Acheson could, as he d i d 
on January 5 t h , specify two general c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n s i -
"How to solve the United Kingdom balance of payments 
problems, which the Americans regard as o f c r u c i a l 
importance, and (2) What could be done to ensure the 
kind o f a c t i o n during the t r a n s i t i o n period i n the 
sphere of commercial p o l i c y t h a t would lead us a l l i n 
the d i r e c t i o n o f our long run o b j e c t i v e s . " 0 5) 
This again was a l l q u i t e encouraging to the 3 r i t l s h . But 
then there had never been much d i f f e r e n c e i n the u l t i m a t e goals 
i n the post-war international-economic f i e l d . Both countries 
wanted the expansion of vrarld trade, f r e e r trade and s t a b l e 
exchange r a t e s . The d i f f e r e n c e s arose as to how to achieve t h i s . 
True enough, the Americans now seemed to admit of the necessity 
and the importance o f a t r a n s i t i o n a l period as indeed they had 
been forced to i n the B r e t t o n Vfoods Agreement. On the other hand, 
t h e i r ideas of the t r a n s i t i o n period i n i t s d e t a i l s v a r i e d from 
the B r i t i s h p o i n t o f view. As we have already seen above, the 
main controversy a r i s i n g i n London w i t h Hawkins was over-I.T.O. 
v. 
encroaching on the a u t h o r i t y o f the I.M.F. and i n f a c t attemptJjag 
to modify, i n America's favour, some of the t r a n s i t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s 
(1*0 See Coulson to Ronald and H a l l Patch, January 9, quoted 
i n f u l l above. 
(15) Washington to F.O., January 10,19^5, UE170/113/53-
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of the I.M.F. The optimism from the B r i t i s h i n Washington was 
l a r g e l y because of the g e n e r a l i t y of the t a l k s ; they were not 
shown the d e t a i l s of the d r a f t convention Hawkins had taken to 
London. Nevertheless, I n d i c a t o r s such as Clayton's views and 
Roosevelt's employment aims could perhaps have been seen as 
modifiers of any o p t i m i s t i c assessments. R.S.Hudson, f o r example, 
i n Washington a t t h i s time, had encouraging t a l k s with Pasvolsky 
and Clayton who evinced great sympathy for U.K. economic problems 
and appeared to regard the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the 19A3 document, 
which r e s u l t e d from the Law H i s s i o n , as l e s s I n t r a c t a b l e than 
had been Judged a t the time i n England, Nevertheless, Hudson 
concluded that as f a r as even the t r a n s i t i o n period i s concerned, 
"... i t i s not going to be easy to get them to swallow 
q u a n t i t a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n of imports ..." (16) 
which was r e a l l y the c r u c i a l i s s u e f o r the maintainance of B r i t i s h 
a g r i c u l t u r e i n any v i t a l form, whether i t was dressed up and 
expressed i n terms of balance of payments problems or not. S t i l l , 
l e t us now have a c l o s e r look at the Hawkins/Liesching t a l k s up 
to the conclusion of the f i r s t stage. 
I f one uses a mathematical analogy, then the two main p l u s s e s 
for the B r i t i s h were American proposals on t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n and 
the reception given to U.K. proposals on f o o d - s t u f f s . 
F i r s t of a l l t a r i f f s . L i o n e l Bobbins i n h i s r e p o r t on the 
Commercial T a l k s , dated January 29j 19^5, expressed the o p i n i o n 
that the Americans were genuinely t r y i n g to meet B r i t i s h 
(16) Notes by Hudson of a dinner at the 
Washington Embassy, dated January 
UE253 /113 /53 . 
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d i f f i c u l t i e s * For examplet-
"The present American proposal i n regard to t a r i f f s i s 
a 50 per cent cut a l l round. We n a t u r a l l y have maintained 
an a t t i t u d e of the g r e a t e s t r e s e r v e i n t h i s r e s p e c t , and 
indeed, have I n d i c a t e d that the view might be taken that 
the United S t a t e s , a t any r a t e , as a high t a r i f f country, 
could be expected to go f u r t h e r than t h i s . But i n f a c t 
of course, i f t h i s r e a l l y i s the i n t e n t i o n of the 
Adm i n i s t r a t i o n , i t i s something very s e n s a t i o n a l indeed." 
(17) 
For the B r i t i s h , the proposal expressed a q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r -
ent approach on the part of the Americans. Even on B r i t i s h I m p e r i a l 
Preference the Americans, as Robbins put i t , no longer regarded i t s 
a b o l i t i o n i n terms of the 'exorcism of ultimate e v i l 1 . T h e i r 
whole approach on t a r i f f s and preferences was much more acceptable. 
Secondly, f o o d s t u f f s . T h i s had been prima f a c i e , the 
stumbling block of the 19^3 t a l k s . Since then, the B r i t i s h had 
developed more s o p h i s t i c a t e d proposals on the food i s s u e , based 
(18) 
on a memorandum by Anderson l a t e r modified by the War Cabinet, 
on November 22^^\ with percentages and f i g u r e s l a t e r i n s e r t e d ^ 2 0 ^ 
though these were not d i s c l o s e d to the Americans i n the t a l k s . 
B r i t a i n had two primary concerns i n t h i s a r e a . The f i r s t was to 
pro t e c t her domestic a g r a r i a n i n d u s t r y a g a i n s t competition from 
low cost producers or subsidised a g r i c u l t u r a l imports. Secondly, 
she wanted to be assured, as the main world importer of f o o d s t u f f s , 
of r e l i a b l e sources and cheap produce. So measures had to be 
devised to prevent the d e b i l i t a t i o n of B r i t i s h A g r i c u l t u r e by 
f o r e i g n competition and means of r e g u l a t i n g the supply and 
s t a b i l i s i n g p r i c e s of overseas products imported into the U.K. 
(17) Robbins Report on Commercial T a l k s , January 2 9 , 19l+5» 





S u b s i d i e s and t a r i f f s were Judged inadequate to t h i s task. The 
general l i n e s of the B r i t i s h proposals weret 
(1) No p r o t e c t i o n which r a i s e s domestic p r i c e s to J$ above 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l p r i c e , judged on a moving average over a 
number of y e a r s . 
( 2 ) I f a country's production of c e r t a i n f o o d s t u f f s exceeded y% 
c a l c u l a t e d as a moving average over a number of years then 
steps should be taken to reduce p r o t e c t i o n or f i n a n c i a l 
( i . e . sub.) a s s i s t a n c e . 
(3) F i n a n c i a l s u b s i d i e s on s p e c i f i c products, e.g. eggs, milk, 
not for drainage or lime. 
Exceptions under ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) would be allowed on n u t r i t i o n a l 
grounds, a g r i c u l t u r a l d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n and for balance of payment 
reasons. The p r i n c i p l e of n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n would be accepted 
( 2 V 
s u b j e c t to the amount of I m p e r i a l Preference allowed under I.T.Q. 
Hawkins and Lloyd Steere, (the a g r i c u l t u r e attache at the 
U.S.Embassy i n London) reacted to these proposals i n a subdued 
manner. They i n d i c a t e d a number of problems with the proposals 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the a b s t r a c t i o n s x' and y' f o r concrete p r o t e c t i o n 
f i g u r e s and the d i f f i c u l t y t h i s would in v o l v e for the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
i n making a c l e a r judgement on the proposals. S t i l l , on the whole, 
as Bobbins commented 1-
t h e i r r e c e p t i o n of the general Idea was much more 
favourable than any of us had ventured to hope." ( 2 2 ) 
So, the Americans on two key i s s u e s now seemed more amenable 
to B r i t i s h needs and proposals and t h e i r general approach appeared 
more sympathetic. However, even at t h i s stage there were a 
considerable number of s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s between the two. 
(21) See WP(^5)97, Feb.2^,19^5, U.S.Draft Commercial Convention 
and comments by Chancellor of Exchequer U E 9 3 5 / 1 1 3 / 5 3 > 
PP 15-17. 
( 2 2 ) Robbins report on Commercial T a l k s , Jan. 2 9 , 19^5, U E / 1 9 6 / 1 1 3 / 
53-
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The American proposals on preferences, d e s p i t e t h e i r 
apparently changed a t t i t u d e s , were s t i l l most unpalatable to the 
B r i t i s h . The Americans suggested 
(1) where preference f r e e entry e x i s t e d margins should be halved, 
(2) where the preference margin exceeds h a l f the general duty a 
c e r t a i n part of i t would remain, 
(3) where preference margin i s h a l f or l e s s than h a l f , the 
general duty, the preference should be abolished, 
(*0 preferences immune i f no t a r i f f a l t e r a t i o n because of 
100 f l o o r . 
(5) a l l r e s i d u a l preferences to be reduced to a negotiated l e v e l , 
(6) where 1939 aggregate import l e v e l s from c o u n t r i e s enjoying 
preferences was l e s s than 5% of t o t a l imports of that 
product - preferences were to be abolished. 
The B r i t i s h considered (5) and (6) to be unacceptable and 
incommensurate with American o f f e r s on t a r i f f s . As for 1 - ^ 
they r e a l i s e d that reductions of preferences would have to be 
made somewhat on these l i n e s i f any progress was to be made with 
the U.S. but they considered the extant proposals went too f a r . 
For example, i f there was to be a 100 ad valorem f l o o r for t a r i f f s 
why not a 50 f l o o r f o r preference margins? 
Another point c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the t a r i f f preference I s s u e s 
was the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a clause that looked remarkably l i k e an 
escape clause f o r the U.S. on the t a r i f f question. S p e c i a l quota 
r e s t r i c t i o n s were to be allowed to operate i f t a r i f f reductions 
caused increased exports of a c e r t a i n good such that i t was 
de s t r o y i n g the domestic i n d u s t r i a l production of that good. T h i s 
was to be a u n i l a t e r a l l y decided i s s u e for f i v e y e a r s and then 
a p p l i c a b l e a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n with the cou n t r i e s involved and 
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approval of the I.T.O, T h i s r e a l l y b o i l e d the p o s i t i o n down to 
the c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n i -
"Does the United S t a t e s want more imports? 1 1 (23) 
There were a l s o d i f f e r e n c e s over three other p r a c t i c a l trade 
i s s u e s . The American ideas on s t a t e trading seemed to d i s c r i m i n a t e 
a g a i n s t B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n as a mixed economy as opposed to R u s s i a . 
The Americans were beginning to apply pressure on B r i t a i n to 
dispense with long term bulk purchases which were o f t e n of v i t a l 
importance to the U.K., for example, the Argentine beaf c o n t r a c t s . 
And t h i r d l y , America's p o s i t i o n on export s u b s i d i e s seemed somewhat 
ambivalent for although they c a l l e d for t h e i r a b o l i t i o n , they i n 
f a c t e x e r c i s e d such p r a c t i c e s themselves notably f o r cotton. 
The U.S.'s d e f i n i t i o n of a Customs 1 Union, with the necessary 
c o n d i t i o n that the two countries should have a common t a r i f f 
f r o n t i e r , was yet another p e c u l i a r i t y which would cause the U.K. 
d i f f i c u l t i e s with members of the commonwealth and Empire. 
To compound the problems of B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s with the Common-
wealth and Empire f u r t h e r , the U.S. had proposed something again 
most unusual. I t was not l e f t to sovereign a u t h o r i t y to decide 
whether to extend the b e n e f i t s of the commercial convention to 
non-members or not. Members were e x p l i c i t l y p r o h i b i t e d from 
doing so. Again, a p r o v i s i o n which could cause the U.K. acute 
embarrassment and economic inconvenience i n terms of the Empire. 
F i n a l l y , we come to one of the most contentious i s s u e s , the 
encroachment by the I.T.O. upon the a u t h o r i t a t i v e area of the 
I.M.F. The Americans, as noted above, were proposing to modify 
the I.M.F. arrangements and take a c t i o n over B r i t a l n * s accumulated 
(23) WP(^5)97, quoted i n f u l l above, UE935/I13/53. 
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s t e r l i n g balances. The Americans now wanted to 
( 1) R e s t r i c t the period of exchange c o n t r o l s to an unconditional 
maximum of 5 y e a r s . 
(2) They wanted to give the I.T.O. a u t h o r i t y over the problem of 
blocked balances. 
(3) I f exchange c o n t r o l s were to be used i n the t r a n s i t i o n period 
they were now to be non-discriminatory. 
I n view of the enormity of the balances, the B r i t i s h considered 
that they would have to be gradu a l l y l i q u i d a t e d , and probably i n 
such a f a s h i o n as not to create c o n v e r t i b l e currency. There was 
a l s o the problem of B r i t a i n ' s import p o s i t i o n a t the war's end 
which would be most d e l i c a t e . I t might be necessary to import 
from S t e r l i n g Area c o u n t r i e s on a s i m i l a r b a s i s as during the war; 
i . e . continuing to accumulate s t e r l i n g balances. 
" I n these circumstances we could not p o s s i b l y observe 
any r i g i d r u l e of non-discrimination as regards the 
l i q u i d a t i o n of the s o - c a l l e d "blocked s t e r l i n g balances", 
nor a requirement that we must not i n f u t u r e b u i l d up 
any f r e s h blocked balances. These consequences flowed 
i n e v i t a b l y from the f a c t s of our p o s i t i o n , which was not 
p a r a l l e l e d by that of any other country." (2*0 
The problems of commercial p o l i c y were thus f a r from r e s o l v e d . 
The advances made on t a r i f f r eductions and a g r i c u l t u r a l f o o d s t u f f s 
was encouraging as was Hawkins' a f f a b i l i t y and expressed 
optimism. But the s u b s t a n t i a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s was s t i l l 
b a s i c a l l y there, and witnessed to perhaps most a c u t e l y i n the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of the exchange c o n t r o l proposals. Indeed, as we 
s h a l l see, they were to be a s i n i s t e r f o r e t a s t e of American p o l i c y 
ploys to come. 
I n l a t e January p o s i t i v e danger s i g n a l s began to come from 
Washington. Hudson reported a hardening of the views of Clayton 
and Pasvolsky a t a luncheon on the 26 th . I n f a c t the two Americans 
(2W) I b i d 
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r u l e d out of court post-war q u a n t i t a t i v e p r o t e c t i o n of B r i t i s h 
(25) 
a g r i c u l t u r e . On the 2 9 t h , H a l i f a x contributed a warning by 
Informing the F.G. that opinion i n the S t a t e Department was no 
longer uniformly, or s o l i d l y i n favour of the d r a f t m u l t i l a t e r a l 
convention. I n f a c t he was worried that Hawkins might be out of 
l i n e with the p r e v a i l i n g views i n Washington, which had changed 
considerably s i n c e Hawkins had l e f t for London. in. f a c t , by 
February, s e r i o u s doubts were a r i s i n g among B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r s * 
I t was now c l e a r t h a t the U.S. wished to resume f u l l - s c a l e 
A r t i c l e V I I t a l k s . T h i s caution was r e f l e c t e d i n a l e t t e r to 
C h u r c h i l l immediately before the Y a l t a meeting, from A t l e e and 
Anderson. A t l e e i n p a r t i c u l a r was concerned with the news of 
recent trends and suggested that a delay should be engineered to 
allow S i r H. Hopkins, newly appointed to the Washington Embassy 
Mission, to report on Washington's r e a c t i o n s to the Hawkins-
(27) 
L i e s c h i n g t a l k s . ' Only two days l a t e r a t Y a l t a , S t e t t i n i u s 
reminded F.D.K. of the pause i n A r t i c l e V I I t a l k s and Roosevelt 
then formally wrote to W.S.C. suggesting that B r i t a i n should 
appoint a new high l e v e l committee to resume the t a l k s , with a 
m i n i s t e r i n charge. C h u r c h i l l was i n somewhat of a quandary and 
pondered the problem f o r a number of days. I n the end he accepted 
the advice of h i s m i n i s t e r s and p r e v a r i c a t e d ; the resumption 
( ? 8 ) 
was to be f u r t h e r delayed. T h i s response by C h u r c h i l l was 
r e c e i v e d very i l l i n Washington. S h o r t l y a f t e r the o f f i c i a l view 
was expressed i n the D.O.3.B., which warned that i f the B r i t i s h 
(25) See Memo on the luncheon, Jan.26 th ,19^5 . UE 859 /113 /53 . 
(26) H a l i f a x to F.O. Jan. 31, 19^5, 517/113/53-
(27) See Deputy P.M. and Chancellor of Exchequer to P.M. Feb.2 , 
19^5, UE 656 /113 /53-
(28) See Kolko, Op.Clt. p.*+88 and P.M. to Deputy P.M. and 
S ^ C ^ V n Exchequer,Feb.11 . 19^5 , UE656 /113/53, and w.b.o. to F.D.R. Feb.13, 19W5, U E 8 6 O / I I 3 / 5 3 . ' 
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i n s i s t e d on ma in t a in ing b i l a t e r a l c o n t r o l s t -
"This i s a game t h a t two can p l a y , and the n a t u r a l 
r e a c t i o n o f many i s t ha t the American answer to such a 
t h r e a t should be higher t a r i f f s against B r i t i s h goods 
and perhaps some exc lus ive t r a d i n g arrangements o f our 
own." (29) 
I n February, Hawkins re tu rned to the U.S. and a l though he 
re tu rned to London i n March, was soon r e c a l l e d once aga in so t h a t 
t a l k s were o n l y resumed on h i s second r e t u r n i n A p r i l . Hawkins 
then t o l d the B r i t i s h t ha t both S t e t t i n i u s and C lay ton favoured 
a m u l t i l a t e r a l commercial p o l i c y agreement and wanted an e a r l y 
conference. This was good news Indeed i f the Americans were 
going to proceed on the bases o f the p r e l i m i n a r y Hawkins-Llesching 
t a l k s . The i n f o r m a l t a l k s were renewed on A p r i l 18, though now 
there were new quest ions hanging over the d i scuss ions , f o r on the 
12th, F.D.R. had d ied to be succeeded by the l a r g e l y unknown 
q u a n t i t y o f U.S.Truman. The t a l k s once again were slowed down 
and l i t t l e e f f e c t u a l progress was made du r ing the f o l l o w i n g weeks. 
On the o the r s ide o f the A t l a n t i c , however, hear ings were 
beginning on the proposals to extend the R . T . A . A . , and I n f a c t 
l i b e r a l i s e i t s p rov i s ions to a l l ow 50# cuts on e x i s t i n g t a r i f f s 
w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g l e g i s l a t i v e s t r u c t u r e . A t f i r s t s i g h t 
t h i s appeared favourab le to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , bu t i n f a c t the 
b i l l was to prove to be one o f the t u r n i n g po in t s i n B r i t a i n 1 s 
n e g o t i a t i n g f o r t u n e s w i t h the U.S. F i r s t o f a l l , the A d m i n i s t r -
a t i o n gave an assurance to Congress t h a t i n a l l f u t u r e t rade 
agreements an escape clause would be i n s i s t e d upon to p r o t e c t 
domestic producers, a proposal t h a t had already caused the B r i t i s h 
(29) D.O.S.B. X I I , 19^5, Quoted i n Kolko , Op .C i t . pA88 . 
(30) Memo, Hawkins-Liesching t a l k s , A p r i l 7, 19^5, 1565/113/53-
(31) The Doughton B i l l . 
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cons te rna t ion when in t roduced i n t o the Hawkins-Llesching t a l k s . 
Secondly, and most damning, was the adopt ion o f the f o l l o w i n g l i n e 
here expressed by S t e t t i n i u s , tha t the new act w o u l d i -
" . . . work no fundamental change i n the p r i n c i p l e o f the 
e x i s t i n g law, nor w i l l i t change i n any way the admin-
i s t r a t i o n o f the law as i t was es tab l i shed by the Congress 
i n I t was the i n t e n t i o n o f the Congress i n the 
o r i g i n a l law t h a t t rade agreements should be employed to 
expand our f o r e i g n trade by a process o f hard-headed and 
b u s i n e s s - l i k e b a r g a i n i n g . The Act has been adminis te red 
i n s t r i c t accord w i t h t h i s purpose, and i t w i l l cont inue 
to be adminis tered i n tha t way." (33) 
Indeed, Truman h i m s e l f , i n support o f the Doughton B i l l , 
s t a ted tha t t h i s would be America ' s p o l i c y i n the f u t u r e . 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to assess Just how f a r Truman's i n f l u e n c e a f f e c t e d 
U.S.stance on t h i s i s sue . Charles L . Mee, i n h i s book on the 
Potsdam Conference i n d i c a t e s t h a t Truman was wary and somewhat 
d i s t a n t w i t h the Sta te Department p r o f e s s i o n a l s , so i t i s 
somewhat unclear Just how close an a p p r e c i a t i o n he had o f the 
i s sue . He was c e r t a i n l y never over-sympathet ic to B r i t a i n ' s 
f i n a n c i a l quandary J y / and evidence f rom the Potsdam Conference 
i n d i c a t e s h i s u n w i l l i n g n e s s to embark on novel l i n e s o f a c t i o n 
(32) See U.S.Congress, Cmte. on Ways and Means, Fore ign Trade 
Agreements, Report to accompany H.R. 32^2, House Repor t , 
5 9 S 79th Cong; 1st Sess. 19^5» P-9. 
(33) U.S.Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 19^5? 
Extension o f the Rec ip roca l Trade Agreements A c t , Hearings 
on H.R. 2652, superceded by H.R.32^0, 79th Congress; 
1st Sess. (Apr i l -May 19^5), p .10. 
(3*0 For s u b s t a n t i a t i n g quote see below. 
(35) See Mee pp.112-113, Charles L . Mee, 'Meeting at Potsdam', 
Andre Deutsch, London, 1975. 
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be fo re the end o f h o s t i l i t i e s w i t h Japan, when th ings would be 
c lea re r and the U.S. p o s i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y as the possessor o f 
the Atomic Bomb, would also be c lear f o r a l l to see. I n Truman's 
b r i e f i n g book a t Potsdam, was e n t e r e d i -
" I t seems c lea r tha t i t would be des i r ab l e to avoid the 
convocat ion o f a f u l l - f l e d g e d peace conference to dea l 
w i t h the major p o l i t i c a l problems tha t have a r i s e n as a 
r e s u l t o f the t e r m i n a t i o n o f the war i n Europe." (36) 
However, as we s h a l l see, the d e c i s i o n not to embark upon 
f across the board t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s 1 emanated more f rom the S ta te 
Department than f rom Truman, though he undoubtedly gave h i s f u l l 
support to t h i s . R.N.Gardner on t h i s , w r i t e s t ha t i t was i n the 
Winter o f I9M+-W5 t h a t the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e j e c t e d the idea o f an 
across the board t a r i f f - r e d u c t i o n p o l i c y because Congressional 
soundings i n s t i g a t e d as a r e s u l t o f the Hawkins-Lleschlng t a l k s 
brought unfavourable r eac t ions to such proposals . J ' A l though , 
he does not s p e c i f i c a l l y s ta te tha t the B r i t i s h were informed o f 
t h i s a t t ha t t ime the n a r r a t i v e c e r t a i n l y Impl ies i t . I n f a c t , 
on A p r i l 28, C lay ton wrote to Hawkins t e l l i n g him tha t the 
execut ive p o l i c y was to be i n l i n e w i t h the Doughton B i l l . There 
were no p rov i s ions f o r across- the-board r educ t i ons , and even I f 
there were t -
" . . . there are ser ious o b j e c t i o n s and d i f f i c u l t i e s o f a 
t e c h n i c a l and p o l i c y nature to such a p o l i c y . " (38) 
I t should be noted here t h a t C lay ton makes no s p e c i f i c re fe rences 
to Congressional o b j e c t i o n s which were the reasons l a t e r g iven to 
the B r i t i s h f o r dropping t h i s l i n e o f approach. And y e t , desp i t e 
the above memorandum, i t would appear tha t i t was not u n t i l 
(36) Mee, O p . C l t . p .21. 
(37) See Gardner, O p . C i t . p.151. 
(38) C lay ton to Hawkins, Memo, A p r i l 28, 19^5, F.R.19^5, 
V o l . v i l , p.*f5. 
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another three months had passed t h a t the B r i t i s h were t o l d 
c a t e g o r i c a l l y t ha t t h i s l i n e o f approach would have to be 
abandoned. 
"Mr. C lay ton on h i s a r r i v a l made i t q u i t e c l ea r t h a t 
the pledges which were g iven by Pres ident Truman d u r i n g 
the debate on the Doughtoa B i l l commit the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
to s e l e c t i v e t a r i f f r educ t ions by b i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s 
a f t e r the p a t t e r n o f the pre-war procedures." (39) 
This was a severe setback f o r B r i t i s h hopes. The Americans 
were w e l l aware o f t h i s , but d i sc la imed d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
by i n s i s t i n g tha t a l though across the board t a r i f f r educ t ions 
were p r e f e r a b l e , they would not be acceptable to Congress. 
Gardner accepts t h i s apologia l a r g e l y on i t s face va lue , and 
i n d i c a t e s the problems the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n experienced w i t h 
Congress i n implementing the Do ugh t o n B i l l . He goes on to l ay 
the blame f o r the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t a r i f f p o l i c y not on American 
conservatism but on C lay ton ' s o v e r - o p t i m i s t i c view o f B r i t a i n ' s 
r e a c t i o n to the 50# s e l e c t i v e r e d u c t i o n clause i n the Doughton 
B i l l . However, one cannot help bu t f e e l tha t C l a y t o n ' s 
opt imism concerning f u t u r e B r i t i s h ac t ions was not so much 
determined by cons idera t ions o f the Doughton B i l l and i t s e f f e c t , 
but r a the r by the knowledge o f o the r types o f pressures the U.S. 
could exer t on the B r i t i s h to b r i n g them i n t o l i n e w i t h U.S. 
p o l i c y . As f o r C l a y t o n ' s defence o f the Doughton B i l l i n Congress 
was concerned, he was so i nep t a t t imes tha t one wonders whether 
I t was not c o n t r i v e d so t h a t the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n could po in t to 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f the b i l l ' s passage as evidence tha t a b i l l 
i n c o r p o r a t i n g 'an across the board r e d u c t i o n c lause 1 would stand 
no chance o f acceptance. 
(39) See CP(*+5)116, p . 3 . Memo by Pres .B .o f T, R .S .Cr ipps , A r t . V I I 
o f the Mutual A i d Agreementi Commercial P o l i c y , August 16, 
19V?, UE 3692/113/53. N.B. C lay ton a r r i v e d i n London 
o f f i c i a l l y f o r UNRRA t a l k s but u n o f f i c i a l l y , a lso to get 
A r t . V I I t a l k s o f f the ground. 
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I n House H e a r i n g s i -
"Mr. Knudsoni 'My a t t e n t i o n has been c a l l e d to a 
statement by Mr. C h u r c h i l l t h a t they would no more 
change I m p e r i a l Preference than we would a b o l i s h 
the t a r i f f . How about t h a t ? 1 . " 
This was indeed a p e r t i n e n t ques t ion and r e a l l y r e q u i r e d a 
lengthy e labora te e x p l a n a t i o n i n r e p l y and an e l u c i d a t i o n o f 
some o f the problems Invo lved and o f what progress had been 
made toward t h e i r s o l u t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n regard to general 
commitments a l ready gained f rom B r i t a i n . However, a l l C lay ton 
mustered i n r e p l y was i -
"Mr. C lay ton i ' W e l l , wise men o f t e n change t h e i r m i n d 1 . " 
This was ha rd ly a competent way to prepare the ground f o r an 
even more l i b e r a l approach than the Doughton B i l l , so much so 
t h a t one i s led to suspect the Americans d i d not f avour such a 
move. 
From the London end a great dea l o f disappointment was 
experienced. Penrose was l a t e r to g ive a more jaundiced view 
o f the d e c i s i o n to s t i c k w i t h the H . T . A . A . procedures. He 
does not d i r e c t l y ques t ion the motives i n v o l v e d , bu t he c e r t a i n l y 
casts h i s doubts on them. 
"They ( the under - sec re ta r i e s o f the S ta te Department) 
d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t Congress would be induced to go 
beyond the l i m i t s set by the Rec ip roca l Trade Agreements 
A c t . I n r e t r o s p e c t the v a l i d i t y o f t h e i r judgements on 
t h i s matter i s d o u b t f u l , and I n any casa i t seemed to 
3ome o f us a t the time tha t the at tempt ought to have been 
made even i f I t f a i l e d . " ( M ) 
I n f a c t i t i s f a i r l y c lear t ha t American motives were not 
what they were argued to be. O r i g i n a l l y f rom 19^2 there had 
been a l i n k between t a r i f f s and preferences and t h e i r mutua l ly 
(VO) U.S. Cong. Extension o f the R . T . A . A . , House Hear ings , 
P.37, 19*5. 
(Wl) Penrose, O p . C i t . p .107. 
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advantageous r e d u c t i o n and e l i m i n a t i o n . One was the q u i d , the 
o ther the quo. But by the Sumner o f 19^5 the B r i t i s h had made 
i t c l ea r t ha t a s t r a i g h t dea l on t h i s basis would r e q u i r e 
s u b s t a n t i a l across the board t a r i f f r educ t ions f o r the d i s m a n t l i n g 
o f the p r e f e r e n t i a l empire system. This would cause ser ious 
disadvantages f o r the Americans, as opposed to the R . T . A . A . 
system. Onder R . T . A . A . the U.S. could b r i n g a l l s o r t s o f 
pressures to bear i n b i l a t e r a l t rade n e g o t i a t i o n s to ensure a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y outcome. These powers would be d r a s t i c a l l y reduced 
by the a l t e r n a t i v e procedure. Thus i t was i n U.S. i n t e r e s t s to 
ma in t a in the R . T . A . A . i f pos s ib l e . They could s t i l l i n s i s t 
w i t h the Doughton B i l l t ha t they were f o l l o w i n g a t rade l i b e r a l -
i s a t i o n p o l i c y . I t would be doubly advantageous i f they could 
do t h i s and s t i l l have i m p e r i a l preference d i sman t l ed ; and by 
June 19*+5 Clayton had discovered a way to do j u s t t h a t : -
B r i t a i n ' s f i n a n c i a l needs. 
" I t would be q u i t e unwise, however, to consider making 
B r i t a i n an o u t r i g h t g i f t o f the r equ i red severa l 
b i l l i o n d o l l a r s , as has been r e c e n t l y suggested by 
c e r t a i n c r i t i c s o f B r e t t o n Woods. I t would be unwise 
even to supply the funds as a c r e d i t w i t h o u t l a y i n g 
down cond i t ions t h a t would in su re ( s i c . ) a sound 
advance towards our post-war o b j e c t i v e s . " (W2) 
This was e v e n t u a l l y the t a c t i c t h a t was adopted by the 
Americans* B r i t a i n ' s f i n a n c i a l problem was such t h a t i t was 
obvious she would r e q u i r e f u r t h e r d o l l a r support f r om the D.S. 
i f American ambi t ions f o r the post-war i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic 
system was not to be undermined by B r i t i s h n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
Th i s being so, then i t was much more p r e f e r a b l e to e x t r a c t 
concessions f rom the B r i t i s h f o r the d i s c r e t e amount o f d o l l a r 
(4-2) Clayton to Vinson, June 25, 19^5, PP 1^7-8, 
C lay ton , O p . C i t . 
c r e d i t , which would be necessary anyway i f the U.S . s . v i s i o n 
o f the f u t u r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy was to be r e a l i s e d , than 
to r a d i c a l l y a l t e r the U . S . t a r i f f system, which would cause 
some t r o u b l e i n Congress, and would i n e f f e c t be a v o l u n t a r y , 
u n i l a t e r a l abandonment o f an economic p o s i t i o n t h a t was 
perceived to be i n the U^S. i n t e r e s t s to m a i n t a i n . 
I n a d d i t i o n to the change o f p o l i c y on t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s , 
the Americans supplemented t h i s w i t h o ther new proposa ls , 
something which suggests tha t the change on the t a r i f f issue was 
more than simply a response to judgements o f i t s a c c e p t a b i l i t y 
to Congress, and thus more o f a coherent and s t r u c t u r e d s h i f t to 
e x t r a c t concessions f rom the B r i t i s h to b r i n g them more i n l i n e 
w i t h unadul tera ted U.S. v iews. 
The Americans proposed the procedure whereby a 'nucleus* 
o f t r a d i n g nat ions would meet to ca r ry out a whole ser ies o f 
b i l a t e r a l agreements s imul taneous ly . Thei r proposals concerning 
exchange r e s t r i c t i o n s r eve r t ed back to being more i n l i n e w i t h 
B r e t t o n Woods, but there were f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s over expor t 
subsidies and a g r i c u l t u r e , where the B r i t i s h view was r e j e c t e d 
i n favour o f t a r i f f s , i n t e r n a l subs id i e s , quota r e s t r i c t i o n s 
and s t a t e t r a d i n g on the basis o f 'commercial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 1 . 
C r l p p s 1 comment on t h i s was i -
" I f the Americans continue to take the l i n e t ha t 
f u l f i l m e n t o f A r t i c l e V I I depends on our accept ing 
t h i s set o f proposals as they s tand, the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
I n reaching agreement w i t h them may w e l l prove 
insuperab le , " (MO 
(V3) See Clay ton to Vinson , June 25, 19^5, para .1 , I b i d . 
(MO CP(W5)116, Memo by Pres. o f B. o f T. C r lpps . August 16, 
19^5i 3692/113/53. 
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The B r i t i s h regarded i t as most o b j e c t i o n a b l e tha t 
d i f f e r e n t methods ahould be adopted f o r dea l ing w i t h t a r i f f s 
and preferences! which would once again enable d o c t r i n a l 
pressures to be brought to bear on the l a t t e r . There were a lso 
o b j e c t i o n s to American proposals f o r a l l o w i n g subs id ies to be 
imposed on surplus goods as t h i s would enable the U . S . , w i t h 
her huge reserves , to ensure sales o f her h i g h cost p roduc t ion 
commodities f o r a s u f f i c i e n t l y Long per iod to c r i p p l e her less 
w e l l - o f f compet i to r s . F i n a l l y , Crippa was concerned over the 
U.S. tendency to c l o s e l y associate the commercial and f i n a n c i a l 
t a l k s and i n h i s memo quoted a l e t t e r o f r e p l y f rom A c t i n g 
Secre tary o f S t a t e , Grew,to a Congressman. 
"We f e e l t ha t any c r e d i t granted by t h i s country to 
Great B r i t a i n should be accompanied by s a t i s f a c t o r y 
arrangements w i t h respect to the t i m e l y r e l a x a t i o n 
o f the r e s t r i c t i v e f i n a n c i a l and trade p r ac t i c e s 
which have grown up o f necess i ty dur ing the war ," (^5) 
This p o i n t o f view was r e i n f o r c e d by Clay ton i n August , 
f r e s h f rom Potsdam, where some economic aspects o f the war had 
been discussed. There was no doubt the B r i t i s h would have to 
c l o s e l y s c r u t i n i s e the American demands. I t was a cLoar and 
acknowledged f a c t t h a t the most impor tan t issue i n Anglo-
American r e l a t i o n s was whether or not B r i t a i n could o b t a i n 
f i n a n c i a l support f rom the U.S. Now the ques t ion was, what p r i c e 
was to be p a i d , and which undes i rable aspects o f the U.S. demands 
could be avoided? The Americans were reques t ing p r i o r i t y repay-
ment r i g h t s f o r any post Land-Lease c r e d i t , B r i t i s h r a t i f i c a t i o n 
o f B r e t t o n Woods and a number o f o the r ac t ions which under the 
u n c e r t a i n circumstances o f mid-19^5 were most unpala table to 
the B r i t i s h . The B r i t i s h knew tha t the absence o f U.S. f i n a n c i a l 
ass is tance would r e s u l t i n commodity shortages, prevent s t e r l i n g 
I b i d . p A . 
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f rom going c o n v e r t i b l e , make i t very d i f f i c u l t to r a t i f y B r e t t o n 
Woods and necess i ta te the p e r p e t u a t i o n and probable p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
o f b i l a t e r a l t r a d i n g and exchange r e s t r i c t i o n s . A l l o f which 
e v e n t u a l i t i e s would des t roy any hopes o f post-war economic 
coopera t ion w i t h the U.S. But t h i s would a lso deny the Americans 
the r e a l i s a t i o n o f t h e i r post-war economic dream. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , 
B r i t a i n had commitments which f u r t h e r complicated the i ssues , f o r 
example, the A r t i c l e V I I commitments. Never theless , there was 
an undeniable Inter-dependence between the U.S. and the U.K. 
which the Americans would have to pay some regard to i f t h e i r 
hopes were to be r e a l i s e d . This was c e r t a i n l y how J .E.Coulson 
saw the p o s i t i o n and why he recommended f u r t h e r e f f o r t s to 
reach agreement w i t h the U . S . , however, he emphasised the need, 
f i r s t o f a l l , to achieve a b r ea th ing space i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s 
so t h a t the B r i t i s h would f o r m u l a t e t h e i r views c l e a r l y on the 
(LA) 
proposals C lay ton had handed to them. 
By August 1^ th , a t the f i n a l t a l k s on commercial p o l i c y i n 
London, the ou t s t and ing problems were s t i l l unreso lved . The 
B r i t i s h were, s t i l l very unhappy about the proposed ' nuc leus 1 
approach and numerous o ther p o i n t s , no t the l ea s t o f which was 
the v o l a t i l e and s h i f t i n g p o s i t i o n o f the U.S. n e g o t i a t o r s . 
However, w i t h the depar ture o f C lay ton f rom London i n August, 
progress on the commercial and commodity t a l k s was a r res ted f o r 
a w h i l e . On other f r o n t s the s i t u a t i o n continued to change 
r a p i d l y . With the c a p i t u l a t i o n o f Japan, Lend-Lease was a l l 
bu t stopped and as the Americans had been proposing f o r some 
months, the var ious aspects o f economic, commercial and monetary 
(U-6) See Memo. 'Anglo-American R e l a t i o n s 1 , J .E .Coulson , F.O. 
August 16, 19^5, UE3702/109V631 also 'Proposals to 
E s t a b l i s h an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade Organ i sa t i on , dated 
J u l y 21, 19^5, UE3£3^/l09V53j handed to the B r i t i s h by 
Clay ton on August 4-th, 19W5, 
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p o l i c y were g radua l ly being brought together . The American 
v i s i o n o f the post-war economic wor ld was now to be considered 
' i n t o t o ! J the signs d i d not augur w e l l f o r the B r i t i s h . 
During August the pace o f prepara t ions f o r new t a l k s picked 
up somewhat, though they s t i l l lacked a p o s i t i v e d r i v i n g f o r c e . 
E a r l i e r i n the war, the B r i t i s h had been e n t h u s i a s t i c about 
h e l p i n g to r e b u i l d the w o r l d ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy on new and 
e x c i t i n g l i n e s . Now they were v i r t u a l l y reduced to f i g h t i n g a 
rearguard a c t i o n to salvage what they could o f B r i t a i n ' s 
economic i n t e r e s t s i n the face o f dec is ions made p r i m a r i l y by 
the U.S. This change was r e f l e c t e d i n the d i f f e r e n t approach to 
economic problems the B r i t i s h adopted i n the l a t t e r stages o f 
the war. I n the e a r l y n e g o t i a t i o n s B r i t a i n had favoured an 
advance on a l l f r o n t s , monetary, commodity and commercial i n 
order to assess the i n t e r a c t i n g e f f e c t s o f developments i n any 
o f the three f i e l d s . This was p a r t l y commonsense, and p a r t l y 
symptomatic o f the care r e q u i r e d , g iven B r i t a i n 1 s precar ious 
economic s i t u a t i o n . The U.S. on the o ther hand had favoured 
more o f a piece-meal approach. The exp lana t ion f o r t h i s , I t h i n k 
l i e s p a r t l y i n the j ea lousy between the Treasury and Sta te Depart 
ments, and p a r t l y because o f the U.S. economic s t r e n g t h . With 
such a power fu l economy one does not need to be as s e n s i t i v e 
about the framework i n which i t operates . However, by the 
p o s i t i o n s had a l t e r e d . The B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n was now so desperate 
t h a t faced w i t h the end o f Land-Lease, and commercial problems 
w i t h the U . S . , a number one p r i o r i t y was e a s i l y e s t a b l i s h e d . 
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I t was now obvious t h a t above a l l e lse f i n a n c i a l ass is tance 
f rom the U.S. was r equ i r ed i f B r i t a i n was to be economical ly 
r e h a b i l i t a t e d - a l l else on the economic plane had to be 
subordinated to t h i s . The Americans were also aware o f t h i s 
p r i o r i t y , cut ins tead o f r e c i p r o c a t i n g the B r i t i s h s h i f t they 
moved toward an advance on a l l f r o n t s i n the knowledge t h a t 
B r i t i s h f i n a n c i a l necess i t i e s would enable them to g a i n advantages 
i n o ther areas o f d i s c u s s i o n . Hawkins f o r example i n d i s c r e e t l y 
t o l d L iesch ing on September 7, t h a t : -
"Clay ton considered i t impe ra t i ve t h a t t a l k s on 
commercial p o l i c y should proceed s imultaneously w i t h 
the f i n a n c i a l d iscuss ions . . . " (^7) 
Hawkins r a t h e r c l u m s i l y t r i e d to cover up, saying C lay ton 
d i d not mean tha t the U.S. should take advantage o f U.K. f i n a n c i a l 
weakness to make u n f a i r gains i n o ther areas o f economic concern 
to the U . S . , but s imply t h a t a l l these problems should be wound 
up b e f o r e the end o f h o s t i l i t i e s and the loss o f war- t ime 
cooperat iveness . S t i l l , the s l i p had been made and indeed we o n l y 
need to look at C l a y t o n ' s correspondence w i t h V l n s o n ^ ^ ^ to see 
what Hawkins had meant. 
Two th ings p r e c i p i t a t e d the renewal o f t a l k s w i t h the 
Americans. F i r s t o f a l l the t e r m i n a t i o n o f Lend-Lease on August 
2 * f t h ^ ^ a n j i secondly Keynes 1 r e a c t i o n to t h i s . Lord Robbins, 
i n h i s autobiography notes t h a t most people who were not f a m i l i a r 
a t close quar te rs w i t h the U.S. scene were shocked by the 
t e r m i n a t i o n i -
(*4-7) Memo, Llesching-Hawkins conversa t ion , September 7th 19^5> 
UE 09^/53. 
(U-8) See above. 
(^9) For d e t a i l s o f which see preceding chapter. 
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"But I t was a much greater su rp r i s e to most o f us when 
we l e a r n t tha t Keynes, having persuaded m i n i s t e r s t ha t 
he could secure a s u b s t a n t i a l g r a n t - i n - a i d and a t the 
same time s e t t l e the e n t i r e A r t i c l e V I I business on 
h i s own, had departed f o r Washington f o r t h i s purpose 
w i t h o u t c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h any o f the o ther o f f i c i a l s 
concerned." (50) 
Keynes, probably b e t t e r than anyone e l s e , knew o f the d i r e 
s t r a i t s the U.K. would f i n d h e r s e l f i n w i thou t Lend-Lease and 
w i t h o u t a l t e r n a t i v e f i n a n c i a l ass is tance f rom the U.S. This 
was the main reason f o r h i s p r e c i p i t a t e departure f o r the U.S. 
He had a f u l l grasp o f the f u t u r e f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s o f the 
U.K. but u n f o r t u n a t e l y there were two other po in t s which he 
missed. F i r s t o f a l l , the U.S. was no t prepared to g ive the U.K. 
a g r a n t - i n - a i d , and secondly, they were not prepared to dea l w i t h 
the commercial issues on the casual l e v e l Keynes adopted on h i s 
a r r i v a l i n Washington. There were soon complaints about the f a c t 
t h a t Helmore was the on ly Board o f Trade r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ^ 1 ^ . 
By September 12, i t was obvious t h a t a f u l l commercial team 
would have to be sent o u t , and indeed as Robbins p o i n t s o u t , they 
(ZD) 
were eager to go, ' what he does not i n d i c a t e i s t ha t i t was 
i n B r i t a i n ' s perceived i n t e r e s t s to keep the f i n a n c i a l and 
commercial t a l k s as t i g h t l y compartmentalised as p o s s i b l e . 
C lay ton agreed to delay the commercial t a l k s u n t i l the a r r i v a l 
o f the B r i t i s h team on the 2 7 t h . ^ 3 ) 
(50) Bobbins, Op .C l t . p.20lt. 
(51) See August 30, Coulson to F.O. UE3995/109V53* C l a y t o n ' s 
complaints v i a Hawkins, L i e s c h i n g , UEV|»+2/109V53, 
September 7? 19^5-
(52) O p . C i t . p.205. 
(53) See A.M.S.S.O. to H a l i f a x , September 15, 19^5, UE^W /109V 
53, and Washington to London, September 15, 19^5, UE1+273/ 
loMf/53. 
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Although Keynes had perhaps acted r a sh ly and w i t h o u t 
cons ider ing the p o l i t i c a l aspects o f the economic problems 
c l o s e l y enough, one could not accuse him o f being s l i p - s h o d , 
i n h i s economic a n a l y s i s . I n a lengthy paper e n t i t l e d 'Proposals 
f o r F i n a n c i a l Arrangements i n the S t e r l i n g Area and between the 
U.S. and the U.K. to Fol low A f t e r Lend-Lease, 1 more b r i e f l y 
r e f e r r e d to as Gen .89/1. , Keynes c a r e f u l l y o u t l i n e d B r i t a i n ' s 
(erK ) 
f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n and poss ib le courses o f a c t i o n . J 1 
(5^) See Gen. 89/1 , dated September 12, 19^5j 
For the Cabinet by J.M.Keynes, UEM-260/1OM+/53. 
The f o l l o w i n g are the p r o v i s i o n a l f i g u r e s on which 
Keynes was to base h i s a n a l y s i s . 
Dec. 19^5 go ld and d o l l a r reserves j l 1,9 B 
Dec. 19^5 B r i t i s h overseas l i a b i l i t i e s #1^.5 B. 
Estimates o f export recovery 1-
19^5 tflA00ra 
19^6 32,W00m - 19^6 d e f i c i t i n t rade 
22,500m - #3,500m 
S t e r l i n g Area l i a b i l i t i e s Dec. 19^5 approx. #12B. 
L i a b i l i t i e s ou t s ide S t e r l i n g Area approx. #WB. 
T o t a l debts est imated #16 - 18B. 
Estimate o f d o l l a r s r e q u i r e d f rom U.S. 35B< 
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Keynes' p r e l i m i n a r y comments on the f i g u r e s were t h a t 
B r i t a i n should not be requ i red to pay a commercial r a t e o f 
i n t e r e s t on any f i n a n c i a l a i d f rom the U . S . , nor should she be 
manoeuvred i n t o a p o s i t i o n where she was o b l i g e d to u n i l a t e r a l l y 
renounce debts to s t e r l i n g c r e d i t o r s or place repayments o f such 
debts on a subordinate l e v e l to d o l l a r repayments. Fo l lowing 
these opening comments were proposals f o r two a l t e r n a t i v e 
s o l u t i o n s to B r i t a i n ' s problems. A l t e r n a t i v e ' A ' consisted o f the 
pe rpe tua t ion o f the S t e r l i n g Area and an Empire based recovery , 
though working w i t h i n the ru l e s o f the I . M . F . t r a n s i t i o n a l 
arrangements. Keynes considered t h i s an economical ly v i a b l e 
a l t e r n a t i v e , though less a t t r a c t i v e than a l t e r n a t i v e B, 
There were obvious problems w i t h t h i s l i n e o f approach which 
Keynes discussed a t some l eng th , the most obvious o f which was 
f r i c t i o n w i t h the U.S. Indeed, i t i s quest ionable whether t h i s 
was i n f a c t a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e once the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s are taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . A l t e r n a t i v e ! B ! was 
a #5B non-commercial l o a n / c r e d i t f r o m the U . S . , J u s t i f i e d on 
the grounds o f B r i t a i n ' s pre-December 19**1 d o l l a r purchases, 
U.K. expendi ture i n the Middle East , I n d i a and Burma, and 
B r i t a i n ' s h i g h i n d u s t r i a l conversion r a t e to war p r o d u c t i o n ^ 
\_ 
I n a d d i t i o n , B r i t a i n would attempt i n b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , \ 
x 
t o reduce s t e r l i n g l i a b i l i t i e s by having about SS^-B w r i t t e n o f f . 
The remainder would be released i n ins ta lments and, w i t h 
c u r r e n t l y earned s t e r l i n g , would be a v a i l a b l e and c o n v e r t i b l e f o r 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t rade a f t e r 19W6. The B r e t t o n Woods t r a n s i t i o n a l 
pe r iod would not be terminated so soon but any element o f 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n would be Immediately dispensed w i t h i n the use o f 
a v a i l a b l e s t e r l i n g balances as between the o ther coun t r i e s o f the 
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area and count r i es ou t s ide the area. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the S t e r l i n g 
Area D o l l a r Pool would be abo l i shed . I n e f f e c t the loan was to 
enable the S t e r l i n g Area to make d o l l a r purchases i n the 
t r a n s i t i o n a l pe r iod and to help B r i t a i n overcome her S t e r l i n g 
Debt problems w i t h o u t r e s o r t to s t r i c t c o n t r o l s . 
By September 14-th, Keynes 1 paper had been s tud ied by the 
Cabinet and i t was w i t h t h i s i n mind as w e l l as a paper by 
Cripps on Commercial problems, t ha t a meeting o f m i n i s t e r s took 
place on tha t day. By now, as we have seen, i t was obvious t h a t 
commercial t a l k s would have to complement the f i n a n c i a l t a l k s so 
there was p len ty o f room f o r thought on the wide area o f 
economic p o l i c y . I n f a c t , there was l i t t l e nove l t y i n C r i p p s 1 
paper. He made the standard o b j e c t i o n s to t r e a t i n g preferences 
and t a r i f f s d i f f e r e n t l y . On s ta te t r a d i n g Cripps d i d no t want 
c o n t r o l s to p r e j u d i c e the e f f e c t i v e use o f such methods, though 
he was prepared to accept r e g u l a t o r y 'good behaviour 1 r u l e s . 
His views on q u a n t i t a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n o f t rade were s i m i l a r , he 
d i d not want them to be a s u b s t i t u t e f o r t a r i f f s , but a t the 
same time he wanted to be able to programme imports so tha t the 
U.K. could spend her f o r e i g n resources on goods necessary f o r 
her recovery . On a g r i c u l t u r e and the s u b s i d i s a t i o n o f goods i n 
excess supply, we have already considered the B r i t i s h v iews , 
which remained unchanged. F i n a l l y , there were d i f f e r e n c e s 
concerning i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a r t e l s which the Americans wished to 
c o n t r o l w i t h an i n t e r n a t i o n a l Sherman A c t . The B r i t i s h were less 
p o s i t i v e p a r t l y because they lacked the expe r t i s e i n t h i s area 
and p a r t l y because the problem d i d not apply so much to B r i t i s h 
(55) companies. J 
(55) See Gen.82/2 Memo, President o f the Board o f Trade, 
Cabinet Commercial P o l i c y September 13,194-5, 
UE*353/109V53, and CP(if5)8o 1^397/109*-/53. 
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Crlpps gave a general but deeply f e l t warning on the need to 
safeguard the t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d , a warning tha t was taken to 
hea r t a t the Cabinet meeting. On the whole, the Cabinet was i n 
agreement w i t h the two papers tha t had been presented. The advice 
to the commercial n e g o t i a t o r s , about to embark f o r the U.S. l ed 
by L i e s c h i n g , was to f o l l o w the general p o l i c y o u t l i n e d . 
N a t u r a l l y t h e i r b r i e f was more c lear cut than Keynes 1 , f a r more 
work had been done on t h i s area p r e v i o u s l y . The atmosphere was 
s t i l l f a i r l y o p t i m i s t i c desp i te the growing r e a l i s a t i o n of the 
complex problems i n v o l v e d and the d i f f e r e n c e s between the U.S. 
and the U.K. Never theless , an agreement was s t i l l regarded i n 
B r i t a i n 1 8 i n t e r e s t s , provided c e r t a i n safeguards could be 
achieved, namely, to cover the t r a n s i t i o n a l pe r iod and acceptance 
by the U.S. o f appropr ia t e p o l i c i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n regard to 
h i g h employment. w " 
One o f the most i n t r a c t a b l e problems was the ambivalence 
o f B r i t i s h p o l i c y toward i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic problems; a 
c lea r example o f which I s the incompat ib le a l t e r n a t i v e s 'A* and 
•B' i n Keynes 1 Gen. 89 /1 , And indeed t h i s was a l ready becoming 
apparent i n Washington even before L i e s c h i n g ! s miss ion l e f t London. 
(56) See Gen. 82/2. 
(57) Meeting o f M i n i s t e r s , P . M . , Ch.of E x . , P re s .B .o f T . , 
Mlns . o f A g r l c . and Food, S . S . I n d i a , Br idges . L i e s c h i n g , 
Shackle, Robbins, e t c . , Sept .1 1 *, 19^5, UEl+326/109^/53-
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The f i r s t mee t ing o f the U . S . / U . K . Top Committee ( h e r e a f t e r 
Top.Com.) o n September 11th enumerated t he t h r e e m a i n areas 
f o r d i s c u s s i o n as (1 ) The o r d e r l y w i n d i n g up o f Lend-Lease*, 
(2) The U . K . f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n ; (3) F i n a l i s e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
monetary and commerc i a l m a t t e r s . 7 Such s u b j e c t s were soon 
t o b r i n g o u t the ambiva lence o f the B r i t i s h a p p r o a c h . I n d e e d , 
o n the f o l l o w i n g day a t a press c o n f e r e n c e H a l i f a x and Keynes 
were d rawn o n the s t e r l i n g i s s u e . T h i s was o f g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e , 
o f c o u r s e , because i t was t he essence o f B r i t a i n 1 3 a m b i v a l e n c e . 
I t i l l u s t r a t e d w e l l t he B r i t i s h p r e d i c a m e n t * -
(1) Unable w h o l l y t o t r u s t o r r e l y o n U . S . p o l i c i e s . 
(2) Unable t o p u t the d e c i d e d b e n e f i t s o f c o l l a b o r a t i o n 
w i t h the U . S . a s i de w i t h o u t a t h o r o u g h a t t e m p t t o 
r e s o l v e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s be tween the t w o . 
T h i s r e s u l t e d i n B r i t i s h a t t e m p t s to p r e s e r v e the S t e r l i n g A r e a 
t o t he e x t e n t o f p r o v i d i n g a s a f e t y n e t t o f a l l back o n i f U . S . 
p o l i c i e s were seen t o be i n i m i c a b l e t o B r i t i s h hopes o f economic 
r e c o v e r y . T h i s , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , made t h e a l t e r n a t i v e o f c o o p e r a t i o 
w i t h the U . S . more d i f f i c u l t , f o r t h e i r p r i m a r y g o a l i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic p o l i c y was t o d i s e s t a b l i s h t he B r i t i s h 
I m p e r i a l P r e f e r e n c e System and the d o l l a r p o o l . F u r t h e r m o r e , 
t h e Amer icans f o u n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o accep t B r i t a i n ' s s u g g e s t i o n s 
f o r w r i t i n g o f f Lend-Lease and f o r n o n - c o m m e r c i a l U . S . f i n a n c i a l 
a s s i s t a n c e when B r i t a i n was r e l u c t a n t t o t r e a t h e r c r e d i t o r s i n 
(59) 
a s i m i l a r f a s h i o n and w r i t e down t h e s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s . ' 7 
(58) See 1st m e e t i n g Top.Com. S e p t . 11,19^5, UEM*36/1 OM*/53, 
and F .R . 19^5» V o l . I I , Potsdam Papers , pp 122-126. 
(59) See Wash ing ton Press C o n f e r e n c e , H a l i f a x and Keynes , 
September 12, 19^5, UEM+12/109V53. 
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i 
Keynes must a l r e a d y have had d o u b t s c o n c e r n i n g h i s i n i t i a l 
o p t i m i s m , however , i t was some t i m e b e f o r e t h e h a r s h r e a l i t i e s 
o f t he U . S . p r o p o s a l s and p o l i c y l i n e was f u l l y r e a l i s e d . 
As the month o f September s l i p p e d by s t e r l i n g became o f 
g r e a t s a l i e n c e i n the t a l k s . B o t h C l a y t o n and V i n s o n adopted t h e 
l i n e o f e q u i t a b l e war c o n t r i b u t i o n w h i c h meant t h a t B r i t a i n 
s h o u l d 3cale down h e r s t e r l i n g ba lances and w r i t e a l a r g e 
p r o p o r t i o n o f them o f f . Thl3 was t h e i r r e p l y t o t he two B r i t i s h 
p r o p o s a l s o f e i t h e r a m i x t u r e o f w r i t i n g o f f p l u s c o n v e r t i b i l i t y 
o r c o n t r o l l e d c o n v e r t i b i l i t y ove r a v e r y ex tended p e r i o d . 
A t the second m e e t i n g Keynes expressed a p e r s o n a l v i e w , a g a i n i n 
l i n e w i t h Gen ,89 / 1 , t h a t i f the ba lances were #123 , t h e n perhaps 
1/3rd c o u l d b e w r i t t e n o f f and the r e s t r e n d e r e d c o n v e r t i b l e i n 
s t a g e s . T h i s appeared t o be aore s a t i s f a c t o r y t o C l a y t o n and 
V i n s o n . However , f o r even t h i s t o be a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e 
B r i t i s h , two c r u c i a l p o i n t s remained u n r e s o l v e d . F i r s t o f a l l 
t h e w r i t i n g o f f o f s t e r l i n g ba lances must n o t appear as i m p e r i a l 
a r r o g a n c e , a d i k t a t f r o m W h i t e h a l l . T h i s wou ld u p s e t the a l r e a d y 
p r e c a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s i n c o u n t r i e s such as Egypt and 
I n d i a . I n d e e d , t he F . O . was so concerned ove r t h i s t h a t t hey 
p ressed Keynes to g e t assurances f r o m the Amer icans t h a t t hey 
would accep t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r I n i t i a t i n g t h i s , and p r e s e n t i t 
( f t ? } 
as an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f the Amer i can f i n a n c i a l d e a l . 
( 6 0 ) See 1 s t mee t ing F inance t a l k s , S e p t . 19,19^5, U E W o i / I O M f r / 5 3 . 
(61) I b i d . 
(62) See F .O . to Keynes , September 25, 19^5, UEi*505/109*+/53» 
a t the b o t t o m o f t he t e l e g r a m i n lon&hand , ' P . M . agrees* , 
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A t t h i s s tage the i s s u e was p o l i t i c a l dynami t e f o r the B r i t i s h . 
I t was one t h i n g f o r i t to l eak o u t now, b u t q u i t e a n o t h e r f o r t h e 
s c a l i n g down to be p r e s e n t e d i n a comprehensive p l a n w h i c h 
I n c l u d e d U . S . p a r t i c i p a t i o n and h e l p . I f such a s u g g e s t i o n 
l e aked now, n o t o n l y was a l t e r n a t i v e *A' o f Gen.89/1 d e s t r o y e d , 
b u t t h e r e c o u l d be f u r t h e r h a r m f u l e f f e c t s o n t h e c o h e s i o n o f t he 
Empire because o f B r i t a i n ' s p r o p o s a l t o u n i l a t e r a l l y d e f a u l t o n 
he r d e b t s . Not o n l y was the economic cohes ion o f the Empire a t 
s t a k e , b u t a l s o i t s p o l i t i c a l c o h e s i o n . The second c r u c i a l i s s u e 
was the s i z e o f t he l o a n / c r e d i t / g r a n t - i n - a i d t h a t t h e Amer icans 
were p r epa red t o s u p p l y and the n a t u r e o f the s t r i n g s to be 
a t t a c h e d . Toward t he end o f September , w o r r i e s began to a r i s e 
among the B r i t i s h c o n c e r n i n g p o s s i b l e c o n d i t i o n s , b u t t h e r e was 
s t i l l o p t i m i s m even f o r an i n t e r e s t - f r e e l o a n . Keynes and 
H a l i f a x s i m p l y b e l i e v e d the a r rangements would r e q u i r e a b i t o f 
' d r e s s i n g ' t o make them a c c e p t a b l e s -
rt.•. a l o a n f r e e o f i n t e r e s t wou ld n o t t a k e t h e Amer i can 
p u b l i c by s u r p r i s e . " (63) 
T h i s o p t i m i s m was d e s p i t e r e p e a t e d i n s i s t e n c e s f r o m C l a y t o n 
and V i n s o n t h a t an i n t e r e s t f r e e l o a n was o u t o f the q u e s t i o n . 
To accoun t f o r t h i s l a c k o f s e n s i t i v i t y to the change i n 
a t t i t u d e s o f the A m e r i c a n s , perhaps one c o u l d t u r n t o P r o f e s s o r 
R o b b i n ' s a u t o b i o g r a p h y . There he r e c o r d s the l a c k o f a p p r e c i a t i o n 
o n t h e B r i t i s h s i d e o f the m i s t r u s t gene ra t ed among the Amer icans 
caused by B r i t a i n f r e e z i n g the A r t i c l e V I I t a l k s t h r o u g h 19^h. 
(63) H a l i f a x t o B e v i n , P e r s o n a l , Top S e c r e t , Sep t .26 . 19^5, 
UBM+78/109V53. 
(6*0 See H a l . to F . O . S e p t . 26, 19^5, UEM+78/109**/53, and 
Wash, to F .O . S e p t , 27, T e l . 6^90, J . M . K . t o F o r . S e c . 
and Ch. o f Ex . 1^502/109^/53. 
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He a l s o n o t e s the d i f f i c u l t y t he team i n W a s h i n g t o n had i n 
l o w e r i n g t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s and hopes o f C a b i n e t m i n i s t e r s , 
o r i g i n a l l y u p l i f t e d by Keynes h i m s e l f , to a more r e a l i s t i c l e v e l . 
He says t h a t t h i s was one o f the d i f f i c u l t j o b s t h e team had t o 
d o , however , a t t h i s s tage i t wou ld appear t h a t Keynes and 
H a l i f a x themselves were s u f f e r i n g f r o m o v e r - o p t i m i s m and a poor 
a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the U . S . change o f a t t i t u d e s . 
Toward the end o f September the Americans i n t r o d u c e d a 
n o v e l p r o p o s a l ; an escape c l ause to a l l e v i a t e t he p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f u n f o r e s e e n and u n a c c e p t a b l e burdens caused by the i m p o s i t i o n 
o f an i n t e r e s t r a t e o n f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e g i v e n t o the U . K . 
The B r i t i s h were q u i c k t o see p o s s i b l e p i t f a l l s h e r e . From 
A m e r i c a n c r i t i c s wou ld come a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t t h i s was a d e v i o u s 
B r i t i s h p l o y t o a v o i d r epayments . From B r i t a i n , c r i t i c s wou ld 
a rgue t h a t such a p r o v i s i o n would r e q u i r e d e t a i l e d knowledge o f 
t h e B r i t i s h domes t i c economy. There was a l s o t he f u r t h e r w o r r y 
t h a t t h e r e would be an e lement o f d i s c r e t i o n i n the c l a u s e , 
w h i c h would a l l o w b u r e a u c r a t i c and c o n g r e s s i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e 
and p re s su res s i m i l a r t o those w h i c h had been e x p e r i e n c e d w i t h 
Lend-Lease . On the 27th, H a l i f a x and Keynes r e p o r t e d y e t a 
f u r t h e r e x t e n s i o n o f t he t a l k s , t h i s t i m e o n t h e i r i n s t i g a t i o n . 
H a l i f a x had proposed an e x t e n s i o n to 999 y e a r s o n the leases 
f o r U . S . bases i n the West I n d i e s i n an a t t e m p t to b r i n g abou t a 
g e n e r a l economic conco rda t i n w h i c h he b e l i e v e d a i n t e r e s t -
f r e e l o a n to be s t i l l p o s s i b l e . C l a y t o n and V i n s o n were 
(65) See R o b b i n s , O p . C i t . pp.20U--5. 
(66) See Wash, to S.S. and Ch. o f Ex . Sep t . 27,19^5, 
UE»f502/109^/53, and Wash, to F .O . Sep t .27 , UEW502/109V53. 
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e n t h u s i a s t i c , the B r i t i s h appeared t o be d o i n g t h e i r Job f o r 
them by w i d e n i n g the t a L k s . They d e c i d e d to t a k e advantage o f 
t h e o p e n i n g p r o v i d e d and sugges ted t h e s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n c l u s i o n 
o f c i v i l a v i a t i o n and communica t ion agreements m i g h t oe o t h e r 
s u i t a o l e q u i d pro quo3. A t t h i s H a l i f a x reneged somewhat. He 
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t the U . S . b u s t n o t appear to oe b l a c k m a i l i n g 
t he U B K . Soraetnlng t h a t was d e c l a i m e d w i t h a l a c r i t y by C l a y t o n 
and V i n s o n . 
M e a n w h i l e , back i n London , B e v i n , a f t e r r e a d i n g Keynes 1 
t e l e g r a m o f September 27i d e c i d e d t h a t i n v i e w o f A m e r i c a n 
s t a t e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g B r i t a i n ' s p e s s i m i s t i c e s t i m a t e s o f he r own 
economy and t h a t a g r a n t i n a i d was o u t o f the q u e s t i o n , the 
b e s t t h i n g to do was t o h o l d o u t f o r an i n t e r e s t - f r e e l o a n o f 
#5B. I n f a c t , i n a r e c e n t mee t ing w i t h S.S. Jimmy B y r n e s , he 
had p u t f o r w a r d such a p r o p o s a l w h i c h he b e l i e v e d had r e c e i v e d 
a s a t i s f a c t o r y r e sponse . So as f a r as London was conce rned , 
a s a t i s f a c t o r y f i n a n c i a l agreement was s t i l l w e l l o n tne c a r d s . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Byrnes was n o t i n the l e a s t i n t e r e s t e d o r k n o w l e d g e -
a b l e o n f o r e i g n economic m a t t e r s , w h i c h ne l e f t i n the capab le 
hands o f W i l L . C l a y t o n . Thus h i s o p i n i o n shou ld n o t have been 
t a k e n q u i t e a t the f a c e v a l u e t h a t B e v i n took i t . ^ ^ 
(67) I b i d . 
(68) See JMK t o SS and C h . o f fcix, T e l , Ho. 6^90, U^502/109V53-
(69) September 28, 19^5» UiiU-582/109*+/53. 
(70) See W a t t , tf.C. P e r s o n a l i t i e s and P o l i c i e s - S t u d i e s i n 
t h e F o r m u l a t i o n o f B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y I n the 
T w e n t i e t h C e n t u r y , Longman's Green and Co. L t d . , 
1965t London. 
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By October 1st , the B r i t i s h n e g o t i a t o r s i n W a s h i n g t o n , were 
b e g i n n i n g t o r e a d j u s t t h e i r a p p r a i s a l o f t he s i t u a t i o n . Keynes 
w r o t e t o Eady a s k i n g f o r f u r t h e r g u i d a n c e . A t t h a t t i m e an 
i n t e r e s t - f r e e l o a n w i t h a t e n yea r pause b e f o r e r e p a y m e n t s ; 
began , was b e i n g r ega rded as r e a l i s t i c . T h i s wou ld Impose a 
repayment b u r d e n o f #100m p . a . o n t he B r i t i s h economy. The 
c a u t i o u s W i l l i a m Eady r e p l i e d t h a t he c o u l d g i v e no immedia te 
a d v i c e as the C a b i n e t was s t i l l c o n s i d e r i n g p r e v i o u s communiques 
f r o m t h e Wash ing ton team, h o w e v e r i -
" . . . we c o u l d n o t recommend accep tance o f any commerc ia l 
p r i n c i p l e such as i n t e r e s t even a t low r a t e s i n a l o a n 
d e s i g n e d i n g r e a t p a r t to m o d i f y w o r k i n g o f t he S t e r l i n g 
Area . . . . We must , I s u g g e s t , c o n s i d e r two p e r c e n t as a 
commerc ia l p r i n c i p l e . " ( 7 1 ) 
He went o n to add t h a t a g r a n t - i n - a i d o f #2B w i t h access t o a 
f u r t h e r c r e d i t o f 33 B i n t e r e s t - f r e e was s t i l l i n h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
t h e g o a l t h a t shou ld be aimed f o r . There were a l s o some d i s t u r b -
i n g f e a t u r e s about the development o f the t a l k s i n Wash ing ton 
t h a t he t h o u g h t shou ld be v e r y c a u t i o u s l y d e a l t w i t h . For example , 
the U . S . p r o p o s a l to remove p r e f e r e n c e s f r o m the t a r i f f n e g o t i a t o r s 
and t o make agreement o n them c o n d i t i o n a l upon a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
f i n a n c i a l s e t t l e m e n t was l i k e l y t o cause a p o l i t i c a l f u r o r e i n 
t h e U . K . I n a d d i t i o n , the appearance o f ' b u s i n e s s l i k e s e t t l e m e n t s 1 
o n t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and a v i a t i o n r i g h t s were no t v i ewed 
f a v o u r a b l y i n the U . K . As f a r as communica t ions were conce rned , 
a l l t he B r i t i s h would concede was a d i r e c t w i r e l e s s c i r c u i t w i t h 
Saudi A r a b i a , c e r t a i n l y as f a r as a v i a t i o n was conce rned , any 
concess ions would be c o n s i d e r e d as most h a r m f u l t o p o s t - w a r 
B r i t i s h a v i a t i o n e x p a n s i o n . Eady i n f a c t a d v i s e d c a u t i o n o n t h e 
l a t e s t U . S . p r o p o s a l s . 
(71) See J . M . K . to Eady, O c t . 1 , 19*+5t UEA568/109V531 and 
Eady ' s r e p l y , O c t . 3 , 19^5, UE^569/109V53. 
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By October 7> a l t h o u g h Keynes was s t i l l i m p r e s s i n g o n 
C l a y t o n t h e problems i n v o l v e d i n the commerc i a l a spec t s o f t h e 
proposed f i n a n c i a l t e r m s , t h e r e was l i t t l e response to t h i s o r 
o n t he d e t a i l s o f t he B r i t i s h f i n a n c i a l p r o p o s a l s . The 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s were now such , and w i t h Keynes 1 r e q u e s t f o r f u r t h e r 
t h a t 
g u l d a n c e , / B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r s d e c i d 3 d t h a t a comprehens ive r e v i e w 
o f t he s i t u a t i o n was necessa ry . On October 8 t h a d e t a i l e d b r i e f 
was s en t f r o m the C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer t o W a s h i n g t o n . 
I n i t , D a l t o n , d e s p i t e a t t e m p t s t o g i v e c l e a r and d e c i s i v e , though 
g e n e r a l g u i d a n c e , e v i n c e s s i g n s o f u n c e r t a i n t y and ambiguousness . 
i 
A t the b e g i n n i n g he c l e a r l y s t a t e d i -
" I f b e s t o f f e r i s l a r g e l o a n a t 2 per cen t i n t e r e s t we 
w o u l d n o t accep t i t . We r e m a i n f i r m t h a t we w i l l n o t 
a ccep t o b l i g a t i o n s wh ich we do n o t see r e a s o n a b l e 
c e r t a i n t y o f d i s c h a r g i n g . A l s o , such a commerc i a l 
s e t t l e m e n t wou ld be r e g a r d e d h e r e as an i n e q u i t a b l e 
c o n c l u s i o n to o u r m u t u a l e f f o r t . . . . " (73) 
D a l t o n c o n t i n u e d , however , by s a y i n g t h a t an a c c e p t a b l e 
a l t e r n a t i v e would be a commerc ia l l o a n f r o m the U . S . E x p o r t -
I m p o r t Bank, o r s i m i l a r sou rces . So i t would seem i t was n o t so 
much the commerc ia l n a t u r e o f a l o a n t h a t was d i s t u r b i n g , b u t 
t he f e a r s o f t h e s t r i n g s t h a t m i g h t be a t t a c h e d i n a l o a n o f the 
t y p e under n e g o t i a t i o n . C e r t a i n s t r i n g s would be a c c e p t a b l e i f 
t h e l o a n was o f adequate s i z e , w i t h repayment c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h 
were n o t o f a p u n i t i v e n a t u r e , D a l t o n suggested t h a t a #2B g r a n t , 
J u s t i f i e d o n the grounds o f p re -Lend-Lease pu rchases , w i t h a 
f u r t h e r #3B l i n e o f c r e d i t a t wou ld be a c c e p t a b l e , o r a 
s i m i l a r a r r angemen t , so long as B r i t i s h l i a b i l i t i e s d i d n o t exceed 
(72) See M i n i s t e r i a l mee t ing P . M . , F o r . S e c , C h . o f E x . , 
P r e s . B . o f T . e t c . , October 5th 19^5» UE*f670/109^/53• 
(73) C h a n c e l l o r o f Exchequer t o Wash. Top S e c r e t . T e l . 1009*+, 
O c t . 8, 19**5» 1 ^ 7 0 / 1 0 9 ^ / 5 3 . 
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3100m i n repayment p . a . B a s i c a l l y , D a l t o n was i n s i s t i n g t h a t 
B r i t a i n s h o u l d r e t a i n he r independence t o a c t i n o r d e r t o c o u n t e r 
adverse economic t r e n d s and t h a t such r i g h t s s h o u l d n o t be 
u n r e a s o n a b l y I n f r i n g e d upon by the c o n d i t i o n s o f an A m e r i c a n l o a n . 
Even i f t h e U . K . a c h i e v e d a f u t u r e e q u i l i b r i u m i n h e r b a l a n c e o f 
payments , t h e r e wou ld be no gua ran tee t h a t she would have an 
adequate amount o f d o l l a r s w h i c h would enable h e r t o d i s p e n s e 
e n t i r e l y w i t h monetary c o n t r o l s . For example , c o n v e r t i b i l i t y 
o f o t h e r c u r r e n c i e s w h i c h were s i g n i f i c a n t i n U . K . t r a d e , w o u l d 
a l s o have t o be a necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r f u l l c o n v e r t i b i l i t y . 
I n a d d i t i o n , two f u n d a m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r r e g u l a r s e r v i c e o f 
any l o a n must be a g e n e r a l ba l ance o f U . S . t r a d e and s e c o n d l y , 
t h a t the U . S . would n o t p e r s i s t e n t l y pursue a d e f l a t i o n a r y p o l i c y , 
w h i c h c o u l d b r i n g abou t an i n t o l e r a b l e s t r e s s o n B r i t a i n ' s 
repayment o b l i g a t i o n s . D a l t o n went even f u r t h e r , to the p o i n t o f 
u n r e a l i s m t 
"Because the U n i t e d Kingdom i s such a l a r g e i m p o r t e r o f 
U n i t e d S t a t e s ' goods , i t i s upon us t h a t t he i m p a c t o f 
a w o r l d sho r t age o f d o l l a r s f a l l s most i m m e d i a t e l y . 
We must t h e r e f o r e be p e r m i t t e d t o t ake a p r o s p e c t i v e 
v i e w o f t he t r a d e f a c t s as t h e y a re m a n i f e s t l y d e v e l o p -
i n g , and to a r r i v e a t ou r own judgement o f t he e x i s t e n c e 
o f a sho r t age o f d o l l a r s a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s . " (71*) 
A n o t h e r t h i n g t h a t w o r r i e d the C h a n c e l l o r was the p r o g r e s s 
o n t he f i n a n c i a l t a l k s , w h i c h subsumed s i m i l a r p r o g r e s s o n t h e 
commerc i a l t a l k s w h i c h was no t i n f a c t the case. There was a l s o 
the p e r s i s t i n g p rob lem o f the s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s . D a l t o n and 
o t h e r m i n i s t e r s were now, and had been f o r some t i m e , s c e p t i c a l 
(7*0 I b i d . 
382 
o f A m e r i c a n p o s t - w a r p o l i c y . 
"We need n o t e l a b o r a t e to y o u o u r d o u b t s abou t the 
r e a l p o l i c y t h a t Amer ican A d m i n i s t r a t i o n may f o l l o w 
i n the n e x t f e w y e a r s . " (75) 
Such c o n c e r n n a t u r a l l y a f f e c t e d t he manner i n w h i c h the 
B r i t i s h v i ewed the e x i s t e n c e o f t h e i r own s t e r l i n g economic b l o c . 
Consequen t ly D a l t o n now i n f o r m e d the Wash ing ton Embassy. 
"We t h i n k i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t any ar rangement about S t e r l i n g 
A r e a , and p a r t i c u l a r l y s c a l i n g down o f S t e r l i n g d e b t s , 
s h o u l d n o t ( r e p e a t n o t ) be f o r m a l i s e d i n A m e r i c a . " (76) 
F i n a l l y , D a l t o n c a u t i o n e d the B r i t i s h n e g o t i a t o r s a g a i n s t 
t he use o f q u i d pro quos such as a v i a t i o n , t e l e - c o m m u n i c a t i o n s 
and i s l a n d bases . He appears to have been unaware t h a t the 
l a t t e r was sugges ted by H a l i f a x . D a l t o n u rged t h a t t he v a r i o u s 
d i v e r s e agreements must be made o n t h e i r own m e r i t s r a t h e r t h a n 
as a r e s u l t o f p r e s s u r e s b r o u g h t t o bear because o f B r i t a i n ' s 
f i n a n c i a l needs. 
D a l t o n was d e s p e r a t e l y t r y i n g to r i d e two ho r se s a t once . 
He agreed w i t h the b a s i c aims common to b o t h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , 
mone ta ry c o n v e r t i b i l i t y and a l i b e r a l commerc ia l p o l i c y , b u t 
f o r the weakened B r i t i s h economy to f u n c t i o n under such c o n d i t i o n s 
as p e r t a i n e d a t t h a t t i m e , i t r e q u i r e d a d r a s t i c i n f u s i o n o f 
r e s o u r c e s . Bu t r e s o u r c e s o f the magni tude t he U . K . d e s i r e d , 
m i g h t i n U . S . o p i n i o n , make her i n t r a n s i g e n t and o b d u r a t e i n 
coming to agree i n more s p e c i f i c f i e l d s such as i m p e r i a l 
p r e f e r e n c e , o i l , meat , a v i a t i o n , t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , e t c . From 
D a l t o n 1 s p o i n t o f v i e w , t h e type o f agreement t he Amer icans had 
t a c i t l y sugges ted would leave 3 r l t a i n weak and w i t h l i t t l e 
independence f r o m A m e r i c a n p o l i c i e s . B r i t i s h economic independence 
and the need f o r A m e r i c a n f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e , were two d i f f i c u l t 
ho r se s t o r i d e i n d e e d , and t h e i r pa ths were to d i v e r g e i n c r e a s i n g l y . 
(75) I b i d , p a r a . 12 . 
(76) I b i d , p a r a . 17* 
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B e f o r e c o n t i n u i n g w i t h the c r u c i a l f i n a n c i a l t a l k s , l e t 
us f i r s t c o n s i d e r the f i n a l s tages o f the commerc i a l t a l k s . 
By l a t e 19^5 b o t h s i de s were more t h a n f a m i l i a r w i t h the 
s u b s t a n t i a l I s sues i n v o l v e d , though d i p l o m a t i c e t i q u e t t e m i g h t 
p r o h i b i t e x p l i c i t a r t i c u l a t i o n o f t hose i s s u e s . A l l t h a t was 
l e f t was the f i n a l j o s t l i n g f o r the s t a k e s . I n p o i n t o f f a c t , 
though C l a y t o n , who wa3 now the ma in f i g u r e I n the S t a t e D e p a r t -
ment so f a r as economic I s s u e s , as we have seen, had adopted a 
d i f f e r e n t v i ew f r o m t h a t wh ich had p r e v a i l e d i n t he S t a t e D e p a r t -
ment d u r i n g t he Law, Wash ing ton t a l k s . C l a y t o n had e f f e c t i v e l y 
r e l e g a t e d p r e f e r e n c e i s s u e s below the f i n a n c i a l and monetary o n e s . 
He d i d g e n e r a l l y h o l d v e r y s i m i l a r v i e w s t o H u l l o n a l i b e r a l 
economy. However, he had moved away somewhat f r o m H u l l and 
P a s v o l s k y f s c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n t r a d i n g p r i n c i p l e s to t he a rea w h i c h 
had f o r f o u r y e a r s been the p r i m a r y c o n c e r n o f Henry Morgen thau . 
On November 7th, f o r e x a m p l e i -
" M r . C l a y t o n emphasised h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the 
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y f e a t u r e s o f the b i l a t e r a l agreements 
( o f t h e U . K . ) must be e l i m i n a t e d , and the s t e r l i n g 
a rea d o l l a r p o o l must be a b o l i s h e d . I n h i s v i e w t h e 
a b o l i t i o n o f t he d o l l a r p o o l was much more i m p o r t a n t 
t o U . S . e x p o r t e r s t h a n the e l i m i n a t i o n o f empi re 
p r e f e r e n c e . " (77) 
T h i s s w i t c h o f emphasis by C l a y t o n h e l p s t o e x p l a i n why the 
f o l l o w i n g commerc ia l t a l k s proceeded s t e a d i l y w i t h f e w u p s e t s t o 
a p r ima f a c i e s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n c l u s i o n . C l a y t o n reasoned t h a t 
B r i t a i n ' s p o s t - w a r i m p o r t needs were easy to see. He a l s o 
r e a l i s e d t h a t the v i t a l l y needed equipment to r e n o v a t e B r i t a i n ' s 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g I n d u s t r y was o n l y a v a i l a b l e f r o m the U . S . , so 
p r e f e r e n c e s wou ld n o t a f f e c t the ma in e x p o r t f l o w f r o m t h e U . S . 
t o t he U . K . The t h i n g t h a t d i d w o r r y the U .S . however , was t h a t 
(77) P .161. M i n u t e s U . S . Top.Cmte. M e e t i n g , Nov.7,19^5» 
Byrnes i n the c h a i r . F .R. o f U . S . V o l . V I . 
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the S t e r l i n g A r e a had a number o f raw m a t e r i a l s w h i c h . t h e U . S . 
wanted access t o . F u r t h e r m o r e , such t r a d e would h e l p to i n j e c t 
d o l l a r s i n t o the w o r l d economy w h i c h i n t u r n would h e l p to a v o i d 
the danger o f i n v o k i n g d i s c r i m i n a t o r y a c t i o n a g a i n s t the U . S . 
under t he I . M . F . d o l l a r shor t age c l a u s e . What the Amer icans 
r e a l l y f e a r e d was the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t he S t e r l i n g Area D o l l a r 
P o o l w h i c h c o u l d r e s t r i c t U . S . t r a d e w i t h t he members o f t he 
S t e r l i n g A r e a , o r cause a massive U . S . t r a d e imba lance w i t h t h e 
S t e r l i n g A r e a . T h i s c o n v e r s i o n o f t he S t a t e Depar tment t o 
M o r g e n t h a u ' s m o n e t a r i s t v iews were thus to a l l o w a more f l e x i b l e 
l i n e o f approach o n t h e commerc ia l t a l k s , and t o t h i s we must now 
t u r n . 
A t t he v e r y f i r s t mee t ing o f t h e commerc ia l t a l k s the 
Amer icans were p r e p a r e d t o make a v e r y b i g c o n c e s s i o n I n d e e d . 
They agreed t h a t t a r i f f s and p r e f e r e n c e s shou ld be t r e a t e d o n 
the same b a s i s . There was t o be no more s q u a b b l i n g over 1 a c r o s s -
t h e - b o a r d 1 v e r sus ' t h e n u c l e u s ' a p p r o a c h . C l a y t o n s t i l l i n s i s t e d 
o n the grounds o f C o n g r e s s i o n a l o p i n i o n , t h a t a f o r m u l a would 
have t o be d e v i s e d f o r the e l i m i n a t i o n o f r e s i d u a l p r e f e r e n c e s as 
u n p a l a t a b l e as he knew t h i s was t o t he B r i t i s h . N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
t h i s was a v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t s t ep f o r w a r d i n d e e d . One t h i n g 
t h a t was d i s t u r b i n g t o L i e s c h i n g , w h i c h he p o i n t e d o u t t o C l a y t o n 
the f o l l o w i n g d a y , was t h a t the Amer icans no l o n g e r c a l l e d f o r 
the a b o l i t i o n o f p r e f e r e n c e s under t he a u s p i c l e 3 o f A r t i c l e V I I , 
b u t as c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r f u r t h e r U . S . f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e . 
C l a y t o n once a g a i n p leaded C o n g r e s s i o n a l p r e s su re s as the excuse , 
though he must have been wary o f d i s c l o s i n g h i s hand too much a t 
t h i s s tage c o n c e r n i n g t h e more t a n g i b l e l i n k s w h i c h were t o be 
(78) See Wash, t o Cab. O f f s . 1 s t M e e t i n g Com.Po l . October 2,19*+5 
UE 1+708/1 09V53 . 
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e s t a b l i s h e d L a t e r be tween s a t i s f a c t o r y agreements w i t h t he 
B r i t i s h and f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e . The d r a f t p r o p o s a l s p r e s e n t e d 
by t he Amer lcaas o n t h e 3rd s p e c i f i c a l l y d e c l a r e d t he i n t e n t i o n 
t o f o l l o w the A r t i c l e V I I p r i n c i p l e s 5 t h e r e was no m e n t i o n o f 
f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e . The s p e c i f i c p r o p o s a l s w e r e i -
1. No i n c r e a s e I n marg ins o f p r e f e r e n c e , 
2. M . F . N , t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s to be a u t o m a t i c a l l y ex tended t o 
p r e f e r e n c e s , 
3. E x i s t i n g p r e f e r e n c e agreements t o be u n i l a t e r a l l y a b r o g a t e d , 
S u i t a b l e a r rangements to e l i m i n a t e p r e f e r e n c e s n o t covered 
by the above. 
5. A d h e r e n t s s h o u l d u n d e r t a k e to exempt t h e i r e x p o r t s , to o t h e r 
members , f rom e x p o r t t axes w h i c h a re o f a p r o t e c t i v e r a t h e r 
t h a n o f a revenue r a i s i n g n a t u r e . A p r o t e c t i v e e x p o r t t a x 
s h o u l d be d e f i n e d as one w h i c h has the e f f e c t o f enhanc ing 
t h e c o m p e t i t i v e p o s i t i o n o f a d o m e s t i c i n d u s t r y , u t i l i s i n g 
t he p r o d u c t s . I n no event shou ld p r e f e r e n c e s be m a i n t a i n e d 
o n e x p o r t t a x e s . 
6. Commitments w i t h r e g a r d t o t a r i f f s shou ld p e r m i t c o u n t r i e s t o 
t a k e t empora ry a c t i o n to p r e v e n t sudden and w i d e s p r e a d 
I n j u r y t o the d o m e s t i c p roduce r s conce rned . U n d e r t a k i n g s 
f o r r e d u c i n g t a r i f f s shou ld t h e r e f o r e c o n t a i n an escape 
(79) 
c l ause t o cover such c o n t i n g e n c i e s . ' 7 The r e a c t i o n o f 
Keynes, H a l i f a x and L l e s c h i n g to these p r o p o s a l s was m i x e d . 
There was no q u i b b l i n g over 1, 2 and b u t o n 3, t h e y suggested 
t o D a l t o n t h a t p r e f e r e n c e agreements s h o u l d o n l y be t e r m i n a t e d 
hy m u t u a l agreement . There was no s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o e i t h e r 
5 o r 6 i n the l e t t e r they sent to D a l t o n , though we have a l r e a d y 
(79) See T a r i f f s and E q u a l i t y o f T rea tmen t amendments, 
October 3 , 19^5, UEt+708/109^/53. 
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seen t h a t the t a r i f f escape c l a u s e was most w o r r y i n g t o the 
B r i t i s h . ^ 0 ) Keynes , e t a l , however , d i d n o t t h i n k t h a t the 
Amer icans were l i k e l y to move much f r o m the p o s i t i o n d e s c r i b e d 
above . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t hey asked London i f t h e y c o u l d c l i n c h 
agreement w i t h an o f f e r t o e l i m i n a t e p r e f e r e n c e s o n commodi t i es 
where t he p r o p o r t i o n coming f r o m p r e f e r r e d sources t o the t o t a l 
i m p o r t o f such commodi t i es was 5% o r l e s s . T h i s was w i t h the 
p r o v i s o t h a t the A m e r i c a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n accep t the p rog re s s t o 
d a t e . ( 8 l ) 
M i n i s t e r i a l a p p r o v a l was g i v e n o n Keynes 1 p r o p o s a l w h i c h 
was p re sen ted t o the U . S . d e l e g a t e s o n the 1 8 t h , U n f o r t u n a t e l y 
t he Amer icans r e j e c t e d the B r i t i s h v iews so Keynes pu t them i n 
w r i t i n g to e l i c i t c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s f r o m the U . S . , i n the hope 
t h a t t h i s would h e l p t o c l a r i f y t h e s i t u a t i o n . When i n f a c t t he 
c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s appea red , Keynes asked f o r p e r m i s s i o n to 
(82) 
accep t them i f t h e y were a l s o approved by the U . S . A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
From the new p r o p o s a l s i t appeared as i f t h e Amer icans had 
moved away f r o m t h e i r d o c t r i n a l approach to p r e f e r e n c e s . They 
now a d m i t t e d t h a t p r e f e r e n c e and t a r i f f cu t s s h o u l d be i n t e r -
r e l a t e d and t h a t the a b o l i t i o n o f p r e f e r e n c e s was someth ing w h i c h 
would r e q u i r e c a r e f u l and e x t e n s i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s . F u r t h e r m o r e , 
they now appeared to be c o n d u c t i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e 
f r amework o f A r t i c l e V I I r a t h e r t h a n as c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r 
f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e . P r e f e r e n c e s were now to be reduced a l o n g 
w i t h t a r i f f s , no new ones were t o be i n t r o d u c e d o r o l d ones 
(80) J . M . K . H a l . , L l e s c h i n g to C h . o f Ex. Oc tober 9,19^5, 
UE*f720/109^/53 - Nabob 133-
(81) I b i d . 
(82) Wash, to London, Nabob 195, O c t . 20,19^5, 
UE^720/109^/53. 
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i n c r e a s e d . But mo3t i m p o r t a n t , on the i s s u e o f the a b o l i t i o n 
o f the r e s i d u e : -
" A c t i o n f o r the e l i m i n a t i o n o f t a r i f f p r e f e r e n c e s wou ld 
be t a k e n i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h adequate measures f o r the 
s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n o f b a r r i e r s to w o r l d t r a d e , as 
p a r t o f the m u t u a l l y advantageous i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r r a n g e -
ments comple ted i n t h i s document . " (83) 
T h i s was most amenable t o the B r i t i s h , who b e l i e v e d t h a t t h i s 
was about the be s t t h e y c o u l d d o . U n f o r t u n a t e l y no sooner were 
t he B r i t i s h b e g i n n i n g to f e e l p leased w i t h themse lves t h a n the 
Amer icans began t o renew c e r t a i n l i n e s o f p r e s s u r e . They 
sugges ted t h a t B r i t a i n ' s r e s i d u a l p r e f e r e n c e marg ins shou ld be 
abolished a t the proposed t r a d e c o n f e r e n c e i n 19^6; whereas t h e i r 
e x i s t i n g p r e f e r e n t i a l a r rangements w i t h the P h i l l i p i n e s were t o 
be e l i m i n a t e d o n l y g r a d u a l l y . So l a t e October w i t n e s s e d the 
c l o u d s g a t h e r i n g o v e r t he t a l k s once a g a i n . 
The C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer o n Oc tober 26th made i t 
c l e a r B r i t a i n was p r epa red t o e l i m i n a t e p r e f e r e n c e s e v e n t u a l l y , 
p r o v i d e d t h e r e was commensurate l i b e r a l i s a t i o n o f t r a d e measures 
c a r r i e d o u t by t he U . S . and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . However , as t h e 
P r e s i d e n t o f the Board o f Trade added on the f o l l o w i n g d a y : -
"They s t i l l p r o p o s e d , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e i r own a t t i t u d e 
i n the case o f t he P h i l l i p i n e s to h o l d o u t to Congress 
the hope t h a t t he p r e f e r e n t i a l system can be e l i m i n a t e d 
as a r e s u l t o f the f o r t h c o m i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s and a re 
u n w i l l i n g to a d m i t t h a t the comple te f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h e i r 
d e s i r e s i s an u l t i m a t e g o a l w h i c h can a t b e s t be reached 
b y s t a g e s . " CSU-) 
On. the f o l l o w i n g day the s i t u a t i o n began to change somewhat 
d r a s t i c a l l y . The T r e a s u r y Depar tment and, as we have seen, 
C l a y t o n , b o t h r ega rded the monetary a spec t s o f the U . K . 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic s t r u c t u r e as p o t e n t i a l l y t he most i n i m i c a l 
(83) D r a f t V I I , U . S . 
(8h) See C h . o f Ex. t o Wash. Oct.26,19*+5, UE5135/109V53> and 
P re s . o f B . o f T . to Wash. L l e s c h i n g , O c t . 2 ? , 19*+5, 
UE5066/109V53. 
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t o U . S . i n t e r e s t s . Now, s i m u l t a n e o u s l y to t h e commerc ia l 
t a l k s , d i s c u s s i o n s were c o n t i n u i n g ove r f i n a n c i a l a i d to B r i t a i n . 
A l r e a d y i t had been made i m p l i c i t l y c l e a r t h a t commerc ia l and 
f i n a n c i a l agreement were t o some degree I n t e r d e p e n d e n t , though 
t h e r e was r e l u c t a n c e to use t h i s b i g s t i c k f o r the commerc ia l 
t a l k s . I t was to be r e s e r v e d to c r a c k a b i g g e r n u t . The 
T r e a s u r y and C l a y t o n knew t h a t t he o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t o f i n a n c i a l 
a s s i s t a n c e f r o m the U . S . f o r the U . K . , was dependence upon the 
S t e r l i n g A r e a , w i t h the d o l l a r p o o l and supp lemen ta ry monetary 
agreements . I f the S t e r l i n g Area c o u l d be weakened by a 
commitment f r o m the U . K . t o a b o l i s h I m p e r i a l P r e f e r e n c e , t h e n 
o b v i o u s l y the a l t e r n a t i v e t o f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e f r o m the U . S . 
wou ld be s e v e r e l y unde rmined . However, t h e r e were a number o f 
peop le w i t h i n the S t a t e Depa r tmen t , n o t a b l y Acheson , who were 
more s y m p a t h e t i c t oward t he U . K . o n monetary i s s u e s and p r e f e r r e d 
a more Immedia te agreement on p r e f e r e n c e s r a t h e r t h a n r i s k the 
p o s s i b i l i t y , remote as i t was, o f a p o s s i b l e b r e a k w i t h the U . K . 
o n economic I s sues w h i c h would l eave I m p e r i a l P r e f e r e n c e s i n t a c t . 
On October 28th, L i e s c h i n g w r o t e to t he C a b i n e t O f f i c e s t h a t he 
had been summoned to the S t a t e Depar tment by W i l c o x , where he 
was t o l d o f a s tormy s e s s i o n a t the T rea su ry I n v o l v i n g S t a t e 
Depar tmen t o f f i c i a l s , C l a y t o n and V i n s o n , w h i c h r e s u l t e d i n 
agreement to accep t d r a f t 7 o f t he T a r i f f s and P r e f e r e n c e s I s s ue 
and a l s o p r o b a b l y the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e document w h i c h had been 
drawn up to ensure t h e r e was no a m b i g u i t y i n v o l v e d i n the 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n . L i e s c h i n g was somewhat 
d o u b t f u l about t h i s second p o i n t , b u t the s i t u a t i o n was much 
improved and hopes r a i s e d . T h i n g s were s t i l l n o t f i n a l i s e d 
(85) See Gen. 89/12, d e t a i l s i n Baboon 207, Annexes A and B. , 
Nov. 6, 191*5, UE5350/109V53* See a l s o M i n i s t e r i a l M e e t i n g 
Nov. 5, 19**5, P . M . i n c h a i r , o n F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y , p . 1 * . 
D a l t o n ' s comments. 
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t h o u g h , and i t was o n l y a m a t t e r o f days b e f o r e L i e s c h i n g was 
c o m p l a i n i n g , t h i s t i m e , o f Hawkins b e i n g " . . . o b s t i n a t e and 
d o c t r i n a i r e . . . " p a r t i c u l a r l y r e g a r d i n g the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . 
However , d e s p i t e the d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h V i n s o n and C l a y t o n 
o v e r t he t a r i f f p r e f e r e n c e i s s u e , and l a s t m inu t e d o u b t s ove r 
q u a n t i t a t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s , the f i n a l amendments were made on 
November 5« The document which was f i n a l l y a c c e p t e d o n December 
1st , and p u b l i s h e d on December 6th, was now c o m p l e t e d . I n f a c t 
t he p r o v i s i o n s o n t a r i f f s and p r e f e r e n c e s were v i r t u a l l y t h e 
same as the U .S . Oc tober 3> p r o p o s a l s ' w i t h the e x c e p t i o n t h a t 
t h e p r o v i s i o n f o r u n i l a t e r a l a b r o g a t i o n o f p r e f e r e n t i a l agreements 
was d r o p p e d . So, d e s p i t e C l a y t o n ' s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t A r t i c l e V I I 
commi t t ed B r i t a i n , u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y , t o the a b o l i t i o n o f p r e f e r -
ences , the e f f e c t o f t he new agreement was t o m o d i f y t h i s . Any 
r e d u c t i o n s o f t a r i f f s and p r e f e r e n c e s were now to be o f a 
m u t u a l l y advantageous n a t u r e . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e was no p r i o r 
commitment t o reduce o r e l i m i n a t e p r e f e r e n c e s p r i o r to 
n e g o t i a t i o n , nor was a f i n a l d a t e s e t f o r t h e i r f u l l a b o l i t i o n . 
So f a r t h e n , the compromise agreement was much i n B r i t a i n ! s 
f a v o u r , though t h e r e was some c o n c e r n o v e r t he escape c l a u s e f o r 
t he Amer icans o n t a r i f f s . There were o f course o t h e r a spec t s 
o f t he commerc ia l t a l k s bes ides the t a r i f f p r e f e r e n c e i s s u e , and 
b e f o r e r e t u r n i n g to the f i n a n c i a l t a l k s we must f i r s t l o o k b r i e f l y 
a t the r e s u l t s o f t he se t a l k s . 
On s t a t e t r a d i n g a s a t i s f a c t o r y outcome had been reached w i t h 
B r i t a i n p l e d g i n g h e r s e l f t o commerc ia l p r i n c i p l e s i n the use o f 
s t a t e t r a d i n g . However , t r o u b l e was t o d e v e l o p l a t e r ove r t h i s , 
(86) See L i e s c h i n g to C a D . O f f s . Nabob 229, Oct .28,19^5, 
UE 51 ^7/109I+/53 and L i e s c h i n g and Shack le to R o b b i n s , 
Nov. 3 , 19^5, UE5325/109V53. 
(87) See above. 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y wi th regard to post-war long term beef contracts 
wi th Argentina. Three other troublesome issues had simply 
f i z z l e d out a f t e r strong objections had been expressed. These 
* were the necessity f o r land cont igu i ty f o r customs unions, the 
p r o h i b i t i o n on extending the benef i t s of a fu tu re I . T . O . to 
non-members and the proposals concerning exchange cont ro ls , a l l 
put forward by the U.S. On th is l a t t e r point a simple statement 
was made urging common membership o f the I .T .O . and the I . M . F . 
There was no need to take th i s any f u r t h e r , as f a r as Clayton 
was concerned, f o r there would be bet ter opportunit ies to modify 
Bret ton Wood3 i n the f i n a n c i a l t a l k s . 
Quanti tat ive regulations were to be abolished by the 
agreement, with temporary exceptions to a l l ev i a t e the t r a n s i t i o n 
period. The other main exception was to enable B r i t i s h and 
American agr icu l tu re a degree of expansion and prosperi ty i n the 
post-war period. The U.S. was so in ten t on securing her 
a g r i c u l t u r a l prosperi ty that she in s i s t ed , on what was seen as 
one o f the most objectionable clauses i n the agreement, one that 
would allow her to subsidise the export of goods i n world 
surplus. A point that has already been elaborated on above. 
An add i t iona l comment i s required here, however, because the 
need f o r such a clause indicates the lack of success i n the 
commodity control f i e l d . Both the U.S. and U.K. had d i f f e r e n t 
views on th i s though now the Americans, p a r t i c u l a r l y because 
of Clayton's inf luence , were moving away from an e f f e c t i v e 
commodity control s c h e m e . F i n a l l y , quant i t a t ive r e s t r i c t i o n s 
were to be allowed on balance o f payment grounds, though on a 
non-discriminatory basis. There had been some argument over the 
(88) See previous chapter. 
(89) See p ,1^5, Selected Papers of W.Clayton. 
391 
r i g h t to discriminate i n the t r a n s i t i o n a l period and one of the 
points the U.K. had been successful on was that the above non-
d isc r imina t ion ru le would not apply to the use of inconver t ib le 
currencies u t i l i s e d f o r buying needed imports. 
On the face of i t there was no wonder the B r i t i s h ministers 
and negotiators were pleased wi th the resul ts of the commercial 
t a lks . S t i l l , as they were both w e l l aware, the commercial and 
f i n a n c i a l ta lks were 3imply a r t i f i c i a l d iv is ions of the o v e r a l l 
economic sphere. Concessions given to the B r i t i s h i n the 
commercial ta lks might very wel l be seen as J u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
harsher treatment i n the f i n a n c i a l t a l k s . Certainly as the 
f i n a n c i a l ta lks reached the i r climax i t became obvious that the 
apparently favourable agreement on commercial pol icy was very 
much of a Pyrrhic Vic to ry . The f i n a n c i a l ta lks were to be the 
decisive f a c t o r . 
Two days before Dalton d ra f t ed h i s lengthy piece o f 
cautionary advice f o r Keynes, the U.S. Top Committee held i t s 
f i r s t meeting. I t s main purpose was to'discuss the exchange of 
( 9 1 ) 
views wi th Hal i fax and Keynes on f i n a n c i a l matters. 7 
(90) For de ta i l s o f above see J.S.M. Wash, to Cab.Offs. 
Nov.3, 19^5, ^ 5 3 2 6 / 1 0 9 ^ / 5 3 (Commercial Negotiations Gen.)i 
Agreed Formula i n 3aboon 2 0 ? , Nov.6, 19^5, UE5350 /109V53J 
Top Secret M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting, P.M. i n chair , Nov. 5^19^5 
UE51+00/109^/53. 
(91) See F.R. of U.S. 19^5, Vol . V I , p. 1 M , Minutes of U.S. 
Top. Committee Meeting, Oct. 6, 19^5-
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Although the three meetings with the B r i t i s h negotiators had been 
indecis ive , Harry White was eager to advocate a very pos i t ive 
l i ne on the amount of f i n a n c i a l assistance that should be o f f e red 
to the B r i t i s h . White to ld the meeting that i n his opinion the 
U.K. would require # 3 « 3 B give or take a b i l l i o n , to clean up the 
balance of payments and s t e r l i n g problems ' n i c e l y 1 , whereas 32B 
could probably s t i l l do the job though less adequately. ^ 
Despite the experts 1 opinion, there was s t i l l uncertainty at the 
meeting regarding the f i n a l f i g u r e . And yet , although they could 
not decide how much credi t they were prepared to give B r i t a i n , 
they d id decide that favourable solutions of other economic Issues 
were necessary. They did not seem to appreciate that f a v o u r a b i i i t y 
might be d i r e c t l y related to the amount of credi t they were 
prepared to extend to the U.K. S t i l l i -
" I t was . . . agreed that i t was essential that the 
f i n a n c i a l and commercial pol icy understandings be 
accompanied by an o v e r a l l settlement of lend-lease, 
surplus disposal , and re la ted claims and bene f i t s . " (93) 
Of the persons present at the October 6 meeting, Clayton 
was one o f those i n favour of exceeding the mean amount of # 3 « 3 s 
put forward by White, Furthermore, Clayton went ahead and 
raised B r i t i s h hopes on the basis of th i s convic t ion. On 
October 9, a message was received i n London from Washington, 
expressing Clayton's views, but wi th the q u a l i f i c a t i o n that they 
were not to be pub l i c ly a t t r ibu ted to him or the State Department. 
(92) White head of Cmte. to study U.K.Fin.needs. He de l ibe ra te ly 
excluded Luxford and Bernstein who were sympathetic to U.K. 
See R.N.Gardner, Op.Cit. pp.19^-5-
(93) I b i d . p. 11*3. 
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The de t a i l s were, a 35B c redi t wi th a grace period of f i v e years 
before repayments were to begin. The uses f o r the SJ^ B were not 
(oh/ 
spec i f ied and there was no mention o f a spec i f i c in te res t r a t e . ' 
On the same day i n Washington, H a l i f a x and J.M.Keynes talked with 
Vinson and Clayton using Dalton's l e t t e r of the eighth f o r 
guidance. Clayton and Vinson re i t e ra ted the proposals already 
leaked to the B r i t i s h wi th the add i t ion of a 2% in te res t charge 
a f t e r the f i v e year grace period. J ' These proposals were l e f t 
to be considered by the B r i t i s h . Meanwhile the Americans t r i e d 
to hammer out a d e f i n i t e l ine on the terms f o r the c r ed i t . 
At a Finance Committee meeting on the 11th October, the 
Americans made considerable progress on the credi t terms. The 
meeting, chaired by Vinson, endorsed the proposals already put 
to the B r i t i s h but also requested that the technical sub-
committee should undertake to produce object ive c r i t e r i a f o r a 
waiver clause on repayments, A va r i e ty of other re la ted issues 
were discussed and a number of conclusions and recommendations 
made. F i r s t of a l l the aid would take the form of a l i ne of 
c red i t rather than a loan. Secondly, a f t e r some desul t ry 
discussion, i t .was t en ta t ive ly decided to charge 2% in te res t 
a f t e r the f i v e year grace period. The only suggestion that the 
c red i t should be in te res t f ree came from J.W.Angell , Assistant 
Administrator i n the F.E.A., but such a suggestion was never 
seriously i n contention. T h i r d l y , the waiver clause was agreed 
t o , but on condi t ion that progress was made toward giving p r i o r i t y 
repayment r igh t s to the U.S. so that the B r i t i s h could not invoke 
(9*0 See Wash, to F.O. Oct, 9, 19^5, UEi+685/109V53. 
(95) 1.63# e f f e c t i v e ove ra l l i n t e r e s t charge. 
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the waiver to use American credi t to pay o f f Loans to other 
c red i to rs . F i n a l l y , there was the question of the size of the 
c r e d i t . Vinson said that he did not intend to reach a f i n a l 
decision at the meeting but he i n v i t e d those present to discuss 
the problem, a f t e r some c l a r i f i c a t i o n from White. White, working 
on a f i g u r e of 03.3B f o r B r i t a i n ' s t o t a l t r a n s i t i o n a l d e f i c i t , 
and by introducing the p o s s i b i l i t y of various agreements to 
borrow and monetary manipulation B r i t a i n could resort t o , 
wh i t t l ed the U.K. requirement from the U.S. down to #1B whichi -
" . . . would be required from the U.S. i f the only 
purpose of the credi t was to cover the t r a n s i t i o n 
d e f i c i t of the U.K." (96) 
Clayton objected to th i s on two groundsi (a) the B r i t i s h 
estimates ranged between a d e f i c i t of 05 - 6B> not 03.3B; 
(b) White had not taken in to account adequately the d ra in on U.K. 
gold and do l l a r reserves the w r i t i n g down of the s t e r l i n g 
balances would have. Clayton was determined to destroy the 
s t e r l i ng area do l l a r pool and other r e s t r i c t i v e B r i t i s h economic 
practices; but not at the expense of B r i t a i n ' s t o t a l economic 
collapse, which could be even more i n i m i c a l to U.S. economic 
in te res t s . The d i f fe rence here, between Clayton and the Treasury, 
was one of judgement regarding B r i t a i n ' s economic pos i t i on , 
rather than one concerning basic po l i cy . However, no decision 
was taken at th i s stage though White ce r ta in ly t r i e d to chop the 
f i g u r e down. Obviously as White was a senior representative o f 
the Treasury Department th i s d id not augur wel l f o r B r i t a i n ' s 
claims f o r f i n a n c i a l assistance. 
(96) Meeting of U.S. Finance Cmte.Oct. 11,19*+5, 
F.R. 19^5, Vol . V I , PP.1W5-1W9. 
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I n London Dalton was r e luc t an t ly coming to accept that 
a g ran t - in -a id was not possible, but he s t i l l had two preferable 
a l ternat ives to the U.S. proposals. The f i r s t one,as i n his 
telegram of October 8th, consisted of a #2B grant plus 33.^-B 
c red i t at 1#, secondly, f a i l i n g t h i s , an i n t e r e s t - f r e e loan 
with a ten year grace period before repayments begin, and then 
l i a b i l i t y was not to exceed 0100m i n any one y e a r . ^ ^ I f we 
compare these suggestions with the agreements reached by the U.S. 
Financial Committee on the 11th, the divergence of opinions Is 
very marked and Indeed the gu l f widened even f u r t h e r with the 
decision of the U.S. on October 17th to agree t en t a t i ve ly on a 
f i g u r e of 03.5B f o r the B r i t i s h c r e d i t ^ 9 8 \ though as the 
Secretary of State was to admit to Winant some weeks l a t e r , they 
could probably have managed 3*tB. 7 7 
One a l te rna t ive which could have reduced Br i ta in*s l i a b i l i t i e s 
would have been an acceptance by the U.S. of equali ty of s a c r i f i c e 
i n regard to pre-December 19^1 war expenditure. Some minor 
concessions had already been made, as we noted early on i n the 
account, but Vinson and Clayton now repeatedly assured the U.K. 
that th i s would be unacceptable to Congress. Keynes had some 
d i f f i c u l t y i n coming to terms with t h i s . He thought he saw 
widespread goodwill and a desire to h e l p ' , from the American 
publ ic , and commented that , " . . . Clayton was generous and not 
unreasonable..." Keynes saw the problem i n the lack of 
government leadership. 
" . . . i t i s d i f f i c u l t to believe they do not under-rate 
what bold and eloquent leadership could do. But you 
must understand that such leadership i s jus t what I s 
lacking i n t h i s present adminis trat ion from the President 
down." (100) 
(97) See Ch.of Ex. to J.M.K. Oct.12,19^5, Ufc)^803/109V53. 
(98) See F.R.191*5, Vol . V I , p. 155, Footnote, 
(99) S.S. to Winant, Nov. 5th, 191*5, F.R.19^5, Vol . V I , p . 1 51+. 
(100) J.M.K.to Ch.of Ex.Oct.18,191+5, UE4-920/109V53. 
396 
With regard to what we know of the decisions and Line of 
approach the Americans had decided to adopt, t h i s seems an 
inaccurate assessment, indeed according to Lord Robbins i t would 
seem to per ta in more to the B r i t i s h . The Americans had 
prevaricated and had appeared somewhat unsure whi l s t undergoing 
the s e t t l i n g i n o f the new President. To compound th i s 
uncertainty, B r i t a i n had only supplied sketchy f igures of her 
economy f o r the U.S. and as we have seen, there were d i f ferences 
between the State and Treasury Departments. S t i l l , the not ion 
that Vinson and Clayton lacked the a b i l i t y to be decisive was 
soon to be d i spe l led . This assessment by Keynes was that o f a 
very t i r e d and severely i l l man. He had come to the U.S. with 
the b e l i e f that he could get a g ran t - in -a id of 35 - I t was 
now obvious that t h i s was not to be. Keynes found th i s d i f f i c u l t 
to understand. He was to f i n d i t even more d i f f i c u l t to come to 
terms wi th wil l ingness of the Americans to subordinate B r i t a i n ' s 
economic in teres ts to the i r own to a very considerable extent. 
I t was not the lack of leadership that was the cause - as Penrose 
says, no one t r i e d to convince Congress, i t was the unpalatable 
views and conditions which clashed so much wi th h i s own o r i g i n a l 
hopes that Keynes found d i f f i c u l t to assimilate . On October 20th, 
the pos i t ion was b l u n t l y c l a r i f i e d by Vinson, He to ld H a l i f a x 
and Keynes that a meeting of the U.S.Top Committee had 
unanimously decided what they believed would be acceptable to 
Congress. 
1) 33£B at 2% wi th f i v e years repayment grace. 
2) . p o s s i b i l i t y of a waiver clause. 
3) whatever i s required to clear up Lend-Lease at 
3(c terms, i . e . 2$$>, 
(101) See Robbins, Op.Cit. pp,20U-20?. 
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I n re turn f o r t h i s , B r i t a i n was expected to enter the 
same commitments, p a r t i c u l a r l y as pertained to the S t e r l i ng Area, 
as had been discussed p r e v i o u s l y . ^ 1 0 2 ^ This was, as we have 
seen, neither unanimous nor d e f i n i t e l y the las t word. Clayton 
had pressed f o r a higher o v e r a l l f i g u r e , and the view had been 
expressed that Congress would not d i f f e r e n t i a t e s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
between or SJW.OB. S t i l l the B r i t i s h were hardly to know 
t h i s , though they were aware o f the changeability regarding the 
technical de ta i l s of the l i ne of c r e d i t . Indeed, th i s was the 
very point Dalton made as a preamble to a lengthy appraisal sent 
personally to Keynes i n Washington.^1^3) 
F i r s t o f a l l Dalton thought that i n view of what seemed to 
him to be the uncertainty of the s i t u a t i o n that the B r i t i s h 
should t ry to take the i n i t i a t i v e by a f u r t h e r set of proposals. 
These he set out i n two ' a l t e r n a t i v e s ' , A and B. 
Al te rna t ive ' A 1 1 -
(1) 32.B f o r 50 years at wi th a f i v e year grace period, 
(2) Option on a fu r the r #2B, in te res t f r ee to l i b e r a l i s e 
S te r l ing Area do l l a r purchases. 
(3) B r i t a i n would then (a) ask f o r a negotiated scaling 
down of s t e r l i n g balances; (b) sponsor the I . T . O , ; 
(c) recommend Bret ton Woods to Parliament. 
(k) Above condi t ional on a sa t i s fac to ry waiver clause, 
i . e . not subject to Congressional d i s c r e t i on or over-
interference i n the B r i t i s h economy, to be invoked i f 
there was a shortage of d o l l a r s , on in t e rna t iona l 
depression or d i s rup t ion of world trade. (101*) 
(102) J.M.K. to Ch.of Ex. Oct. 20th, 19^5, UE*f99Vl09V53• 
(103) Ch.of Ex. to J.S.M. Wash. Baboon 155, Oct.27,19^5, 
UE502V109^/53. 
(10»O See I b i d and Wash, to Cab.Off s.Oct.21,1 9^5, UE502^/109V531 
the l a t t e r f o r waiver d e t a i l s . 
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I f th i s was not acceptable then a l te rna t ive ' B ' should be 
resorted to ; a s t ra ightforward commercial loan of 32-J-B at 2% 
with no commitments other than repayment. Dalton was aware of 
the contention th i s might cause i n Washington and attempted to 
j u s t i f y them i n a lengthy explanatory telegram which immediately 
fol lowed the new proposals. ^ 
"We are f u l l y conscious of the importance of these 
negotiations f o r Anglo-American re la t ions and i f we 
appear to be guarding our own v i t a l in te res ts rather 
cautiously, not least of those in teres ts i s a r e l a t i o n -
ship with the United States which w i l l stand the tes t 
of the f u t u r e . I t i s on th i s account that we cannot 
accept obl igat ions which we may not be able to f u l f i l l , 
or agree to conditions which are capable of double 
in t e rp re t a t ions . " (106) 
Af te r the optimism generated by the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 35B 
grant, the s i t ua t i on now by contrast looked gloomy indeed. 
B r i t i s h expectations of what the Americans would do was having 
to be rapid ly revised, but the Americans were not rev is ing the i r 
expectations o f B r i t i s h actions i n a s imi lar ve in . They were 
s t i l l demanding the same concessions from B r i t a i n under conditions 
of d r a s t i c a l l y reduced f igures f o r f i n a n c i a l assistance. This 
was what Dalton strongly objected to . 
(105) Ch, of Ex. to J.S.M. Wash. Oct. 27, 19^5, 
UE502»+/109^/53. 
(106) I b i d . 
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"a) I n addi t ion to accepting a l i a b i l i t y of at least 
31B wi th in te res t at 2 per cent fo r the purpose of 
enabling countries which are valuable markets of our 
own to tu rn to do l l a r goods i n the Immediate f u t u r e , 
we are apparently to f i n d about another b i l l i o n do l l a r s 
out of our reserves so that the do l la r s avai lable to 
the s t e r l i ng area are to be the same as i f the loan 
were 35 b i l l i o n . 
b) Probably making s t e r l i n g convertible e a r l i e r than we 
should l i k e . 
c) I f the commercial ta lks reach some agreement, sponsor-
ing the Commercial Conference, wi th pressure f o r some 
Empire commitment to the United States i f the Conference 
f a i l s . 
d) Presumably abolishing d i sc r imina t ion against U.S. 
exports even i n 19A6.11 (107) 
Dalton was also concerned over the p rac t i ca l appl ica t ion o f 
the waiver clause, but as may be i n f e r r ed from the above, the 
main stumbling bloc was the s t e r l i n g balances, and on th i s Dalton 
was to express himself f o r c i b l y . The o r i g i n a l hope f o r a grant-
i n - a i d or an in te res t f ree loan would have allowed the U.K. to 
regain a viable economic pos i t ion , and at the same time th i s 
gesture from the U.S. would have provided an i n d i c a t i o n of her 
wi l l ingness to cooperate i n a l i be r a l i s ed world economy with an 
economically healthy and competitive U.K. I f , as now appeared 
to be the case, the U.S. was to o f f e r a loan at commercial rates 
of in te res t both U.S. wil l ingness to see an economically healthy 
competitive B r i t a i n , and her cooperative s p i r i t , were placed i n 
doubt. B r i t a i n once again faced the dilemma of e i ther rel iance 
on the U.S. , a recognised gamble but with the best prospects i f 
i t succeeded, or the maintainance of an economic safety net 
based on the S te r l ing Area. This entai led a less act ive l ine on 
proposals fo r reducing the s t e r l i n g balances, and i n f a c t as 
Dalton proposed, I s o l a t i n g them from the f i n a n c i a l negotiations 
wi th the Americans. For the Americans favoured a massive 
reduc t ion /wr i t ing o f f , of the s t e r l i n g balances as part and 
parcel of the dismantling of the S t e r l i ng Area. Obviously, I f 
(107) I b i d . 
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B r i t a i n reneged on her s t e r l i ng l i a b i l i t i e s i n a massive way, 
th i s would not be conducive to voluntary deposits by member 
states of the i r do l la r s and ot.ier hard currencies. Such 
cancellations would, the Americans thought, lessen the need f o r 
f i n a n c i a l assistance fo r the U.K. For the B r i t i s h , however, 
three fac tors were of utmost importance. F i r s t of a l l as has 
been mentioned, the e f f e c t on U.K. -S te r l ing Area r e l a t i ons . 
Secondly, i f the U.S. gave a loan to the U.K. on commercial terms 
i t would be even more d i f f i c u l t to I n s i s t that economically 
backward and p o l i t i c a l l y sensi t ive countries l i k e Ind ia , Egypt 
and Middle East o i l producers should adopt a l t r u i s t i c po l ic ies 
and wr i t e o f f the i r credi ts to the U.K. T h i r d l y , even I f these 
countries agreed to act i n th i s way, B r i t a i n would be exchanging 
s t e r l i n g l i a b i l i t i e s at non-commercial, i . e . in te res t ra tes , 
f o r do l l a r l i a b i l i t i e s at commercial rates. Furthermore, the 
aim of such a loan was to finance U.S. exports to the S te r l ing 
Area, not only was 3 r i t a i n to be squeezed f i n a n c i a l l y , but some 
of her las t trade preserves were to be penetrated by the U.S. , 
who was i n a f a r bet ter pos i t ion to compete i n such markets. 
With th i s i n raind^^8^ Dalton suggested that a gentlemen's 
agreement would be more appropriate, one which would f ree the 
s t e r l i n g issue from the credi t negotiat ions. He proposed that 
B r i t a i n should pledge herself to as much l i b e r a l i s a t i o n as 
possible, non-discriminatory use of s t e r l i n g balances, B r i t i s h 
con t ro l over releases of cap i t a l amounts of s t e r l i n g and f i n a l l y , 
a commitment to negotiate the reduction of s t e r l i n g balances with 
f u l l regard to American opinions on t h i s . ^ 1 0 ^ 
(108) See Ch.of Ex. personal f o r J.S.M.Wash. Oct .27, 19^5, 
UE502V109V53. 
(109) I b i d . 
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On the fo l lowing day, Keynes repl ied to Dalton's two 
telegrams. Dalton, Keynes al leged, had grossly misjudged the 
s i t u a t i o n . I n fac t i n the personal l e t t e r he sent via Robbins, 
he re fers to 'demented' advice regarding the proposal i n 
Al te rna t ive , B 1 which;-
1 1 . . . i s so e n t i r e l y out of touch with r e a l i t y that we 
are l e f t dazed." (110) 
I n the o f f i c i a l l e t t e r , Keynes simply informed the Chancellor 
that there was no a l te rna t ive 'B ' avai lable . The reasons he 
gives are not that the proposal i s simply un rea l i s t i c but that 
the U.S. government does not have powers outside o f Lend-Lease 
3c provisions to proffer f i n a n c i a l assistance on reasonable 
terms, i . e . 2|# over 30 years. As f o r the Import-Export Bank, 
in te res t would be 3# over the period of the loan, but i n i t i a l 
service would be 8 # . ^ 1 1 ^ This put the emphasis back squarely 
on a negotiated ' p o l i t i c a l ' loan from the U.S. The only 
a l t e rna t ive to th i s was a home based recovery, an opt ion that to 
many appeared u n r e a l i s t i c . So, th i s put the onus very much upon 
the B r i t i s h to square things with the Americans on the i r 
f i n a n c i a l proposals. 
This problem i s misrepresented by Dalton i n h i s memoirs. 
I n Keynes* personal l e t t e r to Dalton he complains of the unrealism 
of a l t e rna t ive ' B 1 and the confused l i ne of thought running 
through Baboon 156, p a r t i c u l a r l y wi th regard to what appeared a 
complacent a t t i tude toward a possible breakdown i n the t a l k s . 
(110) Dalton. Op.Cit. pp .?6-77, l e t t e r J.M.K. to Dalton, 
dated Oct. 28th, 19^5-
(111) See J.M.K. to Dalton, Oct.28th, 191*5, UEJ169/109^/53-
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Dalton denies any complacency, and indeed th i s could have been 
simply a mis in te rpre ta t ion by Keynes, However, so f a r as the 
denial of unreallsm i s concerned, Dalton blunders badly. He 
confuses Al te rna t ive ' B ' , a purely commercial loan wi th no t i e s , 
wi th paragraph (b) i n Al te rna t ive ! A ! , which, as un rea l i s t i c as 
that was, was nowhere near so divorced from r e a l i t y as 
Al te rna t ive ' B ' . ^ 1 1 2 ^ The explanation of th i s mistake might' 
l i e i n the f ac t that Robbins returned to London at th i s time and 
elucidated the s i t u a t i o n and the problems that the B r i t i s h had to 
face i n Washington. At thl9 time Dalton cer ta in ly modified h i s 
views r a p i d l y , as we sha l l see. This rather v io len t change i n 
his understanding of the s i t ua t i on may account f o r h i s inaccurate, 
l a t e r , recol lec t ions or he may simply have been re luctant to 
admit to his f a i l u r e previously to assess the s i t u a t i o n accurately. 
Dalton, to give him his due, quickly adapted to the new 
s i t u a t i o n once i t had been c l a r i f i e d . He quickly abandoned any 
hopes f o r Al te rna t ive '3* but he was s t i l l convinced that f u r t h e r 
e f f o r t s needed to be made to maintain cer ta in basic r i g h t s f o r 
B r i t a i n ' s domestic and in te rna t iona l economic ro le s . He worked 
hard on t h i s fo r a number o f days and during the la te hours of 
November 5th and early morning of the fo l lowing day, he presented 
his case to the inner C a b i n e t . ^ 1 ^ I n f a c t , Dalton's proposals 
were almost Iden t i ca l wi th those o f October 27th, i n A l t e rna t ive 
' A 1 , wi th one or two adjustments. The f i r s t tranche of the 
c red i t was now to be at 2% rather than \% and the commitments 
on l i b e r a l i s i n g the S te r l ing Area were s l i g h t l y more s p e c i f i c . ^ 1 ^ 
(112) See Dalton, Op.Cit. p.78 and Baooon 155 and 156, quoted 
above. 
(113) Inner Cab. normally At lee , Bevln, Dalton, Morrison and 
Cripps. 
(1lLf) See Ch.of h-x. to Hal.and J . M.K.Wash. Nov.6,1 9W5 
UE531*9/109y53« Dalton Op.Cit . pp 79-30: Watt D.C, 
o p . c i t . p .65. 
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I f , however, th i s s l i g h t l y modified a l t e rna t ive *A' was not 
acceptable, i n view of the need to reach a settlement the 
B r i t i s h team should be empowered to go as fa r as 34-B at 2% 
with an opt ion on a fu r the r #1B at the same in te res t ra te , wi th 
f i v e years grace before the 50 years repayment instalments 
began.^ 1 1 5) Obviously i f anything better was mooted by the 
Americans then they should t r y to negotiate f o r such gains on 
the pos i t ion as i t had been set ou t . However, i f t h i s minimum 
was a l l that was obtainable, then as much as Dalton d i s l i k e d the 
idea a waiver clause was essent ia l . The waiver must be couched 
i n such language though, which would avoid d iscre t ionary ac t ion 
or interference by the U.S. , a point that was r e i t e ra t ed by the 
Foreign Secretary. On the key question of the S t e r l i ng Area 
Dalton s a l d i -
i t was essential that the Americans should not 
have any grounds f o r in te r fe rence . I t was i n our i n t e r e s t 
to make the best terms we could and we should be l e f t wi th 
a f ree hand to make them." (116) 
Both Atlee and Cripps agreed, largely f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons, 
that any large scale reduction of the s t e r l i ng balances was 
v i r t u a l l y impossible, though they should be reduced as f a r as 
f r e e l y negotiated agreements allowed. At t h i s po in t , Professor 
Robbins contributed to the discussion. As a prel iminary 
observation he t o l d the meeting that on the face of things the 
Americans d id seem to want to help the U.K. , but that such help 
was to be i n accordance with Congressional and public opinion. 
But then, strangely a f t e r presenting Congress and public opinion 
as major r e s t r i c t i n g influences on the Adminis t ra t ion, he went on 
to contradict t h i s . 
(115) See Top Secret Min.Meeting, 10 Downing S t . , Nov.5,19^5, 
chaired by At lee : Financial Pol icy , US^OO/109V53• 
(116) I b i d . 
"On the old proposal f o r a commercial loan, Professor 
Robbins thought that there was l i t t l e chance of 
anything on those lines emerging without the f u l l 
support of the Adminis t ra t ion, and the Adminis t ra t ion 
would not help us to take steps which would enable us 
to turn to ourselves instead of col laborat ing i n 
expanding world trade above a l l else the Americans 
wanted l i b e r a l i s a t i o n o f the s t e r l i n g area, . . . " (117) 
So here Robbins suggests that i t was not so much negative 
res t ra in ing factors such as Congress that were determining some 
of the more objectionable aspects of American proposals but the 
pos i t ive pol ic ies held by the American decision makers. Robbins 
here accepts the existence of substant ia l d i f ferences separating 
the two countries, something as we sha l l see shor t ly Keynes was 
s t i l l ra'cher re luc tant to do. S t i l l , at the m i n i s t e r i a l meeting 
i t was agreed that Dalton's suggestions should be accepted and 
communicated to Keynes for general guidance. However, before 
th i s could be done, f u l l Cabinet acquiescence had to be gained, 
something which proved rather d i f f i c u l t . The l e f t - w i n g o f the 
Cabinet objected strongly to these proposals. There were a 
number of reasons f o r t h i s . There was ta lk of a post-war 
s o c i a l i s t Commonwealth federa t ion , a pol icy which would be 
d i f f i c u l t to carry out i f the S t e r l i n g Area was weakened and 
re la t ions with less developed countries aggravated by the w r i t i n g -
o f f of s t e r l i ng balances. Secondly, the terms were undoubtedly 
harsh, and t h i r d l y , there was a reluctance to be so closely t i ed 
to the c a p i t a l i s t U.S. when there were so many hopes of s o c i a l i s -
ing the B r i t i s h economy and society. The c r i t i c i sms of Dalton's 
po l i c i es were indeed severe. 
"Alexander, Bevan and Shinwell were most unhappy and 
apprehensive about the f u t u r e , though none of them 
pressed the i r objections so hard as to threaten to 
res ign ." (118) 
(117) I b i d . 
(118) Dalton, Op.Cit. p.79. 
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I n f a c t , Bevin, Cripps and Dalton managed to push the 
proposals through the Cabinet, ' . . . w i t h no modi f ica t ion 
whatsoever. . . ' . So Dalton was able to send o f f the new 
ins t ruc t ions to Keynes on the 6 t h . He to ld Keynes that he 
should make a l o t of the f a c t that B r i t a i n was exchanging a 
b% s t e r l i n g l i a b i l i t y f o r a 2% d o l l a r one, which furthermore 
was to enable the U.S. to export more to the S te r l ing Area. 
I n taking t h i s in to consideration, Dalton thought i t would be 
only f a i r that B r i t a i n should be allowed simply to progressively 
remove d i sc r imina t ion from the S t e r l i n g Area and to reduce 
s t e r l i n g balances by voluntary agreement, rather than adopting 
more dras t ic p o l i c i e s . ^ 1 ^ As we sha l l see, these l a t t e r points 
were wholly inadequate to appease American expectations regarding 
B r i t i s h actions i n th is f i e l d . 
Some de ta i l s of the Cabinet's decisions were soon transmitted 
by Winant to the U.S. , and i t i s i n t e res t ing to note the immediate 
concentration on the re la t ionship between the S t e r l i ng Area and 
the l i ne of c red i t , Winant picked up the de ta i l s of the Cabinet 
meeting i n conversation with Bevin on the 6 t h , but of course he 
was not t o ld of the minimum conditions B r i t a i n was prepared to 
accept. Bevin pointed out the s igni f icance o f the second tranche 
which would allow B r i t a i n to l i b e r a l i s e the S te r l ing Area, to 
the benef i t of the U.S. Winant himself emphasised th i s point i n 
his l e t t e r to Byrnes, but of course Winant himself was somewhat 
out o f touch with the developments i n Washington, so l i t t l e 
weight should be attached to his a d v i c e . ^ 1 2 C ^ 
(119) Ch.of Ex. to Wash. Nov.6th,19l+5, UE53W9 /I09^/53. 
(120) Winant to S.S. Nov.6th, 19*+5» Vo l . V I , pp1 ^6-157. 
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The B r i t i s h were s t i l L s u f f e r i n g from the ambivalence of 
t h e i r p o l i c i e s . One argument f o r a large loan was t h a t i t 
would enable the B r i t i s h to l i b e r a l i s e the S t e r l i n g Area. This 
would be possible because of the strengthened p o s i t i o n o f B r i t i s h 
reserves and the h e a l t h i e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of immediate assets to 
l i a b i l i t i e s . However, i f the lean was of more meagre proportions 
then the B r i t i s h wished to i s o l a t e the S t e r l i n g Area from the 
loan n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r fear o f America imposing conditions which 
at one l e v e l would solve the problem o f the s t e r l i n g balances by 
w r i t i n g them o f f , but at the same time would place B r i t a i n i n a 
p o s i t i o n of great dependence, economically, upon the U.S. I t 
would also destroy any p o s s i b i l i t y o f the S t e r l i n g Area p r o v i d i n g 
a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to American assistance. Keynes believed 
t h a t some of the problems involved w i t h the S t e r l i n g Area were 
soluble simply by a c a r e f u l explanation o f i t s workings and 
r a l s o n d'etre. I n accordance w i t h t h i s on November 7 t h , he sent 
H.D.White a lengthy document on the S t e r l i n g Area I n an attempt 
to educate him as to i t s workings. 
Keynes 1 document i s i n t e r e s t i n g I n that i t s t i l l r e f l e c t s 
the view t h a t Anglo-U.S. d i f f e r e n c e s were caused by misunder-
standings, i . e . communication problems rather than s u b s t a n t i a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s of i n t e r e s t s . This disregards the decided c o n f l i c t 
of i n t e r e s t s now w e l l I n evidence. This document was presented 
to White at a time when tempers were f r a y i n g and patience 
evaporating. Already i t was obvious Keynes 1 o r i g i n a l hope f o r 
a g r a n t - i n - a i d and l a t e r h i s hope f o r an i n t e r e s t - f r e e loan, 
were now both out of the question. And ye t , i n t h i s paper on 
what was r a p i d l y becoming the most contentious issue i n Anglo-
U.S, r e l a t i o n s , Keynes displays an ingenuous innocence 
toward the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s o f the s i t u a t i o n . There was 
no way i n which the U.S. could accept the S t e r l i n g Area I n t h i s 
form and give large f i n a n c i a l a i d . 
I n h i s paper Keynes b r i e f l y o u t l i n e d the development o f 
the S t e r l i n g Area, presenting i t as a n a t u r a l r a t h e r than a 
c u l t i v a t e d development. He i n d i c a t e d that i t was only w i t h the 
war t h a t h i g h l y r e s t r i c t i v e c o n t r o l s and import licences which 
d i s c r i m i n a t e d against currencies i n short supply, had been 
introduced. He went on to describe the s o l u t i o n to t h i s . 
, f I t i s not the system as such which i s r e s t r i c t i v e o f 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l commerce, but the f a c t t h a t the area 
as a whole has command over a supply of d o l l a r s , and 
other f o r e i g n currencies, which I s f a r from adequate 
to meet i t s n a t u r a l requirements." (121) 
This was not, o f course, ne c e s s a r i l y so. I n f a c t the 
American argument was, l i b e r a l i s e t rade, remove d i s c r i m i n a t o r y 
r e s t r i c t i o n s and the workings o f the f r e e market economy ( w i t h 
a l i t t l e help from the I.M.F.) would r i g h t these currency short 
comings. Whether they a c t u a l l y believed t h i s or not i s another 
matter - what was Important to them was th a t t h i s would give 
them access to Empire markets and raw mat e r i a l s . The B r i t i s h 
argued - more d o l l a r s , more trade. The U.S. was saying increa 
trade by reducing c o n t r o l s and more d o l l a r s would appear. 
Another point which was to be taken up by the Americans was 
J.M.K's e x p l i c i t reference to S t e r l i n g Area no n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
by the end of 19^6, i f adequate funds were made a v a i l a b l e . No 
reference was made to the n e g o t i a t i o n s , some already concluded, 
w i t h a number o f European and other non-Sterling Area countries 
(12 t ) J.M.K. to White, ' S t e r l i n g Area Arrangements 1, Nov.7th, 
19^5, ^ 5 5 6 5 / 1 0 9 ^ / 5 3 . 
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This omission had serious consequences f o r U.S. p o l i c i e s and 
even t u a l l y was to r e s u l t i n the American i n s i s t e n c e on f u l l -
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y w i t h i n twelve months of the loan agreement, 
abrogating B r i t i s h r i g h t s under the I.M.F. On the question of 
w r i t i n g down the s t e r l i n g balances, Keynes refused to r i s k 
a l i e n a t i n g the S t e r l i n g Area, and i n s i s t e d t h a t no p r i o r commit-
ments could be made. Reductions, i f possible, would have to be 
by n e g o t i a t i o n and mutual agreement, Keynes concludes the paper 
r a t h e r a r r o g a n t l y describing the concessions B r i t a i n was being 
c a l l e d on to make, (what he omits to add i s t h a t B r i t a i n was 
committed to much of t h i s before the loan t a l k s and had f u r t h e r 
agreed that many of the practices were undesirable and i n i m i c a l 
to world trade,) and f i n a l l y he claims t h a t only B r i t a i n could 
judge what a i d she needed. We:-
"... would be foregoing the advantages to B r i t i s h exports 
of the large volume o f p o t e n t i a l purchasing power i n 
overseas countries which would otherwise be a v a i l a b l e on 
a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y basis favouring the U.K.: and they 
would be committing themselves to make s u b s t a n t i a l f u t u r e 
payments i n f u l l c o n v e r t i b l e currency without the a s s i s t -
ance to t h e i r capacity to l i q u i d a t e the s t e r l i n g balances 
which they would otherwise have r e t a i n e d . They were not 
prepared to accept commitments which they d i d not see 
t h e i r way to f u l f i l l . . . Their acceptance of a plan on the 
general l i n e s i n d i c a t e d above would, t h e r e f o r e , only be 
possible i f the aid contemplated was on a s u f f i c i e n t scale, 
and o f t h i s they must be the f i n a l judges, to carry the 
weight of the commitments they would be expected to 
undertake." (122) 
Despite t h i s rather s u r p r i s i n g attempt at frankness w i t h 
White, Keynes on one point was to admit to more s i n i s t e r p r a c t i c e s 
I n a l e t t e r to Eady he said t h a t i t appeared as i f the Americans 
had only j u s t r e a l i s e d that the proposals under co n s i d e r a t i o n d i d 
not cover payments agreements and accumulated s t e r l i n g holdings 
of non-Sterling Area countries, Keynes admitted t h a t he had 
(122) I b i d . 
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d e l i b e r a t e l y avoided such t o p i c s but he was now f e a r f u l that 
the U.S. might launch a d o c t r i n a i r e a t t a c k , demanding the 
a b o l i t i o n of such p r a c t i c e s . This would s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t the 
standing of s t e r l i n g and endanger important l i n e s of a g r i c u l t -
u r a l supply such as Arg e n t i n i a n beef. Furthermore, B r i t a i n had 
to be wary of committing h e r s e l f to c o n v e r t i b i l i t y and non-
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t h i s f i e l d when s i m i l a r o b l i g a t i o n s might not 
be accepted by countries l i k e Argentina. Keynes recommended 
that London should give a t t e n t i o n to such possible e v e n t u a l i t i e s 
as there was a danger o f such a move by the Americans at a high 
l e v e l which could e a s i l y prove to be i r r e s i s t i b l e . Keynes 
suggested that a possible p a l l i a t i v e , though maximum o f f e r , 
might be to agree to run the c l e a r i n g agreements on a non-
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y basis a f t e r the S t e r l i n g Area had been l i b e r a l i s e d . 
(123) 
The problem over the payment agreements wi t h n o n - s t e r l i n g 
countries was indeed soon to play a key r o l e i n the U.S./U.K. 
t a l k s . On November 7 ( the U.S.Top Committee had, i n f a c t , 
reviewed the s i t u a t i o n as i t stood. Much o f the t a l k i n g 
was done by Vinson, who appeared c r i t i c a l of B r i t a i n ' s requests 
and the way they had been subject to so many changes. Also, he 
cast doubts on the accuracy of the assessment of the economic 
d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g B r i t a i n , as presented by the B r i t i s h , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the l i g h t o f American assessments.^ 1^^ Vinson, 
taking i n t o account a #13 (U.J.) Canadian c r e d i t and a 3250m 
£xport-Import Bank. Loan, recommended a 33*5^ c r e d i t a t 2%. He 
remark ed on the most recent change i n B r i t i s h proposals, from 
(123) See J.M.K. to ifiady, Nov.3th, 19**5, U^Mo/i 1->9V53. 
(12*0 See 1 ? u 5 , Vol. V I , pp.1 57-162, byrnes i n the c h a i r , 
Clayton, Vinson, Wallace, Secies, McCabe, w'hi te and others. 
(125) See the o p t i m i s t i c State Lepart^ont P o s i t i o n Papers, 
prepared f o r the Potsdam Conference. 
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the two tranche November 5th proposal, to the Novemoer 7> one 
tranche proposal, which he found .710re acceptaole but s t i l l 
o b j e c t i o n a o l e i n regard to ii:s size. These B r i t i s h proposals 
were i n f a c t submitted to the t e c h n i c a l comnlttee f o r s c r u t i n y 
and r e v i s i o n . A f t e r Vinson's remarks a discussion began on the 
f i g u r e f o r the f i n a l amount of c r e d i t to be given. During t h i s 
d i scussion White Indicated that from a document r e c e n t l y received 
from Keynes, he i n f e r r e d t h a t the present proposals d i d not a f f e c t 
the non-Sterling Area monetary c o n t r o l s . ^ 1 ^ 0 ^ Following t h i s 
consternation arose i n the meeting. Clayton had p r e v i o u s l y 
supported a c r e d i t f o r the U.K. He haa dropped h i s i n s i s t e n c e 
on t h i s i n the face o f o p p o s i t i o n from Vinson a:id Secies, w i t h 
the proviso that he could r e v i v e such a proposal i f the 
circumstances warranted I t , ^ ~ ^ Kow:-
because of 
"... h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the d i s c r i m i n a t o r y features 
of the b i l a t e r a l agreements must be e l i m i n a t e d . . . 
(and t h a t ) . . . the a b o l i t i o n of the d o l l a r pool was 
much more important to U.S. exporters than the 
e l i m i n a t i o n of empire preference. 1 1 (123) 
Clayton proposed t h a t the 30.53 extra should oe considered 
as a bargaining point to b r i n g about a s a t i s f a c t o r y conclusion 
of the remaining points of contention between the two c o u n t r i e s , 
obviously here meaning the non-Sterling Area monetary c o n t r o l 
problem. I t was agreed at the meeting that moves should be made 
to f i n a l i s e the Lend-Lease clean-up and:-
(126) See above f o r d e t a i l s o f J.K.K's document. 
(12?) See F.h.19^5, Vol. V I , p . l 6 l , footnote 10, t h i s d e c i s i o n 
was taken on Oct. 17,.19^5? at the *+th meeting o f the 
U.S. F i n a n c i a l Cmte. 
(123) I b i d . 
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"With respect to amount the Group should f i r s t press 
f u l l y w i t h the B r i t i s h the question of handling of 
s t e r l i n g c o n v e r t i b i l i t y , the s t e r l i n g area d o l l a r 
pool, and the status o f the b i l a t e r a l agreements."(129) 
Repercussions from t h i s meeting were soon to be f e l t by 
the B r i t i s h i n Washington. On the 11th of iNovember, Keynes t o l d 
Dalton t h a t (b) of A l t e r n a t i v e 'A1, the second part o f the two 
tranche proposal, was now d e f i n i t e l y out. The B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n 
i n Washington were now pressing f o r $U-kB at 2^ w i t h f i v e years 
grace which was more s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r the Americans, but LIOW 
t e c h n i c a l points w i t h regard to s t e r l i n g were g i v i n g t r o u b l e . ^ 1 
I n the l i g h t o f t h i s and other feed-back from Washington, 
London once again began to reassess the s i t u a t i o n . Now, l a r g e l y 
because of the n o n - s t e r l i n g area c o n t r o l s , the B r i t i s h already 
believed that the U.S. would press f o r f u l l B r e tton Woods 
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y at an earl y d a t e . ^ 1 ^ 1 ^ Furthermore, i f t h i s meant 
t h a t there was no chance of reaching a s a t i s f a c t o r y f i n a n c i a l 
agreement wi t h the Americans, then B r i t a i n would not be able to 
accept the commercial agreements which had oeen p r o v i s i o n a l l y 
accepted by the two sides. 
On November 19, a c r u c i a l meeting was held of the U.S./U.K. 
Finance Committee. The Americans entered the meeting w i t h an 
a t t i t u d e which was becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y less sympathetic to the 
U.K. Even Clayton's attempts to concede an extra #0 .5^ to the U.K. 
as a concession f o r more p o s i t i v e B r i t i s h a c t i o n on s t e r l i n g , had 
been vetoed by Vinson and Eccles, despite the Commerce Depart-
ment's s u p p o r t . V i n s o n began the meeting by proposing 
(129) I b i d . 
(130) J.M.K. to Dalton, Nov.11th 19U5, US5525/109^/53 . 
(131) Top Secret, Progress of F i n a n c i a l and Commercial 
Negotiations, Washington, Economic Relations Dept. 
Nov. 16, 191+5, U^621/109^/53 . 
(132) U.S. 5th F i n a n c i a l Cmte. Meeting, Nov.8th, 191*5, see 
footnote p.162. "F.H.19I+5, Vol.VI. 
*H2 
f i g u r e s which were to be i n s e r t e d i n the new d r a f t that had 
been handed round at the meeting. He suggested a 33 . 5 B Line of 
c r e d i t plus whatever was necessary to cLean up Lend-Lease. 
Keynes r e p l i e d w i t h a ploy to t r y to separate Lead-Lease from 
the proposed c r e d i t . He suggested 3^3 pLus whatever was required 
by Lend-Lease, upon which he placed a maximum l i a b i l i t y of 3500m. 
Vinson and Eccles objected s t r o n g l y to t h i s . F i r s t o f a l l they 
r i g h t l y claimed t h i s was a novelty. They had p r e v i o u s l y understood 
that B r i t i s h claims f o r 3^.5^ included the assistance required 
f o r cleaning up Lend-Lease. Now they were demanding 3**.0B as a 
l i n e o f c r e d i t , plus a maximum l i a b i l i t y o f 3500m f o r Lend-Lease. 
Keynes explained f u r t h e r that t h i s was taking i n t o account the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a 31B loan of U.S. d o l l a r s oy Canada which would 
simply o f f - s e t the cumulative trade imbalance between the two 
cou n t r i e s . No agreement could be reached on these points except 
that they were to be the object of f u r t h e r discussion. The duel 
between Vinson and Keynes continued over three f u r t h e r p o i n t s . 
The f i r s t issue was o f l i t t l e s i g n i f i c a n c e , a minor disagreement 
over the l e v e l o f B r i t i s h imports i n r e l a t i o n to Invoking the 
waiver clause. The other two points were more troublesome, both 
having to do w i t h s t e r l i n g . The f i r s t contentious point was a 
U.S. proposal t h a t i f the waiver was invoked then the U.K. should 
p r o p o r t i o n a l l y reduce i t s repayments on a l l other debts contracted 
a f t e r January 1 s t , 19^5. The B r i t i s h would not accept t h i s on a 
number of grounds. F i r s t o f a l l there was an innate B r i t i s h 
d i s l i k e of r e t r o s p e c t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n and secondly such a measure 
would r e s t r i c t B r i t a i n ' s n e g o t i a t i n g powers on f u t u r e loans f o r 
the d u r a t i o n of the U.S. loan. This would adversely a f f e c t , i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , the chances of suc c e s s f u l l y n e g o t i a t i n g settlements 
of the s t e r l i n g balances. A s i m i l a r o b j e c t i o n was made to the 
t h i r d proposal which would have e f f e c t i v e l y placed a £ l 75m p.a. 
l i m i t on payments to holders o f s t e r l i n g balances, because i f 
payments went above t h i s , then repayment of the U.S. loan was to 
be s i m i l a r l y accelerated. Clayton w i t h h i s intense d i s l i k e of 
the s t e r l i n g area stepped i n at t h i s p o i n t , 
"He d i d not see how i t would be possible f o r the 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n to persuade Congress to accept a 
settlement under which the U.K. would be l e f t f r e e 
to make payments to i t s s t e r l i n g c r e d i t o r s consider-
ably i n excess o f payments on the U.S. debt." (133) 
A f t e r f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n i t was decided to r e f e r the issue back 
to London. 
There i s no doubt that the o f f i c i a l American r e p o r t o f the 
above meeting does not accurately r e f l e c t e i t h e r the tension or 
the s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s that e x i s t e d between the two sides. 
However, I n a personal telegram sent the f o l l o w i n g day to Eady, 
Keynes gives us a clearer I n s i g h t i n t o the problems. I n the 
telegram he asked f o r advice from London, to be based on previous 
telegrams, and guesstimates of what they thought the Americans 
might accept. He went on to add th a t the s i t u a t i o n was d e t e r i o r a t -
ing badly and th a t he was reaching the end o f h i s physical 
c a p a b i l i t i e s . 0 n t h e 21st a more d e t a i l e d and lengthy 
a p p r a i s a l was sent to Dalton from a l l members of the B r i t i s h 
mission i n Washington. The mission believed that to some extent 
the Americans at the meeting had been pressing to see how f a r 
they could go. For example, the question o f scaling down the 
s t e r l i n g balances was solved without too much c o n t r o v e r s y . ^ 3 5 ) 
(133) U.S./U.K. Finance Crate. Meeting, Move.19,19W5. 
Vinson i n the Chair, F.R. 19^5, Vol. V I , p . l 6 6 . 
(13^) Keynes to Eady and Bridges, Nov.20th, 19^5, U E 5 6 6 1 / 1 0 9 V 5 3 • 
(135) See para. 6, ( i i and ( i i i of the Finance Agreement. 
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A more immediate i n d i c a t i o n o f t h i s was a reLuctance expressed 
by the Americans t h a t the November 18th d r a f t be presented to 
the U.K. government as i n any way a f i n a l i s e d document. I n 
support o f t h t s they had d e l i b e r a t e l y omitted the f i g u r e s f o r the 
c r e d i t . Taking these f a c t s i n t o account, and some progress 
that had been made i n regard to the r e l a t i o n s h i p between B r i t a i n ' s 
balance of payments and conditions f o r Invoking the waiver, the ' 
mission s t i l l held out hopes f o r a tt^B c r e d i t . This was seen, 
however, as c o n d i t i o n a l upon achieving a s a t i s f a c t o r y conclusion 
of Lend-Lease discussions which were becoming more of a problem. 
The B r i t i s h mission i n Washington held the impression t h a t the 
U.S. were undecided whether to apply a 3c agreement to solve 
t h i s or not. This was something the B r i t i s h would r e s i s t very 
s t r o n g l y indeed. They wanted the U.S. to reduce B r i t a i n ' s 
l i a b i l i t i e s under Lend-Lease by t h e i r acceptance of reverse 
l i a b i l i t y f o r a i r c r a f t d i v e r t e d back to the U.S. by the U.K. a t 
the time of Pearl Harbor. I n order to strengthen B r i t a i n ' s 
bargaining p o s i t i o n , the mission requested t h a t the government 
should not allow them any lee-way f o r concessions on t h i s . There 
was an exception to t h i s , however. I f the U.S. o f f e r e d $5^3, 
which included an amount to clear up Lend-Lease, then perhaps 
the U.K. should accept l i a b i l i t y up to #600m. The other two 
thorny U.S. proposals, r e l a t i n g to the standing of s t e r l i n g , were 
described as simply ' lnacceptable' ( s i c ) . On the three other 
major issues, S t e r l i n g Area Exchange Arrangements (para, 6 ) , 
Exchange R e s t r i c t i o n s and Import Controls (para. 8 ) , and other 
Exchange Arrangements (para.7)> the mission recommended accept-
ance of the former two. On the l a t t e r Issue they questioned 
whether I n f a c t i t would be p r a c t i c a l to maintain payments' 
(136) See Nabob 372, UE5672/109V53. 
agreements w i t h non-Sterling Area countries once currently-
earned s t e r l i n g was made f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e . I n p a r t i c u l a r i f i t 
was possible to concede t h i s to the Americans, I t would be an 
e x c e l l e n t bargaining counter to take to Clayton as an u l t i m a t e 
concession to s e t t l e any outstanding d i f f e r e n c e s between the 
two c o u n t r i e s . ^ 1 3 7 ) 
Keynes I n f a c t misjudged somewhat London Reaction to the 
American d r a f t . ^ W A S W Q - Q aware of the d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n 
the s i t u a t i o n and wrote a personal l e t t e r to Cato about t h i s . 
I n p a r t i c u l a r , t r o u b l e was f l a r i n g up over the Lend-Lease s e t t l e -
ment, w i t h the Americans t a l k i n g o f l i a b i l i t y a t 2 | j£ , i . e . 
3c terras. The In f l u e n c e o f Crowley, (despite h i s r e t i r e m e n t ) , 
Jesse Jones and Baruch, was being f e l t i n a resurgence of hard-
l i n e business a t t i t u d e s . 
"The American side now seem convinced that they can get 
nothing past Congress which they cannot represent as 
hard t r a d i n g out o f which America gets as much f u t u r e 
b e n e f i t as i t concedes." (139) 
Nevertheless, Dalton's reactions to the U.S. proposals s t i l l 
somewhat surprised Keynes. Dalton, i n f a c t was s t i l l not f u l l y 
aware of the t u r n f o r the worse which was running i t s course i n 
the U.S., but was s t i l l extremely exasperated. I n h i s view the 
o r i g i n a l r a i s o n d'etre f o r f i n a n c i a l assistance was to enable 
B r i t a i n to (a) overcome her balance of payments problems, 
(b) to amend the serious s i t u a t i o n i n regard to the f o r e i g n 
holdings of s t e r l i n g . To many, the money now o f f e r e d seemed 
inadequate to accomplish these two goals. What was even more 
(137) J.S.M. Wash, to Cabinet O f f i c e s , Nov.21st, 19^5, 
UJS5672/109^/53. 
(138) Contained i n Nabob 372, UE5672 /109V53• 
(139) Keynes to Cato, Nov.22, 1 9^5, UE5676/I 09 V 5 3 . 
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worrying, as Dalton pointed out to theCabinet, was t h a t B r i t a i n 
was being subjected to a d i k t a t from Washington. He d i d not 
mention the f a c t t h a t the U.S. was now r e l u c t a n t to see the 
proposed c r e d i t being used to service s t e r l i n g debts, but h,e d i d 
concentrate f o r some time on the time l i m i t the U.S. wished to 
impose, i . e . end of 19^6, by which time the U.K. was supposed to 
reach agreement w i t h her s t e r l i n g c r e d i t o r s such t h a t c u r r e n t l y 
earned s t e r l i n g could be made f r e e l y c o n v e r t i b l e . Apart from 
t h i s appearing i m p r a c t i c a l to the B r i t i s h , i t would also p r e j u d i c 
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f reaching s a t i s f a c t o r y agreements with such 
c r e d i t o r s , as they would know th a t B r i t a i n would have to reach 
an accommodation wi t h them by th a t time. Further more, B r i t a i n 
was being forced to give up c e r t a i n safeguards provided by the 
I.M.F. and become t i e d to a U.S./U.K. agreement f o r f i f t y years 
which u n l i k e the .I.M.F. she could not walk out o f as e a s i l y . 
To Daltoh, the Americans seemed to have three o b j e c t i v e s , a 
f o u r t h was l a t e r added by J.li.Coulson. 
1) No waiver I f B r i t i s h reserves exceed £x. 
2) C o n v e r t i b i l i t y by 19*+6. 
3) Abandonment o f b i l a t e r a l payments agreements, i n c l u d i n g 
those w i t h Europe and L a t i n America. 
^) B r i t a i n could not repay more to S t e r l i n g Area c r e d i t o r s 
i n a year than to the U.S. (1^0) 
I n considering the above I t was decided t h a t Atlee himself 
should w r i t e to H a l i f a x and i n d i c a t e c l e a r l y j u s t what B r i t a i n 
would or would not accept. There was great concern regarding 
the untoward e f f e c t s of the controversies over economic issues 
were having on Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s . At the same time, 
(1^0) Top Secret Cab,Memo, Ch.of Ex. Gen. 89 /13 , Nov.22, 19^+5, 
UK5770 / 109V53 . 
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A t l e e had to consider the possible p o l i t i c a l repercussions i n 
the U.K. as w e l l as the more obvious t h r e a t s to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s 
the signature of an agreement o f the presently proposed nature 
would have. Atlee declared that 3 r i t a i n was not, repeat not, 
prepared to accept 1 9*+6 as a dead-line f o r concluding n e g o t i a t i o n s 
w i t h s t e r l i n g c r e d i t o r s , abrogation ( i . e . by c o n v e r t i b i l i t y ) o f 
B r i t a i n ' s t r a n s i t i o n a l r i g h t s , under Bretton Woods, at the end 
of 19^6, p r e f e r e n t i a l r i g h t s o f repayment f o r the U.S. loan or 
the a d d i t i o n of a reserves l i m i t as a c o n d i t i o n f o r the waiver. 
Unfo r t u n a t e l y , even before t h i s reached Washington, the t a l k s 
took yet another t u r n f o r the worse. 
As the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s l e t t e r was being sent o f f the U.S./ 
U.K. Combined Top Committee was discussing the thorny problem o f 
cleaning up Lend-Lease and surplus property. The meeting was 
acrimonious and d i s t u r b i n g . Clayton, Vinson and McCabe were the 
f r o n t runners f o r the U.S., and b a s i c a l l y wanted to i n s i s t on a 
lump sura l i a b i l i t y f o r the B r i t i s h o f 2750m at 3c terms, i . e . 
2-§# or cash to cover the two categories. The Americans added two 
underlying t h r e a t s , f i r s t of a l l the present f i g u r e was dependent 
upon a s a t i s f a c t o r y conclusion of the o v e r a l l economic t a l k s and 
secondly I f a c o n s t i t u e n t part of the lump sum of 3750m was 
quibbled over then there would have to be an item by item review, 
which Vinson assured the B r i t i s h would come to considerably more 
than the present f i g u r e . I n f a c t , the B r i t i s h d i d quibble, i n 
p a r t i c u l a r over the f i g u r e of 3150m, which had been placed on 
surplus property. The B r i t i s h i n f a c t had o f f e r e d #5ffi to cover 
t h i s . ^ l l + 2 ^ McCabe at one stage i n c a u t i o u s l y suggested t h a t the 
O M ) P.M. to Hal. Nov .2l*th, 19^5, U&5768/1 0 9 V 5 3 . 
(1^2) Dalton i n h i s attempts to present the agreement i n a 
reasonable l i g h t notes these 'large stocks' as one of the 
major b e n e f i t s to the U.K. p . 81, Op.Cit. 
U.S. s e l l the surplus property h e r s e l f to t h i r d p a r t i e s , a 
proposal Keynes smoothly said he would be most happy to accept. 
At t h i s stage Clayton stepped i n to f i l l the breach and i n s i s t e d 
that the f i g u r e had to be treated as a whole. Vinson s t r o n g l y 
backed him up. The B r i t i s h then t r i e d to have the l i a b i l i t y 
reduced i n con s i d e r a t i o n o f the a i r c r a f t r e - d i r e c t e d back to the 
U.S. at the time of Pearl Harbor, but to no a v a i l . The 
discussions terminated i n c o n c l u s i v e l y . ^ ^3) 
By November 2 7 t h , the Americans were i n possession o f the 
B r i t i s h Government's views on the f i n a n c i a l t a l k s . The only 
p o i n t which had not been communicated without q u a l i f i c a t i o n was 
Atlee's s t i p u l a t i o n regarding the c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of c u r r e n t l y 
earned s t e r l i n g o f the s t e r l i n g area, by the end of 19^6. Keynes 
pointed out to him t h a t t h i s was back-tracking on previous 
B r i t i s h commitments on t h i s . The remainder o f ' t h e 
unacceptables 1 stood. On the p o s i t i v e side, the B r i t i s h were 
o f f e r l n g : -
(1*1-3) F.R. 19^5, Vol.VI, pp 168-173, Minutes U.S./U.K. 
Combined Top Cmte. Nov. 21*, 1 9^ +5, s h o r t l y afterwards 
at the 11th meeting of the U.S. Finance Cmte 
#650m was agreed on, exclusive o f the loan, f o r 
Lend-Lease and surplus property. See foot n o t e p.173? I b i d . 
See J.M.K. to White, ' S t e r l i n g Area Arrangements 1, 
Nov. 7th, 19^5) UE5%5/109V53, Baboon 303 , Ch.of ux. to 
Keynes, Nov. 26, 19*+5, UE?672 /109V53 and Keynes' r e p l y 
Nabob 4-00, from J.M.K., Hal. and a l l members o f the 
Mission to Dalton, Nov.27, 19**5, UE5823 /109^/53-
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a) To modify the S t e r l i n g Area, i . e . c o n v e r t i b i l i t y 
of c u r r e n t l y earned S t e r l i n g Area s t e r l i n g , by 19^-6, 
excluding m i l i t a r y expenditures u n t i l 19^8. 
o) To recommend the I.M.F. to Parliament. 
c) To associate the B r i t i s h Government w i t h the recent 
documents on trade and commerce. 
d) To modify as q u i c k l y as possible other exchange and 
import r e s t r i c t i o n s , r e f e r r e d to i n paras. 7 and 8 of the 
U.S. d r a f t . 
e) To seek vo l u n t a r y agreements wi t h s t e r l i n g c r e d i t o r s 
on l i n e s proposed by the U.S. at an e a r l y date, and i n 
accordance w i t h circumstances. (1^5) 
The B r i t i s h were so disturbed by the developments i n 
Washington that Dalton dispatched S i r ftlward 3 r i d g e s , at 
extremely short n o t i c e , on November 30 th , to t r y to s o r t things 
out and rejuvenate the exhausted B r i t i s h team. Bridges was 
supplied w i t h a new B r i t i s h d r a f t but i t was only considered 
fen passant' by the Americans. At the Combined Finance Committee 
meeting on December 2nd, the U.S. put the B r i t i s h d r a f t to one 
side and i n s i s t e d t h a t a new d r a f t they had j u s t drawn up should 
be the basis of the agreement.^ 
J.S.M. Wash, to Cab.Offices, Nov.25,19^5, 'Comments of 
the U.K. Government on the p r o v i s i o n a l American D r a f t ' , 
UE57811/109^/53. 
(1^6) For t e x t o f B r i t i s h Doc. See CP(^5)312j considered by 
Cabinet on Nov.28,19^5) t r a n s m i t t e d to B r i t i s h i n Wash. 
Baboon 315, Nov.29th, UE5879/109V53 - dated Dec. 1 s t , 
f o r the meeting w i t h U.S. reos. For U.S. doc. see F.K. 
19*+5, Vol.VI, pp 173-177* 'U.S. Dr a f t Memo of Understanding 
on F i n a n c i a l Matters', Nov. 30 th , 19^5-
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At the arduous daylong meeting on the f o l l o w i n g day, s l i g h t 
concessions were made to the B r i t i s h . The U.S. agreed to a 
rewording o f the time l i m i t f o r c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of c u r r e n t l y 
earned s t e r l i n g , to twelve months a f t e r the f i n a n c i a l agreement 
came i n t o e f f e c t , and that there should be the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
mutually agreeing to a l t e r t h i s . I t should also b>2 added a 
problem mentioned previously was also solved at t h i s time regard-
(147) 
ing the l i m i t to be allowed on . s t e r l i n g debt repayments. " 
However, on the c r u c i a l issues, the Americans refused to be 
moved. They s t i l l i n s i s t e d on r e g u l a t i n g f u t u r e loans to the U.K. 
to keep them i n l i n e w i t h the U.S. c r e d i t and on preventing the 
in v o c a t i o n of the waiver unless repayments to s t e r l i n g c r e d i t o r s 
were also reduced p r o p o r t i o n a l l y . Nor would they change the 
twelve month l i m i t on c o n v e r t i b i l i t y , agree to the dAferment o f p r i n c i p a l or base the waiver on a one rather than a f i v e year 
:ans, moving a v e r a g e . ^ T h e concessions made by the America  small 
as they were, were only made "... w i t h great reluctance. 
The f i v e year moving average was acceptable, although the B r i t i s h 
would have pref e r r e d one year, but now at lea s t i t was divorced 
from the l e v e l of r e s e r v e s . ^ Of the B r i t i s h aims enumerated 
by Coulson on November 2 9 t h ^ ^ 1 \ only one had been achieved. 
(147) See para 6 ( i ) and 5(t>) of f i n a l agreement:- decided on 
by U.S. Fin. Cmte. Nov. 28. embodies i n Nov. 30 th . U.S. 
d r a f t , para 5 ( 1 ) , 4(b). See footnote F.R.1945, Vol. VI,p. 1 67. 
(148) See F.K.1945, Vol. V I , pp 185-7, Dec. 3, 1945, SS to Winant. 
(1^9) Wash, to Cab. O f f i c e s , Nabob 1+36, UE5934/1094/53 > 
Nov. 30, 1945. 
(150) I b i d . 
(151) See note on CP(45)312, by J.E.Coulson, Nov.29,1945, 
UE5967/1 0 9 V 5 3 . 
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Of the other two, the U.S. had e f f e c t i v e l y maintained the 
p r i o r i t y o f t h e i r loan over others and 19 -^6 as the deadline 
f o r c o n v e r t i b i l i t y . Despite t h i s r e l a t i v e lack of success, 
Bridges wrote personally to Atlee on the ^r<X, I n h i s o p i n i o n 
there was l i t t l e l e f t to argue about. The l i n e s had been 
c l e a r l y drawn. The only area where some m o d i f i c a t i o n might be 
possible would be i n regard to payments' agreements outside the 
S t e r l i n g Area where the U.S. representatives were unsure of 
t h e i r f a c t s . ( 1 5 2 ^ 
The Prime M i n i s t e r , Dalton and: Cripps were s t i l l d i s s a t i s f i e d . 
Atlee c a l l e d I n Ambassador Winant and informed him o f the strong 
B r i t i s h o b j e c t i o n s to the extant American proposals. He wrote 
i n a s i m i l a r v e in to the Mission i n Washington.^^3) Atlee 
expressed h i s b e l i e f t h a t the B r e t t o n Woods Agreement would not 
be accepted by Parliament because of the e f f e c t on i t of the 
proposed f i n a n c i a l agreement. 
"The three e s s e n t i a l points where the f i n a n c i a l agreement 
runs counter to the Bretton Woods Agreement are, f i r s t , 
we are deprived o f the b e n e f i t of the f i v e - y e a r t r a n s i t i o n a l 
period provided at Bretton Woods, which, f o r us, alone among 
a l l the other s i g n a t o r i e s , i s cut down to f i f t e e n months; 
second, we are deprived, alone of a l l the other s i g n a t o r i e s , 
o f the b e n e f i t o f the scarce currencies clause; t h i r d , we 
are deprived, alone of a l l the other s i g n a t o r i e s , o f the 
r i g h t , by r e s i g n i n g membership o f the fund, to regain 
freedom of a c t i o n i n matters regulated by the B r e t t o n Woods 
agreement. This t h i r d freedom, moreover, i s withdrawn from 
us f o r more than h a l f a century, I.e. during the currency 
of the loan agreement." 0 5*+) 
Bridges to A t l e e , Nabob Dec,3, 191+5, U t S 5 9 8 V l 0 9 V 5 3 . 
See F.h. 19^5, Vol.VI, pp 188-89, Winant to S.S. Dec.3, 
19^5, and P.M., Ch.of hix, and Pres.B.of T. to Wash. 
Baboon 338, Dec. 3 , 19^5, U K 5 9 3 V 1 0 9 V 5 3 . 
Baboon 338, I b i d . 
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B r i d g e s ' r e p l y t o A t l e e was r a t h e r u n u s u a l . F i r s t o f a l l 
he c l a i m e d t h a t t h e t e l e g r a m as r e c e i v e d a p p e a r e d ' c o r r u p t ' , 
and r e q u e s t e d a f u r t h e r c o p y . He c o n t i n u e d by d i s c u s s i n g i n 
some d e t a i l t h e p o s s i b l e p r o v i s i o n s f o r w i t h d r a w a l f r o m t h e 
I . M . F . and t h e n c o n c l u d e d b y i n d i c a t i n g t h e need f o r a new c o p y 
t o b e s e n t s p e e d i l y t o r e a c h h i m b e f o r e t h e m e e t i n g o f t h e U . S . / 
U . K . F i n a n c e C o m m i t t e e l a t e r t h a t d a y . 3 r i d g e s g i v e s t h e 
i m p r e s s i o n o f b e i n g i r r i t a t e d b y t h e o p i n i o n s e x p r e s s e d f r o m 
L o n d o n and t h a t h e w i s h e d t o c l i n c h t h e d e a l as i t s t o o d . ^ 5 5 ) 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , H a l i f a x s t r o n g l y p r e s s e d t h e o b j e c t i o n s o f t h e 
P r i m e M i n i s t e r a t t h e m e e t i n g and V i n s o n and C l a y t o n r e a d i l y 
a g r e e d t o c o n c e d e o n two o f t h e t h r e e m a i n o b j e c t i o n s . B r i t a i n 
was n o t t o be d e p r i v e d o f t h e s c a r c e c u r r e n c y c l a u s e n o r o f h e r 
r i g h t t o w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e I . M . F . On t h e t h i r d i s s u e t h e 
A m e r i c e n s s t o o d f i r m . 
"Much as t h e U . S . r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w o u l d r e g r e t a 
b r e a k d o w n i n n e g o t i a t i o n s w h i c h h a d come so n e a r a 
s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n , t h a t mus t be t h e o u t c o m e I f 
t h e U .K. . f e l t u n a b l e t o a c c e p t t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n . " (156) 
I t l o o k e d as i f t h e t w e l v e m o n t h c o n v e r t i b i l i t y d e a d l i n e w o u l d 
h a v e t o s t a n d . 
B r i d g e s i n f o r m e d E a d y , I n L o n d o n , o f t h e A m e r i c a n s t a n d . 
The p o s i t i o n was c o n s i d e r e d b y A t l e e , D a l t o n , B e v i n , C r i p p s , 
3 e v a n and S h i n v e l l . A f t e r c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t t h e y 
d e c i d e d one more a p p e a l s h o u l d b e made o n t h e c o n v e r t i b i l i t y 
q u e s t i o n , b u t i f i t was r e j e c t e d b y t h e A m e r i c a n s , t h e n t h e y 
(155) B r i d g e s t o E a d y , D e c . 19^5, U259SV109V53. 
(156) F . R . 19^5, V o l . V I , p . 191, M i n u t e s o f C o m b i n e d F i n a n c e 
C m t e . D e c . h} 1 9 M . 
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d e c i d e d t o a c c e p t t h e a g r e e m e n t as i t s t o o d . ^ 5 7 ) T h e 
A m e r i c a n s r e m a i n e d adaman t o v e r t h e r e d u c t i o n o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n 
p e r i o d and t h e a g r e e m e n t was s i g n e d as i t s t o o d o n December 6 t h , 
1 9 ^ - ( 1 5 8 > 
(157) CM (*t5) 59, C o n c l u s i o n s , UE6101/109^/53. 
(158) F . R , 19^5, V o i . V I , pp M i n u t e s U . S . / U . K . 
Combined F i n a n c i a l Crate, D e c . 5 , 19^5. 
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CONCLUSION 
" T h a t t h e r e was s o m e t h i n g a c c i d e n t a l a b o u t t h e 
A m e r i c a n r e s p o n s e t o t h e w o r l d I s a c o m f o r t i n g 
r e a s s u r a n c e t o t h o s e who w i s h t o c o n f u s e t h e 
A m e r i c a n r h e t o r i c and d e s c r i p t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n s 
w i t h t h e r e a l i t i e s and p u r p o s e s o f o p e r a t i o n a l 
p o w e r , b u t g i v e n t h e s o c i e t y and I t s needs A m e r i c a n 
F o r e i g n P o l i c y c o u l d h a r d l y h a v e b e e n d i f f e r e n t . " 
(1) 
I n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n I t r i e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t 
n a t u r e o f K . o l k o ' s b a s i c e x p l a n a t i o n , and why I t h o u g h t t h i s 
was i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r s t u d y i n g e v e n t s w h i c h h a v e o c c u r r e d i n 
t h e p a s t . A t t h e same t i m e I f e e l a c e r t a i n s y m p a t h y w i t h much 
o f t h e s u b s t a n c e o f w h a t K o l k o has t o s a y . I n p a r t i c u l a r 
I c o n c u r w i t h h i s i m p l i e d c r i t i c i s m o f i d e a l i s t i c h i s t o r i c a l 
(2) 
a c c o u n t s w h i c h i g n o r e , o r g l o s s o v e r , t h e p r o b l e m s o f 
e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . I n d e e d , many o f 
t h e comments he has made o n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s o e t w e e n t h e U . S . 
a n d t h e U . K . a p p e a r c o n s o n a n t w i t h , w h a t I m y s e l f n a v e s a i d i n 
t h i s t h e s i s , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f 
e c o n o m i c i s s u e s . H o w e v e r , t h e r e i s a c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e , and 
t h i s l i e s i n t h e n a t u r e o f t h e g r o u n d s o n w h i c h s u c h s t a t e m e n t s 
c a n be made. I t i s h e r e t h a t I d i v e r g e f r o m K o l k o , and many 
e t h e r w r i t e r s ^ \ b e c a u s e i t i s t h i s w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s t h e 
n a t u r e o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n g i v e n . T h e g r o u n d s o n w h i c h I h a v e 
b a s e d my a c c o u n t s h o u l d now be a b u n d a n t l y c l e a r . W h e t h e r s u c h 
a n a c c o u n t c o n s t r u c t e d f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a n d j u d g e m e n t s o f 
( 1 ) K o l k o , O p . C i t . p . 6 2 ^ . 
(2) F o r e x a m p l e , See H . F i n e r ' D u l l e s Over S u e s ' , 
H e i n e m a n , L o n d o n , ^<)6h. 
(3) F o r e x a m p l e , D a v i d Uees and R . N . G a r d n e r . 
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A m e r i c a n ' r h e t o r i c ' , ' d e s c r i p t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n s 1 and 
e v i d e n c e o f r e a s o n s i s c o m f o r t i n g o r r e a s s u r i n g i s i r r e l e v a n t 
t o t h e t a s k o f t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h w h a t was o r was : i o t t h e 
c a s e . What I w o u l d now L i k e t o do i s b r i e f l y s u m m a r i s e w h a t 
I f o u n d t h e case t o b e . 
D u r i n g t h e war B r i t a i n was p l a g u e d w i t h t h s p r o b l e m o f 
p a y i n g f o r t h e m a t e r i a l s w h i c h w e r e n e c e s s a r y t o p r o s e c u t e t h e 
war a g a i n s t t h e -Vxi s P o w e r s . The a t t e m p t t o come t o t e r n s w i t h , 
t h i s p r o b l e m has f o r m e d t h e b a s i s o f t h i s a c c o u n t . The 
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e d i l e m m a t o p r o s e c u t e s u c c e s s f u l l y a war 
f o r s u r v i v a l and a t t e m p t t o a v o i d , n o t s i m p l y e c o n o m i c b u t 
p o l i t i c a l b a n k r u p t c y a t t h e end o f t h e c o n f l i c t , w e r e e x c e e d i n g l y 
p e r v a s i v e f o r t h e U . K . I n c r e a s i n g l y as t h e war p r o g r e s s e d , t h e 
U . K . h y d t o t u r n t o t h e U . S . and r e l y o n h e r f o r e c o n o m i c and 
m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . Such a p o l i c y was i n e v i t a b l e i f t h e U . i ' . . 
was t o s u r v i v e . T h e r e was no o t h e r f r i e n d l y power c a p a b l e o f 
o f f e r i n g t h e a s s i s t a n c e w h i c h t h e U . K . r e q u i r e d , h o w e v e r , d e s p i t e 
t h e c l o s e c o l l a b o r a t i o n w h i c h d e v e l o p e d b e t w e e n t h e two ^ n g l o -
3 a x o n p o w e r s , t h e r e was l i t t l e i l l u s i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e f a c t 
t h a t t h e two c o u n t r i e s ' i n t e r e s t s d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a n i d e n t i t y . 
T h e r e w o u l d be l i t t l e c o m f o r t f o r t h e B r i t i s h i n a v i c t o r y o v e r 
t h e A x i s Powers i f h e r p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c s o v e r e i g n t y was 
t o be c h a l l e n g e d t o a n u n a c c e p t a b l e l e v e l by t h e power and 
i n f l u e n c e o f t h e U . S . 
A t f i r s t g l a n c e t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t s 
w h i c h d e v e l o p e d b e t w e e n t h e U . S . and t h e U . K . a p p e a r e d e l u s i v e . 
B o t h t h e B r i t i s h and A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s had e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n 
o v e r t h e e c o n o m i c e x p e r i e n c e s o f t h e 1 9 2 0 ' s and 1 9 3 0 ' s and 
h o p e d t h a t t h e y m i g h t a v o i d t h e p i t f a l l s w h i c h had f o l l o w e d t h e 
end o f t h e G r e a t War . F u r t h e r m o r e , d e s p i t e t h e d e e p l y f e l t 
r e s e r v a t i o n s o f B r i t i s h I m p e r i a l i s t s and some A m e r i c a n 
r e p u b l i c a n s , one c a n l e g i t i m a t e l y a t t r i b u t e p o l i c i e s o f 
e c o n o m i c d e - c c n t r o l and l i b e r a l t r a d i n g p r a c t i c e s t o b o t h t h e 
U . K . and t h e U . S . T h i s g e n e r a l i n c l i n a t i o n o f b o t h c o u n t r i e s 
c e r t a i n l y c o n s t i t u t e d a common g r o u n d w h i c h a t l e a s t e n a b l e d 
t h e i n s t i g a t i o n o f t a l k s b e t w e e n t h e two c o u n t r i e s o n a w i d e 
s p e c t r u m o f e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s , e v e n i f i t d i d n o t g u a r a n t e e 
t h e i r s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y a t t h e same t i m e i t 
c o n f u s e d t h e i s s u e s s o m e w h a t . 
The r e a s o n s f o r t h i s were t h a t f i r s t o f a l l i t was i n d e e d 
o n l y a g e n e r a l c o m m i t m e n t and b y no means was I t c a p a b l e o f 
f u l l y d e t e r m i n i n g e x p l i c i t p o l i c y o n p a r t i c u l a r a r e a s o f 
e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y . F o r e x a m p l e , n e i t h e r s i d e c o n t e m p l a t e d t h e 
i n s t i t u t i o n o n p r i n c i p l e , o f a f u l l l a i s s e z f a i r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
e c o n o m y . L i b e r a l i s a t i o n was n o t s e e n as a n a b s o l u t e p r i n c i p l e 
and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e t e r m was s u b j e c t t o 
d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n s i n d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s . B o t h c o u n t r i e s 
w e r e a l s o d e t e r m i n e d t o m a i n t a i n and so f a r as a g r i c u l t u r e was 
c o n c e r n e d _ i n c r e a s e , c o n t r o l s t o f u r t h e r t h e i r own p e r c e i v e d 
n a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t s . S e c o n d l y , t h e r e was t h e c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n 
f o r B r i t a i n c o n c e r n i n g t h e u? . tu re o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h 
p o l i c i e s o f d e - c o n t r o l and l i b e r a l i s a t i o n c o u l d be e f f e c t e d 
w i t h o u t s e v e r e l y d a m a g i n g t h e d o m e s t i c e c o n o m y . T h i r d l y , t h e r e 
was l i t t l e d o u b t i n e i t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s ' v i e w s t h a t t h e d e s i r e d 
g o a l o f a l i b e r a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy had t o be p u r s u e d w i t h 
t h e h e l p o f c e r t a i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t s - and i n s t i t u t i o n s 
w h i c h w o u l d a s t a r ) l i s h a f r a m e w o r k o f r u l e s w i t h i n w h i c h 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e and commerce c o u l d f u n c t i o n i n art o r d e r l y 
f a s h i o n , h o w e v e r , t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f such a f r a m e w o r k w o u l d 
^2? 
i n e v i t a b l y f a v o u r some and be p r e j u d i c i a l t o o t h e r s . The 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f s u c h a f r a m e w o r k o f r u l e s c o u l d n o t be d i v o r c e d 
f r o m t h e p e r c e i v e d i n t e r e s t s o f t h e n a t i o n s i n v o l v e d , I t s o o n 
became o b v i o u s t o b o t h t h e U . S . and t h e U . K . t h a t t h e y d i d i n 
f a c t h a v e c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e : - : t s when t r y i n g t o d e c i d e t h e n a t u r e 
o f t h e m o n e t a r y and t r a d e o r g a n i s a t i o n s . Such i n s t i t u t i o n s 
c o u l d n o t bo e s t a b l i s h e d o n p u r e l y e c o n o m i c c r i t e r i a , t h e y 
i n e v i t a b l y r e f l e c t e d t h e p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c j u u g e - n e n l s o f t h e 
two c o u n t r i e s , j u d g e m e n t s w h i c h w e r e b a s e d or. w h a t was b e s t 
f o r t h e two r e s p e c t i v e n o t i o n s . F i n a l l y , t h e a t t e m p t s t o c r e a t e 
a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c o r d e r f o r t h e pos t - v : a r p e r i o d by 
B r i t a i n and t h e 11.3. wns f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d b y o c c a s i o n s ! 
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s and c o n f u s i o n s c a u s e d b y t h e c o m p e t i n g v i e w s 
w h i c h v i e d f o r s u p r e m a c y w l t h i n t h e two a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . 
I n t h e o p e n i n g c h a p t o r we saw how t h e B r i t i s h had t o 
e x t e n d and i n t e n s i f y e c o n o m i c c o n t r o l s t o meet t h e demands 
p l a c e d o n t h e economy b y war p r o d u c t i o n . The m a i n i m p e t u s f o r 
such c o n t r o l s e m a n a t e d f r o m t h e Bank o f E n g l a n d , b u t i t was 
o n l y w i t h g r e a t r e l u c t a n c e t h a t m o n e t a r y and c o m m e r c i a l c o n t r a ] 
w e r e a d o p t e d t o s a f e g u a r d t h e s t a n d i n g o f s t e r l i n g and t o 
e f f e c t u a t e t h e o p t i m u m use o f r e s o u r c e s . The A m e r i c a n s 
w e r e q u i c k t o c r i t i c i s e such m e a s u r e " , b u t d i d L i t t l e t h a t 
w o u l d have e n a b l e d t h e - B r i t i s h t o a v o i d t h e m . I n d e e d , . . m e r i c a : i 
a c t i o n s e v i n c e d l i t t l e s y m p a t h y f o r ' B r i t a i n ' s p r e c a r i o u s 
e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n . T h e r e were some l e g a l r e s t r a i n t s o n w h a t 
t h e A m e r i c a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o u l d do i n t h e e a r l y mon ths o f t h e 
('+) See o p . 3 - 7 j when no f u r t h a r o c-r,a l i s a r e g i v e n 
such r e f e r e n c e s a r e t o t h e o r e s e n t w o r k . 
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w a r , b u t t h e s e c o u l d h a r d l y be r e g a r d e d as i n s u p e r a b l e . 
I n f a c t t h e A m e r i c a n s seemed somewhat p r e - o c c u p i e d w i t h t a k i n g 
a d v a n t a g e o f 3 r i t a i n f s p o s i t i o n . T h e y p r e s s e d f o r a f a v o u r a b l e 
r e v i s i o n o f t h e 1938 A n g l o - A m e r i c a n T r a d e A g r e e m e n t and 
c o n t i n u o u s l y i n s i s t e d t h a t B r i t a i n w o u l d have t o d i v e s t h e r s e l f 
o f h e r o v e r s e a s a s s e t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e U . S . and L a t i n 
A m e r i c a , b e f o r e i t w o u l d ne p o s s i b l e t o p u s h any p r o v i s i o n s 
f o r e c o n o m i c h e l p f o r B r i t a i n t h r o u g h C o n g r e s s . ^ J J T h i s 
i n c e s s a n t i n v o c a t i o n o f C o n g r e s s i o n a l o p p o s i t i o n t o m e a s u r e s 
t h a t w o u l d s t r e n g t h e n 3 r i t a i n 1 s p o s i t i o n was t o wear somewhat 
t h i n d u r i n g t h e l a t t e r s t a g e s o f t h e w a r . H o w e v e r , t h i s i s 
n o t t o say t h e r e was no o p p o s i t i o n i n C o n g r e s s , b u t t h a t s u c h 
o p p o s i t i o n was f r e q u e n t l y m a n i p u l a t e d t o e x c u s e t h e more b r u t a l 
p u r s u i t o f A m e r i c a n i n t e r e s t . B e f o r e t h e U . S . became a 
c o - b e l l i g e r e n t t h e r e a p p e a r e d t o be l i t t l e b a r g a i n i n g l e v e r a g e 
o p e n t o t h e U . K . t o c o u n t e r such A m e r i c a n demands . I n t h e 
t r a d e t a l k s she w?;s a b l e t o s t a l l b y i n s i s t i n g o n t h e need t o 
c o n s u l t w i t h t h e D o m i n i o n s , a p l o y w h i c h was t o b e used more 
t h a n o n c e , b u t t h e r e was no a v o i d i n g t h e s a l e o f h e r i n v e s t m e n t s . 
The need f o r r e a d y c a s h was t o o u r g e n t , and t h e A m e r i c a n s 
w o u l d o n l y p r o v i d e a l i m i t e d amoun t o f h e l p h e r e . The most 
s p e c t a c u l a r s a l e was t h a t o f t h e V i s c o s e C o r p o r a t i o n j u s t p r i o r 
t o L e n d - L e a s e ^ ° ^ , b u t t h r o u g h o u t t h e war B r i t a i n d i v e s t e d 
( 7 ) 
h e r s e l f o f £ 1 , 1 1 3 m w o r t h o f o v e r s e a s i n v e s t m e n t s . 
(5) See p p . 13 - 19 
(6) See p .19 
(7) See Cmd. 6706, 19^5* 
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As e a r l y as mid-19^0 t h e b u r d e n o f t h e c o s t o f w a r , 
a b u r d e n w h i c h t h e U . S . d i d l i t t l e t o a l l e v i a t e u n t i l L e n d -
L e a s e , was s u c h t h a t Keynes and many o t h e r s t h o u g h t t h a t t h e r e 
w o u l d be no a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n o f c o n t r o l s and 
b i l a t e r a l i s m a t t h e end o f t h e w a r , i f B r i t a i n was t o a v o i d 
a n e c o n o m i c c o l l a p s e . T h e r e i s a sense o f i r o n y h e r e i n t h a t 
A m e r i c a n p o l i c y t o w a r d t h e U.K. . i n t h e e a r l y p a r t o f t h e war 
was p a r t i a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s t r i n g e n c y o f t h e e c o n o m i c 
c o n t r o l s B r i t a i n i n t r o d u c e d : c o n t r o l s t h e A m e r i c a n s v e h e m e n t l y 
condemned a n d u r g e d B r i t a i n t o d i s p e n s e w i t h a t t h e end o f 
h o s t i l i t i e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e f o r c e o f s u c h i r o n y was l a r g e l y 
l o s t o n t h e A m e r i c a n n e g o t i a t o r s . 
The p r o b l e m s o f e c o n o m i c p o l i c y f i r s t a r o s e b e t w e e n t h e 
two c o u n t r i e s i n t a l k s f o r a s u p p l e m e n t t o t h e 1938 T r a d e 
A g r e e m e n t . I n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e s e t a l k s i t became o b v i o u s 
t h a t t h e A m e r i c a n s w a n t e d t o m o d i f y B r i t a i n ' s p r e f e r e n t i a l 
t r a d e s y s t e m . H o w e v e r , t h e r a p i d a l t e r a t i o n o f B r i t a i n ' s 
t r a d e p o s i t i o n and e v e n t u a l l y t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f L e n d - L e a s e , 
w h i c h e f f e c t i v e l y p l a c e d B r i t a i n * s t r a d e o n a n o n - c o m m e r c i a l 
b a s i s , r e n d e r e d t h e t r a d e t a l k s somewhat i r r e l e v a n t and 
c e r t a i n l y a n u n s u i t a b l e venue f o r t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f e c o n o m i c 
p r i n c i p l e s w i t h w i d e i m p l i c a t i o n s . I n any case t h e s p e c i f i c 
c o n c e s s i o n s t h e A m e r i c a n s w e r e d e m a n d i n g and t h e d e f e r r e d 
b e n e f i t o f a B r i t i s h c o m m i t m e n t t o l i b e r a l p o s t - w a r t r a d e 
p o l i c i e s w e r e c o n s i d e r e d t o be g r o s s l y i n c o m e n s u r a t e w i t h w h a t 
H a w k i n s was o f f e r i n g t h e B r i t i s h i n r e t u r n . 7 J 
(3) See C h a p t e r I . 
(9) See p .22 
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The p o s s i b i l i t y o f B r i t a i n c o m m l t i n g h e r s e l f t o p o l i c i e s 
o f l i b e r a l t r a d i n g a l s o a r o s e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i n t h e L e n d - L e a s e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t a l k s i n a much more s p e c i f i c and f o r c e f u l 
m a n n e r . The A m e r i c a n S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t c o n s i s t e n t l y m a i n t a i n e d 
t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a s t a b l e t r a d e s y s t e m w i t h a h i g h l e v e l 
o f t r a n s a c t i o n s d e p e n d e d u p o n B r i t a i n ' s a b a n d o n m e n t o f 
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r e f e r e n t i a l p o l i c i e s . I t was n o t u n t i l t h e 
c l o s i n g s t a g e s o f t h e war w i t h t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f S t e t t i n l u s , 
and a number o f o t h e r a p p o i n t m e n t s i n t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t , 
mos t n o t a b l y W i l l i a m C l a y t o n t h a t t h i s p o l i c y was f i n a l l y 
r e l e g a t e d t o a s e c o n d a r y p l a c e b e l o w t h a t o f p r o m o t i n g n o n -
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y m o n e t a r y p o l i c i e s . B o t h p o l i c i e s w e r e i n t e n d e d 
t o p r o m o t e A m e r i c a n d o m i n a n c e i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o n e t a r y 
f i e l d and e n a b l e A m e r i c a n e n t e r p r i s e t o e n t e r m a r k e t s p r e v i o u s l y 
t h e p r e s e r v e o f B r i t a i n . 
The 3 r i t i s h s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d t h e p r e s s u r e s f r o m t h e S t a t e 
D e p a r t m e n t t o e n t e r i n t o c o m m i t m e n t s o n t r a d e p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h 
t h e y f e a r e d m i g h t p r e j u d i c e B r i t a i n ' s p o s t - w a r e c o n o m i c 
r e c o v e r y and w h i c h c o u l d be w h o l l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h m i g h t t h e n p r e v a i l . As t h e C o n s i d e r a t i o n T a l k s 
c o n t i n u e d , h o w e v e r , t h e A m e r i c a n s became more and more i n s i s t e n t 
The p r o b l e m was e v e n t u a l l y c o n s i d e r e d a t t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l i n 
A u g u s t 19^1) when t h e i s s u e s o f p o s t - w a r e c o n o m i c p o l i c y w e r e 
r a i s e d a t t h e P l a c e n t i a Bay m e e t i n g b e t w e e n R o o s e v e l t and 
C h u r c h i l l , ( 1 0 ) 
I t h a s b e e n r e c e n t l y a l l e g e d t h a t C h u r c h i l l d i d n o t r e g a r d 
e c o n o m i c p o l i c y as v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t and showed l i t t l e c o n c e r n 
w i t h i t . ^ 1 1 ^ T h e r e i s no d o u b t t h a t C h u r c h i l l ' s p r i m a r y i n t e r e s 
(10) See p p . 31 - *M -
(11) See , ' R o o s e v e l t and C h u r c h i l l - T h e i r S e c r e t W a r t i m e 
C o r r e s p o n d e n c e ' , L o w e n s t e l n , e t a l , B a r r i e a n d 
J e n k i n s , L o n d o n 1975) See i n t r o d u c t i o n . 
w e r e I n n o n - e c o n o m i c f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n d war s t r a t e g y , b u t 
t h e e v i d e n c e a l s o s u g g e s t s t h a t he was a w a r e o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f e c o n o m i c p o l i c y and was by no means i g n o r a n t o f t h e 
p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s i n v o l v e d . H i s p e r f o r m a n c e a t P l a c e n t l a B a y 
and t h e Second Quebec C o n f e r e n c e , h i s v i e w s o n t h e C o n s i d e r a t i o n 
A g r e e m e n t and l a t e r i n t h e war o n a v i a t i o n r i g h t s , h i s t i m e l y 
s p e e c h o n t a r i f f s and p r e f e r e n c e s i n t h e House o n A p r i l 2 1 , 
1 9^1 and h i s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d t h e A m e r i c a n c o n t r o l o f B r i t a i n ' s 
r e s e r v e s , a l l i n d i c a t e a l i v e l y c o n c e r n and a p p r e c i a t i o n o f 
t h e s e p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s . 
A t P l a c e n t i a Bay C h u r c h i l l s t r o n g l y d e f e n d e d t h e s t a t u s 
quo o f B r i t a i n ' s e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s . He r e f u s e d t o a g r e e 
t o W e l l e s ' demands a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g d o c u m e n t was d a n g e r o u s l y 
a m b i g u o u s . I n t h e U . K . t h e p r e v a l e n t v i e w was t h a t B r i t a i n 
h a d a v o i d e d any d o c t r i n a i r e c o m m i t m e n t t o a b o l i s h p r e f e r e n c e s 
and o t h e r d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r a c t i c e s . The C h a r t e r was r e g a r d e d 
as a s t a t e m e n t o f a s p i r a t i o n s b y t h e two c o u n t r i e s t o w o r k 
j o i n t l y t o w a r d s a s t a b l e , more l i b e r a l w o r l d t r a d i n g s y s t e m . 
I n t h e U . S . H u l l was d i s a p p o i n t e d b y t h e l a c k ' o f a s p e c i f i c 
f 
c o m m i t m e n t b y B r i t a i n t o n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b u t p r o m o t e d t h e 
i m p r e s s i o n and i m p l i e d t h a t he t o o k t h e d e c l a r a t i o n t o mean 
t h a t B r i t a i n was t o a b o l i s h t r a d e p r e f e r e n c e s . The f a c t was 
t h a t t h e B r i t i s h and A m e r i c a n s d i d h a v e a s u b s t a n t i a l c o n f l i c t 
o f i n t e r e s t s h e r e . The U . S . was d e t e r m i n e d t o b r e a k i n t o 
B r i t i s h e m p i r e m a r k e t s v i a t h e a b o l i t i o n o f B r i t a i n ' s 
p r e f e r e n t i a l s y s t e m . I r o n i c a l l y t h e B r i t i s h w e r e i n f a c t n o t 
a v e r s e t o l i b e r a l i s i n g t h e i r t r a d e p o l i c i e s , b u t t h i s w o u l d 
d e p e n d u p o n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and i n p a r t i c u l a r , A m e r i c a n 
p o l i c i e s . The B r i t i s h b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e i r p o s t - w a r e c o n o m i c 
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s i t u a t i o n m i g h t be t o o p r e c a r i o u s t o c o m m i t t h e m s e l v e s , o n 
p r i n c i p l e , t o a p o l i c y o f d e - c o n t r o l . The r e s u l t o f t h i s was 
a s t a n d - o f f j a d e c l a r a t i o n w h i c h was a m b i g u o u s i n n a t u r e and 
one w h i c h c a u s e d l e a d e r s o f t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t t o be d e t e r m i n e d 
t h a t any s u b s e q u e n t d e c l a r a t i o n o r a g r e e m e n t w o u l d be f a r more 
e x p l i c i t . 
By t h e end o f 19^1 B r i t a i n was a l r e a d y c o n c e r n e d w i t h 
p o s s i b l e p o s t - w a r e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s , t h e mos t b a s i c and mos t 
f e a r e d o f a l l was a m a s s i v e i m b a l a n c e o f p a y m e n t s . I t s o o n 
became o b v i o u s t o t h e B r i t i s h t h a t t h e i r e c o n o m i c s t a n d i n g , 
w o u l d i n a i l p r o b a b i l i t y , be so p r e c a r i o u s t h a t I s o l a t e d 
a g r e e m e n t s o n c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f e c o n o m i c p o l i c y w o u l d be 
i n a d e q u a t e and p o s s i b l y d a n g e r o u s . The d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s o f 
e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y w e r e a l l i n t e r - c o n n e c t e d , and i f B r i t a i n ' s 
n i c e l y b a l a n c e d economy was t o r e c o v e r , s t o c k w o u l d h a v e t o 
be t a k e n o f t h e w h o l e e c o n o m i c p i c t u r e t o e n s u r e t h a t no p a r t 
o f i t t i p p e d t h e s c a l e s . As we h a v e s e e n i n c h a p t e r t h r e e , 
K e y n e s changed h i s s t a n c e o v e r t h e n e e d f o r e c o n o m i c c o n t r o l s 
and b y l a t e 19*+1 he b e l i e v e d t h a t a m o n e t a r y I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
C l e a r i n g U n i o n m i g h t e n a b l e B r i t a i n t o a v o i d t h e mos t s t r i n g e n t 
t y p e s o f c o n t r o l s . I n d e e d i n i t s e a r l y f o r m t h e C . U . was s u c h 
a c o m p r e h e n s i v e and r a d i c a l p l a n t h a t i t c o u l d h a v e s t o o d 
v i r t u a l l y I r r e s p e c t i v e o f o t h e r e c o n o m i c p r o v i s i o n s . H o w e v e r , 
as i t was g r a d u a l l y m o d i f i e d b y t h e A m e r i c a n s i t became 
I n c r e a s i n g l y n e c e s s a r y t o f o r m u l a t e o t h e r e c o n o m i c and t r a d e 
p o l i c i e s as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e S . F . c o u l d 
o p e r a t e s u c c e s s f u l l y . The o v e r t l y p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n s w h i c h 
t h e U . S . I m p o s e d u p o n t h e S . F , and t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f n a t i o n a l 
c u r r e n c i e s and g o l d as t h e o n l y means o f s e t t l i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
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a c c o u n t s meant t h a t t h e p a s s i v e o r n e u t r a l b a n k i n g c h a r a c t e r -
i s t i c s o f t h e C . U . w e r e l a r g e l y L o s t . T h i s l o s s o f n e u t r a l i t y 
mean t t h a t t h e S . F . c o u l d be more e a s i l y c h a l l e n g e d o n p o l i t i c o -
e c o n o m i c g r o u n d s and t h a t a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s w o u l d h a v e 
t o be t a k e n t o e n s u r e i t s e f f i c i e n t f u n c t i o n i n g . I n s h o r t i t s 
s u c c e s s w o u l d d e p e n d f a r more o n t h e p r e v a i l i n g p o l i t i c o -
e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s i n t h e w o r l d ; i t was n o t i n I t s e l f a 
s o l u t i o n t o such p r o b l e m s , w h i c h t h e C . U , had p a r t i a l l y b e e n . 
T h u s , f o r t h e B r i t i s h , t h e m o n e t a r y p r o p o s a l s w o u l d h a v e t o be 
c o m p l e m e n t e d b y t r a d e and c o m m e r c i a l p r o v i s i o n s . T h e i r d e l i c a t e 
e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n made i t e s s e n t i a l t h a t c o n d i t i o n s b o t h i n t h e 
t r a d e and c o m m e r c i a l f i e l d w e r e s u c h t h a t t h e y c o u l d c o m m i t 
t h e m s e l v e s t o more l i b e r a l e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s . 
I n v i e w o f t h e s e p e r c e p t i o n s t h e B r i t i s h c o n s i s t e n t l y 
a r g u e d t h a t t h e y s h o u l d n o t u n d e r t a k e any g e n e r a l p o l i c y 
c o m m i t m e n t s w h i c h p r e v a i l i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s m i g h t make I t 
i m p o s s i b l e f o r them t o c a r r y o u t . F o r a l t h o u g h one o f t h e m a j o r 
c o n t e n t i o n s o f t h e a c c o u n t i s t h a t e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s d i d h a v e 
a h i g h p r i o r i t y p l a c e d u p o n t h e m , t h e y mus t n o t be c o n c e i v e d 
o f o u t s i d e a more g e n e r a l c o n t e x t . The B r i t i s h w e r e a l s o d e e p l y 
p r e - o c c u p i e d w i t h t h e s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
v i s a v i s t h e i i m p i r e , W e s t e r n E u r o p e and R u s s i a . The s t r a t e g i c 
weakness o f t h e 3 r i t i s h E m p i r e h a d b e e n c r u e l l y d e m o n s t r a t e d b y 
t h e J a p a n e s e and t h e B r i t i s h w e r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h f i n d i n g some 
means b y w h i c h h e r s t r a t e g i c i n f l u e n c e i n t h e w o r l d m i g h t be 
b o l s t e r e d up i n t h e p o s t - w a r p e r i o d . F r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w e r e s e e n as a m i n i m u m r e q u i r e m e n t o f s u c h a 
p o l i c y . T h u s t h e d a n g e r o f d i s r u p t i n g such r e l a t i o n s b y 
B r i t a i n h a v i n g t o r e n e g e c n e c o n o m i c c o m m i t m e n t s she had g i v e n 
t o t h e U . S . was v e r y much t o t h e f o r e f r o n t i n B r i t i s h t h i n k i n g . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e s i t u a t i o n was c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e d e v e l o p m e n t 
o f a f u l l - e m p l o y m e n t p o l i c y by t h e B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s 
b e g a n w i t h t h e B e v e r i d g e R e p o r t o f 19^2 and was l a t e r f u l l y 
a r t i c u l a t e d i n B e v e r i d g e ' s W h i t e P a p e r ' F u l l E m p l o y m e n t i n a 
(12) 
F r e e S o c i e t y 1 i n 1 9 ^ . S u c h p l e d g e s c o u l d n o t be 
r e d e e m e d i f i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c c o m m i t m e n t s w e r e made w h i c h 
c o u l d f o r c e t h e B r i t i s h t o i m p o s e d e f l a t i o n a r y d o m e s t i c p o l i c i e s . 
The U . S . h o w e v e r , d i d n o t h o l d s u c h p r o g r e s s i v e v i e w s o n s o c i a l 
p o l i c y and was r e l u c t a n t t o a c c e p t a r g u m e n t s f o r t h e m a i n t a i n -
ance o f m o n e t a r y and t r a d e c o n t r o l s o n such g r o u n d s . B r i t i s h 
e f f o r t s t o a v o i d c o m m i t m e n t s t o e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s w i t h o u t due 
r e g a r d t o p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s w e r e i n t h e end c o m p r o m i s e d , 
p a r t l y b e c a u s e o f t h i s , and b e c a u s e such e f f o r t s were s e e n as 
a c h a l l e n g e t o U . S . i n t e r e s t s . 
As t h e war p r o g r e s s e d B r i t a i n ' s economy was go p. r e d more 
and more t o war p r o d u c t i o n n a s o d o n L e n d - L e a s e s u p p l i e s . One 
m a j o r e c o n o m i c r e s u l t o f t h i s was t h e l o s s o f m a r k e t s and 
o v e r s e a s t r a d e as h e r economy was now f u n c t i o n i n g p r i m a r i l y o n 
a n o n - c o m m e r c i a l b a s i s . B r i t a i n ' s v o l u m e o f t r a d e d w i n d l e d t o 
o n e - t h i r d I t s i m m e d i a t e p r e - w a r l e v e l . O t h e r i s s u e s a g g r a v a t e d 
t h e s i t u a t i o n , such as t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s i m p o s e d b y t h e 
A m e r i c a n s u n d e r t h e a u t h o r i t y o f L e n d - L e a s e , b u t s u f f i c e i t t o 
say f o r t h e moment B r i t a i n was d e e p l y w o r r i e d o v e r h e r f u t u r e 
t r a d e p r o s p e c t s . 
(12) See Cmd, 6527, -[^th. 
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The e a r l y A m e r i c a n i n s i s t e n c e , t h a t B r i t a i n s h o u l d c o m m i t 
h e r s e l f t o n c n - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y t r a d e p r a c t i c e s was f i r s t s e e n 
as a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g b y t h e B r i t i s h . F o r e x a m p l e , N . 3 . R o n a l d 
as l a t e as e a r l y 19 lt2 t h o u g h t t h a t t h e U . K . w o u l d n a v e a n 
u n a n s w e r a b l e ca se a g a i n s t e n t e r i n g c o m m i t m e n t s o f t h e c h a r a c t e r 
t h e U . 3 . w a n t e d , o n c e i t v;as p r o p e r l y e x p l a i n e d . ^ 1 ^ ^ S u c h 
h o p e s w e r e e v e n t u a l l y t o p r o v e g r o u n d l e s s and as t h e c o n f l i c t 
o f i n t e r e s t s became c l e a r I t WFIS more and more o b v i o u s t h a t i t 
was g o i n g t o be e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o r e s o l v e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s 
o f t h e two c o u n t r i e s . 
N o t o n l y w e r e t h e 3 r i t i s h d i s c o v e r i n g i t d i f f i c u l t t o 
come t o t e r m s w i t h A m e r i c a n i d e a s f o r t h e p o s t - w a r e c o n o m i c 
s u p e r - s t r u c t u r e b u t t h e y a l s o h a d l i t t l e s u c c e s s o n more 
s p e c i f i c a r e a s o f e c o n o m i c p o l i c y . Vie have s e e n q u i t e c l e a r l y 
t h e c o n t r o v e r s y w h i c h a r o s e o v e r t h e 1 9^1-^2 w h e a t n e g o t i a t i o n s 
when t h e A m e r i c a n s abandoned t h e i r o w n ' p r i n c i p l e s ' t o f u r t h e r 
t h e i r a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t s . 3 u t t h i s was n o t t h e o n l y s e t 
o f t a l k s o n s p e c i f i c e c o n o m i c i s s u e s w h i c h p r o v e d i n c o n c l u s i v e . 
The H o t S p r i n g s Food C o n f e r e n c e o f 1 91+3 > t h e o i l , t e l e c o m m u n i c a -
t i o n s and a v i a t i o n t a l k s w e r e a l l a b o r t i v e t o one d e g r e e o r 
a n o t h e r , t h e s u p p l e m e n t a r y t r a d e t a l k s f a i l e d and A m e r i c a n 
a t t e m p t s t o d i s r u p t B r i t i s h meat s u p p l i e s f r o m t h e A r g e n t i n e 
was a f u r t h e r symptom o f t h e two c o u n t r i e s ' c o n f l i c t i n g 
e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s . B r i t a i n was i n a weak and e x p o s e d p o s i t i o n 
b u t s t i l l h e l d a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d l e g a c y o f e c o n o m i c i n f l u e n c e ; 
(13) See p . 8 0 . 
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l a n d i n g r i g h t s i n E m p i r e c o u n t r i e s , m i l i t a r y b a s e s i n t h e 
M i d d l e and F a r E a s t , o i l r i g h t s i n t h e A r a b S t a t e s and g r e a t 
i n f l u e n c e as t h e w o r l d ' s l a r g e s t i m p o r t e r o f f o o d . The U . S . 
w a n t e d a m a j o r s ay i n a l l t h e s e a r e a s f o r e c o n o m i c and s t r a t e g i c 
r e a s o n s . F o r e x a m p l e , she was c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e d e p l e t i o n o f 
h e r o w n o i l r e s e r v e s and a l s o saw g r e a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r 
e x p a n d i n g U . S . c i v i l a v i a t i o n f o l l o w i n g t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n 
d e v e l o p i n g b o m b e r s d u r i n g t h e w a r . T h i s e x p a n s i o n h o w e v e r 
d e p e n d e d v e r y much o n w o r l d - w i d e l a n d i n g r i g h t s . Thus s u c h 
c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s p r o d u c e d i n c o n c l u s i v e r e s u l t s . So as 
f a r as 3 r i t a i n was c o n c e r n e d , t h e r e was l i t t l e e n c o u r a g e m e n t 
f o r h e r f r o m t h e a t t e m p t s w h i c h w e r e made t o p r o v i d e r u l e s a n d 
r e g u l a t i o n s i n s p e c i f i c a r e a s o f e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y . T h e r e 
was l i t t l e t o i n d i c a t e how e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y i n t h e s e a r e a s 
w o u l d d e v e l o p a f t e r t h e w a r . T h e r e was no s e c u r i t y o r c e r t a i n t y 
n o r a n y t h i n g c o n c r e t e w h i c h m i g h t h a v e i n d i c a t e d how B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s w o u l d f a r e a f t e r t h e w a r . I n s h o r t , t h e r e was n o t 
much t o e n c o u r a g e B r i t a i n t o a d o p t a more f a v o u r a b l e a t t i t u d e 
t o w a r d A m e r i c a n p o l i c i e s o f l i b e r a l i s a t i o n . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r B r i t a i n h e r e c o n o m i c w e a k n e s s was 
a l m o s t as o b v i o u s t o t h e U . S . as I t was t o h e r . I n t h e 
memorandum w h i c h was c o n f i d e n t i a l l y p a s s e d t o t h e B r i t i s h i n 
e a r l y 19^2, P a s v o l s k y n o t o n l y u r g e d B r i t a i n t o c o n c u r I n 
U . S . e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s , b u t s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h i s was a r e a s o n a b l e 
p r i c e t o pay f o r t h e h e l p w h i c h o n l y t h e U . S . c o u l d g i v e f o r 
(1 h) 
B r i t a i n ' s p o s t - w a r r e c o v e r y . The B r i t i s h , and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e , and t h e T r e a s u r y , w e r e w e l l 
a w a r e t h a t c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e U . S . i n t r a d e and i n p u r s u i n g 
( 1 l 0 See p . 7 3 . 
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p o l i c i e s o f m u l t i l a t e r a l i s r c w e r e t h e b e s t p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
B u t t h e y w e r e n o t t h e o n l y o n e s . The B r i t i s h s t i l l h a d a t r a d e 
and m o n e t a r y s y s t e m b a s e d o n t h e E m p i r e . A s y s t e m w h i c h many 
b e l i e v e d had s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i v e l y 
q u i c k r e c o v e r y f r o m t h e s l u m p o f t h e e a r l y 1930 ' s . W i t h s u c h 
a n o p t i o n o p e n t h e y w e r e n o t p r e p a r e d t o p l u n g e h e a d l o n g a f t e r 
t h e A m e r i c a n l e a d t o w a r d s r a d i c a l d e c o n t r o l o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r a d e and m o n e t a r y e x c h a n g e s . P a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e l i g h t o f 
A m e r i c a n i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e w a r , t h e B r i t i s h b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e y 
c o u l d evade some o f t h e more s t r i n g e n t c o m m i t m e n t s w h i c h t h e 
A m e r i c a n s d e s i r e d . P u t c r u d e l y , t h e y w a n t e d t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e 
o f A m e r i c a ' s weakened b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n b r o u g h t a b o u t b y h e r 
e n t r y I n t o t h e w a r . 
The A m e r i c a n s , h o w e v e r , w e r e n o t t o b e d e f l e c t e d f r o m 
t h e i r g o a l b y t h e w a r . The w r a n g l i n g o v e r t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
I s s u e c o n t i n u e d u n a b a t e d . T h i s was n o t t o t a l l y u n e x p e c t e d b y 
t h e B r i t i s h , and i n d e e d t h e y h o p e d t h a t s u c h d i s c u s s i o n s w o u l d 
now b r i n g them some b e n e f i t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e t i d e o f e v e n t s 
i n t h e F a r E a s t was n o t s o l e l y r e s t r i c t e d t o a f f e c t i n g t h e 
A m e r i c a n s . The n o t a b l e v i c t o r i e s t h e J a p a n e s e I n f l i c t e d o n t h e 
U . K . , c o m b i n e d w i t h R o m m e l ' s J a n u a r y o f f e n s i v e i n t h e W e s t e r n 
D e s e r t , b r o u g h t B r i t a i n ' s p r e s t i g e down t o a l o w ebb i n d e e d . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e J a p a n e s e s u c c e s s e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y I n M a l a y a 
w i t h h e r t i n and r u b b e r d o l l a r e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y , w h i c h h a d b e e n 
one o f t h e l y n c h - p l n s o f t h e S t e r l i n g A r e a , s e v e r e l y u n d e r m i n e d 
t h e c o h e s i o n o f i m p e r i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The p r e f e r e n t i a l a n d 
m o n e t a r y a r r a n g e m e n t s w i t h t h e e m p i r e , w h i c h had b e e n s e e n as 
a p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t o i n - d e p t h c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h t h e U . S . 
was t h u s d a n g e r o u s l y u n d e r m i n e d ^ 1 ^ . I n v i e w o f t h i s , B r i t a i n ' s 
(15) See p . 90. 
d e c l i n i n g p r e s t i g e , and the i n s i s t e n c e o f the Americans, 
f i n a l l y v o i c e d by R o o s e v e l t , the B r i t i s h r e l u c t a n t l y f e l t 
o b l i g e d to s i g n the American v e r s i o n o f the Lend-Lease 
Agreement. 
The agreement was not however a t o t a l c a p i t u l a t i o n on 
B r i t a i n ' s p a r t . R oosevelt's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s 
took the form o f p e r s o n a l appeals t o C h u r c h i l l and f i n a l l y 
assurances t h a t p r e f e r e n c e s were not to be a b o l i s h e d p r i o r to 
c o n s u l t a t i o n s between the two and t h a t a c t i o n s on the economic 
f r o n t should be such as to be m u t u a l l y advantageous. F u r t h e r m o r e , 
th e a b o l i t i o n o f p r e f e r e n c e s was not to be c o n s i d e r e d as a q u i d 
pro quo f o r Lend-Lease, Acheson, who had been one o f the key 
U.S. n e g o t i a t o r s i n the C o n s i d e r a t i o n T a l k s was l a t e r to speak 
l i g h t l y o f t h i s f i n a l exchange o f l e t t e r s between C h u r c h i l l and 
x i o o s e v e l t . T h i s i s somewhat st r a n g e i n the l i g h t o f events i n 
1 9 ^ , p a r t i c u l a r l y C h u r c h i l l ' s A p r i l statement i n P a r l i a m e n t 
c o n c e r n i n g t a r i f f s and p r e f e r e n c e s . The l e a d i n g R e p u b l i c a n 
senator on f o r e i g n p o l i c y , A r t h u r Vandenberg c e r t a i n l y took a 
dim view o f t h i s p e r s o n a l assurance f r o m R o o s e v e l t . Not s i m p l y 
because i t o b v i o u s l y q u a l i f i e d the B r i t i s h commitment to 
a b o l i s h p r e f e r e n c e s i n A r t i c l e V I I o f the agreement, b u t 
a l s o because o f the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t o t h e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g s had 
been reached between the two l e a d e r s which might a f f e c t 
American p o l i c y . Thus the agreement was not q u i t e what 
I t appeared to be a t face v a l u e . The d i v e r g e n c e o f views 
w i t h i n the two a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s had not been c o n c l u s i v e l y 
r e s o l v e d . Both c o u n t r i e s placed d i f f e r e n t emphases on the 
agreement and indeed the i s s u e was to re-energe w i t h Law M i s s i o n 
(16) Gee Vandenberg, Cp.Cit. pp 98 -99 . 
t a l k s a t the end o f 19*0 and agai n i n Late 1 9M+ and 19^5. 
The problem i n f a c t was never s a t i s f a c t o r i l y r e s o l v e d , i n s t e a d 
i t d i m i n i s h e d i n importance f o r the U.S. because o f the s h i f t 
i n p o l i c y emphasis i n the S t a t e Department toward p r i m a r y 
concern over B r i t a i n 1 s monetary arrangements, and secondly, 
because of a more r e a l i s t i c a p p r e c i a t i o n o f B r i t a i n 1 s economic 
p l i g h t . An a n a l y s i s wnich suggested t h a t p r e f e r e n c e s alone 
would not be such a b a r r i e r to American e n t e r p r i s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
as t h e r e would be l i t t l e a l t e r n a t i v e to b u y i n g U.S. i n d u s t r i a l 
p r o d u c t s f o r many months a f t e r the end o f the war. Such a 
s w i t c h i n emphasis was t o have some s e r i o u s consequences f o r 
the B r i t i s h , 
The year 19^2, so f a r as economic p l a n n i n g oetween the 
two c o u n t r i e s i s concerned, was i n t e r e s t i n g not so much i n 
terms o f s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s b u t I n the c o n d i t i o n s which 
i n h i b i t e d the two s i d e s from c o n t i n u i n g t h e i r p l a n n i n g e f f o r t s . 
E f f o r t s which the 19^2 agreement had e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d should 
be u n d e r t a k e n e x p e d i t i o u s l y . There were, however, a number o f 
problems a r i s i n g i n 19^-2 which were to a f f e c t the c h a r a c t e r o f 
f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s and which p a r t l y e x p l a i n the reasons f o r 
d e l a y . 
19^2 saw the b e g i n n i n g o f the concern w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
monetary q u e s t i o n s . Questions which were to cause major 
.problems w i t h i n the U.S. a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The S t a t e Department, 
under H u l l , was d e termined to b r i n g about a change i n the 
economic r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s i n the post-war w o r l d . 
H u l l v i g o r o u s l y pursued a p o l i c y which would enable American 
t r a d e and overseas i n v e s t m e n t s to expand g r e a t l y i n the p e r i o d 
a f t e r the war. H i s c e n t r a l concern was thus t o break down the 
p r e f e r e n t i a l t a r i f f system o f the l a r g e s t pre-war t r a d i n g b l o c . 
However, as I have i n d i c a t e d b e f o r e , t r a d e was si m p l y one 
component p a r t o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy. With r e g a r d t o 
monetary p o l i c y , an area which n e c e s s a r i l y complemented t r a d e 
p o l i c i e s , the S t a t e Department d i d not have the f i n a l say. 
Indeed, t h i s area became dominated by Morgenthau's Treasury 
Department. T h i s l e d to much i l l - f e e l i n g between the two 
departments, b o t h on the p e r s o n a l l e v e l and over s u b s t a n t i v e 
p o l i c i e s . The Treasury cared l i t t l e f o r H u l l ' s open-door 
l i b e r a l t r a d e p o l i c i e s . T h e i r concern was t o e s t a b l i s h monetary 
s t a b i l i t y and the pre-eminence o f the d o l l a r i n w o r l d t r a d e . 
The r u t h l e s s p u r s u i t o f such p o l i c i e s by Morgenthau a f f e c t e d 
the S t a t e Department's t r a d e p o l i c i e s t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t . 
F i r s t o f a l l the Treasury on a number o f occasions o f f e r e d 
the p r o s p e c t s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i n g a g a i n s t American t r a d e i n t e r e s t s 
i f t h e r e was a s c a r c i t y o f d o l l a r s w i t h i n the S.F. This was 
c o n t r a r y t o t h e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e o f S t a t e Department economic 
p o l i c y . Secondly, Morgenthau i n c o l l u s i o n w i t h Crowley's 
F.iC.A., l i m i t e d B r i t a i n ' s r e s e r v e s to an i n o r d i n a t e l y low l e v e l , 
e s p e c i a l l y i n view o f the overseas l i a b i l i t i e s she was r a p i d l y 
a c c u m u l a t i n g . T h i s w o r r i e d members o f H u l l ' s department and 
H u l l h i m s e l f who wanted economic c o o p e r a t i o n from B r i t a i n , 
which Treasury p o l i c y might pre-empt i f B r i t a i n was unable t o 
e n t e r i n t o l i b e r a l t r a d e p o l i c i e s because o f a gross shortage 
o f r e s e r v e s . F i n a l l y , once the monetary arrangements had been v. 
concluded a t B r e t t o n Woods, Morgenthau's i n t e r e s t s moved 
somewhat away from economic i s s u e s . He now became obsessed w i t h 
h i s p l ans f o r the p a c i f i c a t i o n o f Germany and was prepared t o 
o f f e r the B r i t i s h economic h e l p t o a s s i s t i n persuading them 
t o concur i n such p o l i c i e s . At Quebec i n September )9lrh} 
Morgenthau, as H u l l put i t , gave t h e b a i t o f Stage I I Lend-Lease 
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away f o r B r i t i s h support o f h i s p a c i f i c a t i o n p l a n s . H u l l 
b e l i e v e d such b a i t should have been used to get an u n e q u i v o c a l 
3 r i t i s h pledge to a b o l i s h p r e f e r e n c e s and o t h e r r e s t r i c t i v e 
t r a d e p r a c t i c e s . A g o a l which p o i n t e d l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t the 
A r t i c l e V I I p r o v i s i o n s o f the Lend-Lease Agreement had not 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y r e s o l v e d the problems o f p r e f e r e n c e s and o t h e r 
types o f economic c o n t r o l s so f a r as the Americans were 
concerned. 
Such c o n f l i c t s between departments d i d not c r e a t e the 
s u b s t a n t i v e c o n f l i c t s o f i n t e r e s t between the U.S. and the 
U.X.j but a t times they d i d add to them and c e r t a i n l y caused 
the B r i t i s h c o n s i d e r a b l e problems. These problems c o n s i s t e d 
p r i m a r i l y o f t r y i n g to e s t a b l i s h f i r m l y wh£.t American p o l i c y 
a c t u a l l y was. T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y so i n the l a t t e r stages 
o f the war and undoubtedly c o n t r i b u t e d to B r i t i s h m i s p e r c e p t i o n s 
o f what they were, o r were not g o i n g to get o u t o f the 
Americans i n the f i n a n c i a l agreement. A f u r t h e r e f f e c t o f 
the U.S. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s f a i l u r e to c o o r d i n a t e and execute 
p o l i c y e f f e c t i v e l y r e l a t e s to Lend-Lease i n 19^5- There were 
a number o f departments i n v o l v e d and t h i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
c o m p l i c a t e d the problems. However, the S t a t e Department and 
the T r e a s u r y both l o s t o u t to a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t . Both o f 
them f a v o u r e d the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f e x t e n s i v e wartLme Lend-Lease 
t o 3 r i t a i n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y i n the c o n f u s i o n over d e t a i l , i t 
would appear t h a t b o t h R o o s e v e l t and l a t e r Truman responded 
more t o the s t r o n g and d e c i s i v e v o i c e o f m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y Leahy, t h a t Lend-Lease should be v i g o r o u s l y 
r e s t r i c t e d to m a t e r i a l d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the war e f f o r t . 
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On the B r i t i s h s i d e c o o r d i n a t i o n was b e t t e r , though t h e r e 
were some n o t a o l e d e p a r t m e n t a l c o n f l i c t s . The most s e r i o u s o f 
these c e n t r e d on the A g r i c u l t u r a l M i n i s t r y i n 19^3/"l9 LrU, I n the 
a f t e r m a t h o f the Law M i s s i o n n e g o t i a t i o n s . S t r o n g f e e l i n g s 
spread t h r o u g h o u t the Cabinet and o p i n i o n s on the m e r i t s and 
d e m e r i t s o f commercial t a l k s w i t h the Americans were p o l a r i s e d . 
So much so, t h a t C h u r c h i l l had to suspend the t a l k s f o r many 
months. A pause which was to a n t a g o n i s e the Americans to a 
marked degree. Thus b o t h sides had i n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a i problems 
and c o o r d i n a t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s , though as we have seen i n d e t a i l , 
such problems seemed to be more widespread w i t h i n the American 
adminls t r a t i o n . 
The monetary t a l k s were to be a v i c t i m , a t t i m e s , o f such 
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s , and poor communication between the two 
c o u n t r i e s . The l a t t e r aspect was sometimes d e l i b e r a t e l y f o s t e r e d 
by b o t h c o u n t r i e s to enable the development o f coherent plans 
which could then be s u b m i t t e d to the o t h e r s i d e . T h i s i d e a 
seems to have been i n evidence on b o t h s i d e s o f the A t l a n t i c I n 
t h e e a r l y stages o f the monetary t a l k s and r e s u l t e d i n two v e r y 
d i f f e r e n t plans b e i n g developed. 
The monetary t a l k s were v e r y much o f a mixed b l e s s i n g f o r 
the B r i t i s h . T h e i r , o r r a t h e r Keynes 1, o r i g i n a l hopes had t o 
be s e v e r e l y m o d i f i e d as the t a l k s p r ogressed, and d e s p i t e the 
r e s u m p t i o n o f commercial t a l k s I n l a t e 1 9 ^ , the monetary t a l k s 
were k e p t t i g h t l y c ompartmentalised on American i n s i s t e n c e . 
The U.S. i n s i s t e d t h a t the monetary t a l k s should c o n t i n u e on 
t h e l i n e s which had been adopted, and should not be s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
(17) 
i n f l u e n c e d by the r e s u m p t i o n o f w i d e r t a l k s on A r t i c l e V I I ^  ' . 
T h i s enabled the t a l k s to reach what appeared to be a s a t i s f a c t -
o r y c o n c l u s i o n a t B r e t t o n Woods, b u t the B r i t i s h were not immune 
(17) See p.236. 
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to t h e idea t h a t the I.M.F. commitments would have to be 
commensurate w i t h o t h e r commercial u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t h a t might 
be n e g o t i a t e d . One p r e c a u t i o n the B r i t i s h took a g a i n s t 
untoward developments was the I s o l a t i o n o f the problem o f 
S t e r l i n g Area accumulated balances. 
T h i s was an i s s u e t h a t was regarded as a d e l i c a t e problem 
by the B r i t i s h , and one i n which t h e y d i d not want American 
i n t e r f e r e n c e , as i t might be a make o r break Issue so f a r as 
S t e r l i n g Area economic and p o l i t i c a l cohesion was concerned. 
The r e s u s c i t a t i o n o f B r i t i s h f o r t u n e s oy 19^5 made the S t e r l i n g 
Area, once a g a i n a v i a b l e , though poor second b e s t , a l t e r n a t i v e 
t o c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h the U.S. I f B r i t a i n was f o r c e d t o 
r a d i c a l l y a l t e r her hopes o f such c o l l a b o r a t i o n , t h e n t h i s 
a l t e r n a t i v e had o b v i o u s l y to be m a i n t a i n e d . A second p r e c a u t i o n 
was the B r i t i s h i n s i s t e n c e on c e r t a i n safeguards i n the 
agreement; the most i m p o r t a n t o f which was the l e n g t h y 
t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . 
The B r i t i s h were, however, placed i n a d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n 
by c o n c l u d i n g the B r e t t o n Woods Agreement p r i o r t o agreements 
on commercial p o l i c y . Pasvolsky, and o t h e r Americans, had 
agreed t h a t a l l such agreements would have to 'hang t o g e t h e r ' , 
b u t such statements were mere reass u r a n c e s ; t h e y i n no sense 
s t i p u l a t e d how the v a r i o u s agreements were to be i n t e r -
connected. As we have seen, the commercial t a l k s themselves 
were f a r more i n c o n c l u s i v e t han the monetary t a l k s and were o f 
l i t t l e h e l p to the B r i t i s h i n the immediate post-war y e a r s . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , the f i n a l n a t u r e o f t h i s 'hanging together', was 
det e r m i n e d by concessions f o r c e d f r o m the B r i t i s h I n r e t u r n 
f o r f i n a n c i a l a i d . Thus the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d , which B r i t a i n 
had so a r d u o u s l y s t r u g g l e d f o r , was d r a s t i c a l l y reduced. 
At the i n a u g u r a l meeting o f the I.M.F. i n Savannah, Georgia, 
i n 19^6, the B r i t i s h a l t h o u g h they were the o n l y c o u n t r y to 
oppose the U.S., had to accede t o y e t a f u r t h e r m o d i f i c a t i o n 
o f the I.M.F. T h i s f u r t h e r m o d i f i c a t i o n wcs to the a c t i v e / 
p a s s i v e n a t u r e o f the Fund. American pr o p o s a l s f o r the 
management o f the Fund made i t o b v i o u s t h a t they were determined 
t o develop a more a c t i v e and more p o s i t i v e p o l i c y f o r the Fund 
t h a n had been envisaged by the B r i t i s h a t S r e t t o n Woods. I t 
was a v e r y d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n t h a n t h a t which had been 
t a c i t l y agreed to by Keynes i n r e t u r n f o r h i s abandonment 
o f p r o p o s a l s r e l a t i n g to u n i t a s . However, the c r e d i t agreement 
had n o t y e t been passed by Congress, so t h e r e was danger i n any 
f u r t h e r B r i t i s h o p p o s i t i o n on t h i s . The f i n a l ' m o d i f i c a t i o n 1 
o f B r e t t o n Woods c o n s i s t e d o f c e r t a i n d e c l a r a t i o n s by White on 
the scarce c u r r e n c y c l a u s e . 
"Very d e f i n i t e l y t h i s c o u n t r y assumes no moral 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a s c a r c i t y o f d o l l a r s .... 
... the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the c o r r e c t i o n o f the 
maladjustment i s not a u n i l a t e r a l one. I t w i l l be 
the d u t y o f the Fund to make a r e p o r t not o n l y to the 
c o u n t r y whose currency i s scarce b u t a l s o to the 
c o u n t r i e s who are e x h a u s t i n g or are u s i n g the re s o u r c e s 
o f the Fund I n a manner which I s n ot c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the 
purposes o f the Fund." (18) 
Thus c n t h r e e major i s s u e s , the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d , 
p a s s i v i t y and scarce c u r r e n c y , the U.S. was able to a l t e r the' -., 
n a t u r e o f the Fund by i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which B r i t a i n was i n no 
p o s i t i o n t o c h a l l e n g e , o r by demanding concessions f o r 
f i n a n c i a l h e l p , which B r i t a i n was i n no p o s i t i o n t o r e f u s e . 
The study o f the monetary t a l k s a l s o i n d i c a t e s the s h i f t 
i n n e g o t i a t i n g procedures which g r a d u a l l y took p l a c e i n the 
U.S. d u r i n g 19*+3. T h i s s h i f t was from c l o s e and somewhat 
(18) Quoted i n Gardner, U.K., Op.Cit. p.137. 
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e x c l u s i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the B r i t i s h to n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h 
a number o f n a t i o n s . Such t a l k s had the appearance though not 
the substance o f m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m . T h i s more t h a n a n y t h i n g e l s e 
proved the death k n o l l f o r a s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n c l u s i o n o f the 
t a l k s t o e s t a b l i s h g e n e r a l r u l e s and procedures f o r commercial 
p o l i c y . 
The B r i t i s h , as I have i n d i c a t e d b e f o r e , were prepared t o 
adopt more l i b e r a l economic p o l i c i e s and go a long way, 
v o l u n t a r i l y , to meet American demands on t h i s , p r o v i d e d t h i s 
d i d n o t f u r t h e r undermine the economic p o s i t i o n o f B r i t a i n 
which had been so weakened by the war. A v i t a l aspect o f t h i s 
need t o be r e a s s u r e d was a p o s i t i v e framework f o r t r a d e and 
commercial a c t i v i t y such t h a t t h e r e would be r e d u c t i o n s o f t r a d e 
b a r r i e r s i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s and commercial uehaviour c o m p a t i b l e 
w i t h her own. As f a r as the U.S. was concerned, the B r i t i s h 
wanted s u b s t a n t i a l a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d r e d u c t i o n s o f t a r i f f s i n 
r e t u r n f o r B r i t a i n ' s e v e n t u a l a b o l i t i o n o f p r e f e r e n c e s . 
However, by mid-1 9*+5 the Americans had made i t c l e a r t h a t t h i s 
was o u t o f the q u e s t i o n , and f u r t h e r m o r e , they a l s o adopted a 
p o l i c y o f i n s e r t i n g an escape clause even i n b i l a t e r a l l y 
n e g o t i a t e d r e d u c t i o n s . A p o l i c y which was to be l a t e r 
f o r m a l i s e d by Truman i n 19^7 by an e x e c u t i v e o r d e r . 
Such p o l i c i e s posed many problems f o r the B r i t i s h . They 
e v e n t u a l l y concurred i n the American compromise procedure o f a 
n u c leus o f n a t i o n s b i l a t e r a l l y r e d u c i n g t a r i f f s on M.F.N, b a s i s , 
b u t t h i s was s t i l l p r o f o u n d l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . The main problem 
was the c o m p l e x i t y o f such n e g o t i a t i o n s and the time r e q u i r e d 
to c a r r y them o u t . I f B r i t a i n ' s economic t r a n s i t i o n problems 
were t o be r a p i d l y overcome so t h a t she could e n t e r i n t o the 
American s p i r i t o f t r a d e l i b e r a l i s m , t h en t r a d e o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
would have to be opened up i m m e d i a t e l y and on a l a r g e s c a l e . 
B r i t a i n was not i n the c o m p e t i t i v e p o s i t i o n she had been i n 
d u r i n g the 193 c's. She had an enormous ground to make up 
s i m p l y to achieve her pre-war commercial s t a n d i n g . Thus, 
B r i t a i n was v e r y r e l u c t a n t to abandon her p r o t e c t e d empire 
t r a d i n g base, which c o u l d a c t as a source o f r e c o v e r y i n r e t u r n 
f o r t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s n e g o t i a t e d over a l e n g t h y p e r i o d o f t i m e . 
As we have seen, t h e r e were a number o f o t h e r troublesome 
commercial problems, :ror example, on a g r i c u l t u r e and s t a t e 
t r a d i n g , but t h i s was r e a l l y the crux o f the commercial t a l k s . 
Thus, a l t h o u g h the 19^5 j o i n t s t atement on commercial p o l i c y 
was regarded as s a t i s f a c t o r y , i t was s i m p l y a statement o f 
I n t e n t . There was n o t h i n g d e f i n i t e l y c o n c r e t e about i t and i n 
t h i s sense i t was a major d i s a p p o i n t m e n t f o r the B r i t i s h . The 
v a r i o u s t a l k s on economic i s s u e s were not 'hanging t o g e t h e r ' . 
The p o s i t i v e n a t u r e o f the I.M.F. was not r e f l e c t e d i n the 
commercial t a l k s . As f a r as the B r i t i s h were concerned, whatever 
r e s u l t e d from the p r o j e c t e d c o n f e r e n c e , on commercial and t r a d e 
p o l i c i e s , would be too l a t e and p r o b a b l y too piecemeal. There 
was l i t t l e or no reassurance here f o r the B r i t i s h t o commit 
themselves to the a b o l i t i o n o f the economic system based on 
s t e r l i n g and the empire and e n t e r i n t o l i b e r a l t r a d e p o l i c i e s 
advocated by the U.S. 
There was a s i g n i f i c a n t f a i l u r e on commercial p o l i c y f o r 
the B r i t i s h . I f t h e r e was no s u b s t a n t i a l complement to the 
I.M.F. i n commercial terms, t h e n t h i s i n i t s e l f was a c h a l l e n g e 
to the v i a b i l i t y o f the monetary i n s t i t u t i o n . However, t h i s 
was by no means a l l o f the p i c t u r e . The 3 r i t i s h had even 
g r e a t e r problems, as the war drew to a c l o s e , which were used 
by the Americans, d u r i n g the war, as we have seen i n 
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c h a p t e r f i v e , the Americans c o n t r o l l e d the l e v e l o f B r i t i s h 
r e s e r v e s by m a n i p u l a t i n g Lend-Lease s u p p l i e s . T h i s weakened 
B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary s t a n d i n g . F urthermore, a 
c r u e l dilemma developed. B r i t a i n ' s monetary p o s i t i o n was 
weakened by American a c t i o n s which caused s u s p i c i o n and r e s e n t -
ment among the B r i t i s h . These f e e l i n g s g r a d u a l l y developed i n t o 
deep s c e p t i c i s m r e g a r d i n g America's l i k e l y post-war p o l i c i e s . 
Over-dependence on America was seen as u n d e s i r a b l e . Thus t o 
m a i n t a i n an a l t e r n a t i v e t o i n - d e p t h c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h the U.S., 
the B r i t i s h compartmentalised the problems o f the s t e r l i n g 
b a l a n c e s . They were t o be d e a l t w i t h by B r i t a i n a lone. A l t h o u g h 
t h i s safeguarded some k i n d o f a l t e r n a t i v e f o r 3 r i t a i n , i t 
exacerbated her poor monetary p o s i t i o n . The balances were n o t 
t o be r a d i c a l l y reduced nor p a r t i a l l y l i q u i d a t e d w i t h the h e l p 
o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic I n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The p o s i t i o n o f s t e r l i n g and B r i t a i n ' s t r a d e and 
r e c o n v e r s i o n problems made I t o b v i o u s t h a t above a l l e l s e 
B r i t a i n must have some f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e i f her economy 
was n o t going to c o l l a p s e . The a b r u p t ending o f the war and 
Lend-Lease made the i s s u e even more c r u c i a l . L i b e r a l i s e d 
t r a d e p o l i c i e s and a r a d i c a l r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
exchange by the I.C.U, might have been s u f f i c i e n t to save the 
B r i t i s h economy, b u t these had been m o d i f i e d or delayed by 
the f a i l u r e to r e s o l v e s a t i s f a c t o r i l y d i f f e r e n c e s o f I n t e r e s t 
between the U.S. and the U.K. The U.K. had no a l t e r n a t i v e 
b u t to a c t as s u p p l i c a n t t o the U.S. f o r f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e . 
I t was e s t i m a t e d t h a t B r i t a i n had spent over £7j500m on 
the war e f f o r t or one q u a r t e r o f the n a t i o n ' s pre-war w e a l t h . 
I n 19 lt-5 the n a t i o n ' s imbalance between revenue and e x p e n d i t u r e 
was r u n n i n g a t £ 1 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 p.a. The B r i t i s h c ould not i g n o r e 
the p r i o r i t y o f seeking f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e . 
The Americans used B r i t a i n ' s f i n a n c i a l needs to press t h e i r 
demands f o r t r a d e and monetary l i b e r a l i s a t i o n . W i l l i a m C l a y t o n 
was l a r g e l y i n charge o f t h i s , w i t h the a d d i t i o n a l h e l p o f 
Fred Vinson from the Treasury, C l a y t o n had s h i f t e d somewhat 
from H u l l ' s p o s i t i o n , as we noted above, and thus found i t 
e a s i e r to cooperate w i t h the T r e a s u r y Department, though he 
was s t i l l more s y m p a t h e t i c toward t h e B r i t i s h on the need f o r 
adequate l i q u i d i t y f o r expanding her t r a d e . The d e t a i l s o f the 
l o a n agreement do not r e q u i r e r e i t e r a t i n g . The Americans 
pursued a p o l i c y v.'hich they b e l i e v e d would b e n e f i t them g r e a t l y 
i n economic and commercial terms. The argument t h a t Congress 
f o r c e d such a p o l i c y upon them, i s , as we have seen, s p u r i o u s . 
C l a y t o n confessed to Vinson the need to e x t r a c t such commitments 
from B r i t a i n which were embodied i n the f i n a n c i a l agreement lo n g 
( 1 0 ) 
b e f o r e the t a l k s were o f concern to Congress. 7 The repeated 
i n v o c a t i o n of C o n g r e s s i o n a l o p p o s i t i o n indeed appears to have 
been very much a b a r g a i n i n g p l o y . For example, t h e r e was 
never much t r o u b l e over Lend-Lease a p p r o p r i a t i o n s . 
l9'i-3 1 9 ^ 19^5 
(20) 
H. 3. H. 3. H. 3. 
^07 - 6 8 2 - 0 33*+ - 21 63 - 1 35W - 28 unanimous 
v o i c e v o t e . 
(19) See p.361. 
(20) House and Senate v o t i n g on Lend-Lease 
i m p r o p r i a t i o n s from 'Congressional P o l i t i c s i n 
the Second World War 1, ho land Young, Columbia 
U.P. 1956. 
As Keynes commented, the House i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the a l l e g e d 
misuses o f Lead-Lease was a damp s q u i b , f u r t h e r m o r e , LeiKi-
Lease to China c o n t i n u e d f o r many months a f t e r the end o f 
h o s t i l i t i e s d e s p i t e d e c l a r a t i o n s by the S t a t e and T r e a s u r y 
Departments on the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f Lend-Lease c o n t i n u i n g on 
any grounds o t h e r than those o f ' p r o s e c u t i o n o f the war'. 
So what was B r i t a i n l e f t w i t h a t the end o f 19^5? The 
memories o f v i c t o r y blended s o u r l y w i t h the r e a l i s a t i o n o f her 
economic p o s i t i o n . The I.M.F. co u l d r o t b r i n g about the 
r a d i c a l change Keynes had o r i g i n a l l y envisaged, and the n a t u r e 
o f the I.M.r. was i n f a c t c o n t r a r y t o many o f th-e o r i g i n a l 
a s p i r a t i o n s o f the B r i t i s h Government. The t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d 
was d r a s t i c a l l y reduced, imposing c o n v e r t i b i l i t y o b l i g a t i o n s on 
B r i t a i n f o r c u r r e n t l y earned s t e r l i n g f o r J u l y 19^7- The Fund 
was to be more p o l i t i c a l and a c t i v e than o r i g i n a l l y thought and 
the B r i t i s h escape c l a u s e , the scarce currency p r o v i s i o n s , 
could be rendered i n e f f e c t i v e by American i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
r e g a r d i n g what c o n s t i t u t e d ' a c t i n g c o n t r a r y t o the aims o f the 
Fund!. 
The whole monetary v i s i o n f o r the post-war w o r l d was 
f u r t h e r undermined by the l a c k o f a complementary commercial and 
t r a d e i n s t i t u t i o n . For the B r i t i s h the time f a c t o r here was 
c r u c i a l and i n f a c t t h e i r f e a r s were w e l l founded. Not o n l y 
r e g a r d i n g the r e v i v a l o f American p r o t e c t i o n i s m which l e d t o 
the abandonment o f the I.T.O. i n 1950, but a l s o w i t h r e g a r d t o 
the l e n g t h y n e g o t i a t i o n s which were necessary even to get the 
G.A.T.T. agreement i n t o some shape. I t was e v e n t u a l l y 
i n s t i t u t e d i n 19^7. For B r i t a i n the second major d e f e c t 
r e g a r d i n g t r a d e was her c r i t i c a l f i n a n c i a l s t a n d i n g . Here the 
U.S. took a hard l i n e . They r e f u s e d to b o l s t e r B r i t a i n ' s 
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f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n t o an e x t e n t which would r e - c r e a t e her 
f i n a n c i a l independence. The U.S. was determined t h a t B r i t a i n 
£°1 ) 
should n o t be able t o t u r n i n on h e r s e l f and t h e empire, 
f o r her economic s a l v a t i o n . Thus they r e f u s e d t o a l l o w the U.K. 
to use the d o l l a r c r e d i t t o f i n a n c e or l i q u i d a t e s t e r l i n g d e b t s . 
The c r e d i t had to be a minimum, A minimum which would enable 
B r i t a i n t o f u n c t i o n e c o n o m i c a l l y and cooperate w i t h the U.S. 
A minimum which would a l l o w B r i t a i n the s t r e n g t h to make s t e r l i n g 
c o n v e r t i b l e i n the near f u t u r e t o f a c i l i t a t e U.S. t r a d e w i t h 
the S t e r l i n g Area, b u t not enough s t r e n g t h t o stand i n d e p e n d e n t l y 
o f the U.S. A minimum which would a l l o w B r i t a i n t o r e v i v e and 
c o l l a b o r a t e I n l i b e r a l i s i n g w o r l d t r a d e w i t h o u t b e i n g too much 
o f a c o m p e t i t o r . The Americans b e l i e v e d t h a t they had indeed 
s t r u c k the n i c e balance r e q u i r e d i n the f i n a n c i a l agreement. 
The Americans b e l i e v e d t h e y had succeeded I n t h e i r 
economic p o l i c i e s . The B r i t i s h were committed to the I.M.r., 
which would be g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d by America, and to e a r l y 
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y . C o n v e r t i b i l i t y which would be accompanied by 
the a b o l i t i o n o f the d o l l a r p o o l , the b a s i s o f s t e r l i n g 
monetary d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t t r a d e w i t h the U.S. I ; i a d d i t i o n , 
B r i t a i n was committed to the e v e n t u a l a b o l i t i o n o f p r e f e r e n t i a l 
t a r i f f s and a number o f o t h e r g e n e r a l p o l i c i e s which were to be 
t a l t e n up a t the p r o j e c t e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference on t r a d e and 
commerce. At the same time the U.S. b e l i e v e d i t had ensured 
b o t h i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y and I n p r a c t i c e the dominance o f the 
d o l l a r i n world f i n a n c e s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s and had 
avoided any major commitments to l i b e r a l i s a t i c a o f t r a d e which 
would s e v e r e l y damage American domestic I n d u s t r i e s . 
(21) See p. l*-05. 
On paper the American goals seemed to have been r e a l i s e d ; 
h u t time and circumstances were to have some untoward e f f e c t s . 
The B r i t i s h r e f u s a l t o w r i t e o f f s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s , d e s p i t e a 
g e n e r a l commitment to the Americans to do so. and the d e v a l u a t i o n 
o f the U.S. c r e d i t because o f the removal o f economic r e s t r i c t i o n s 
i n the U.S. were to have i m p o r t a n t consequences. Consequences 
which were to undermine the s t a n d i n g o f s t e r l i n g . The 
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f American demands and B r i t i s h b e l i e f s concern-
i n g the n a t u r e o f American p o l i c y and the e f f e c t i t would have 
on B r i t a i n r e s u l t e d I n B r i t i s h a t t e m p t s to m a i n t a i n the S t e r l i n g 
Area as f a r as p o s s i b l e . The r e s u l t s o f the war-time economic 
n e g o t i a t i o n s were v e r y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r the B r i t i s h and t h e r e 
i s some evidence to suggest t h a t t h e y b e l i e v e d the development 
o f events would r a d i c a l l y a l t e r the r e l a t i o n s h i p s the U.S. had 
attempted to impose upon them. I t d i d not take l o n g f o r men l i k e 
R obert Bcothby to moot the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t c i r c u m stances would 
f o r c e the B r i t i s h t o r e p u d i a t e some o f the agreements e n t e r e d 
(22) 
I n t o w i t h the U.S. ' A t l e e h i m s e l f was l a t e r t o comment 5 -
" I t h i n k we had to ( i . e . accept the U.S.-U.K.. Finance 
Agreement). We weren't i n a p o s i t i o n to b a r g a i n . We 
knew the c o n v e r t i b i l i t y c l a u s e was q u i t e i m p o s s i b l e and 
would c r e a t e g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y l a t e r on and we t o l d the 
Americans so. But they wouldn't see i t and we were 
f o r c e d t o accept the f a c t t h a t w i t h o u t the c o n v e r t i b i l i t y 
c lause t h e r e would be no l o a n . " (23) 
There was indeed l i t t l e doubt t h a t the B r i t i s h were 
bludgeoned i n t o t h i s agreement. For example, D a l t o n r e c o r d s i n 
h i s memoirs how, i n the c l o s i n g stages o f the t a l k s , he began 
to" prepare a speech announcing the breakdown o f n e g o t i a t i o n s , 
(22) See Hansard, 19^6, J u l y 19, C o l . 1621. 
(23) "A Prime M i n i s t e r Remembers", W i l l i a m s , F. Heineman 1961, 
U.K. , p. 13I+. 
(2h) See D a l t o n , Op.Cit. p.SU-. 
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There i s l i t t l e need to wonder on t h i s f o r o f the f o u r minimum 
r e q u i r e m e n t s , the B r i t i s h i n s i s t e d on; (1) I.M.F. scarce 
c u r r e n c y r i g h t s , (2 ) the r i g h t o f w i t h d r a w a l f r o m the I.M.F., 
(3) the I.M.F. t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d , (K) t h a t t h e r e should be no 
c o n n e c t i o n between the f i n a n c e agreement and o t h e r areas o f 
economic concern, o n l y the former two were i n f a c t conceded by 
the U.S. 
And so, d e s p i t e repeated c l a i m s t h a t B r i t a i n would not 
e n t e r I n t o agreements which she would be unable to keep, i t 
would appear t h a t i n the end t h i s was what she was f o r c e d to do. 
The Americans, as subsequent events were to show, had o v e r -
played t h e i r hand. The i n a b i l i t y o f s t e r l i n g to countenance 
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y I n 19^7 was an ex post f a c t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f 
B r i t a i n ' s concern w i t h p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s . Though, o f 
course, some o f these untoward c o n d i t i o n s were b r o u g h t about by 
h e r s e l f i n response to f e a r s o f American p o l i c i e s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
exchange was n o t p l a c e d on a m u l t i l a t e r a l b a s i s f o r many y e a r s . 
The s o f t c u r r e n c y areas o f the B r i t i s h Empire and a l s o Western 
Europe l a s t e d f o r many y e a r s , and were i n f a c t supported by the 
Americans - though now on the grounds o f economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
c o l o u r e d by s t r a t e g i c p o l i c i e s . The Hi.P.U. f o r example was not 
wound up u n t i l 1 958• 
I t would be wrong to d i s m i s s b o t h B r i t i s h and American 
p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s as f a i l u r e s . 3 o t h c o u n t r i e s argued 
and bargained f o r t h e i r own p e r c e i v e d i n t e r e s t s . They 
compromised on many i s s u e s , and circumstances beyond t h e i r 
c o n t r o l m o d i f i e d much e l s e o f what they at t e m p t e d t o do. The 
I n a b i l i t y o f these two n a t i o n s t a t e s to f u l l y t r u s t each o t h e r 
and the c l a s h o f economic and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s r e s u l t e d i n 
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ambiguous u n d e r t a k i n g s on b o t h s i d e s and a f a i l u r e t o r e s o l v e 
the s u b s t a n t i a l problems. Consequently i n the years t h a t 
f o l l o w e d the c o m p e t i t i o n and c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t s c o n t i n u e d 
unabated. B r i t a i n c o n t i n u e d t o make d i s c r i m i n a t o r y t r a d e 
agreements, the f i r s t one as e a r l y as September 17, 19^6, w i t h 
A r g e n t i n a J , and as f e a r e d , she had to f a l l back, l a r g e l y on 
to t h e S t e r l i n g Area as a s a f e t y n e t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y the b a s i c 
weakness o f the area was to p e r p e t u a t e many p o l i t i c a l and 
economic problems f o r t h i s c o u n t r y . Over s p e c i f i c commodities, 
such as o i l , t e n s i o n s were soon to mount between the two 
c o u n t r i e s as they v i e d f o r the c o n t r o l o f raw m a t e r i a l s and 
p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . I n the l.T.G. t a l k s and l a t e r i n the G.A.T.T. 
t a l k s many o f the commercial and t r a d e problems which had been 
broached on d u r i n g the war were t o reappear once a g a i n . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , a working system o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e and 
monetary exchange was e s t a b l i s h e d . The worst c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f 
the d e p r e s s i o n years were a v o i d e d , though such r e s u l t s were 
more a t t r i b u t a b l e to M a r s h a l l A i d and o t h e r types o f m i l i t a r y 
and economic a s s i s t a n c e from t he U.S. r a t h e r than the economic 
plans o f the war y e a r s . I n b r i e f the post-war economic system 
was more ad hoc and piecemeal than i t has o f t e n been c h a r a c t e r i s e d . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , i t d i d not r e s o l v e the d i f f e r e n c e s of the two 
major a r c h i t e c t s o f post-war economic plans. N e i t h e r a i d i t 
e s t a b l i s h a n e u t r a l system of economic r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s . 
G u i d e l i n e s were e s t a b l i s h e d b u t the c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t s 
c o n t i n u e d , pursued i n the t r a d i t i o n a l manner: the e x e r c i s e o f 
p o l i t i c a l power and i n f l u e n c e . 
(25) See Snyder, D a l t o n correspondence October 31? December 17) 
19^+6, January 27 , February ^, 19^7 i n Hansard, 
February 10, 19^7, Cols. 22 - 2 ? . 
When, embarking upon a r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t one o f the main 
d r i v i n g f o r c e s must be the b e l i e f t h a t something needs c l e a r e r , 
or more comprehensive, e x p l a n a t i o n . For me t h i s was c e r t a i n l y 
the case. The l i t e r a t u r e on the area I have looked a t i s 
v a r i e d i n q u a l i t y and i n c o n c l u s i v e i n n a t u r e . S u b s t a n t i a l 
accounts o f the p o l i t i c s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
are few and f a r between and t : : i s i s so w i t h r e g a r d to the war. 
O b v i o u s l y i t i s p o s s i b l e to p i c k up s n i p p e t s o f i n f o r m a t i o n 
from books concerned more w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y . Indeed I have t r i e d to i n d i c a t e t h a t the p o l i t i c s o f 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s cannot be f u l l y understood 
o u t o f the wider p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t . The obverse o f t h i s i s , 
however, e q u a l l y t r u e . I t i s t h i s d e f i c i e n c y i n the economic 
sphere which I have t r i e d to r e p a i r . I t would be I n a p p r o p r i a t e 
here to present an e x t e n s i v e b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l a n a l y s i s , b u t I 
would l i k e t o p r o v i d e some i n d i c a t i o n o f the u s e f u l n e s s and 
m e r i t s o f a c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f the l i t e r a t u r e I have used. I n the 
f o l l o w i n g r e v i e w I do not g i v e f u l l book r e f e r e n c e s , though such 
r e f e r e n c e s may be found I n the b i b l i o g r a p h y . 
I . M. Drummond's ' I m p e r i a l Economic P o l i c y 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 3 9 ' , i s 
a p a r t i c u l a r l y good i n t r o d u c t i o n which g i v e s a d e t a i l e d p i c t u r e 
o f B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r - w a r p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s . A l t h o u g h 
Drummond i n d u l g e s i n a n a c h r o n i s t i c judgements on s u b s t a n t i v e 
economic p o l i c i e s he does c o n s t r u c t a d e t a i l e d h i s t o r i c a l 
account based on f o r e i g n o f f i c e and o t h e r government documents. 
L. C. Gardner's 'Economic Aspects o f New Deal d i p l o m a c y ' i s a 
much l e s s d e t a i l e d account, which covers the economic s i d e o f 
American f o r e i g n p o l i c y , but i t does p r o v i d e a u s e f u l i n t r o d u c t i o n 
t o a more d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f American war p o l i c i e s . 
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H u l l ' s memoirs V o l . I I , and Woodward's ' H i s t o r y o f trie 
Second World War' are two books which g i v e a more g e n e r a l 
p i c t u r e o f the f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s o f the two c o u n t r i e s . Woodward 
i n the l a t e r expanded e d i t i o n uses r e f e r e n c e s to f o r e i g n o f f i c e 
documents t o s u b s t a n t i a t e the q u i t e d e t a i l e d case he puts 
f o r w a r d . These books, i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the S t a t e Depart-
ment's F.R. p u b l i c a t i o n s and books such as Cadogan's d i a r i e s , 
Lea.hy*s a u t o b i o g r a p h y , Sherwood's work on Roosevelt and Hopkins 
and D.C.Watt's ' P e r s o n a l i t i e s and P o l i t i e s ' , p r o v i d e an 
I n t e r e s t i n g view o f some o f the most i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r s who 
appear i n the account and o f some o f the wider p o l i t i c a l and 
m i l i t a r y I s s u e s . 
So f a r as secondary source f a c t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n i s concerned, 
t h e r e are a number o f good r e f e r e n c e books. The g r e a t e s t 
w e a l t h o f i n f o r m a t i o n i s to be found i n the o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h 
C i v i l S e r i e s p u b l i c a t i o n s such as ft.S.Sayers on f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y 
and Hargreaves and Gowing on c i v i l i n d u s t r y and t r a d e . A f u r t h e r 
u s e f u l volume i s W.H.McNeil's 'America, 3 r i t a i n and R u s s i a ; t h e i r 
C o o p e r a t i o n and C o n f l i c t 1 9 ^ 1 - ^ 6 ' - From the American s i d e , 
H.A.Natter's 'Postwar F o r e i g n P o l i c y P r e p a r a t i o n 1 9 3 9 - ^ 5 '> and 
E.F.Penrose's 1 Economic P l a n n i n g f o r the Peace', are books i n 
a s i m i l a r v e i n . Tney are p r i m a r i l y f a c t u a l i n c o n t e n t , concerned 
w i t h the i n s t i t u t i o n a l make-up o f the v a r i o u s branches o f 
government t h a t p a r t i c i p a t e d i n economic p l a n n i n g and a l t h o u g h 
they p r o v i d e an i n t e r e s t i n g c a t a l o g u e o f the outcome o f 
n e g o t i a t i o n s , they r a r e l y d e l v e I n t o how such r e s u l t s came about, 
C l a y t o n ' s papers, D a l t o n ' s memoirs and Blum's account o f 
Korgenthau's wartime term o f o f f i c e p r o v i d e more d e t a i l e d 
r e a s o n i n g f o r the v a r i o u s economic p o l i c i e s and n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t 
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went on d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . However, as I have i n d i c a t e d i n 
the n a r r a t i v e , b o t h D u l t o n and Blum, on b e h a l f o f Korgenthau, 
a t times appear to be more concerned w i t h g i v i n g an a p o l o g i a 
f o r c e r t a i n a c t i o n s r a t h e r t han r e c o u n t i n g how they happened, 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , read j u d i c i o u s l y t h e y form a c r u c i a l p a r t o f the 
n a r r a t i v e . There are o f course a l a r g e number o f o t h e r 
a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l and b i o g r a p h i c a l works t h a t I have c o n s u l t e d 
and o f these J.P.Young's on the I.M.F., and the a u t o b i o g r a p h i e s 
o f Acheson and Hobbins and Harrod's b i o g r a p h y o f Keynes 
p r o b a b l y p r o v i d e the most u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n , ideas and evidence 
o f reasons on a wide spectrum o f the economic problems. 
There are t h r e e o t h e r secondary source books on which I 
should comment. The f i r s t o f these i s Kolko's 'The P o l i t i c s 
o f War 1. I have a l r e a d y made my o b j e c t i o n s t o KoLko f a i r l y 
c l e a r . However, some o f the h i s t o r i c a l evidence he p r e s e n t s to 
i l l u s t r a t e h i s t h e s i s i s o b v i o u s l y v a l u a b l e and a s u b s t a n t i a l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n toward u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e wartime r e l a t i o n s o f 
B r i t a i n and America. David Hees's book 'Harry Dexter White -
A Study i n P a r a d o x 1 , i s r a t h e r d i s a p p o i n t i n g i n i t s l a c k o f 
o r i g i n a l h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l . To be f a i r to Hees, he was 
o b v i o u s l y more concerned w i t h a k i n d o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l h i s t o r y 
o f White t h a n w i t h a d e t a i l e d h i s t o r i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n . What 
i n f o r m a t i o n he does g i v e c o n c e r n i n g the wartime n e g o t i a t i o n s i s 
l a r g e l y c u l l e d f r o m Blum and Gardner. 
The t h i r d book i s i n f a c t Gardner's ' S t e r l i n g D o l l a r 
Diplomacy'. Much o f what Gardner says i s to the p o i n t and 
a c c u r a t e . However, i n many cases he does not f u l l y s u b s t a n t i a t e 
h i s judgements c l e a r l y and t h i s a t times leads him to make 
mis t a k e s . My main o b j e c t i o n to Gardner i s s i m i l a r t o the one 
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I l e v e l l e d a g a i n s t Kolko and t h a t i s t h a t the grounds are not 
f u l l y demonstrated on which judgements are passed and on which 
the n a r r a t i v e i s c o n s t r u c t e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , the l a c k o f d e t a i l e d 
documentary r e s e a r c h has caused Gardner t o o m i t much i n f o r m a t i o n 
c o n c e r n i n g problems such as Lend-Lease and how they v i t a l l y 
a f f e c t e d B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n . He a l s o f a i l s t o see the c r u e l 
dilemma o f choice t h a t faced the U.K. The choice b e i n g between 
i n d e pth c o o p e r a t i o n v i t h the U.S. and p l a c i n g her f a i t h i n 
America responding i n a f a v o u r a b l e manner, or r e t a i n i n g an 
economic system based on s t e r l i n g and p r e f e r e n t i a l t r a d i n g . 
A l t h o u g h , i n the end, the B r i t i s h compromised, the p e r c e p t i o n 
o f the choice had a v i t a l and fun d a m e n t a l a f f e c t on 3 r i t i s h 
p o l i c y . A p o i n t Gardner l a r g e l y o v e r l o o k s . 
F i n a l l y , c o n c e r n i n g the m a t e r i a l s I have used, I must say 
something on my p r i m a r y sources. I t would be i m p o s s i b l e f o r 
me t o go through a l l the documents I have used and pass 
i n d i v i d u a l judgements on a l l o f them as to t h e i r m e r i t s and 
r e l i a b i l i t y . And y e t , i n a sense, t h i s i s what I have a l r e a d y 
done i n w r i t i n g t h i s account. As I s t r e s s e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n , 
each piece o f evidence has to be handled i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. 
Judgements about evidence depends g r e a t l y on the c o n t e x t w i t h i n 
which the h i s t o r i a n p e r c e i v e s i t . For example, judgements 
about the 'Pasvolsky Memorandum' are f a r more d i f f i c u l t to make 
th a n those on a memorandum which i s s i m p l y f o r i n f o r m i n g people 
w i t h i n the S t a t e Department o f a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f a f f a i r s . 
I n the l a t t e r case the pr i m a r y g o a l c e t e r i s p a r i b u s may be 
i n f e r r e d as b e i n g to i m p a r t i n f o r m a t i o n . I n the case o f the 
Pasvolsky Memorandum, t h e r e i s a whole spectrum o f p o s s i b l e 
p o l i t i c a l motives which could be placed upon i t . 
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Such c o m p l i c a t i o n s make judgements about the memorandum, the 
reasons f o r I t s c o m p o s i t i o n , e t c . , v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o assess. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y I f e a r t h e r e i s l i t t l e e l s e t h a t can be s a i d 
about the r e l i a b i l i t y o f source m a t e r i a l s because t h i s appears 
to be a ma t t e r o f c o n t i n g e n c i e s . Thus g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s 
are not r e a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e . 
To conclude, i t might be a p p r o p r i a t e t o suggest some 
c r i t i c i s m s o f t h i s work. F i r s t o f a l l because o f the type 
o f e x p l a n a t i o n X have adopted i t i s ex t r e m e l y complex and 
somewhat d r y . I t would be wrong to a l l e g e , however, t h a t 
I have i n d u l g e d i n an e x e r c i s e i n which one cannot see the 
wood f o r the t r e e s . I t i s a d i f f i c u l t piece o f work to read 
b u t s i m p l y because the - t r e e s are d e s c r i b e d i n g r e a t d e t a i l t h i s 
does not pre v e n t one ^rom i d e n t i f y i n g the wood. The c o m p l e x i t y 
o f the work i s r e a l l y u n a voidable as my u n d a r s t a n d i n g o f an 
h i s t o r i c a l account n e c e s s i t a t e s the d e t a i l e d study o f evidence 
and i t s i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o the n a r r a t i v e to demonstrate the 
grounds on which my judgements and the n a r r a t i v e s t a n d . 
Secondly, the t h e s i s has an obvious b i a s toward 3 r i t i s h 
sources. U n f o r t u n a t e l y the money was not a v a i l a b l e f o r me to 
t r a v e l t o the U.S. t o c o n s u l t u n p u b l i s h e d documentary evidence. 
I have compensated f o r t h i s i n two ways. F i r s t o f a l l by 
making the n a r r a t i v e p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h B r i t i s h a c t i o n s 
and r e a c t i o n s t o s t a t e d American p o l i c i e s . And secondly, I have 
t r i e d to supplement the I n f o r m a t i o n from p u b l i s h e d U.S. 
d i p l o m a t i c documents w i t h v e r y d e t a i l e d s t u d i e s o f some o f the 
admi r a b l e a u t o / b i o g r a p h i e s t h a t the American p a r t i c i p a n t s have 
produced. 
^59 
T h i r d l y , I have r e s t r i c t e d m yself to c e r t a i n types o f 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . N e g o t i a t i o n s which were concerned w i t h p o l i t i c o -
economic r e l a t i o n s , an area which I c o n s i d e r e d to have been 
o n l y i n a d e q u a t e l y e x p l a i n e d . Hcwover, t o make the c l a i m t h a t 
Anglo-American war-time r e l a t i o n s cannot be f u l l y u nderstood 
w i t h o u t l o o k i n g a t the economic d i m e n s i o n o f such r e l a t i o n s , 
poses a problem f o r myself and t h i s t h e s i s . For a l t h o u g h I 
have prese n t e d a v e r y d e t a i l e d account o f the economic d i m e n s i o n , 
I have s a i d l i t t l e about the s t r a t e g i c and more p u r e l y p o l i t i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the two c o u n t r i e s . I have on a number 
o f o c c a s i o n s made a l l u s i o n s to such developments and i n d i c a t e d 
how they a f f e c t e d t he economic t a l k s . What I have not done i s 
to demonstrate what e f f e c t s the economic i s s u e s had on w i d e r 
p o l i t i c a l and p o s s i b l y s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s and d e c i s i o n s . 
T h i s i s c e r t a i n l y a f a i l i n g o f the t h e s i s , b u t no more so t h a n 
works which have been w r i t t e n about a l l i e d d i p l o m a c y , o b l i v i o u s 
t o the u n d e r - c u r r e n t s o f the p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
T h i s t hen i s b o t h an end and a b e g i n n i n g . My work on A n g l o -
American p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s i s not e x h a u s t i v e . I t i s 
not e x h a u s t i v e even w i t h i n the a r t i f i c i a l l i m i t s I have 
Imposed. Not o n l y might f u r t h e r h i s t o r i e s be w r i t t e n on t h i s 
area which w i l l m odify and perhaps improve some o f the i n f e r e n c e s 
and judgements t h a t I have made, b u t h o p e f u l l y someone w i l l 
e s t a b l i s h how these n e g o t i a t i o n s a f f e c t e d o t h e r aspects o f the 
war. I n so d o i n g I am sure t h a t much o f what I have s a i d w i l l 
be seen i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t and a l t e r e d a c c o r d i n g l y . 3 u t now 
t h e r e i s something concrete and s u b s t a n t i a l to amend, m o d i f y 
or r e f u t e f o r the grounds on which t h i s work has been done are 
g i v e n as f a r as my c a p a b i l i t i e s o f i n t e l l e c t u a l r i g o u r p e r m i t . 
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I n t h i s sense I have brou g h t to an end the chaos o f 
c o u n t l e s s d i s c r e t e pieces o f evidence, e x i s t i n g w i t h o u t 
any r e l a t i o n s h i p s c o n n e c t i n g them t o g e t h e r . I n t h a t 
end t h e r e I s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a new u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f 
the war, o f Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s and o f much t h a t 
has a f f e c t e d the w o r l d ' s post-war i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
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